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In twinkling of an eye
1
  
And hiding the sun in sandy mist 
The gale came down with paces swift 
And cloaked the summer’s day like purple night 
Without reflection! What is dark and what is bright? 
 
W. F.Hussain (ca. 1952) 
  
  
~vi~ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
~vii~ 
ABSTRACT 
Clausewitz described military victory as a condition where the enemy‘s ability to enter 
battle, resist or resume hostilities is destroyed. The notion summarises the paradigms of 
success that preceded Clausewitz and survived through much of the 20
th
 century. Is such a 
doctrine of victory still valid? The short answer is ‗no‘; and yet, despite increasingly 
paradoxical outcomes, military planners, strategists and statesmen continually seek 
answers for their failures in variously perceived causative influences. Few question the 
validity of the Clausewitzian doctrine of victory that drove their initiatives.  
The rapid transformation in society and international culture has brought with it changes 
in geo-political and geo-economic relationships as well as warfare. While the traditional 
linkages between war and politics remain, the mechanisms driving these have altered. In 
less than ‗absolute wars,‘ it is the wider bargain and the stakes in that bargain that make 
the ‗enemy do our will‘ and not purely the opposition‘s inability to enter battle, resist or 
resume hostilities. The complexities surrounding contemporary war, diplomacy and 
strategy necessitate an organising theory to make better sense of policy and action.  
War is ultimately a violent clash of societies and its character a reflection of opposing 
cultures, history and experiences. An external dimension to strategy is thus always at work 
even if not fully recognised; as is often the case. Such un-factored influences create a sort 
of volatility in victory and defeat adding new challenges while offering opportunities at 
the same time.  Similarly, diplomacy, which invariably precedes and succeeds coercive or 
compelling use of violence, too is fettered by such external influences.  
A bivariate approach that triangulates desired ends with the opposing notions of success 
and perception of defeat is argued. The theory presented here encapsulates traditional 
precepts, adds new ones and simplifies the complexities that have come to surround 
victory in contemporary times. Offered here are some valuable ingredient to flavour any 
strategic recipe, not just war and conflict. The eternal challenge of calibrating means and 
ends needed more systematic awareness of functional and dominant domains of victory 
which, it is argued, is possible through application of simple principles. The theory 
potentially allows for a more focused, proportionate, efficient and productive use of 
power. It is hoped that strategists and analysts alike, would find here new concepts and 
tools for use in praxis, perspective planning and retrospective analyses.  
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS 
EXPLANATION OF TERMS 
3Z The abbreviation is used as a collective reference to ‗Zan, Zar – 
Zamin.‘ See also ‗Zan‘, ‗Zar‘ and ‗Zamin‘. 
Actuality: The state or fact of being ‗actual.‘
2
 In a purely metaphysical 
context, as relevant to this thesis, the definition is broadened to 
include the reality of conditions or facts in addition to the state of 
actually existing objectively. See also reality. 
 Advantage 
(Measure of 
victory): 
As a measure of degree of military success or victory measured in 
relation to the aims and objectives of the operation(s). Strategic 
advantage sits just above the level of stalemate.
3
 ‗Advantage‘ may 
not be decisive but serves policy nonetheless. See also ‗decisive 
victory‘ and ‗success.‘ 
Aggressor: Refers to an entity that consciously initiates political violence to 
achieve leverage through violence or threat of violence. The 
degree of military success is leveraged for achieving political 
aims. Aggressor(s) may be a single state, an alliance, or a non-
state group or a combination of these. 
Aggressed: The aggressed (or respondent) includes a single state, alliance, 
group or a combination of these in a state of conflict. The 
Aggressed is/are drawn into hostilities by an ‗aggressor‘ who 
presents a political bargain which the aggressed entity defers. 
Altered 
Expectation 
Argument (AEA) 
An ‗Altered Expectation Argument‘ is the impact on the notional 
Expectation Argument as a result of external factors such as 
psychological conditioning, information warfare, motivation and 
indoctrination etc. In a tactical sense, shaping the battlefields 
alters the expectation argument. 
Awareness: The ability to perceive, to feel, or to be conscious of events, 
objects or patterns. Awareness does not necessarily imply 
understanding. 
Axioms: Constitutive elements of each and every theory: basic 
assumptions, which, as it were, form the foundations of a theory, 
are regarded as ‗evident‘ (directly accessible to the human mind) 
and are no longer questioned by scientists. Axioms are hardly 
ever made explicit in social science theories. An axiom would be, 
for example, the assumption of decision-making approaches that 
human beings behave rationally or that they all have certain 
interests, which they follow openly or subcutaneously in their 
political behaviour.
4
 
Calculus: The term is used in this work to denote nonmathematical 
decision-making criteria: a nonmathematical evaluation, 
estimation, or computation. 
~xviii~ 
Cognitive 
Dissonance: 
Two cognitions are said to be dissonant if one cognition follows 
from the opposite of another.
5
  
Common 
Expectation 
Argument (CEA) 
See first High Expectation Argument (HEA) and Low 
Expectation Argument (LEA). A CEA represents a notion of 
evenly matched belligerents.  
Conflict: A disagreement through which the parties involved perceive a 
threat to their needs, interests or concerns. Such a conflict can 
exist between friendly and cooperative groups. 
A more security related explanation is a clash of political, 
ideological or economic interests between two or more groups.  
Conflict 
Termination: 
Conflict terminates when the parties involved no longer present a 
threat to each other‘s interests OR when one side permanently 
abandons, regresses or accommodates the other party / parties 
such that they no longer pose a threat. 
Capitulation: See reversal. 
Cultural 
Dissonance: 
Cultural dissonance is often defined as social cognitive 
dissonance (see cognitive dissonance). It occurs when social 
groups of people collectively experience cognitive dissonance, 
and respond by generating false or mythological explanations. 
The greatest dissonance occurs in the most politicized issues.  
Expectation 
Framework (EF) 
Used as an organising framework for Expectation Arguments, see. 
IEA, EEA, HEA, LEA, CEA and AEA.  
External 
Expectation 
Argument (EEA) 
The EEA represents the expectational position of entities other 
than the belligerents. 
Effectual 
Strategic 
Environment: 
The operative influential elements and aspects of the environment 
connected to the ‗friction – change‘ dynamic of the regional-
domestic order, the international system in general and influential 
powers in particular that are affected by volatility or changes in 
the international system. 
High Expectation 
Argument (HEA) 
HEA represents a general notion of positive outcomes of a 
conflict situation as held by particular influence group. Such a 
group is likely to develop a sense of disappointments or failure 
when the expected (high) outcomes are not met.   
Face Validity: The extent to which a measure looks valid to the ordinary person. 
Face validity has nothing to do with scientific validity.
6
 
Face validity is concerned with how a measure or procedure 
appears. Unlike ‗content validity‘, face validity does not depend 
on established theories for support. 
~xix~ 
Globalisation: The term is used with reference to the acceleration and 
intensification of mechanisms, processes, and activities that 
promote global interdependence. It is a concept that involves the 
‗deterritorialisation‘ of social, political, economic, and cultural 
life.
7
 
General Case: Used in reference to the nature of war as perceived by either 
belligerent. The general case implies that the magnitude of the 
threat to either side does not entail the very survival of the 
threatened entity. In other words, the objective is compellence, 
coercion or deterrence and not annihilation. 
High Expectation 
Argument (HEA) 
HEA suggests a general perception where unfavourable outcome 
– by way of military or political defeat – is expected for the entity 
to which a high expectation is attached. 
Illusory 
Correlation: 
An illusionary correlation exists when there is no relationship (a 
zero correlation) between two variables, but a relationship is 
perceived to exist by some.
8
 For example, the notion of negative 
correlation between Victory and defeat. 
Impinged 
Entities: 
 
Impinged entities include those directly affected. Such entities 
may or may not have an active role in fighting and those that join 
on either side not in pursuit or defence of a common political aim 
but their own separate interests. 
Intermediate 
Objective: 
An objective other than the main which either paves the way for 
the final objective or must be captured to allow manoeuvre to 
develop towards the final objective. 
Internal 
Expectation 
Argument (IEA) 
IEA represents how an instrument of power notionally visualises 
its own end state when applied in a given conflict environment. 
An IEA, like EEA and AEA, is itself represented as High, Low or 
Comm. 
Levels of War:
9
 The British interpretation of the levels of war, as elaborated in the 
British Defence Doctrine
10
, is used throughout the thesis. These 
include: 
The Grand Strategic Level: The full use of issues associated with 
the maintenance of political independence and territorial integrity 
and the pursuit of wider national interests. 
The Military Strategic Level: This is the military component of 
grand strategy. The two are collectively referred to as ‗strategic 
level‘. 
The Operational Level: The level at which campaigns are 
planned. It links military strategy to tactics. 
The Tactical Level: The level at which war-fighting actually takes 
place. It is the art of disposing forces for battle. 
Low Expectation 
Argument (LEA): 
A LEA implies a general perception where unfavourable outcome 
– by way of military or political defeat – is expected for the entity 
to which a low expectation is attached.  
~xx~ 
Market State: The emerging constitutional order that promotes maximising the 
opportunity of a people, tending to privatise many state activities 
and making representative governments more responsive to the 
market.
11
 
Military Strategy: The art of developing and employing military forces consistent 
with grand strategic objectives.
12
 
Multivariate: Having or involving a number of independent mathematical or 
statistical variables. 
Nation State: A nation state is a sovereign entity dominated by a single nation
13
 
and claims sovereignty over a fixed territory.
14
 It is distinguished 
from other forms of state structures by its emphasis on a defined 
territory and the degree of organisation required to manage that 
territory.
15
   
Negative 
Correlation: 
This a relationship between two variables in which the variables 
tend to change in opposite directions—when one is high or 
increases, the other tends to be low or decrease.
16
 
Notional 
Assessment 
Factor (NAF) 
NAF indicates the relative variance between what victory or 
defeat is perceived to be among the belligerents. It is the 
condensed influence of a number of factors such as the nature of 
war, the political object, culture, history etc. It is not a 
mathematical coefficient but a notional argument. All belligerent 
develop a notional framework built around the standalone value 
attached to the 3Zs or their cumulative interplay. Understanding 
an opposition‘s NAF would theoretically allow attainment of the 
required political leverage towards satisfying own perception of 
victory though a more accurate calibration of violence and effects. 
The concept can be applied to inform planning ante and in bellum.     
Observers: Observers are entities that are either marginally influenced or 
totally unaffected by a state of violence between two belligerents. 
Observers take no part in the conflict except in the capacity of 
representing the international community and its responses.  
OODA Loop: The fundamental and cyclic decision making process ‗observe‘ - 
‗orientate‘ - ‗decide‘ – ‗act‘ as introduced by Lt Col John Boyd, 
USAF (1927-1997).
17
 
Operational Art: The skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic goals 
through the design, organisation, integration and conduct of 
campaigns or major operations.
18
 
Paradigm: ‗A commitment to the same rule or standard‘.
19
 A general 
consensus so taken for granted as to be unconscious or even 
ideological.  
Perception: It is the process of attaining awareness or understanding of 
sensory information. From Latin percepio, meaning ‗receiving, 
collecting, action of taking possession, apprehension with the 
mind or senses.‘20  
~xxi~ 
Pre-theory or 
Pre-theory: 
A pre-theory is a conceptual exploration designed to identify and 
observe relationships in a field of inquiry carefully, then to 
formulate organising principles and testable theories. It may be 
used to develop new and rudimentary ideas regarding political 
phenomena or to classify procedures and methods of research and 
analysis.
21
  
Positive 
Correlation: 
This is a relationship between two variables in which both tend to 
change in the same direction—when one increases; the other also 
tends to increase.
22
 The proportion of change may or may not be 
linear. 
Post-positivism Multi-perspective triangulation as opposed to empiricism.
23
 
Quid nominis and 
quid rei: 
Quid nominis (Latin: what the name says) and quid rei (essence of 
the thing). ‗A purely nominal definition is just a licence to 
abbreviate and raises no special problems; but a real definition 
postulates the existence or at least the possibility of   that which is 
defined and therefore requires justification‘.24 Quid rei is the 
thing's ‗quiddity‘ whereas quid nominis is the quiddity of the 
name. 
A logical approach to explaining ‗quiddity‘ was presented by 
Saccheri (1667- 1733), a mathematician and philosopher. 
According to Sacchari, a definition quid nominis becomes a 
definition quid rei ‗by means of a postulate, or when we come to 
the question whether the thing exists and it is answered 
affirmatively.‘ Definitions quid nominis are in themselves quite 
arbitrary, and neither require nor are capable of proof; they are 
merely provisional, and are only intended to be turned as quickly 
as possible into definitions quid rei ‗by means of certain 
postulates of existence or constructions and by means of 
demonstrations or when we come to the question whether the 
thing exists and it is answered affirmatively.‘25 
Realpolitik: Politics based on practical and material factors rather than on 
theoretical or ethical objectives.
26
 
Respondent: See ‗aggressed‘.  
Reversal: 
(Measure of 
Victory) 
Reversal is a large scale setback for an ‗aggressor‘. It is 
distinguished from failure by the significant leverage acceded to 
the opposition. When used in the context of the aggressed, the 
term capitulation implies a general collapse. 
Success (Measure 
of victory): 
The middle tier in a three-level view of relative military 
achievement namely strategic victory, success and advantage.
27
 
See also decisive victory and advantage. 
~xxii~ 
Threat, 
Categories of : 
 
A first degree threat is one where the very existence or continued 
existence in a form desired by the threatened party is at stake. A 
second degree threat is where the core interest of the threatened 
entity is at stake however; its existence is not at risk. A third 
degree threat is where the ante includes peripheral interests or 
where a first or second degree threat to an important ally is 
present. 
Tugged Entities: These are such groups that are drawn into a conflict as a result of 
treaty arrangements, secondary interests, moral obligation or any 
other causation that does not include self-defence, active or latent 
national objectives. 
Victory (Measure 
of): 
See ‗decisive victory‘, ‗success‘ and ‗advantage‘. 
War: It is ‗an armed conflict between two or more parties, usually 
fought for political ends.‘28 The use of violence between 
organised groups aimed at achieving definable politico-military 
objectives directly–through  war-fighting–or  through gaining 
sufficient leverage by military and / or other means for favourable 
post war bargaining.  
Warfare: The conduct of war through use of military and/or other means. 
The term has at places been used to qualify an activity undertaken 
to weaken or destroy the opposition – for example economic 
warfare, psychological warfare, cyber warfare etc.  
Zamin:  Territory seen as space, lebensraum, growth and expansion.  
Zan: The ideological, cultural and political value of objectives of 
war/conflict; for example, territory seen as ideological space. 
Zar: Voracity: wealth, resources, markets as motivation for conflict / 
war. 
Zero Correlation: A zero correlation explains the condition when there is no 
apparent linear relationship between two variables.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AEA Altered Expectation Argument 
C
2
 Command and Control
30
 
C
4
I
2
SR Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Information, 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.
31
  
CEA Common Expectation Argument 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
EA Expectation Argument (See also HEA, LEA, CEA and AEA) 
EEA External Expectation Argument 
EF Expectation Framework 
G7 / G8 Group of seven industrialised countries: Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the United States. Also known 
as the Haley Group. G8 is G7 plus Russia.
32
   
HEA High Expectation Argument 
HIC  High Intensity Conflict  
IW Irregular Warfare 
LEA Low Expectation Argument 
LIC Low Intensity Conflict 
MAD Mutually Assured Destruction
33
 
MOOTW Military Operations Other Than War 
NAF Notional Assessment Factor or Framework 
OODA Observe – Orient – Decide – Act 34 
P.B.U.H Peace Be Upon Him (a traditional Islamic sufficx to the names of 
the prohpets) 
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RMA Revolution in Military Affairs
35
 
UK United Kingdom (used synonymous with Great Britain at places) 
UN United Nations 
US United States, United States of America 
USA United States of America 
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
36
 
WW I World War I 
WW II World War II 
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CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND AND 
METHODOLOGY 
Appearances to the mind are of four kinds. Things either are what they appear 
to be; or they neither are, nor appear to be; or they are, and do not appear to 
be; or they are not, and yet appear to be.
1
 
Epictetus (AD 55–AD 135) 
SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION 
he outcome of a competition, a duel or an engagement is generally reflected in 
terms of shades of success or failure for example, a victory, a defeat, or 
something in between. The latter is usually referred to as a draw, if it is a single 
identifiable battle or, if protracted, a stalemate. In its everyday use, the word ‗victory‘ is 
easy to comprehend as it generally corresponds to its synonyms: success, attainment, 
ascendancy, or triumph. However historically, the question of identifying winners and 
losers has never found entirely straightforward answers. The Second World War, the Cold 
War and its proxy conflicts such as Vietnam for example, point to a dualistic, even 
paradoxical usage the word. When applied in the context of the ‗war‘ against terrorism or 
the struggles of states and peoples fighting for their identity, ideology or very survival, 
different perspectives and interpretations of physical and metaphysical dimensions of 
victory emerge. Perception of victory and defeat also appear to directly influence the 
process of attaining the former while avoiding the latter. For any party to a conflict, 
leverage – the very purpose of coercive and compelling strategies – is intimately tied to 
the opposing subjective and encultured notions of victory and defeat.  
We know from the experiences of the 20
th
 century and what we have seen of the current  
one (21
st 
), that wars do not end the way they did for the great captains of the classical age 
or the relatively recent champions of the modern era.
2
 Victory is not as simple to 
construe, describe, define, convey, internalise or externalise as it perhaps was in the past  
and is even harder to achieve politically even if attained militarily.  
Success has many faces. Some clear and familiar, while others not so obvious and yet 
more that are even paradoxical to the physical outcome. Victory and defeat, while 
vaguely acknowledged in all their complexity, are accepted in rather simplistic and often 
abstract terms. Given the subjectivity of the process – that is to say strategy, to the 
T 
Chapter I—Introduction, Background and Methodology 
~2~ 
objective notion of victory – such assumptions are a potential recipe for wider unintended 
fallouts and even political and social disaster. It is argued that at the political level where 
policy is formed and action shaped, subjective, notional and in many ways volatile 
precepts of winning and losing that emerge constitute a major influence on policy, one 
that should never be ignored.  
Any society or organised group that is in conflict with another generally seeks success 
according to its own understanding of what such success might mean. This, history tells 
us, has been the general way of things. This ‗internalised‘ view of victory, non-victory 
and defeat combined with optimism in one‘s capability as matched against that of the 
opposition has caused conflicts to erupt into wars, shaped the course of wars, set the 
desired goals for the use of coercive and compelling instruments of power, helped define 
the nature and choice of ends and indeed also the strategic choices in war initiation and 
war termination. 
The opportunity to address these substantive issues and arrive at a better understanding of 
the notion and definition of victory and to present a theory thereof was indeed alluring. 
The decision to take-up the challenge and commit to a doctoral research however, finds 
its origins in the encouragement received from Prof. Christopher Bellamy who, when the 
topic was proposed for an MSc thesis, identified its merits for PhD. My preliminary 
research, and later, the survey of literature revealed that the field of study, in its 
dimension and scope as admitted in this inquiry, was in fact largely unaddressed.   
SECTION 2: BACKGROUND  
WHY DOES ‗VICTORY‘ NEED A THEORY AND DEFINITION? 
This research is motivated by the need to identify the condition beyond the frames and 
images of victory and defeat that are presented in historical accounts, literature, the 
media, by leaders, politicians and even societies in self-credit for their achievements. A 
historical analysis of the pursuit of victory suggests that the nature of victory sought, its 
dynamics and the paradigms shaping it govern – in a proactive sense, and shape – in a 
passive context, the conflict continuum. In turn, this influences the ways, as also, the 
means adopted to realise the desired ends of policy.  If this thesis holds even partially, the 
consequences are profound. Both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz caution strategy and policy to 
understand the broader ambit of any military adventure. Sun Tzu argues that ‗weapons are 
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tools of ill omen. War is a grave matter; one is apprehensive lest men embark upon it 
without due refection.‘3 Clausewitz, echoes a similar warning ‗no one starts a war – or 
rather, no one in his senses ought to do so – without first being clear in his mind what he 
intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is the 
political purpose; the latter its operational objective.‘4 Arguably, neither Sun Tzu, nor 
Clausewitz would object if we were to draw a direct relationship between what is to be 
achieved from violence and how that ought to relate to success by way of advancing 
policy. Clearly, ‗Victory‘ as it applies to nations, states, military campaigns and more 
importantly, the course of politics, is not merely a word defining an ‗outcome‘; rather, it 
takes the relevance of a term describing a ‗condition‘ which is part of a larger ‗process‘ 
drawn through time, space and cultural change.  
Contemporary definitions of victory tend to relate to a comparative or competitive 
calculus of outcome as opposed to linking these with the purpose, utility, sustainability 
and effects of victory. Some common definitions are:  
 The defeat of an enemy in battle, or of an antagonist in any contest; a gaining of 
the superiority in any struggle or competition; conquest; triumph; - the opposite of 
defeat.
5
 
 The overcoming of an enemy or antagonist; achievement of mastery or success in 
a struggle or endeavour against odds or difficulties.
6
 
 A conquest gained: success against an opponent.7 
The explanations vary from antonym of ‗defeat‘ to various degrees of success 
(superiority, triumph or conquest). It is also seen as a relative condition between two or 
more opponents wherein there are winners and losers. A point made by many theorists 
and writers on the notion of victory in warfare is that there has been relatively little direct 
research on the subject. This will be evident from Chapter II, where the relevant literature 
is analysed. Victory, as our sampling of definitions and meanings shows, is seen and 
perceived in a linear, straightforward light. There appears to be little more said beyond 
the fact that the victorious party takes the spoils and the world is divided up into winners 
and losers. This research shows that victory in war and success that should accrue from 
such a victory is often divorced in the complex global environment. Could a more 
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structured understanding of the notion of victory within a broad theory of victory allow 
strategists to manage fallouts? The answer is an emphatic ‗yes‘. 
In the absence of theory, a learning process begins with the very first line of operation 
adopted by the revisionist to attain their political objectives. With learning and action 
going along side by side, hostilities have a tendency to prolong as each side adjusts to the 
fluctuating goalposts until at least one of the belligerents learns to relate military effects 
with the nature of leverage that the military instrument offers for political utility. We find 
that actions of statesmen and military commanders in pursuit of political leverage and 
military success are governed by the peculiar prevalent notions and paradigms of victory 
as held by that particular society or group. This notion may be asymmetric, that is to say, 
not common or shared in form or perception as embraced by the other side. Furthermore, 
belligerents may not necessarily enter into a conflict for entirely the same reason or with 
opposing perceptions or ‗ends‘. Relative suppositions of objectives – the notion or 
‗situational-subjective‘ definition of victory – may also differ to the extent of lacking any 
similarity. This relativity of meaning, within a given society, is due largely to changes in 
that society and how historical events are placed in the modern perspective.  
Questions about the meaning of victory have been asked across a wide range of interests 
and disciplines: from the military perspective to psychological, political and philosophical 
perspectives and in its temporal dimension to an abstract, undefined vision – the victory 
awaited. In all its forms, the notion of victory has shaped human endeavours towards its 
attainment. This was manifested most intensely in the war-termination phase of WWII. 
With German and Japanese military defeat inevitable, the events during the last phase of 
the war were more indicative of what the allies perceived as victory as opposed to where 
the opposition believed itself to have conceded defeat.  
It has become increasingly important to understand the meaning, effects, implications and 
indeed the place of military victory in the contemporary world. Tools that assist in 
predicting the effects of victory need to be developed with regard to the intersection 
between military action and national and international policy making. Accordingly, the 
domestic political agenda can determine the meaning of victory and what indicators one 
voices. This can, in turn, influence the conduct of the war. Secondly, the study of victory 
also relates the need, in the final assessment, to take into account the implications of 
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victory. Both these areas are to be seen from the military view of victory as well as the 
social and political aspects of it.  
The social impact of victory or defeat is another area that has gained prominence 
particularly after the Vietnam War.  The role of media and its influence on society in 
assessing victory – this includes the media‘s criticism or promulgation of ideologies of 
victory – has long term and strategic consequences.  For example Dick Polman, a political 
columnist at the Philadelphia Inquirer, writing for the Tribune news Service in September 
2001 identified that while the then US President Mr Bush remained determined to win the 
first war of the 21
st
 century, and that ‗it's clear that most Americans want to flex military 
muscle in pursuit of victory, the problem is that administration officials and foreign 
policy analysts can't agree on what victory is.‘ 8 He argues that Americans ‗...can't agree 
on an answer to the most fundamental questions: How do we know when we've won? Or 
if we've won at all?‘9 Such predicaments can be found echoing in other parts of the world 
too. Such voids in understanding success are far too frequently and far too frequently 
filled through all the wrong means.  
The nature of modern society and the prevailing international environment compels a 
review of the perception of success and failure and forces us to reassess the nature of 
military, political and psycho-social victory. Yet, despite a large amount of research in 
recent years (since 2004), no wholesome or conclusive theory has emerged. William C. 
Martel, the author of Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy (2007), 
finds that ‗despite the vast literature on strategy and war, we do not have any clearly 
defined theory, set of concepts, or language of victory‘ he further amplifies that ‗although 
the problem of victory is of immense importance, the language used to describe victory 
consists largely of terms whose usage is imprecise.‘10  
Such is the backdrop in which this research finds its origins, relevance and motivation. In 
objective, synthesis and approach, this research is charting relatively new territory.  
AIMS, OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE 
AIMS 
The thesis has two broad aims: 
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1) to define victory as it relates to the synthesis of the politico-military and socio-cultural 
dimensions of war, 
2) to develop a theory of victory and identify its influences on and diplomacy.  
In addition to the above, as natural spill-over, the research also provides a useable 
framework and the essential tools for leadership, strategists and military commanders in 
the making of strategy and its execution as well as for  scholarship and students of 
political science, international relations and military history for post analysis. 
OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE 
In terms of purpose, this thesis can best be described as a simultaneous inductive and 
abductive handling of data addressing the research questions. Expressed schematically as 
two loops, a figure of ‗eight‘ that intersect in the middle as expressed in Figure 1 below: 
FIGURE 1: OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE 
(AUTHOR‘S OWN DIAGRAM) 
  
In the first loop, through an inductive process, a generalised concept of victory, elements 
of victory and the relationship among the elements is established. In the second abductive 
loop, ‗phenomena‘ are explained through hypotheses. From verified hypotheses a theory 
is generated. The understanding and definition of victory is then taken to the level where 
it‘s utility towards informing policy and strategy is discussed. The thesis, therefore, 
extends into the development of an objectively framed, scenario-based concept for the 
purpose of war from the standpoint of an ever-evolving paradigm of victory.  
Chapter I—Introduction, Background and Methodology 
~7~ 
‗No one has unique access to a trustworthy crystal ball‘11 and prediction, in meaning, 
scope or context comes with inherent pitfalls. This thesis is not predictive as far as 
warfare is concerned but does look at the evolving and ever changing environment in 
which war occurs.
12
 It does not seek to predict or present the nature and character of 
future war in the military technical context. Rather, it looks at the ever changing 
environment in which war and operations ensue whether they are technically charged or 
primitive, and what ends such operations would or should seek to attain. 
In everyday life, solutions are often a function of how one decides to frame a problem. 
Inversely, ‗the choice of the problem‘ in Margaret Mead‘s words ‗dictates both our choice 
of classification and our point of view – our intellectual stance.‘13  This thesis argues that 
a political objective when interfaced with the notion of victory may suggest a different set 
of strategies and choices as opposed to allowing war‘s inherent tendencies and 
mismatched political objectives from guiding choices and action. 
In terms of temporal scope and value, the study uses evidence of the past, speculative and 
critical historiography,
14
 to inform the present and ‗predict‘ a future course or trend. 
While some of the data admitted in the research dates to the earliest recorded events and 
battles, the notion of victory and its evolution is traced from modern
15
 to contemporary 
times. The future applicability of the emerging paradigms is built around tools for 
‗contemplative reflection‘ as opposed to ‗prescriptive theorisation‘ and therefore not 
restrictive in temporal scope of application. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
‗What is victory?‘ This simplistic enquiry constitutes the primary focus reflected in the 
three broad aims and objectives. Satisfying the scope and depth defined, focuses the 
research in three broad subcategories namely, the military dimension of victory, the 
psychosocial enquiry and political context that is invariably a combination of the two.   
The study is steered by a number of subordinate enquiries, namely: What are the 
components of victory; to what extent and measure have these individual elements 
contributed to the broader notion of victory? How have victory and defeat been perceived 
and manifested in international relations? What is the impact of globalization and the 
‗market order‘ on international politics and how might internal and international conflicts 
under the obtaining and projected environment impact the nature, scope and direction of 
military operations and, in turn, the desired end-state? What is the linkage between 
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military and political victory and how does this relationship inform the art and science of 
war-termination? What roles have belief systems, socio-political and cultural paradigms 
played in shaping the notion of victory? Have such perceptions remained absolute, and if 
not, what were/are their dynamics and the drivers? Is victory an enduring notion or do its 
precepts and perceptions change over time? How volatile is the change in the notion of 
success or failure during the course of war and conflict as well as after the hostilities have 
ended? And last, does a better understanding of the paradigms of victory serve any 
practical purpose for polity and the military in the higher strategic direction of war and 
for setting the conceptual contours of military operations?  
THE THEORETICAL POSITION AND RELEVANCE OF THE THESIS 
The nature of this inquiry spans several disciplines within the broad ambit of social 
sciences. In terms of input, predominantly resting in the domain of political science, 
strands of several sub-disciplines are synthesised; these include:  international relations, 
war studies and strategic studies. History – more specifically military history, sociology 
and cultural studies are the other three sub-disciplines that this work spans. In terms of 
output, the thesis narrows down to political and military conflict, the domain of war and 
strategic studies as illustrated in Figure 2: 
FIGURE 2: THE THEORETICAL POSITION OF THE THESIS 
(AUTHOR‘S OWN DIAGRAM) 
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POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
The thesis aims to define and present a theory of Victory as it applies to the political and 
military dimension of war. The research questions are seminal enquiries that largely 
remain unanswered in literature. Through an analysis of how the notion of victory has 
influenced statecraft and the conduct of war in the past, the future course of international 
conflict, war, warfare and war-fighting will be determined. As such, albeit decidedly 
theoretical, in application this thesis has a predominantly practical focus and is intended 
to provide tools for better orientation at the operational, strategic and grand-strategic 
levels of competition in general and war and conflict in particular. These are tools that 
can help make better sense of the chaos that surrounds war and strategy in the absence of 
sound theory. 
SECTION 3 – METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH METHODS 
This is a qualitative research built around secondary analysis of data. The term qualitative 
research is applied variously in different fields.
16
 In the social sciences, qualitative 
research provides an approach for understanding the world and to construct meaning out 
of experiences. Epistemologically qualitative methods are not intended to invent a 
viewpoint; instead, they only attribute ideas in order that we can truly understand 
motives, reasons and actions.
17
 Defining or redefining victory through a process that 
involves reattribution of new ideas from existing data and facts, abating existential 
position premised on apparently exhaustive analysis and generating theory from within is 
a challenge this research, as indeed that of many social scientists, confronts.  
THE NATURE OF THE STUDY 
Philosophically, this study deals with theorising the condition and process of victory. 
Subjectively however, the abductive epitome of victory and the ‗practitioner‘s‘ notions 
also need to be synthesised towards developing theory. Essentially, this ‗back to front and 
back‘ approach put to question the applicability of common qualitative research methods; 
thus, a tailored approach had to be adopted.  
WHY GROUNDED THEORY? 
A new perspective for social sciences research was established by Barney Glaser and 
Anselm Strauss. For over three decades, Grounded Theory has been progressively 
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developed and is currently considered to be one of the most comprehensive qualitative 
research methodologies available.
18
 The emphasis on explaining phenomena though 
theorising and hypothesising sits as the core of Grounded Theory and is as such the most 
suited approach for the nature of this inquiry. Grounded Theory is not discipline specific, 
is adaptable and its product verifiable. A good Grounded Theory is one that is:  
 inductively derived from data,  
 subjected to theoretical elaboration, and  
 judged adequate to its domain with respect to a number of evaluative criteria.  
Although developed for and principally used within the field of sociology, Grounded 
Theory can be, and has been, successfully employed by researchers and scholars in a 
variety of different disciplines as diverse as education, medicine, psychology and political 
science. Glaser and Strauss do not regard the procedures of Grounded Theory as 
discipline specific and encourage researchers to use and adapt the procedures for their 
own disciplinary purposes.
19
 Further explanation is contained in Appendix A. 
APPLICATION OF GROUNDED THEORY APPROACH 
This research is underpinned by an adapted grounded theory approach. However, the 
exhaustive data-handling procedures found in grounded theory are not fully applied. The 
digression finds its logic in the fact that this research is principally based on secondary 
analysis and does not contest the validity of these data except where indicated. Most data 
used was already axially and selectively coded. New data generated falls in the domain of 
generated theories thus falls in the realm of product rather than the process and is 
therefore outside the data management protocols of grounded theory. With this premise, 
demonstration of data-handling and its progressive coding was considered unnecessary 
and would have greatly reduced the readability of the text without adding value to the 
arguments presented.  
RESEARCH DESIGN 
A good research design is essential for focused research and works like ‗glue that holds 
the research together.‘20 It structures the research and shows ‗how all of the major parts of 
the research project - the samples or groups, measures, treatments or programs, and 
methods of assignment - work together to try to address the central research questions.‘21 
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Research designs are intimately linked with the nature of data admitted. These range from 
experimental research designs, quasi-experimental designs to non-experimental designs. 
In Designing Social Inquiry, G. King et. al. point out that Positivism and verifiability 
require obviating some and precluding other possible approaches, a research design that is 
too strictly curtailed raises its own set of hazards.
 22
  
In establishing valid, verifiable and sufficient open coded data, a ‗twin looped‘ design has 
been adapted as alluded to earlier in Figure 1. The inductive loop was applied where 
sufficient data and its attendant parameters were available whereas an abductive loop (the 
best shot solution) applied where certain amount of hypothesising was necessitated. 
Figure 3 illustrates the design: 
 
FIGURE 3: THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
(AUTHOR‘S OWN DIAGRAM) 
 
An inherent flexibility accrued from this process that allowed data collection to remain 
open-ended; a basic necessity for a thesis that seeks to look into unchartered territory. 
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DATA FLOW AND INTRA-CHAPTER RELATIONSHIP 
The processing and flow of data through the thesis is non-linear as would be expected in a 
grounded theory approach. The type of data generated, the processes involved and its 
structure and flow from chapter to chapter is illustrated in Figure 4 below: 
FIGURE 4: DATA INPUT AND FLOW 
(AUTHOR‘S OWN DIAGRAM) 
 
In the context of data flow, the thesis can be seen to be divided in three parts (note that 
such subdivision is not been formally used.) In the above diagram, the arrow heads 
(hereafter referred to as links) indicate linkage and process whereas the boxes denote the 
content of the chapters and the function of each chapter as a node for data coding. Coded 
data refers to axially coded information. The literature survey provides an initial sampling 
of data for inclusion (blue arrows labelled raw data source). Open coding is carried out in 
Chapter II and III. Simultaneously the process of initial hypothecation and some degree of 
axial coding commences (red arrows labelled ‗Coded Data‘, yellow arrows labelled 
‗Hypothesis‘ and blue outline arrows labelled ‗Thesis‘.) 
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A synthesis of data is carried out in Part 2 where selectively coded date is generated. This 
manifests itself in the form of pre-theories (black outline arrows), theses (blue outline 
arrows) and syntheses (red outline arrows). The process is concluded in Part 3 where the 
theory is generated from the selectively coded data produced in Part 2. 
ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is divided over eight chapters:  
Chapter 1 introduced the topic, set the background and while elaboration the aim, scope 
and objectives, identified the research questions. It also succinctly explained the 
theoretical foundation and methodology for the research. A more detailed explanation of 
the methodology is contained in Appendix A. 
A general survey of literature with a detailed analytical review of selected literature is 
presented in Chapter II. The chapter also serves to refine the research questions. Arguably 
an extension of the literature review, Chapter III explores war in the context of the space 
in which it occurs. The utility of the instrument and its application are discussed. The 
chapter essentially binds the study‘s theoretical framework with a broad understanding of 
the perspectives on war and conflict. 
Chapter IV scopes existing concepts of victory and gleans nascent theories therefrom. 
Several pretheories are constructed which collectively define the various perspectives on 
victory and serve as a framework for case analysis. Chapter V charts selected cases from 
680 AD to the present times. A mix of paradigmatic, deviant and critical cases has been 
used to explore the notion of victory in its fullest sense. Using frameworks for victory 
arrived at in Chapter IV, the grey areas and voids in theory are clearly discerned.  
Chapter VI constructs a synthesised theory which is then used to re-establish a more 
informed relationship between policy, strategy and action in Chapter VII. Major findings, 
conclusions and recommendations are summed up in Chapter VIII.  
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CHAPTER II – LITERATURE REVIEW 
The lessons of history are never clear. Clio is like the Delphic oracle: It is 
only in retrospect, and usually too late, that we understand what she was 
trying to say.
1
 
Sir Michael Howard (1983) 
 
A simpler error that is related to the failure to describe the nature of evidence 
is the failure to distinguish between assertion and evidence.
2
 
Baumeister and Leary (1997) 
INTRODUCTION  
An initial survey of literature between November 2004 and December 2005 revealed a 
surprisingly low volume of direct research dealing with theory and definition of victory.
3
 
The ambiguity and inconsistency in the language and vocabulary of victory was 
immediately evident. However, during the course of the research, more and more 
literature began to appear. A particular surge was noted after 2006. With more and more 
research of varied depth and scope appearing, this chapter was continually revised 
accordingly.
4
 As such, a cut-off date for inputs to this chapter was set as 31 July 2007. 
Literature appearing after this date, particularly where apposite data was to be found, 
continued to be incorporated in the relevant chapters till 31 July 2009. 
The flood of literature, on a subject left comparatively ignored, was apparently 
encouraged by the difficulties faced by the US and its allies in securing political success 
in Afghanistan and Iraq.
5
 Having followed a Clausewitzian script
6
 and disposed perceived 
centres of gravity of both the countries through swift military action, political and 
arguably total military success could not be accrued. It remained elusive even at the time 
of the final write-up of this thesis in Jul 2010.  
Researching a topic on which the literature is not pre-organised as a result of prior 
enquires, necessitated the development of an appropriate framework for categorisation 
and classification of the data in a manner appropriate to the requirements, development 
and flow of the thesis as a whole. The lack of theoretical framework and broad-based 
research on the notion of victory presented, on the one hand, a major hurdle in 
establishing a foundation upon which the thesis could develop, while on the other, a 
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unique opportunity for developing such a framework and building upon some of the 
works that started to emerge.  
The research questions registered in chapter I all relate to one or more of the dimensions 
of war namely: the politico-military, the military-strategic and the psycho-social. 
However, other quintessential areas that the literature review needs to address are culture 
and philosophy so as to provide a perspective on fundamental problems concerning 
matters such as drivers for human action, existence, knowledge, values, truth, reason, 
reality, and language as a whole. The literature survey thus spans works across a broad 
canvas encompassing the aforementioned areas of social science. The purpose of the 
survey is to grasp the tangible, empirically assessable notions, concepts and ideas that 
collectively contain an understanding of victory and defeat or allow for such an 
understanding to be aided or developed.  
Owing to the peculiar relationship that the literature bears to the thrust of this study, the 
review is constructive and analytical in nature and hence voluminous. As for its scope, it 
is influenced in its breadth by the lack of formal research on the subject and, in its depth 
by the attendant question that stem from the basic enquiry.  
Research on the literature was carried out in two phases. The first phase involved a broad 
survey with selective in-depth study to build an annotated bibliography and, using 
inductive method, establish precepts and pointers towards the understanding and 
treatment of victory. The second phase involved a fresh survey based on precepts and 
pointers as well as additional questions that emerged from the first survey. It also 
involved the selection of sources to be included and the basic coding of the data for 
further categorization, field segregation and relevance. A detailed study of the narrowed 
down literature followed.  
With the bulk of the literature being generally indirectly related to the study at hand, a 
constructive secondary analysis of data was needed. Where specific issues emerged, 
deductive reasoning and post-positivism
7
 as opposed to empiricism and reductionism 
provided the necessary tools for analysis. The eclectic blending of ‗notions‘ as well as the 
nomothetic paradigms of victory that emerged, provide some answers to the basic 
question ‗what is victory?‘ and a foundation for the study to build upon. 
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SECTION 1: MILITARY VICTORY 
War's very object is victory, not prolonged indecision. In war there is no 
substitute for victory.
8
 
General Douglas MacArthur 
THE VICTORY CONDITION  
One of the earliest work describing the condition and strategy for victory is undoubtedly 
Sun Tzu‘s Art of War.9 Written between 400 to 320 BC but drawing from earlier texts, 
probably as old as 600 BC
10
 in what is now north China, The Art of War is one of the 
most enlightening, broad and central works that is in many ways unequalled.  Sun Tzu 
links the pursuit of the ‗ends‘ – the condition of victory – with ‗ways‘, ‗means‘ that is to 
say, the strategy and also the ‗methods.‘ He posits that only with the strategy of taking 
‗whole,‘11 will the general find complete victory.12  The military is thus kept intact, 
‗preserving both the advantage that leads to victory and the advantage that comes from 
victory.‘13 Sun Tzu is deeply concerned with how victory is attained and not merely with 
the fact of its attainment. It thus implies a condition where the enemy, as Clausewitz puts 
is, is compelled to do our will
14
  without the need to destroy the ‗whole‘.  
Clausewitz, of course, suggests a more direct approach and this notion is also shared by 
Baron Antoine Henri Jomini, a contemporary and in many ways a rival of Clausewitz. 
Jomini‘s work, Précis on the Art of War,15 stands its own ground in complexity and 
depth. Jomini too identifies the battle as the chief arbitrator of victory or defeat and in that 
sees the destruction of the enemy army as a means to the end of occupying the enemy 
capital (or threatening to), whereupon the enemy would have to make peace on the 
victors terms. Jomini to his credit also identified ‗war of opinion‘ as a distinct category 
meriting separate strategic and political inquiry. His classification of such wars included 
national wars and civil wars.
16
 He arguably alludes to the understanding that the condition 
of victory apparent in such wars is quite different from that one may attain by occupying 
the capital or destroying an army.  
Clausewitz does not advance a theory of victory; he does however describe the condition 
and the process that helps a general arrive to that condition. Clausewitz emphasises the 
need for victory, the condition, to be complete or decisive. He writes ‘... the importance 
of victory is determined by the vigour with which the immediate pursuit is carried out. In 
other words, pursuit makes up the second act of the victory [decisive battle being the 
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first] and in many cases is more important than the first. Strategy at this point draws 
nearer to tactics in order to receive the completed assignment from it; and its first 
exercise of authority is to demand that victory should really be complete.’17 
THE PURSUIT OF VICTORY 
Threaded in the literature on the art of war from Sun Tzu to the great military minds of 
today are prescriptions for winning and cautions to avoid defeats. However, within the 
great works of antiquity like Sun Tzu‘s The Art of War and Thucydides‘ The 
Peloponnesian War,
18
  more than prescription – or in the context of the latter, history – 
are to be found. Thucydides, for example, while describing a particular event in history –
the Peloponnesian War – explores war in a larger context and tries to explain its causes 
through human nature, in the nature of power and the nature of the state. He examines 
methodically many events, paying special attention to facts. He also offers opinion from 
time to time, but does not judge actions as good or evil, he merely shows us that those 
that have power can use it as they see fit and that morality is nothing but a construct of 
power. Not surprisingly, Thucydides is described as the first realist,
19
 as Sun Tzu is 
perhaps the first rationalist theoretician.  
The place of morality and honour in victory is vividly discernable. The Malian dialogue
20
 
on the one hand conveys the realist approach of ‗might is right‘ and, on the other, the 
need for a morality for waging war.  Thucydides presents a purely rational argument that 
in power ‗there can be no compromise‘. For power to be respected, it must be 
demonstrated, any challenger must be put down else others will sense weakness. There 
can be no peace in alliance – there can be only one, the powerful.  Machiavelli echoes the 
same sentiments in The Prince.
21
 Machiavelli's advances what may be described today as 
the realist paradigm of victory: ‗I believe that the man who adapts his course of action to 
the nature of the times will succeed and, likewise, that the man who sets his course of 
action out of tune with the times will come to grief.‘22 He further states, ‗one will 
discover that something which appears to be a virtue, if pursued, will end in his 
destruction; while some other thing which seems to be a vice, if pursued, will result in his 
safety and his well-being.‘23 
Clausewitz describes the victory condition at length. An entire chapter of On War is 
devoted to it.
24
 Clausewitz arrives at an important component of victory and defeat, 
namely the ‗moral‘ dimension. He asserts that it is the defeated side that finds itself in a 
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vicious circle of material loss and loss of morale, each feeding on and intensifying the 
other: 
... [T]he scale of victory does not increase simply at a rate commensurate with 
the increase in size of the defeated armies, but progressively. The outcome of 
a major battle has a greater effect on the loser than on the winner.  This, in 
turn, gives rise to additional loss of material strength, which is echoed in loss 
of morale; the two become mutually interactive as each enhances and 
intensifies the other. ... on the victor‘s side however, all these factors only 
serve to increase his courage. So what happens is that the loser‘s scale falls 
much further below the line of the original equilibrium than the winner‘s rises 
above it. 
25
 
Seen in this way, Clausewitz is arguably the father of a method of victory that manifested 
itself more than a century later, the physical and moral dislocation and paralysis of the 
enemy as opposed to its destruction.  
A much less debated passage of On War identifies the nature of victory and its linkage to 
the nature of war. Clausewitz observes that: 
Since war can be thought of in two different ways—its absolute form or one 
of the variant forms that it actually takes [real war]—two different concepts 
of success arise.... In the absolute form of war.... only one result counts: final 
victory. ...If we postulate the second concept, we will find it legitimate to 
pursue minor advantages for their own sake and leave the future to itself. 
[Emphasis added]
26
  
Clausewitz argues that historically neither form of war has existed exclusively or in 
totality, postulating that we will never find a war entirely in the second category to an 
extent where the first could be disregarded. Victory in parts—that flows from the second 
concept would always therefore be influenced by victories from the first, that is to say, 
the final victory in battle. In summary, Clausewitz offers two key concepts: 
1) linkage between the form of war and the nature of victory and,  
2) the moral influence of victory and defeat; most significantly, the asymmetry of moral 
and physical effects upon the loser as opposed to the benefits accrued by the victor. 
Chapter II—Literature Review  
~22~ 
The Pursuit of Victory: From Napoleon to Saddam Hussein, by Brian Bond (1998)
27
 is a 
perceptive and insightful starting point for advancing our discussion on the contemporary 
understanding of military victory. It provides insight into the changes with regard to the 
perception of victory against the background of historical and social developments.
28
 The 
title ‗The Pursuit of Victory‘ also suggests an ironic addition or qualification such as 'a 
mirage' or 'will-o-the-wisp', and this for two reasons: 
 First, in the purely military sphere, it would become increasingly difficult in 
the later nineteenth century for commanders to win victories which were 
'decisive' in the sense that they annihilated the enemy's main army or battle 
fleet to the extent of making further organized resistance impossible. The 
second was the revolution in fire-power, the rapid spread of railways and the 
telegraph, and perhaps most significant of all, the ability of industrialized 
nation states to raise and maintain huge conscript armies and echelons of 
reserves--all these factors suggested that wars would be decided more by 
attrition than by decisive battles.
29
 
The above extract points to a core aspect which is central to any investigation and 
discussion on the modern view of victory and how it has changed over time.  Another 
aspect that Bond deals with and which is central to the literature is the decisive nature or 
the idea of finality which is commonly associated with the term victory.   In a traditional 
sense victory implies closure and brings an end or a conclusion to a certain social or 
political situation in the total favour of one party. In the past, as Bond states, the element 
of finality in victory was taken as an essential part of its meaning.  However, in the 
modern age or the age of the multinational states and the transparency of borders, the 
situation with regard to final victory becomes more complex and multivalent. Bond 
suggests that ‗the notion of ‗decisiveness‘ implies political direction and control.‘30  
THE SURRENDER 
From the strategic perspective, surrender occurs when ‗a military engagement or a war is 
terminated by an agreement under which active hostilities cease and control over the 
loser's remaining military capability is vested in the winner.‘31 Such victory can be 
accomplished either through disruption, in which the enemy's ability to resist is either 
destroyed in pitched battle or disabled through attrition. ‗Surrender means that winner and 
loser agree to dispense with a last round of fighting'' and is such a rational decision on 
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both sides when a divergent trend of attrition becomes evident and irreversible. ‗What the 
loser avoids by offering to surrender is a last, chaotic round of fighting that would have 
the characteristics of a rout... [the winner] can obtain his objective without paying the 
costs of a last battle.‘32 Take, for example, the French surrender of 1940; both sides 
clearly appreciated the political advantages of concluding an armistice, which is why it 
was successful.  
The French government bargained its residual fighting capacity using the latent threat of 
retreating to Africa and waging the war from there, and could thus ‗disarm‘ the Germans, 
who avoided costly terminal operations. The Germans did not press the French on the 
matter of the fleet.  The Italian surrender of 1943, on the other hand, was confused and 
marred by opportunities lost to the Allies.
33
 Unlike the Germans, the victorious Allies 
adopted an unusually rigid policy of unconditional surrender and refused to negotiate with 
Badoglio and the King except on their own terms. Although this did not seem to prolong 
Italian belligerency, ‗it did make the Allies' fight in Italy harder because they could not 
avail themselves of friendly Italian units against the Germans, who moved quickly to 
disarm their former allies.‘34 
THE FACE OF VICTORY: COLD WAR AND BEYOND 
The many articles and studies on the Cold War provide insight into the meaning of 
victory and material for debate on the ambiguity of the term in the modern context. A 
valuable contribution in this regard is a journal article by Colin S. Gray entitled ‗How Has 
War Changed since the End of the Cold War?‘35 It is essential to appreciate the 
significance of the several contexts of war additional to the military. Above all else, the 
leading driver toward, and in, war, is the political context. Military performance in the 
conduct of warfare is frequently affected by the cultural context as Colin Gray points out:  
… [W]ar is about the peace that will follow; it is not a self-validating 
occurrence. A heavy focus on military transformation tends to obscure the 
enduring fact that war is about a lot more than warfare. Pre-eminently, 
warfare always should be waged with as much regard to the character of the 
subsequent peace as immediate military necessity allows. 
36 
 
The above arguments point to an altered perception of warfare in the post-Cold War era. 
There is a realization that victory implies much more than initial military success. 
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 An excellent introduction to this area of the literature is Winning the World:  Lessons for 
America's Future from the Cold War by Thomas M. Nichols.
37
  This study also refers 
specifically to the way that the Cold War has altered easy perceptions of victory and also 
to the fact that the results of the Cold War have in fact thrown traditional views of 
military success and victory into disarray.  
From among the scholarly community, there has been a curious and unexpected silence 
about the Cold War, a reluctance to think about the nature of the Western victory—or 
even to think of it as ‗victory‘ at all. ‗There have been some attempts to think through the 
end of the Cold War, but these have been arid academic forays, typically self-referential, 
into questions about why practitioners of social science disciplines obsessed by high 
theory were unable to cope with events right in front of their eyes—as though the answers 
to that were not already obvious.‘ 38 To be fair, historians and archivists have been 
struggling to mine ever larger sources of information as they come available, but as some 
observers have pointed out, there seems to be little tension or anticipation in the academy 
and almost no curiosity among policymakers about what those sources reveal.
39
 
Clausewitz warned that wars are contests between two active, willing enemies both of 
whom expect to win. Once begun, war—with its precise planning and cerebral doctrine—
quickly devolves into a series of stratagems and counter stratagems as each side seeks to 
retain advantages long enough to achieve a decisive end by collapsing an enemy‘s will to 
resist. Scales talks about how good the Western armies have become at fighting in the 
Clausewitzian legacy and, in the process, lost sight of how they may need to fight in the 
future. He writes: 
Over the last fifty years Western militaries, particularly the U.S. Armed 
Forces, have been remarkably consistent in how they fight. … However, in an 
era of limited war, the commitment to limited ends demands the use of limited 
means. Thus the lives of soldiers have become even more precious and there 
is a growing impetus to develop a method of warfare that will replace 
manpower expenditures with an ever multiplying application of firepower.
40
 
Drawing on the evidence of the US experience in Kosovo, Scales opines that the enemy is 
watching and improving. He explains: 
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They realize the preoccupation in the West with firepower. Therefore, we 
should not be surprised to eventually encounter an enemy who has learned 
how to nullify the advantages of firepower. …As a result, the emerging ability 
of non-Western forces to counter firepower-centred warfare has been hidden 
in the shadows of unfamiliar military cultures.
41
 
The Cold War and the development of nuclear strategy greatly influenced warfare and 
political interaction between nuclear armed competitors. The ‗polarised‘ world saw new 
forms of warfare emerge and introduced new paradigms of selection of objectives and in 
turn success and victory. The end of the Cold War allowed the world to access a huge 
body knowledge that had remained out of reach in the Eastern Bloc‘s. This literature 
provided a better understanding of the evolution of the notion of victory as was perceived 
on the other side of the Iron Curtain. It constitutes a vital link with the more 
contemporary literature that addresses components, notions, facets and perception of 
victory in both military and social frames of reference.  
A seminar on Soviet-American Dialogue in the ‗Social Sciences: Research Workshop on 
Interdependence among Nations‘ held in 1990 was one of the outcomes of the post-Cold 
War era, a new chapter in world history. In relation to the notion of victory, one of the 
most interesting and direct studies presented at the seminar was ‗Evolution of the Concept 
of Victory in Soviet Military – Political Thought After the Second World War‘ by Andrey 
A. Kokoshin, Viktor M. Sergeev and Vadim L. Tsymbursky.  
The trio present a summary of how the Soviets modified their perception of victory in 
harmony with what was attainable under the environment obtaining during various stages 
or phases of the Cold War in both the political and the military dimension. A theoretical, 
almost mechanical, framework for attaining victory in war appears to have dominated 
Soviet politico-military thought. A semantic structure with two intersecting axes where 
one axis reflects stages to the conception of a final point where war must be terminated in 
a manner considered ‗victorious‘ and the second axis symbolising actions that need to be 
undertaken to achieve superiority over the enemy.
42
 The author‘s interpretation is 
presented in Figure 5 below: 
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FIGURE 5: STAGES OF VICTORY43 
(AUTHOR‘S OWN DIAGRAM / INTERPRETATION) 
After the Second World War, victory was interpreted in Soviet military doctrine in terms 
of the Soviet experience in that war; based as it was on the full destruction of the 
opposition, the achievement of maximum destruction of its actual forces, capabilities, and 
the eventual capitulation of the opposition. The progression of the notion is summed up in 
the following passage: 
 By the middle of the 1980s, the phrase ―the moral orientation of the military 
towards victory‖ was basically transformed into ―preparation to retaliate 
decisively against the aggressor.‖ In practical military terms, the purely 
technical formulae of ―repulsion‖ indicated a base line but no goals were 
defined in military action comparable to the goals that existed in politics, such 
as ―the deterrence of the aggressor‖ or ―the opposition's non-achievement of 
superiority.‖ This situation created disunity between the technical and the 
goal-oriented aspects of victory, insofar as each correlates with one of two 
conditions in the ―ideology of deterrence‖: namely, deterrence itself or an act 
of retribution if deterrence fails. It is precisely because of this disunity that the 
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military doctrine of the members of the Warsaw Pact proclaims the unusual 
military goal of ―the banning or the non-assumption of war.‖44  
SELECTION OF OBJECTIVE 
Sun Tzu suggests that in offence, the object is to avoid battle while in defence the battle is 
sought. This is an important assertion and one that influences military strategy even 
today. Sir Basil Liddell Hart‘s philosophy of the indirect approach is premised on similar 
tenets.
45
 
On occupation and invasion, Sun Tzu asserts that ‗taking a state whole is superior; 
destroying it is inferior to this.‘ In the same passage he continues with that well known 
phrase ‗[T]herefore, one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the most skilful. 
Subduing the other‘s military without battle is the most skilful.‘46 He writes that ‗...the 
superior military cuts down strategy; its inferior cuts down alliances; its inferior cuts 
down the military. The worst attacks walled cities.‘47 Note again the similarity with 
Clausewitz in the latter two assertions and with the duo of Liddell Hart and J. F. C. Fuller 
for the former in the pursuit of military victory.
48
  
Jomini on the other had writes: ‗In a war of invasion the capital is, ordinarily, the 
objective point.‘49  This is how war was viewed in the eighteenth-century and remained 
relevant till the end of the Second World War (similarities can be drawn with the 2003 
Gulf War and the removal of Saddam Hussein, however, technically this was not a war of 
invasion but one of ‗lien‘. Jomini‘s work at first appears confined to the age of Napoleon 
and in that sense was probably out-dated even when published. Some of his ideas 
however, such as ‗geographical lines of operation‘ and ‗objective points‘ survive, perhaps 
because they became so well entrenched in post-Napoleonic military theory that their 
origins have been forgotten.
50
 
OFFENSIVE ACTION 
Sun Tzu‘s prescription for victory through offensive strategy is evident from the 
following excerpt from The Art of War: 
One must take it whole when contending for all-under-heaven. Thus the 
military is not blunted and advantage can be whole. This is the method of the 
strategy of attack.
51
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The above passage points to the distinct similarity between Sun Tzu‘s perceptions of 
victory to the notion attributed to Clausewitz. The difference lies in the choices and 
priorities. For Sun Tzu, it is an inferior choice to seek decision through decisive battle. 
However, at times, one may have to destroy the enemy's state or armed forces, if so, Sun 
Tzu prescribes very similar methods to those of Clausewitz and, like Clausewitz, iterates 
the need to do so quickly and completely.  
Clausewitz‘s notion of military victory is one that has been central to Western way of 
war. Clausewitz describes the state of military victory as one where the enemy‘s ability to 
enter battle, resist or resume hostilities is destroyed. This has tangible and intangible 
components. Intangibles such as will power, motivation and cause are qualities difficult to 
reduce to a strategic equation. The solution is the identification and destruction of the 
enemy‘s centre of gravity. To Clausewitz this is the ultimate and most decisive route to 
absolute victory and as such a military end has to be ruthlessly pursued. Clausewitz 
however does not suggest that such a victory yields political success of itself. He iterates 
that ‗results in war are never final.‘52 The ultimate or ‗real‘ victory will have to be sought 
through diplomacy and bargain reinforced by the quality of leverage, the position of 
strength provided by a military victory. In a sort of an inverse relationship, an absolute 
victory (the military sense of it) is incomplete to the object of policy where as a ‗real‘ 
victory serves policy upfront.  
DECISIVE BATTLE 
The strategy of ‗decisive battle‘ began to emerge in the early 15th century with the Swiss 
who, unlike the practice of the time, gave no quarter, took no prisoners and ignored the 
sanctity of the officer cadre among the enemy. Charles VIII of France practised it with his 
use of artillery in Italy in 1494 and the practice continued under Gustavus Adolphus of 
Sweden and of course Napoleon.
53
 The dogma of the decisive battle took a new shape 
from the period of Napoleon till about 1945 where the annihilation of the enemy force 
was seen as manifestation of victory. Major General Gerard Chaliand, the author of The 
Art of War in World History: From Antiquity to the Nuclear Age
54
 makes an important 
distinction here between decisive battle and battle of annihilation and points to an error by 
some historians in tracing the origins of ‗absolute war‘ to a much earlier period. He 
writes: 
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If we limit ourselves to what British and Americans call grand strategy, only 
battles whose historic military and political results are decisive should be 
considered decisive. In that sense, the conquest of Constantinople 
55
 in 1453 
by the Turks and the Arab victories at the River Yarmuk and Kadisaya in 636, 
which – fought against Byzantium in the case of the former and the Persians 
in the case of the latter – gave them possession of Syria and Iraq, were 
decisive battles.
56
 
Clausewitz may not have ‗invented‘ a new theory of war or presented the conceptual 
contours of a ‗new art‘, he however summed up and consolidated centuries of military 
thought in precise simplicity terms that others before him failed to. Many historians and 
military thinkers who study Clausewitz forget one basic fact that Clausewitz actually talks 
about two kinds of wars: a theoretically perfect one that he calls ‗Absolute War‘ and the 
other, not so perfect but one that men actually fight, ‗Real War‘. Had he lived to review 
the entire work, the more obvious paradoxes would no doubt have been resolved. What 
more the genius of Clausewitz had to offer, we will never know.
57
 
CONTEMPORARY WARFARE AND THE EVOLVING NOTION OF VICTORY 
Warfare is only an Invention - Not a Biological Necessity
58
 
Margaret Mead 
In ‗The Changing Character of War‘59, writing in 2005, Alexandra Gheciu explores the 
perception of victory in the context of the changing nature of war and conflict. The idea 
of a distinct, if not linear, relationship and interaction between changing patterns of 
warfare and the notion of victory is central to Gheciu‘s thesis. The Cold War period is 
offered as a case and evidence for the discernable and obvious difference between 
classical international and contemporary views of war.  
In the classical international system, war involved a clash between two clearly identified 
and territorially defined parties, each seeking a decisive military victory over the other. 
By contrast, the Cold War did not involve an actual military confrontation between the 
superpowers. Framed in terms of an existential conflict between socio-politico-economic 
ideologies, it extensively scripted wars by proxy. The end of the Cold War marked the 
beginning of a new era, one where the focus came to be placed on humanitarian 
interventions, peace support operations, peacekeeping and peace building.
60
 This was 
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soon followed by pursuit of long term interests and the sustaining of a favourable 
international climate (strategic environment) through use of the full range of instruments 
of hard and soft power available at the hands of the architect and inheritor of the new 
order – the USA. The success of the US in the cold war is as total as it could possibly 
have been and, one can reasonably construe, was earned skilfully and far more cheaply 
than taking the path of a more direct strategy
61
 against the USSR.   
Concurrently, other lesser notions of victory emerged where no conclusive or final 
victory can be said to exist but rather a new assessment is necessary. These non-
traditional approaches to victory find relevance in humanitarian and peace-keeping 
activities; particularly after a violent confrontation. In preventive diplomacy and 
peacekeeping, prevention of violence is victory per se - what Prof. Christopher Bellamy 
describes as ‗… break the [enemy‘s] will to initiate or recommence war.‘62   
In an article entitled ‗Dangers of Victory Resisting the Demand to Widen the War‘, 
William Pfaff dwells on the danger of victory in terms of the American assumption of 
power and dominance. The article points to the ambiguity of apparent victory as opposed 
to the wider ramifications and issues a word of warning. He identifies that despite what 
the government or administration in Washington may aspire for itself or its vision of the 
world, there is not going to be a Pax Americana.  
The premise, according to Pfaff, is rested in the nature of the American people. He writes: 
The reason is that the American people are not imperialists, do not imagine 
themselves imperialists, and lack the ruthlessness to impose and maintain an 
empire. If they don't themselves realize that now, or their representatives in 
Washington fail to do so, they will all, as in Vietnam, discover the truth the 
hard way.
 63
 
An article, dealing with victory in the Balkans, points to the uncertainty and ambiguity of 
victory in its modern context. In ‗Victory Spoiled‘, Bacevichk reiterates the words of 
Wellington at the news of Waterloo in 1815.  'Nothing except a battle lost can be half so 
melancholy as a battle won.‘64 He also relates this sense of ambiguity of victory to the 
Kosovo conflict.  
Americans of all political persuasions rightly rejoice that the conflict ends 
with no U.S. combat fatalities and that Serbia's vicious campaign of ethnic 
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cleansing has at last run its course. Yet NATO's success in Kosovo should 
occasion sober reflection rather than euphoria. The legacy of this ill-
conceived war will not lack for melancholy…. 65 
Another article which explores the changing perception of warfare in the modern world 
and its impact on the concept of victory is ‗The American Way of Victory‘, by James 
Kurth.  The article points to the various lessons that can be learnt from the aftermath of 
the Second World War. His article deals with the dangers of the modern views of 
conclusive victory and how a successful military campaign can become a Pyrrhic.  He 
claims that the victory of the American forces over the Germans in the Second World 
War was in many ways, Pyrrhic. 
The main reason was that its victory was in some sense a Pyrrhic one. The 
German enemy was replaced almost immediately by the Russian one, and the 
Japanese enemy was soon replaced by the Chinese one. Even more, since both 
enemies were communist and initially were in alliance, they could easily be 
seen as one enormous enemy 
66
  
The above article also refers to the concept of victory in the Cold War era. This is an 
important conflict to consider in terms of the meaning of victory as it is an example of the 
changing world situation and the new type of warfare which has elicited a different view 
and understanding of victory in an international world.
67
  
This awareness of changing attitudes to warfare and the change in the way that war is 
fought has produced a plethora of literature on the subject.  This also relates indirectly to 
the perception of what victory actually means in this new context.  An article which deals 
with this aspect extends the view of the previous article and looks specifically at the 
changing attitude towards war and consequently victory in the United States. In the article 
entitled ‗An American way of war or way of battle?‘ Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. 
Echevarria, US Army, states: 
…in the early days of the nation‘s existence, the American way of war 
centred on the desire to achieve a ‗crushing‘ military victory—either through 
a strategy of attrition or one of annihilation—over an adversary. U.S. military 
men and political leaders typically saw the destruction of an opponent‘s 
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armed might and the occupation of his capital as marking the end of war and 
the beginning of post-war negotiations.
68
 
Stephen Biddle echoes similar sentiments: 
Military power plays a pervasive role in the study of international politics; in 
fact, much of modern International Relations theory amounts to a debate on 
its influence over state behaviour. Yet all of this rests on very simplistic 
treatments of its nature and determinants. Theoretically, the literature relies on 
logically unsound, unitary notions of military capability that mask crucial 
trade-offs. Empirically, the use of weak proxies undermines existing findings 
and suggests that the literature may have underestimated capability's effects 
relative to audience costs, signalling, or resolve. Analyses of deterrence, 
power distribution, and polarity rest on especially thin ice given the weakness 
of the measures used to represent capability.‘69 
Colin S. Gray, in Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory (2002), argues the relevance 
and attainability of decisive victory in the contemporary era. He provides three essential 
concepts and the language to assess levels of military victory
70
 namely: decisive victory – 
which can be employed with operational, strategic and political meaning; strategic 
success and; strategic advantage. 
SECTION 2: PERCEPTION OF VICTORY AND ITS UTILITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
The political perspective on war is incomplete without reviewing the institution of war in 
international relations theory and practice. To understand what the literature on victory 
has to say in the politico-military context of the postmodern world, it is necessary to first 
explore the place of war and international conflict in the domain of international relations. 
A much acclaimed and widely cited work in this field is International Relations Theory: 
The Three Traditions by Martin Wight.
71
  In identifying the place of war, its nature and 
cause as well as the notion of victory, in International Theory, for the purpose of this 
survey the Wight‘s table titled ‗Paradigms of International Theory‘72 suffices. For the 
idealists, war is seen as an instrument of history, a search for liberation, equality and a 
condition of peace. Ethically, it signifies the prosecution of evil methods so that good 
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may prevail with ‗ends‘ justifying the ‗means‘. For the idealist, thus, victory lies in 
attainment of the ‗Kantian utopia‘.73  
Wars are, or should be, fought for political purpose. For a statesmen war is a controllable 
instrument of political intercourse, which, given the right tools, will and capability, can be 
wielded successfully to further political interests. War is, as Martin Wright points out, 
‗the ultimate feature of international relations as revolution is the ultimate feature of 
domestic politics‘.74 This section of the literature survey looks at some of the defining 
works identifying the linkage between statecraft and war. 
Perceptions of victory often deviate substantially from the battlefield outcome, and these 
perceptions have dramatic consequences. Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney write 
that little research has addressed this phenomenon.
75
 There are very few articles or books 
that even consider how people in general judge success and failure in international 
relations.
76
 There are many writers since Alexis de Tocqueville who have commented on 
the ill-informed nature of public opinion, but they have rarely addressed the issue of 
public evaluations of success in foreign policy.
77
 There are many studies related to 
military effectiveness but these works tend not to incorporate the role of perceptions of 
effectiveness.
78
 In addition, there is a relevant literature on international crises, which 
looks at their causes and consequences, and how crises are managed and perceived by 
decision-makers.
79
 Jonson observes that, ‗there are almost no studies that examine the 
processes by which states are perceived to win or lose crises.‘80 Furthermore, the 
literature on perception and misperception is well established, but mainly looks at the role 
of perceptions in the decision-making process (how leaders, politicians and bureaucrats 
see problems and how they respond to them). Jonson proceeds with an initial evaluation 
of previous events, as well as perceptions of events occurring at the time followed by a 
focus on outside observers as opposed to leader – i.e. those not involved in the decision-
making process.
81
 
WAR AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 
The Rationalist school sees war as a natural passion for men and a breakdown of policy. 
War has limited objectives and is thus limited by such objectives and a negotiated peace 
is envisaged. Victory lies in the negotiated settlement of the issues of conflict; the nature 
of such victory, and conversely defeat, would always be such that it would be acceptable 
to the parties to the conflict. Ethically war is seen as a choice of a lesser evil and not all 
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means are justified
82
 It may thus be perceived as a give and take Victory where the 
belligerents can coexist and move on, perhaps both securing limited victory in the 
political and military sense. The Cuban missile crisis echoes this perspective.
83
 
For the Realists, war finds its place in the conflicting interests of the states and is a natural 
continuation of policy. By their nature wars are defined in terms of the ends sought and 
may, therefore, be unlimited in nature. Victory lies essentially in the realm of advancing 
interests and not necessarily in the outcomes of conflicts. However, practically, this all 
too often involves the unconditional surrender of the enemy. Ethically, expediency 
assumes priority over morality and justification is through necessity and success.
84
    
WAR AND POLICY 
Sun Tzu and Thucydides both present war as an indispensable element of statecraft and 
an activity lending itself to an in depth and dispassionate analysis. Sun Tzu makes ‗war‘ 
the focus and object of his work while Thucydides explains the phenomenon of war itself 
and explores the nature of man, the nature of war and morality in war. The linkage 
between war and politics, morality, strategy and military conflict is clearly established 
and with it the undisputed relationship of each with an inherently ‗dynamic‘ concept of 
victory as it relates to the eternal political competition between states or, more precisely, 
centres of power.  
The link first identified by Sun Tzu can be traced down to Clausewitz who summed it up 
in a single phrase: ‗war is continuation of political intercourse with the admixture of other 
means.‘85 Subsequent theorists have echoed these words in different forms but the bond 
between policy and purpose of war sustains. Among contemporary strategists Colin S. 
Gray has attempted to address the place of war, the function it serves and, the pervasive, 
consistent role of strategy in attaining policy objectives. Leaving aside for the time being 
his monograph Defining and Attaining Decisive Victory, we are concerned here with his 
other monumental work Modern Strategy. Gray maintains that ‗there is an essential unity 
to all strategic experience in all periods of history because nothing vital to the nature and 
purpose of war and strategy changes.‘86  
 Clausewitz said that even the most decisive military victory is never final and hints at, 
but does not talk about in any detail, what we describe today as war termination and 
peace building.
87
 Each war must terminate with and involve diplomatic and political 
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efforts to make victory acceptable and sustainable. Even when a total and decisive victory 
is achievable, limited goals are often more practical. It is on this assertion that Clausewitz 
introduces his notion of real war
88
 - a war that does not conclude on logical policy, 
dynamics of escalation or annihilation of the enemy; instead is moderated by political 
calculations, uncertainties, the limits of strength, and psychological factors.
89
  
 THE PLACE AND PURPOSE OF MILITARY VICTORY 
An important idea introduced by Clausewitz is that the political aim must adapt itself to 
its chosen means, a process which can radically change it; yet the political aim remains 
the first consideration.
90
 Policy, then, will permeate all military operations, and, in so far 
as their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them. ‗War is not 
merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political 
intercourse, carried on by other means.‘91 We may then conclude that a military victory 
thus achieved will contribute to the original political objective sought.  
In Europe‘s feudal culture the internecine object of war was economically motivated and 
ritualistically pursued. Quite often the sole object was of taking knights prisoners in order 
to make them pay ransom. Even later, explains Chaliand, ‗in the Renaissance, the 
conception of war held by the condottieri was close to one of chivalry, in that both, 
aiming to secure ransom, sought not to annihilate the enemy but to capture him.‘92  
Schelling, in Arms and Influence, writes that ‗victory inadequately expresses what a 
nation wants from its military forces. Mostly it wants, in these times, the influence that 
resides in latent force. It wants the bargaining power that comes from its capacity to hurt, 
not just the direct consequence of successful military action.‘93 He further elaborates the 
inherent incompleteness in even the best of military victory: 
Even total victory over an enemy provides at best an opportunity for 
unopposed violence against the enemy populations. How to use that 
opportunity in the national interest, or in some wider interest, can be just as 
important as the achievement of victory itself; but traditional military suicide 
does not tell us how to use that capacity for inflicting pain.
94
 
The object of war is not to cause pain but to accrue political advantage. Pain, albeit inbuilt 
in war, should not be the object of war. 
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Schelling noted that in creating nuclear arsenal the very idea of violent confrontation 
among, or even within close allies of, nuclear rivals raises the stakes to such an absurd 
level that the possibility of outright victory for either side in a military encounter is 
simply ruled out. He writes:  
Military strategy can no longer be thought of, as it could be in some countries 
in some eras, as the science of military victory. It is now equally, if not more, 
the art of coercion, of intimidation and deterrence. The instruments of war are 
more punitive than acquisitive. Military strategy, whether we like it or not, 
has become the diplomacy of violence. 
95
 
This assertion is however in stark contrast to Colin S. Gray‘s work cited above which 
advances the continued relevance of the traditional theory that victory, even decisive 
victory, is not an out-dated concept, albeit with a slight twist. 
MILITARY VICTORY AND POLITICAL DEFEAT 
The volumes of literature available on the Vietnam War and its analysis from almost 
every conceivable angle make it perhaps one of the most written-about campaigns of the 
post-World War II period. The question as to who won the Vietnam War still remains 
heavily contested. However since the US adopted a defeatist demeanour, one can only 
assume that while North Vietnam did not win initially on the battlefield, the US was 
politically defeated. While popular opinion grants the laurels to North Vietnam, many 
including Richard M. Nixon, the US President at the time, opines otherwise. In his last 
book, No More Vietnams
96
 the late Richard Nixon states that in 1973 the US had won the 
war and demonstrates how the anti-war protests in America soured the victory.
97
 He 
writes ‗we won the war and lost the peace, all that was won in 12 years of fighting was 
thrown away in a spasm of congressional irresponsibility‘98 that the media and the anti-
war activists fed off each other and were easily fooled by North Vietnam's propaganda. 
‗The anti-war movement did not have a decisive effect on the outcome of the war from a 
military standpoint, but it had a decisive impact on the political battles that have been 
waged ever since‘99  The Vietcong made it appear they were fighting a civil war for 
freedom. The victory was incomplete and eventually overshadowed by the fall of Saigon 
in 1975.  
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Nixon felt the war was winnable, so he made five points in an attempt to end the war and 
gain peace. To allow an eventual withdrawal of US forces under favourable conditions, 
Nixon had an excellent theory in place. The idea was to push for Vietnamisation, 
pacification, diplomatic isolation and peace negotiations. This, Nixon believed, would 
pave the way for a gradual withdrawal of US forces.
100
 South Vietnam could then be 
financially backed. This worked, albeit partially. The South Vietnamese became more 
able to defeat the Vietcong but results began to accrue only after the US suffered a huge 
political defeat and the Vietcong won in the end. 
Analysis of the politico-military and the socio-political dimensions of the Vietnam War 
reveal that the political, military, socio-cultural and psycho-social objectives for the US 
lay on divergent planes. Vectoring towards positive along any of the ‗lines‘ meant a 
regression towards defeat on the other. In the conceptualisation of dimensions of victory, 
this hypothesis will be developed in Chapter IV and tested in Chapter VI. 
The Gulf War 2003 has become the focus of an intense debate on the means, effects and 
ends of that war.  The issues predominantly debated are whether the quick and relatively 
easy ‗victory‘ in this war is in fact a victory or, in the final analysis, a form of defeat. One 
of the many articles that addressed this issue was ‗HOLD ON THERE!!! Assessing the 
Meaning of Victory in Iraq‘101 by Richard E. Berg-Anderson (2003).  The article warned 
about the implications of victory and the dangers of an early optimistic appraisal that the 
war has been ‗won‘.  This implies that a realization has been gradually emerging since the 
late half of the last century, and particularly after the early victories and confidence of the 
Vietnam War, that initial military success does not always mean final victory. 
THE POLITICAL COST AND PRICE OF VICTORY 
The account of the Pyrrhic Wars by Plutarch presents a fascinatingly philosophical yet 
tangibly comprehendible face of victory that has not lost its currency even in the 21st 
century. The Pyrrhic War was fought by King Pyrrhus of Epirus against Rome and lasted 
from 280 BC to 275 BC.
102
 Plutarch introduces the military genius, courage and boldness 
of Pyrrhus with an account of the Battle of Ipsus ‗where so many kings were engaged, 
Pyrrhus taking part with Demetrius, though yet but a youth, routed those that encountered 
him, and highly signalled himself among all the soldiery‘ he goes on to say that ‗his 
knowledge of military tactics and the art of a general… Hannibal of all great commanders 
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esteemed Pyrrhus as the first, Scipio the second and himself the third as is related in the 
life of Scipio.‘103   
Plutarch contrasts Pyrrhus‘ military genius against the larger social and political context, 
tacitly hinting the short term value and general futility of the victories won.  
THE POLITY, THE PUBLIC AND THE PERCEPTIONAL PARADOX 
Challenging the assumptions of many realist and neorealist thinkers on war and interstate 
conflict, Allan Stam showed, in 1996, how domestic political factors affect the outcome 
of war. Using a rational choice analysis, Stam looks at the factors that affect the decision 
makers' preferences for different outcomes of military conflict, as well as how the payoffs 
of those outcomes are affected by both domestic and structural factors. Structural factors, 
such as the state's population, define a state's power relative to that of other states and will 
affect the probability of a policy succeeding. Domestic factors, such as the positions taken 
by domestic political groups, will affect the preferences of the leaders for particular 
outcomes and their willingness to bear the costs associated with the payoffs and 
probabilities of the various outcomes.
104
 
HARD AND SOFT POWER AND PURSUIT OF POLITICAL VICTORY 
The object of victory in war, Clausewitz tells us, is to be able to force our enemy to do 
our will. In the complex postmodern international order, particularly in an increasingly 
interdependent ‗globalised‘ world, the need to be able to assert influentially over friends, 
foe and neutrals alike, is the main object of Joseph Nye‘s work. The instrument of this 
‗coercion‘ is not the use or threat of use of military power but ‗soft power.‘105  
Soft power is the use of instruments of power other than military, though the military 
instrument may indirectly be responsible for or be the source of ‗soft power‘. In contrast 
to Stephen J. Cimbala who identified ‗soft power‘ as military coercion short of war,106 
Nye defines it as ‗the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion 
or payment.‘107 Machiavelli prescribed that it is more advantageous to be feared than to 
be loved,
108
 Nye proposes that winning the hearts and minds is equally, if not more, 
important in today‘s world. 
Building on the traditional meaning of power as ‗the ability to do things,‘109 Nye argues 
that power is essentially situational. ‗What wins in one game may not at all help in 
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another.‘ He continues, ‗holding a winning poker hand does not help if the game is 
Bridge. Even if the game is poker, if you play your high hand poorly, you can still 
lose.‘110 Nye ascribes political values, culture and foreign policy as the sources of soft 
power.
111
  
Jonathan Schell‘s Unconquerable World: Power, Why Peaceful Protest is Stronger than 
War (2005) is an enlightening work which looks at many faces of victory. Underpinned 
by the assertion that the object of war is to further policy and that non-violence can 
achieve better ‗ends‘ with lesser consequence than war, Schell dwells on the rise and fall 
of the war system and, in his section on nuclear war, goes on to assert that under the new 
paradigm ‗the critical link between military power and political power, which Clausewitz 
had struggled to preserve, was severed at the highest level of international operations.‘ He 
goes on to say that the great powers had to conduct their business ‗in a world that was not 
going to replace the rule of force with the rule of law… the military was presented a role 
– to prevent its own use – that it had never previously played in that way before.‘112   
Schell advances, with evidence of history, the power of non-violent struggle and the 
durability of the ends thus earned. The concept of non-violent struggle will be discussed 
further in Chapters III and VI.  
WAR INITIATION AND WAR TERMINATION 
A very important section of the literature is that which deals with war initiation and 
termination. All rational wars are, or should be, begun and terminated with rational 
considerations. Thucydides provides the earliest ingredients for a rational war initiation 
strategy. He suggests that in addition to power and will, morality – legal and social – is 
needed, even against the weakest of foes.
113
 This argument endures. Modern theorist, 
such as Stephan Van Evera, have looked at the normative rationale for causes of war and 
war initiation and suggest present various hypotheses ranging from necessity to 
opportunity. In Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (1999), Stephen Van 
Evera suggests that false optimism coupled with illusions of victory, pre-emption and 
advantages of ‗jumping the gun, and power shifts allowing for exploitation of windows of 
opportunity encompass the root causes of war.
114
 War initiation in all these cases is 
directly linked to chances of success or, a position of least disadvantage when a victory 
per se is not possible – a notional success is a substitute for victory.   
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Carole Alsharabati and Jacek Kugler (2008) find that ‗most war initiation theories tend to 
lead to a general contention that nations tend to enter a conflict when they are likely to 
win, and, since parity is associated with high uncertainty regarding the outcome of a war, 
it is also associated with peace.‘115 The duo suggests that balance of power theory is 
empirically flawed. ‗Repeated empirical tests have shown that power parity in the last two 
centuries did not lead to peace.‘116 An alternate theory – the power parity theory – is 
advanced.  The theory of power preponderance suggests that nations are more likely to 
fight under parity than under preponderance. The logic behind the argument is that major 
wars are caused by a rising dissatisfied nation surpassing in relative power a declining 
dominant nation.
117
  
 A war may logically be terminated when one military defeats another. The nature of 
peace sought after the war makes this point rather difficult to identify. In ‗When is 
Victory Complete?‘, Eliot A. Cohen, writing in 2005 and discussing the issue of war 
termination in the First Gulf War (1991), argues that by allowing the military to make 
important political judgments, the US civil administration bowed to the idea that war 
termination too was an issue decided on the battlefield.
118
 In 1945, Douglas MacArthur 
who pursued a war termination strategy at times in defiance of Washington also saw 
beyond the battlefield; a trait that often brought him in direct confrontation with his 
political masters. His victory address after the fall of Japan hinted at his logic and the 
importance of war termination: 
We have known the bitterness of defeat and the exultation of triumph and 
from both we have learned there can be no turning back. We must go forward 
to preserve in peace what we won in war.
119
 
In his farewell address to the congress six years later MacArthur had this to say: 
The Japanese people, since the war, have undergone the greatest reformation 
recorded in modern history. With a commendable will, eagerness to learn, and 
marked capacity to understand, they have, from the ashes left in war's wake, 
erected in Japan an edifice dedicated to the supremacy of individual liberty 
and personal dignity; and in the ensuing process there has been created a truly 
representative government committed to the advance of political morality, 
freedom of economic enterprise, and social justice. Politically, economically, 
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and socially Japan is now abreast of many free nations of the earth and will 
not again fail the universal trust...
120
    
The pivotal role played by Colin Powell in ending military operations once the ‗limited 
goal‘  of removing Saddam‘s forces from Kuwait had been achieved, argues Cohen,  was 
incorrect since the Gulf War had truly not been won. The nature of victory was either 
incorrectly comprehended – ignoring the more subjective, and more political defines of 
victory – or incorrectly pursued beyond the simplistic assessment of whether all Iraqi 
soldiers had left Kuwait. In a meaningful sense, the victory was not complete and hence 
déjà-vu for the current President Bush. Cohen attributes ‗a case of the slows‘, in Lincoln‘s 
words to America's generals and in Churchill‘s words, success depended ‗less on 
professional expertise than on wide reading and massive common sense.‘121 Although 
Cohen does not prescribe a road map for victory what he does do is to reiterate the 
primacy of political control and political direction in conduct of, and termination of war. 
John T. Fishel, in his 1992 article ‗Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination 
and Desert Storm,‘ analyses the problems arising out of what he believes was an 
incomplete or an inaccurate vision of ‗ends‘. He defines the ‗end state‘ in the following 
words: 
 …what the leadership desires the battlefield and the surrounding political 
landscape to look like when the war is over, and it represents a range of 
acceptable political/military outcomes. Moreover, end-states suggest 
descriptions, in fairly great detail, of the goals of national policy.
122
  
Fishel believes that, as a consequence of an undefined end state, confusion existed about 
what path the United States should adopt in the post-war phase and indeed on the point at 
which hostile action should be called off and victory declared. Fishel writes: ‗The U.S. 
Government … suggested another political objective for Kuwait that was not at all 
reflected in the end-state derived by the military planners. This objective was to move the 
Kuwaiti government to a more democratic mode.‘123 Fishel went on to note that public 
rhetoric by President Bush caused some concern about whether the removal of Saddam 
Hussein had become one of the criteria for war termination.
124
 It may be argued on the 
contrary as noted by … that it was for this very reason of an accurate, albeit late, vision of 
post war Iraq that Saddam Hussein was not removed and his regime allowed to operate 
for another eleven years. 
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Regardless of the whether the events immediately following Gulf War I were according 
to well laid out strategic plans or emergency corrective measures, the conclusion that 
emerges is that the declared position on victory in terms of objectives as well as the 
environment must be postulated in the war policy.  
SECTION 3: THE PSYCHO-SOCIAL SPHERE 
In this section, two important bodies of literature will be addressed. The first is the socio-
cultural notion and second, the perceptional (without cultural contexts). Addressed within 
this body of literature is the social impact of victory and how it is perceived and possibly 
manipulated by the media and the public. This area of the literature is intertwined with 
various non-military aspects such as media perception, the use of language to project 
culture, ideology and the expectations of the public as opposed to the military facets. In 
essence, what this area of the literature points out is that the term victory has a ‗relative‘ 
dynamic. In other words victory means different things to different people depending on 
cultural and / or perceptional contexts.  
TRUTH AND REALITY 
REALITY 
Reality, in everyday usage, means ‗the state of things as they actually exist.‘125 In a wider 
context it includes everything that is, whether or not it is observable or comprehensible. 
Reality has different connotations when applied to nature or matter and quite different 
when it concerns life and existence. Reality in this sense includes ‗being‘ and sometimes 
is considered to include ‗nothingness‘, which in philosophy is a formal concept.  
Subjective interpretations of reality – the phenomenological perspective – include the 
selectivity involved in the personal interpretation of an event. Although in the strictest 
sense, it implies ‗reality‘ as seen by one and only one individual, this form of reality 
might be common to others as well. Much of the kind of experience deemed spiritual 
occurs on this level of reality and hence it is possible that the experience may be common 
to the entire subset that is culturally so inclined.  From a phenomenological perspective, 
reality is that which is phenomenally real and unreality is non-existent. Individual 
perception can be based upon an individual's personality, focus and style of attribution, 
causing him or her to see only what he or she wants to see or believes to be true. The 
various meanings of ‗reality‘, according to Encarta World Dictionary include:126 
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 real existence: actual being or existence, as opposed to an imaginary, 
idealized, or false nature, 
 all that actually exists or happens: everything that actually does or could exist 
or happen in real life, 
 something that exist or happens: something that has real existence and must be 
dealt with in real life – a vision that ignores the realities of the business world, 
 type of existence: a kind of existence or universe, either connected with or 
independent from other kinds – fantastic notions of alternative realities, 
 philosophy: the totality of real things in the world, independent of people‘s 
knowledge or perception of them. 
WHAT IS REALITY? 
In philosophy, reality is contrasted with nonexistence. Trees, for example, do exist; so 
they are real and mere possibility. A mountain made of gold is merely possible, but such a 
mountain is not known to be real—that is, a golden mountain is possible rather than 
actual, unless one is discovered. Sometimes philosophers speak as though reality is 
contrasted with existence itself, though ordinary language and many other philosophers 
would treat these as synonyms. They have in mind the notion that there is a kind of reality 
— a mental or intentional reality, perhaps — that imaginary objects, such as the 
aforementioned golden mountain, has. Alexius Meinong is famous for holding that such 
things have a so-called subsistence, and thus a kind of reality, even while they do not 
actually exist.  
Some schools of Buddhism hold that reality is something void of description, the formless 
which forms all illusions or ‗maya‘. Buddhists hold that we can only discuss objects 
which are not reality themselves and that nothing can be said of reality which is true in 
any absolute sense. Discussions of a permanent self are necessarily about the reality of 
self which cannot be pointed to nor described in any way.
127
 Similar is the Taoist saying 
that ‗the Tao that can be named is not the true Tao, or way.‘128 
As for the realist and idealist concept of reality, the well-known German philosopher, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 - 1951), in Zettel, finds the difference to be one of only 
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semantics. Wittgenstein states that to the idealist physical objects only exist in so far as 
they are perceived; an unperceived physical object is like making predictions about future 
observations. Whereas, the realist would assert that physical objects exist independently 
of our capacity to perceive them. If the two philosophers raise their children to share their 
beliefs, both children will acquire and use a vocabulary about physical objects in exactly 
the same way. One child will be taught to say, ‗physical objects exist independently of 
our perceptions,‘ and the other will be taught to deny this. If this is the only difference 
between the two children, says Wittgenstein, ‗Won't the difference be one only of battle-
cry?‘129 
TRUTH AND REALITY 
The term truth, like reality, has no single definition and its usage is subjective to context 
and discipline. A typical dictionary definition is ‗the quality of being true, genuine, or 
factual.‘130 In postmodernism/post-structuralism, truth is purely subjective. When two or 
more individuals agree upon the interpretation and experience of a particular event, a 
consensus about an event and its experience begins to be formed. This being common to a 
few individuals or a larger group, then becomes the 'truth' as seen and agreed upon by a 
certain set of people — the consensus reality. Thus one particular group may have a 
certain set of agreed truths, while another group might have a different set of consensual 
'truths'.   This lets different communities and societies have varied and extremely different 
notions of reality and truth of the external world. The religion and beliefs of people or 
communities are a fine example of this level of socially constructed 'reality'. Truth cannot 
simply be considered truth if one speaks and another hears because individual bias and 
fallibility challenge the idea that certainty or objectivity are easily grasped. For anti-
realists, the inaccessibility of any final, objective truth means that there is no truth beyond 
the socially-accepted consensus; although this means there are truths, not truth. 
To summarise; for realists, the world is a set of definite facts, which obtain independently 
of humans (‗The world is all that is the case‘ — Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus), or as 
Michael Dummett termed it ‗the principle of bivalence‘ – Lady Macbeth had three 
children or she did not; a tree falls or it does not—A statement will be true if it 
corresponds to these facts — even if the correspondence cannot be established.131 Thus 
the dispute between the realist and anti-realist conception of truth hinges on reactions to 
the ‗epistemic accessibility (knowability, graspability) of facts. Philosophy addresses two 
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different aspects of the topic of reality: the nature of reality itself and the relationship 
between the mind‘132 (as well as language and culture) and reality. For this research we 
take the position that there are truths, not truth and reality can be defined in a way that 
links it to worldviews or parts of them (conceptual frameworks):  
 Reality is the totality of all things, structures (actual and conceptual), events (past 
and present) and phenomena, whether observable or not.  
 It is what a worldview – whether it is based on individual or shared human 
experience – ultimately attempts to describe or map. 
PERCEPTION AS REALITY 
The definition of victory clearly involves issues of perception versus reality. The 
importance of perception and media is also dealt with briefly in an insightful 2004 article 
titled, ‗Echoes of War: A Thousand Years of Military History in Popular Culture.‘ 133   
Another brief article entitled ‗Day By Day We Are Becoming More Hated‘,134 also shows 
a more public and introspective view of victory, which once again places the meaning of 
victory in the arena of popular culture rather than in a military context.  While not as in-
depth or extensive as the articles previously discussed, yet it provides a common 
perception that victory in the war on terror is at very best an ambivalent one which cannot 
be measured according to the conventional norms of military victory.  This is also an 
article which is characteristic of the increasing deluge of critical studies of the notion of 
victory that is promulgated by the erstwhile Bush Administration. An example is as 
follows.  
Day by day we are creating more terrorists intent upon attacking the US and 
American citizens. ‗When it is over, if it is over, this war will have horrible 
consequences,‘ says Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. ‗Instead of having 
one [Osama] bin Laden, we will have 100 bin Ladens.‘ Does this fit Mr. 
Bush's concept of victory‘? 135 
CULTURE 
‗Culture,‘ Colin S. Gray speculates, ‗is pervasive... Future warfare, as with warfare in all 
periods, will in a sense be cultural; certainly it will be waged by inescapably distinctively 
encultured people.‘136 Culture influences thought and action. It shapes internal and 
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external behaviour, that is to say the emotional triggers and responses as well as the 
contextualised logical processing of information and in no lesser measure the calculated 
and considered responses. This assertion is evinced on matured social science research in 
culture and psychology. War indeed will be waged by what Gray calls ‗distinctively 
encultured people‘ who will manifest facets of their culture in engagements, the battles, 
the campaign, the war and indeed the conflict as a whole. More significantly, because 
culture influences the notion of victory and the manner in which it is pursued, it 
influences the very nature and character of war.  
According to Gregory R. Copley, ‗history tells us that no species is immune from 
obliteration; no culture, language, ethnic community, nation, or belief system has 
guaranteed its survival..., the survival and dominance of a society through history is its 
principal Victory.‘ To develop his argument further, a whole spectrum of levels and tiers 
of victory opens up. As a minimum we have ‗the mere fact that one survives… the 
languages we speak, the generations which may – or, in defeat, may not – follow our 
family line, the welfare we enjoy...,‘137 that is to say the hard genetic dimension and the 
soft moral domain. On the opposite end is dominance and/or absorption – the ability to 
export, expand, absorb affiliate or shield other cultures.  Whether we draw our premise 
from Darwinian logic or Copley‘s observations, the common conclusion points towards 
the very essential and basic level of victory that lies in the realm of first, the biological 
continuity and second, physical preservation – the sustenance of the acquired cultural – 
social and political values that differentiate us in a tribal sense. Progression of the latter is 
itself a higher function.
138
 Reality essentially creates a ‗parallel truth‘, a contrast to the 
assertion that ‗perception is reality‘.  
Cross cultural research indicates that there are systematic cultural differences in the way 
people reason about the world. Such research suggests that human cognition has two 
major ‗modes‘: the ‗intuitive or associative and the other analytic or rule-based.139 
Theoretically, everyone is capable of thinking in both of these modes, but individual 
differences— and cultural ones—have been found to affect which mode is preferentially 
used.
140
 Thinking among Westerners tends to be more analytic, that is, attention is 
focused on objects and their features and reasoning is decontextualized; conversely, 
thinking among East Asians (e.g. Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese) tends to be more 
holistic, that is, attention is dispersed to the field and reasoning is contextualized.
141
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Research by Emma E. Buchtel and Ara Norenzayan in intuition and logic in a cross-
cultural context shows cognitive consequences of cultures stem from specific elements of 
those cultures, these elements in turn affect injunctive social norms. The Social norms 
vary within cultures along the same vectors that also define salient differences between 
cultures. ‗Human cognitive processes are embedded in a network of culturally-specific 
relationships between universal processes, perceptions of reality, cultural norms, and 
behaviour.‘142 The profound conclusion we can draw from this is that cross-culturally 
‗intuitive cognition‘ is a better and more natural tool than interpreting or interacting with 
views in another culture through logical reasoning. The Chinese – American philosopher 
Dr. Yutang Lin had asserted something quite similar: 
We see [in Chinese intellectuals] an opposition of ‗logic‘ versus common 
sense, which takes the place of inductive and deductive reasoning in China. 
Common sense is often saner because the analytic reasoning looks at truth by 
cutting it up into various aspects, thus throwing them out of their natural 
bearings, while common sense seizes the situation as a living whole…Logic 
without such common sense is dangerous.
143
 
For this research, we need to explore further the cognitive differences, the normative 
status and the intuitive. The quest is purely functional, we need to be able to place 
whether these cognitive differences are encouraged by different value judgments, 
proximal causes or the social context.  
DEFINING CULTURE 
Cultures can be ‗understood as systems of symbols and meanings that even their creators 
contest, that lack fixed boundaries, that are constantly in flux, and that interact and 
compete with one another‘144 
Culture influences the manner in which individuals understand their environment. 
‗Culture is much like the air people breathe: it is taken for granted until there is an 
external stimulation that forces people to think about it.‘145 It is only when assumptions 
about this understanding are questioned that the existence of culture starts to become 
apparent to the individual.
146
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Hofstede defined culture as ‗collective programming of the mind‘147  that lies between the 
universal nature of the human animal and an individual‘s unique personality. Stocker in 
her research illustrates this as a pyramid: 
 
FIGURE 6: THREE LEVELS OF MENTAL PROGRAMMING 
SOURCE: STOCKER‘S ADAPTATION OF HOFSTEDE148 
 
The semantic relationship suggests that while all cultures have a common foundation 
rested in human nature, personality can be acquired both as a subset of the culture as well 
as the individual or societies wider experiences. The defiling of these levels, particularly 
of culture as specific to group, contrasts with our earlier discussion. A group or a society 
can assume a bivalence as Drummett concluded based on its own history as well as that it 
shares with another. For example, the British colonies, while retaining their own cultures, 
adapted a special brand of ‗Britishness‘ that continues to manifest itself in every 
functional walk of life such as art, literature, language, commerce, politics and 
bureaucracy.   
The bivalence in construction combined with the intuitive and logical conception of 
interpreting reality implies cultural influences, at their extreme can create entirely 
opposite truths and thus realities. In the cross-cultural context, multiple realities can exist 
on the same phenomenon. Societies where adapted influences coexist, a natural flux in 
the traditional and the progressive brand of truth and reality creates a volatile cocktail. 
The identity crises that many colonies suffer, stems from this flux.  
The use of the term culture in anthropology is traced to the nineteenth century 
anthropologist Edward Tylor. He identified that culture is manifested in human artefacts 
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and activities such as music, literature, lifestyle, food, painting and sculpture, theatre and 
film.
149
 ‗Culture or civilization, taken in its wide ethnographic sense,‘ is thus ‗that 
complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other 
capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.‘150  
CULTURAL STIMULI AND NOTION OF VICTORY 
Culture influences the use and meaning of violence. ‗Warfare between Maya cities was 
frequent, and its aim was largely the capture of royalty for torture and sacrifice rather than 
territorial expansion. Captives were often pitted against the conquering king in an ancient 
ballgame that was stacked in favour of the king; after inevitably losing the contest, 
captives were sacrificed and often decapitated, ‗the Maya believed that death called the 
soul to a type of hell known as Xibalba, where it faced a series of trials and competitions 
with the Lords of Death. Defeat doomed a soul to burial in the evil-smelling Xibalba, 
whereas victory allowed it to dance away and, with other reborn ancestors, guide its 
descendants.‘151 
The influence of culture in shaping behaviour, perception and action is well documented 
in the works of Margaret Mead. Of particular relevance to this thesis are Continuities in 
Cultural Evolution, 1964, Culture and Commitment, 1970 and Keep Your Powder Dry: 
An Anthropologist Looks at America, 1942. Mead believed that human beings have a 
capability of being moulded to grow and change and adapt beyond the range of their 
biological and cultural inheritance. She identifies the value of culture and its ability to 
influence. ‗If we are to fight, if we are to win, if we are to hold before us as we fight a 
goal we will count fighting for, that goal must be in American terms, in the mixture of 
faith in the right and faith in the power of science.‘152  Mead‘s goal, writes Varenne, was 
not cultural critique but cultural construction. In her most seminal work Continuities in 
Cultural Evolution, that we need now, a view of the future that neither minimizes the 
immediate peril nor generates despair. For her work, the perceptional impact 
consequential to how facts and information are interpreted suggest that success as too 
failure are deeply embedded in the moral domain and often more profoundly so than the 
physical realm that we understand all too well.   
Sun Tzu‘s presents a distinctly Confucian face of victory, the hard and the soft coexisting 
like yin and yang as the nature of all things. Barry Boyce elaborates this in the following 
words:  
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After a win, for example, people tend to be elated and a temporary surge of 
energy takes over, but soon that surge will be replaced with genuine tiredness 
and a sense of remorse that now that the battle is over, the thrill is gone and 
the toll has been paid—and must continue to be paid. This time gives 
opportunities to the adversary. A force that seemed invincible may suddenly 
be vulnerable (or ‗vincible‘ in the term used in this translation), merely 
through the passage of time and the inevitable fluctuation of energies. If one 
regards the world as static, its solidity will always fight against you. Within 
the Sun Tzu, this point of view is never taken. Solid is only one side of the 
equation, a part of the fluctuation.
 153
 
Sun Tzu asserts that for the best defence one goes outside the range of enemy, becoming 
ungraspable and thus unbeatable. Victory need not be achieved by will or devastation. 
The Griffith‘s text reads: ‗One skilled at defence hides below the nine earths; one skilled 
at attack moves above the nine heavens. This possibly obscures the more powerful 
message that Sun Tzu might be trying to stimulate in the bamboo text, which points to a 
defence not based in conflict! ‗…of old those skilled at defence hid below the nine 
earths and moved above the nine heavens.‘154 Thus they could preserve themselves and be 
‗all-victorious‘. 
Chaliand identifies that ‗for a long time, at different periods and in different societies, 
warfare took on a ritual character…. Battles were organised as the ultimate recourse to 
the judgement of God.‘155 He identifies the ‗high Middle Ages‘ as the peak of this 
character and its most significant period in the West. The words of Henry, the son of 
William before the battle of Tinchebray, in 1106, echoed with this conviction as  quoted 
by Jacques Duby: 
 I am going into battle only to come to the aid of the desolate people; I 
implore the creator of all things from the bottom of my soul that in today‘s 
battle He may grant victory to whom He has chosen to secure protection and 
rest for His people.
156
 
In Aztec culture, writes Chaliand, victory was not measured in annihilation of the enemy 
but in terms of the prisoners taken, as these were later offered to the Gods as sacrifice. 
‗An enemy was defeated when the leaders had been seized or when his temple was 
destroyed, a sign that his gods were less potent.‘157 
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Anthony Zimm, in his 2005 article ‗A Causal Model of Warfare‘, dealing ostensibly with 
military strategy also refers to the psychological as well as the moral outcomes as basis 
for victory. It explores the advances of warfare strategy and its relation to the meaning of 
victory. Zimm writes:  
There have been marvellous advances in sciences since Clausewitz‘s time. 
Probability and statistics, sociology, psychology and organizational science 
all help us understand combat processes. Chaos and complexity theories offer 
new methodologies to understand what appears at first to be random, 
turbulent, disorganized and chaotic. We have a considerably larger arsenal 
with which to attack the problem. 
158
 
Zimm also discusses and denies the conventional and one-dimensional view of victory, in 
the sense of a final extermination of the enemy.  This, he states, is rarely the case and 
final victory in terms of extermination is hardly ever possible or even wished for in a 
military context. 
In the physical mechanism of victory, the defeated side is utterly annihilated. 
Thermopylae (480 BC), Cannae (216 BC), Little Big Horn (1876), Isandhlwana (1879), 
the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad (1943)
159
 and Iwo Jima (1945) are examples. It may 
be noted that of these only the victory at Cannae was strategic in nature all others were 
‗battles‘ in a larger campaign. In the vast reach of history, examples of annihilation 
yielding strategic victory are mercifully few. Such battles are the stuff of epics, and like 
epics, they are rare.
160
 Zimm also states that idealistic views of victory are often  
erroneous  and even interpretations  of conventional victories such as the Battle of 
Waterloo often do not take account of the fact that most of the  French troops were not 
killed but were surrounded or refused to fight.  
The second body of the literature is concerned with the social impact of victory and how 
it is perceived and possibly manipulated.  This complexity of the changing perception of 
victory from the point of view of the people is explored in ‗The Meaning of Victory‘ 
(2005) by Olga Nikitina and Andrei Zolotov.  This work refers to the changing perception 
of victory of the Russian people during and after the Second World War.  In the past 
victory has been conventionally seen from the point of view of generals, kings or 
governments. Victory was the domain of military and political authorities. This article 
lends credence to the stance that this view of victory has changed in the modern world. 
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The expensive and costly victory that the Russians achieved over the German Reich is 
presented as a victory of the ordinary people.
161
 Similarly, In War and Existence: A 
Philosophical Enquiry, (1994) Michael Gelven observes that: 
...if defeat is the only loss for the warrior, and victory the only triumph, it is 
not the same for those who seek to understand it. There is much that is 
puzzling in war, and the phenomenon itself seems totally incoherent. Men 
who do not even know one another are supremely dedicated to one another's 
annihilation. Good and honest soldiers on both sides seek to destroy one 
another with an almost universal approbation. … If the warrior aches only for 
victory, the thinker aches for coherence. The general asks, 'how can we win?' 
The philosopher asks, 'how can war be thought without contradiction?'
162
 
The Battle of Karbala, fought in 680 AD between Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet 
Muhammad P.B.U.H and the forces of Yazid, the then Caliph of Arabia stands out as the 
most significant battle in Islamic history not so much from the military perspective but 
more so from its religious and political fallout that casts its shadow to this day. The 
spiritual lineage emanating from the Prophet Muhammad‘s household, in which spiritual 
allegiance separated from political, was subscribed only to one appointee – referred to as 
the Imam. After the Prophet Mohammad‘s death, and particularly after Ali, the fourth 
Caliph, the subsequent political leadership saw the need for spiritual authority as a means 
to completion of their power which meant total control of the political and the religious 
spheres of society and the state.
163
 The battle was fought in two perspectives of 
asymmetry, ‗fundamental asymmetry‘164 in terms of the notion of victory held by the 
competing forces and ‗dissymmetry‘165 in terms of numbers, weapons, logistics – the 
physical and moral components of fighting power.  
The Battle of Karbala introduces two important faces of victory: The first, a temporary, 
yet complete victory in Clausewitzian terms, earned by Ziyad‘s Army in the battlefield 
and second, a more romantic and enduring victory, the one that was ultimately Hussein‘s. 
Importantly, because Hussein‘s strategy did not envisage winning the battle and a 
fundamental asymmetry existed in the purpose, immediate objectives, morals and ends of 
the war, it could be said that a new notion of victory emerged; one that perhaps terrorists 
and fundamentalists twist, misconstrue and misuse to justify suicide bombings and killing 
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of innocent civilians today. This finding will be developed further and tested in Chapters 
V and VI respectively. 
The moral-cultural metric has been discussed at length by Gregory R. Copley the Art of 
Victory. In an address to the US army Command and General Staff College, Fort Belvoir 
Copley assessed what victory might mean for the Coalition in Iraq and the International 
Force in Afghanistan. His assertions suggested that the answer was to be found in 
philosophy and not the battlefield.
166
 
Culture plays a significant role in how individuals, groups and society as a whole handle 
and process information, its analysis and the construed outcome. The works of prominent 
anthropologists such as Margaret Mead suggest that a piece of information presented to 
members of different cultural heritage not only gets handled differently but also produces 
widely different perceptional outcome. 
BELIEF SYSTEMS AND PERCEPTIONS OF VICTORY 
We now move on to a body of literature that intrinsically influences perception and 
thought in general and in the context of the research as thane, the purpose of war and the 
nature of victory through war as seen in the major religions of the world.  
In 610 AD Muhammad of Arabia revealed his prophet-hood and invited the Arabs and the 
known world to Islam. Four main religions prevailed at the time and collectively they 
formed the pivots of civilisation. These were Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism and 
Christianity. Each religion, either in its theological origins or the anthropological change 
that affected it, presented a rather similar perspective on victory. However, the ‗laws of 
war‘, were treated quite differently by each.  
The primary source used for an understanding of the place of war and the notion of 
success in each faith discussed is the central holy scripture(s) or book associated with that 
faith or the accepted and documented main source of religious guidance (in case there are 
several -  as is the case in Hinduism). All the religions discussed here have several sects 
and sub-sects where theological sources are variously interpreted. In such cases, 
additional literature is also cross referenced with a view to inform the study with the 
diversity of such views. Broader analysis are not covered in this chapter as our main 
purpose here is to flag issues and focus on the notion of victory in theological teachings 
as interpreted (or evolved) over time.  
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BUDDHISM 
Buddhism was founded by Gautama Siddhartha. There is a minor difference concerning 
the dates of its origins. Taking the Ceylonese (Sri Lankan) tradition, the year 544 B.C is 
taken as the year of death of the ‗Buddha‘.167 This implies that Buddhism preceded 
Christianity by at least half a millennium. 
There are five tenets of morality in Buddhism called the Pancha Shila (tr. five moral 
precepts). These are: a) no killing, or harming any living thing, b) no stealing -- taking 
what is not yours to take, c) avoid sexual irresponsibility, which for monks and nuns 
means celibacy, d) no lying, or any hurtful speech and, e) no alcohol and drugs which 
diminish clarity of consciousness.
168
 
Cakkavattin, the ‗wheel turner‘, in Buddhist political thought is seen as the Universal 
Monarch who ‗rules the Earth to the extent of its ocean boundaries, having conquered 
territories not by force of arms but by righteousness.‘169 The Cakkavattin is charged with 
the responsibility to provide protection, shelter, and security for all living things.
170
 
Cakkavattinism is a paradox in modern Buddhism since originally ‗The Buddha did not 
propound the theory of the Cakkavattin to any actual kings, ‗the Buddhists ... developed 
the idea of the Cakkavatti dhammiko dhammaraagaa who, by a just exercise of power 
would play a pivotal role in transforming society,‘ as a counter to the excesses of actual 
kings.‘171 
The object of war in Buddhism can be seen as peace, security and preservation. ‗We 
cannot but help think that the central ethical precepts of Buddhism, Ahimsa, Karuna, and 
Metta (non-harm, compassion and loving-kindness) have somehow been lost. But in spite 
of the initial shock, the justifications we encounter are quite similar to those we find in 
the other world religions.
172
   
HINDUISM 
Hinduism, Wajid Ali Rizvi opines, is not a religion as such but a ritualistic culture. 
Vedas, Geetha and Mansometri are its most commonly referred books. ‗Geetha is the 
legacy of the peak of the Arian civilisation, the periods when two branches of the royal 
family…fought their famous war, which is its main subject… The main emphasis of 
Geetha is on inspiring, coaching and grooming people for fighting.‘173 Killing, 
particularly in war, is not seen as a bad thing since the soul of the dead is believed to 
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transmigrate in to another living form. This premise is used to justify wars for spoils as 
the following passages from various scriptures indicate: 
With assistance of the deities we should top our coffers with wealth ad [Sic.] 
fill up its shelves, sufficient both for present and the future.
174
  
Rig Veda (1:17-20) 
O Inder, enable us with much wealth to overpower our enemies in our war 
just as the skies dominate the earth. Give us such (quantity of) riches that 
become a source of grabbing the properties of thousands of conquered fertile 
fields and defecting enemies.
175
 
Rig Veda (6:20-21) 
If you are killed (in battlefield) you will go to heaven, and if victorious you 
will enjoy dominance [and wealth]. Therefore rise with firm determination to 
fight.
176
 
The Geetha (2:30) 
In the Hindu tradition, the ancient masterpiece of political science Arthashāstra by 
Kautilya, a minister to a king in 4
th
 Century BC, discusses how political and economic 
power should be wielded. Kautilya propounds that ‗the power of Counsel is superior (to 
sheer might and energy). For, the king with the eyes of intelligence and science (of 
politics) is able to take counsel with small effort and to over-reach his enemy possessed 
of energy or occult practices‘177 Success and victory have a distinctively material 
meaning. Consistent with Confucian philosophy of war, emphasis is on achieving ones 
goal, in this case generally material, through indirect means, ruses and stratagems.  
An interesting article in the Indian daily, The Hindu, by Raj Mohan Gandhi titled ‗Peace, 
War and Hinduism‘, presents a modern perspective on ancient Hindu texts. Drawing a 
comparison between Christianity and Hinduism, Gandhi finds that ‗Christian and Judaic 
teachers taught that the fear of the Lord was the beginning of wisdom, our Indian 
ancestors said that ‗gyan‘ or wisdom would end fear.‘178 Challenging the thesis of war as 
a glorified act, he iterates Hinduism‘s more pacifist face, the one presented by Mahatma 
Gandhi: 
If some Hindus claimed that their ancient epic, the Mahabharata, sanctioned 
and indeed glorified war, Gandhi pointed to the empty stage with which the 
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epic ends — to the noble or ignoble killing of almost every one of its vast cast 
of characters — as ultimate proof of the folly of revenge and violence. And to 
those who spoke, as many do today, of the naturalness of war, Gandhi's reply, 
first expressed in 1909, was that war brutalises men of naturally gentle 
character and that its path of glory is red with the blood of murder. 
179
 
JUDAISM 
From an Islamic perspective, Judaism is the oldest of the ‗heavenly‘ faiths. Again 
according to Islam, the newer faiths, Christianity and Islam itself honour the same God 
whereas the older ones reject the prophets, saints and indeed the ‗god‘ of the religions that 
followed. To assume that a scarlet thread weaving a common philosophy on the treatment 
of violence and war in each of these religions would be suggestive of a purely Islam 
viewpoint of continuity and commonality whereas no such notion is endorsed by the 
Christians or the Jews. From a purely scientific perspective, we assume that there exists 
no such scarlet thread. Nonetheless, ‗It would be hard,‘ writes David Little, ‗to read the 
Old Testament, the New Testament, or the Qur'an [sic.] without encountering the 
questions of the legitimacy and limits of force.‘180  He goes on to say:  
In each of these sacred books, and in the traditions that respectively flowed 
from them, the divine figure is extensively associated with efforts to restrict 
and regulate the use of force. Yahweh, God, and Allah are all predominantly 
characterized as exercising political and legal functions. They all perform 
these functions in such a way as to control certain illicit kinds of force, as well 
as other forms of disobedience, by themselves resorting to the use or threat of 
force, where necessary, as deterrence or punishment. Each deity, that is, is 
pictured as legitimating selected forms of force in the name of preventing or 
minimizing other kinds of ‗illegitimate‘ and ‗excessive‘ force. Max Weber 
described the God of the Old Testament as a ‗God of Foreign Policy,‘ though 
the term could, with some adjustment, be applied to the God of the Qur'an as 
well. The deity in both traditions is centrally preoccupied with the regulation 
and direction of force in international relations.
181
 
Judaism recognises the utility of war in the affairs of man and the affairs of God. This is 
manifest in several passages of the Torah. War is regarded as a possibility but non-
violence is preferred. The Torah emphasises that no war is to be fought without offering 
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surrender terms first; this applied even to the mandatory wars against the Canaanites and 
the Amalekites (ordained wars). It lays down laws that come into play when the nation 
goes to war. It ordains several such laws that point towards the ideas of justice and 
fairness in the conduct of war, ‗Righteousness, righteousness shall you pursue, so that you 
will live.‘182 The latter passages of the Parashah183 also point towards the issue of 
environmental protection: ‗when you besiege a city for many days in order to fight, do not 
destroy its trees by raising an axe against them for you will eat from it.‘184 The tradition 
remains, original scriptures are interpreted variously to accommodate the phenomenon of 
war in the modern political context; nonetheless in its theological origins the notion of 
limitation in scope, conduct and victory is unquestionable and profound. 
The Jewish theological theories of war and victory through war, as with any religion, 
manifest themselves in history, culture and practice. According to Oz Almog, 
commenting on success over the Arabs in, and since, the War of Independence 1948, 
‗Israel‘s victory also received a mystical messianic interpretation in Israeli culture – even 
if only by implication – and this confirmed the Sabara‘s185 elitist self-image.‘186 The links 
between religion and holy war, militarism and messianism, and victory and the tribal cult 
are ancient ones. Victory in war has always been considered a concrete expression of 
superiority of the victor‘s faith and community.    
CHRISTIANITY 
Christianity has been more dynamic in adapting to the ‗spirit of the age‘. Its ancient 
tradition suggested a pacifist faith, rejecting all forms of warfare and introducing the idea 
of patience, perseverance and tolerance – turning the other cheek!187 However, the 
inevitable fight for wealth, living space and needs of statecraft as well as the initial threat 
from Judaism and later Islam provided emotional, political, economic and pragmatic 
grounds for legitimising war and violence. The church condoned war-fighting amongst 
Christian nobles for spoils, territory and other worldly issues and even tried to regulate 
such fighting in various ways including restrictions on days and times for battle. It did not 
however place such restriction when war was imposed by or carried to the non-Christians 
or other sects. The natural tendency from the idealist towards the realist paradigms of war 
emerged the Just War Tradition. In context it serves as an instrument of control; setting 
standards for conduct and for the purpose of war. The two pillars of Just War Doctrine 
build upon the age old concepts of necessity and proportionality. The Just War tradition, 
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though arguably not theological in origin, forms the bedrock of mainstream Christian 
position on war. It is an adaptation from absolute limitation to moderated acceptance as 
Rick Fields points out in The Codes of The Warrior
188
. Quoting Saint Bernard, Fields 
writes: ‗The soldier of Christ kills safely; he dies the more safely. He serves his own 
interest in dying, and Christ‘s interest in killing! Not without cause does he bear the 
sword!‘189  
The theological premise for the Just War tradition is clarified by David Little.  ‗Pacifism, 
or the total renunciation of the use of force, was in general identified with the early 
Christian church to the time of Constantine, and later with many of the Christian sects 
that were established during and after the Reformation, such as the Mennonites, Quakers, 
and others,‘ he goes on to say that ‗the advocates of the just war theory have taken the 
position that evil can be restrained by the coercive power of the state.‘190 The Gospels 
link Christian discipleship to a preference for non-violent benevolence.
191
 However, 
writes Little ‗at the same time, there are several famous passages that clearly authorize at 
least a restricted employment of force and thus provide a possible toehold for just war 
thinking.‘ 
Jesus commands any disciple ‗who has no sword‘ to sell his cloak ‗and buy one.‘192 When 
a disciple attacks a member of the party coming to apprehend Jesus, Jesus not only 
exhorts the disciple to stop, but also promptly heals the man wounded by the disciple.
193
 
It is, in fact, the deep sense of ambivalence about the use of force apparent in this passage 
that seems to pervade the entire message of the New Testament.  
The evolution of the notion of victory in the Christianity represents a development from 
its traditional theological strength of patience and perseverance to the need to institute 
war as an indispensable instrument of human existence and statecraft, governed within 
strict domain of legitimacy and proportionality. The modern paradigms of war and 
victory in war are grounded predominantly in the realist tradition and should not be 
confused with the faith‘s perspectives on war. 
ISLAM 
Majid Khadduri has observed that the ultimate objective in the Islamic worldview is 
peace, not war.
194
 More specifically, no purpose for war exists save that which fulfils the 
religious purpose of defending the interests of the Muslim community (umma), whose 
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members—contrary to the enemies of the divine truth—fear God and obey his prophets. 
War (harb), to the extent that it finds justification in Islamic law, is counted among the 
religious duties ('ibadat) and is defined by the Quranic notion of jihad (fisabilillah), 
‗striving (in the path of God).‘ Jihad comprises a large variety of individual and collective 
efforts to implement the life of pious submission (that is, Islam) to the will of God and 
requires, significantly, an Islamic polity to ensure worldly success. Peace (salam) is also a 
semantically rich concept in the Qur'an. In a just jihad, a ‗mujahid‘ finds himself in a ‗win 
– win‘ situation. The concept of ‗Ghazi ya Shaheed‘ – victory leads to peace and 
prosperity on earth while martyrdom assures a place in heaven and forgiveness – invoke 
inner motivation for selfless submission in the path of God.  
The Koran also ascribes the language ‗manifest victory‘ to a treaty among Muslims and 
Mecca most influential tribe and Mohammad‘s bitterest enemies, the Quraish of Mecca. 
The treaty is famously known as the Treaty of Hudaibia. The circumstances under which 
the treaty was arrived at were indeed surprising. With the Muslims, bargaining from a 
position of weakness but with a willingness to fight, the Quraish somehow agreed to a 
treaty that essentially granted the Prophet and his followers access to Mecca from the 
following year onwards.
195
 The treaty carried four main provisions:
196
 
 Muslims would return to Medina that year without entering Mecca. 
 They may return for Pilgrimage next year but would only remain in Mecca for 3 
Days. 
 If a Quraish from Mecca should join the Muslims he would be sent back but if a 
Muslim should join the Quraish he may remain at Mecca. 
 There would be no fighting for ten years. 
While apparently anything but a victorious settlement, Marmaduke Pickthall argues that 
this truce actually provided the space Islam needed to establish itself at that nascent stage. 
He assesses this apparent defeat to be the greatest victory that the Muslims had till then 
achieved. He writes that war had been a barrier between concerted Muslims and potential 
Muslims. The truce allowed both parties to meet and reunite. The new religion spread 
more rapidly. In the two years which elapsed between the signing of the truce and the fall 
of Mecca, the number of converts was greater than the total number of all previous 
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converts. When the Meccans broke the truce, the Muslims, now a strong force marched 
against them with an army of ten thousand.
197
 
A recent research by Dr Ahmed also finds that the subsequent events unfolded, this treaty 
did indeed prove exceptionally beneficial to the budding faith. It ended the constant 
atmosphere of hostility, the Meccans had a chance to study and soften up to the ‗Islamic 
way of life and resulted in a large number of conversions to Islam from among the most 
prominent members of the Quraish including their famed General Khalid Bin Walid.
198
 
Victory is mentioned at several places in the Qur‘an, in most cases, a physical notion is 
advanced. In terms of superiority of moral purpose and struggle in the ‗right path‘, the 
moral dimension of victory notwithstanding the outcome emerges as the most significant 
feature.  
IMPACT OF FAITH SYSTEMS: A SUMMARY 
This brief survey of the living religions allows for a comparative assessment of how 
success and failure at individual and collective level are construed under different belief 
systems. The theologising of victory and defeat affects the institution and practice of war. 
For example, religion as a motivational philosophy has worked well for the Taliban to 
carry their ‗war‘. Suicide bombings and other means of mass murder and killing of the 
innocent is given a moral context that serves as the principal source of motivation. To the 
suicide bomber it is presented as a short cut to heaven. The killing of the innocent is 
presented as a just end in this world for the blasphemous and the incorrigible.
199
 We find 
that the very character and nature of violence is a direct outcome of a theological 
interpretation of a just and unjust struggle defining both jus in bello and jus ad bellum.   
The opinions of the clergy, the analysts or the jurist notwithstanding, such restrictions 
based on religious or moral grounds seem to only serve a theoretical purpose. In practice 
one finds that religion and morality need only be invoked when in doing so some 
advantage or profit is seen: 
We must search fully into their nature and meaning. What has now been said 
should make perfectly obvious the difference between Jesus' ethic of non-
resistance and all forms of non-violent resistance, to which his views have 
sometimes been watered down in the interest of making them more plausible. 
It is plain that Jesus did not substitute the milder coercion of law courts and a 
system of claims and counter-claims for exacting an eye for an eye. Judaism 
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had already done that! Jesus' ethic is one of non-resisting, unclaiming [Sic.] 
love.‘200 
There exists an inherent link between religion and holy war as prescribed or accepted 
within any religion, militarism and ‗messianism‘201 that follows therefrom, and victory 
and the tribal cult are ancient ones. ‗Victory in war has always been considered a concrete 
expression of superiority of the victor‘s faith and community. The triumph of the 
conqueror was proof of the power of their patron saint.‘202 While victory finds a 
theological explanation in divine intervention and moral right, defeat is also explained in 
the same logic inter alia, impurity in faith, conviction, blasphemy and impurity or 
pollution of the faith but never inferiority of faith or weakness of the ‗saint‘. While we 
may draw this general conclusion, there is at least one notable exception, Chief Seattle 
[1777 – 1866], a Native American who led the Squamish and Duwamish Tribes.203  In a 
speech supposedly delivered before a public gathering called by the Governor of 
Washington, Isaac Ingalls Stevens, on 11 March 1854, said:   
Your God is not our God! Your God loves your people and hates mine! He 
folds his strong protecting arms lovingly about the paleface and leads him by 
the hand as a father leads an infant son. But, He has forsaken His Red 
children, if they really are His. Our God, the Great Spirit, seems also to have 
forsaken us. Your God makes your people wax stronger every day. Soon they 
will fill all the land. Our people are ebbing away like a rapidly receding tide 
that will never return. The white man‘s God cannot love our people or He 
would protect them. They seem to be orphans who can look nowhere for help. 
How then can we be brothers? How can your God become our God and renew 
our prosperity and awaken in us dreams of returning greatness? If we have a 
common Heavenly Father He must be partial, for He came to His paleface 
children. We never saw Him.
204
 
Chief Seattle of the Squamish  
There is another general rule that we may draw from among the contemporary faiths and 
confessions – including Hinduism – that religious philosophy of societal systems is 
inherently comparative and competitive. Each faith thus fosters or implants among its 
followers a principled belief of superiority of faith, if not of ‗being‘. It is often the faith 
that makes one ‗worthy of being counted among the ―children‖ of the ―greater father,‖‘205 
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and in the case of a national religion, an elitism within the nation and among nations. 
Among the monotheist religions, this philosophy is most pronounced in Judaism as 
highlighted in the following verse from Deuteronomy: 
For thou art the chosen people to the Lord thy God, and the Lord has chosen 
thee to be a special possession to himself, out of all the nations that are upon 
the earth.
206
  
How do the theological and interpreted traditions in these religions go on to affect war 
and the notion of victory, particularly in postmodern era are the main arguments that will 
be covered in Chapter III and IV. What is clear in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, is that 
the controlling, channelling and, at times, directing of violence is a subject of deep 
theological significance. ‗Central to the beliefs of each tradition is the conviction that God 
possesses divine authority over force and establishes a just standard for its exercise.‘207 
Religion, whether Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity or Islam, has been used as 
a tool for motivation, inspiration and induced change. Religion forms the foundation and 
dissonance constitutes the process for altering individual, social and even national ethos 
which are then taken to the level of redefining fundamental concepts of right and wrong 
and good and evil. The notion of victory as we have seen is one among these. A common 
feature, more cultural than theological is that triumph and conquest are seen as a proof of 
the power of one‘s god or patron saint while failure and defeat are earthly tests, trials and 
tribulations. 
SECTION 4: ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT AND THE MINIMALIST 
The Apolitical 
By definition, war is political. Its means however can be and often are apolitical. The 
minimalist, according to General Alistair Irwin
208
, has all the advantages. He is bound by 
no rules and no inhibitions or limitations.  ‗It seems to be the case that terrorists have the 
advantage of us in terms of the law and morality, just as much as they do operationally.
 209
  
For the minimalist there are no rules, no uniforms, no front line, no 
inhibitions or limitations, no territory to defend.  So the minimalist can 
choose where and when to strike; he can appear and disappear, cloaking 
himself in the darkness of the underworld.  For those that oppose him, the 
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difficulties are intense.  These are not two boxers facing each other in the dark 
(you will recall Liddell Hart‘s concept of the Man in the Dark), but rather two 
boxers one of whom is invisible.  How can he be found if he cannot be seen?  
How can he be attacked if he cannot be found?
 210
   
The question raised by General Irwin is, ‗what do we do about it? Do we join them 
outside the law and fight them on their own ground? Or do we keep the moral advantage? 
These are questions that we have asked ourselves more than once during the 35 year 
campaign in Northern Ireland‘. 211 The parallel drawn with Northern Ireland here is quite 
interesting as it suggests a sense of similarity in the approach of the minimalist and that of 
organised governments trying to engage or defeat them.  
The Political  
Mao Tse-Tung's writings present an interesting perspective on the nature of victory in 
People‘s wars. Mao‘s famous slogan ‗the enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, 
we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue,‘ summarizes one of 
the most central aspects of his concept of ‗protracted war‘ and its cyclical, drawn-out 
character.  Before the Japanese invasion, Mao strongly criticizes the idea of a constant 
advance or the need to cling on to territory. To him these concepts were unrealistic and 
potentially disastrous.  He argued that the war could only be won slowly, after a long 
series of enemy offensives and retreats. The Maoist notion of success placed victory in 
protracting war; in that not just by bleeding the enemy slowly but attacking his nerves or 
his determination to continue fighting but more significantly in keeping hope alive for 
one‘s own cause. A particular and peculiar concept of victory resided in each stage of 
Mao‘s revolutionary campaign.  For example, during the initial phase of the revolution, 
when the Communists were militarily weak a purely defensive strategy was adopted 
where invincibility was the objective. Later, while operating on interior lines, Mao 
adopted a ‗defensive-offensive strategy‘212 where possibilities for victory could be better 
explored.   
The apparent strength of Mao‘s strategy, and a feature of success of people‘s war 
strategies, lies in how ‗cheaply‘ victory is defined and how willing the revolutionaries are 
to accept casualties and remain hopeful. Cheaply defined victories invariably come at 
great human and material cost. Mao‘s approach in most western cultures would have been 
seen as a deliberate brutalisation of one‘s own people to sustain a political notion and not 
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perhaps the general good of the nation. Another inherent feature in people‘s wars is how 
even the most miniscule of successes finds great glory and how setbacks, even major 
ones, are seen as  a manifestation of the peoples unrelenting will, devotion to the cause, 
and motivation to go on.   
Max Boot‘s Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power, 213 
published in 2002 is arguably an Americanisation of Sir Alistair Horne‘s  A Savage War 
of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962.
214
 Boot provides an in-depth view of the involvement of the 
United States in ‗small wars‘, such as the Boxer and the Philippine Insurrections.  He 
points out that these smaller conflicts were not fought with the express intention of 
achieving a conventional victory ‗… but for reasons related to inflicting punishment, 
ensuring protection, achieving pacification, and benefiting from profiteering.‘ 215 Rudyard 
Kipling‘s ‗White Man‘s Burden‘ from where perhaps both the titles were inspired, echoes 
similar sentiments, albeit as something of a philosophical pun.
216
   
Another useful article which deals with the war on terror and the meaning of victory is 
‗Victory in Terror: War Has Many Meanings‘ by Pauline Jelinek.  This article also 
questions conventional view of victory. ‗Victory might mean a drop in the number of 
terror attacks, or a drop in the death tolls they inflict. But almost no one foresees a 
complete end to terror tactics that have succeeded in getting attention for Islamic 
extremists and others.‘217  
Jelinek hints at the idea of a ‗limited victory‘ regardless of the degree of success that may 
be achieved in such a conflict, the notion of a sense of diminishing returns. Is there a 
point beyond which each of the battles in the war on terror fails to yield results justifying 
the additional means committed? The analogy can be applied to a front, the war and, the 
campaign as a whole and indicates the importance of war termination, even in an 
unorthodox war such as the one against terrorism.   
SECTION 5: RECENT STUDIES ON THEORY AND DEFINITION OF 
VICTORY 
As stated at the beginning of the chapter, from a handful of studies at the time of the first 
round of literature survey carried out between 2004 – 2005, there has been in comparative 
terms, an explosion of research related to the concept, definition, theory, perception, 
notion and purpose of victory. Among the latter works, book lengths studies such as 
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Martel‘s Victory in War: Foundation of Modern Military Policy, (2007) has attempted to 
develop a theoretical framework for understanding victory. Such have been amply 
supported by numerous articles and even internet blog posts. Significant and important 
studies published up till end 2007 have been analysed and incorporated in this research.  
In 2004 in a monograph Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory, Gray set out a 
framework for strategic level analysis of military outcomes and contingent or resulting 
political impacts which is applicable both prospectively as well as retrospectively.
218
 His 
framework defines the quality of victory at the strategic level. Gray asserts the purpose 
and utility of victory as a relative meaning in relation to the ends that policy seeks. On 
extreme end, the most desirable and complete from a policy perspective is ‗decisive 
victory‘; additionally, he adds two distinct classification to the vocabulary namely, 
‗strategic success‘ and ‗strategic advantage.‘219 In terms of quality and utility these shades 
are obviously lower however, these are victories nonetheless. Gray finds that while 
decisive victory is still possible despite it being out of fashion through much of the cold 
war and beyond, strategic advantage and strategic success are equally important 
objectives for the use of military power and ones that can yield meaningful political 
results in the bargaining dynamic. Gray does not look outside the three shades discussed 
as of course anything short of strategic success would fall in the domain of stalemate, 
status quo or other shades of failure.    
An interesting and useful addition to the literature has been Victory before War.
220
 It 
describes what its authors refer to as the worlds most ancient and complete homeland 
defence. Derived from the Vedic tradition of India, this ancient wisdom is used to explain 
causes of terrorism, the folly of using pre-emptive attacks as the principal strategy in the 
war on terrorism, and the principles of modern science and Vedic science that 
demonstrate the effectiveness of Maharishi‘s Vedic defence based on social order, justice, 
equality and dialogue. This work has a purely spiritual outlook and as such falls outside 
the scope of this research which deals with issues of theory and policy. 
Robert Mandel in ‗Reassessing Victory in Warfare‘ (2007) explains the inherent 
subjectivity of the victory notion. Mandel identifies the conceptual difficulties in 
assessing victory from the perspective of the ‗end state, the cost-benefit analysis and the 
embedded subjectivity.‘221 He dissects the concept of victory in two distinct phases 
namely war winning and peace winning. Mandel identifies five important fallacies that 
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accompany a victory. First on his list are the military fallacies that arise from 
‗overestimating the post war payoffs of military power,‘222 political fallacies that stem 
from overestimating the ease of transforming the defeated state‘s post-war political 
system,‘223 economic fallacies stemming from underestimating the ‗costs of post-war 
economic assistance… underlying assumption that such economic reconstruction will be 
smooth, fast and inexpensive,‘224 social fallacies that overestimate the vanquished 
society‘s willingness to adopt the ‗victor‘s social value system‘ and last, diplomatic 
fallacies driven by the victors appreciation of external legitimacy of the post war 
arrangement by ‗assuming the outcome will serve as a positive model admired by 
onlookers.‘225  
In scope and comprehensiveness from among the recent literature, Martel‘s Victory in 
War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy (2007) presents a structured approach to 
assessing victory. Martel uses several case studies to induce a generic framework for 
assessing victory and provides a pre-theory.
226
 Ascribing a scale between military victory 
and ideological victory to the level of victory, Martel applies it to his three level 
analytical framework that looks at the achievement from the victory in ‗change of status 
quo‘, ‗mobilisation for war‘ and, ‗post conflict obligations.‘ Victory in war is seen 
subjective to itself as opposed to what it leads to. Success is seen as a function of how 
well and how professionally something was done as opposed to what actually was 
achieved in terms of policy objectives. 
In an unpublished seminar paper titled ‗Victory and Defeat in International Relations‘ 
(2005), Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney presents a case for perception over reality 
and the inescapable influence of culture on the former.
227
 Their thesis suggests that no 
theory of victory is complete unless the end state is viewed within the absolute and 
relative cultural frameworks of the opposing sides. Two approaches, one entirely 
‗correlational‘, referred to as scorekeeping framework, and the other largely 
‗perceptional‘, the ‗match fixing framework‘ are described. These are dealt with in detail 
in Chapter IV.   
These recent works that collectively serve to inform or construe contemporary pre-
theories of victory cannot be sufficiently underpinned by the foundations and language 
established in earlier works. According to Schelling, ‗victory‘ inadequately expresses 
what a nation wants from its military forces. Mostly it wants the influence that resides in 
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latent force. It wants the bargaining power that comes from its capacity to hurt, not just 
the direct consequence of successful military action. Even total victory over an enemy 
provides at best an opportunity for unopposed violence against the enemy populations. 
‗How to use that opportunity in the national interest, or in some wider interest, can be just 
as important as the achievement of victory itself; but traditional military suicide does not 
tell us how to use that capacity for inflicting pain.‘228  
Victory and defeat register on a sliding scale of possibilities. But a simple axis would 
miss much of the relevant action. Note Michael Howard‘s plausible opinion that a war, 
fought for whatever reason, that does not aim at a solution which takes into account the 
fears, the interests and, not least, the honour of the defeated peoples is unlikely to decide 
anything for very long.
229
 As a military objective, decisive victory is not controversial. 
Whether or not the decision sought needs to be conclusive, if not necessarily quite of a 
Carthaginian character – Carthago delenda est (English: Carthage must be destroyed)230, 
is a matter initially for policy to decide and then for political-military dialogue as events 
unfold.
231
 The quest for decisive success in the 21st century will more and more carry the 
risk of yielding only a painful Pyrrhic victory. 
CONCLUSION 
A review of the literature reveals that there has been little direct research by theorists and 
writers on the meaning and notion of victory. However, the black and white perception of 
victory has been sharply questioned, not only by literature and studies on the topic, but by 
the evolution in modern warfare; as well as changing global political events and the 
makeup of the multinational complex of the modern world. Victory is an essentially 
ambiguous and problematic concept.  
An extensive array of questions and interpretations of victory exist.  What was evidenced 
from the examination of the literature is the ambiguity and relativity of the treatment of 
‗victory‘.  We have also found that the idea of the finality of victory has been discounted 
by many theorists. Critics have tended to study the aftermath of military victories and 
their results or outcomes in terms of the larger implication for politics, diplomacy and 
society.   
Related literature, we find, predominantly deals indirectly with the idea of victory and its 
meaning, particularly in the analysis of military campaigns. Although one can identify a 
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wide range of issues and variable, the studies, reports and books cover areas of discussion 
from conventional correlational approaches – which deal mainly with outcomes and 
results of conflicts, both violent and non-violent in a simplistic way, that is the victor as 
opposed to the defeated – to a more contemporary and complex look at the impact of 
victory and defeat in relation to the purpose served, intended or otherwise.   
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CHAPTER III – WAR AND POLITICS 
It makes no difference what men think of war. … War endures. ... War was 
always here. Before man was, war waited for him. The ultimate trade 
awaiting the ultimate practitioner.
1
 
Cormac McCarthy 
INTRODUCTION 
ar, Quincy Wright suggests, has different appeal to different people.
2
 It is a 
political act with, ideally, clear political direction and objectives. Direction 
here implies the pursuit of national interests towards attainment of which, 
in whole or part thereof, the war contributes. War also has an internal dynamic, one that 
has a tendency of making it an activity unto itself, devoid of external logic and often 
restraint or control. This tendency defies political objectivity and/or the moral and legal 
precepts that have governed war from time to time. When war becomes an act unto itself 
and success is judged in a co-relational context, victory in war and, ‗political victory‘ 
through war, can run a tangential and dangerous course.  
War is also a socio-cultural activity. It is shaped by and in turn shapes societies, culture 
and the psychological approach to war.
3
 Any attempt, therefore, to deconstruct victory or 
to identify and develop a theory thereof, cannot begin without adequate insight to war as a 
political act, a socio-cultural attraction
4
 and a competition – what Clausewitz sees as the 
primordial tendency in war.
5
 
The nature of war, according to Liddell Hart, remains constant while every war exhibits, 
in every case, a new and unique character.
6
 As to what exactly defines the nature of war, 
and what attributes contribute to its character is a debate that scholarship has yet to 
unanimously reconcile. For now, we begin with a basic observation on the political 
intercourse of war.  
A survey of conflicts on the 20
th
 century as indeed the conclusions arrived at in War and 
Anti-war by Alvin and Heidi Toffler,
7
  brings us to the hypothesis that the political 
character of war in general mutates with every significant change in the international 
order and for any particular war it is affected by the international strategic environment 
before and during hostilities.  
W 
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Taking the 20
th
 century as a guide, the period up to the end of the First World War 
defined a particular international system with Europe as an undisputed power centre of 
the world, seen at a global scale as opposed to a regional metric. The League of Nations 
attempted to introduce a new international order after 1919. While it did create a 
distinctly different order, no significant redistribution of power occurred. It also ran 
tangentially to the nature and interests of states locked in an ‗anarchic‘ system. Its  
collapse was accelerated on the one hand by the failure of the US to ratify it and on the 
other by the events that unfolded in the interwar years leading up to the Second World 
War. The Cold War produced an ideologically polarised international order spearheaded 
by the US and the erstwhile USSR. The collapse of the Soviet Union and emergence of 
the US as a single most powerful state created a ‗unipolar‘ world with a character 
distinctly different from what had preceded it. The biggest change since the Cold War has 
come in the shape of the economic interdependence among nations, emergence of mega-
corporations that transcend national borders and in the way they treat capital, technology, 
goods and services. Whether we subscribe to the idea of globalism and globalisation or 
refer to it as selective economic liberalisation, the effect – which is of concern to this 
thesis – remains the same. In relation to the impact of the international environment on 
war, we find that such developments alone do not define how political disputes and wars 
draw their character. How success is gauged in a given order, is arguably a dominant 
dynamic of change in war‘s character alongside technology and the legal aspects of 
warfare.   
Plato summed the future of war in his prediction that ‗only the dead have seen the end of 
war.‘8 Colin S. Gray has long maintained that the institution of war retains much of the 
utility and place it had come to enjoy in centuries past.
9
 While economic development 
needs the security and deterrence that military capability lends it, war is 
counterproductive in an interconnected world. In such an economic order, war, even the 
most localized affair, is international. The ripple effects notwithstanding, degree and 
quality of the belligerents interface at both the governmental and the commercial level is 
at stake. The moral justification for recourse to violence – in real and perceptional terms – 
as well as the outcome – again as perceived internationally and not just domestically – 
affect both belligerents. The consequences are indeed profound; partly because the 
synthesis of trade and liberalisation collectively serve to mitigate the role of governments 
and in turn that of traditionally oriented ‗nation states‘, but largely because in a globalised 
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system, the trade agreements, market access, flow of information, technology and capital 
constitute what we may describe activity that may run contrary to policies of geographical 
dominions subscribing to the Westphalia model of the nation state. Today more than ever, 
stability, security and effective threat management are essential for economies to flourish.  
SECTION 1: WAR AND CONFLICT 
Before a deliberate study of war and the notion of victory in war can commence, it is 
essential to arrive at a definition of war and the wider issue of conflict. Definitions of war 
and conflict, like any social phenomena, are invariably with perspectives, masking a 
particular political or philosophical stance. They are as such varied. This section surveys 
some of the popular definitions of war and conflict from a variety of sources.  
War in its popular sense is understood as a conflict among political groups involving 
hostilities of considerable duration and magnitude.
10
 This ‗descriptive‘ definition of war 
and the apparent relationship it bears with ‗conflict‘ does not adequately capture the 
essence or war quid rei. On the basis of interests, focus or analysis the study of war can 
generally be divided into several categories. The most frequent of such classifications are 
philosophical, political, economic, technological, legal, sociological, religious and 
psychological for each of which ‗stipulative‘ definitions can be found. While these foci 
indicate how theoreticians treat war, most of the actual theories of war and conflict are in 
fact mixed. This is because the complexity of the phenomenon of ‗war‘, both noun (a 
war) and verb (to war), cannot be encapsulated or explained through any single factor or 
mono-dimensional approach. 
A list of generic and persuasive definitions representing the particular usage of various 
terms in this thesis has been presented earlier. However, war and conflict need to be 
addressed more deliberately as their understanding is foundational in nature. Definitions 
of war and conflict cannot and do not exist without context. Political, social, legal and 
military definitions of war present particular additives and omissions. These 
qualifications make the usage of the terms ‗war‘ and ‗conflict‘ subjective and contextual. 
The terms war and conflict are often used interchangeably for example, one definition of 
the ‗war‘ is ‗a state of open, armed, often prolonged conflict carried on between nation, 
states, or parties.‘ By this definition Vietnam was in fact a war. However, officially in the 
eyes of the United States government, it was a conflict,
11
 because Congress never 
Chapter III—War and Politics 
~88~ 
declared war on Vietnam. In fact, the US has not declared war since 1941 in a legal sense 
of the term.
12
  
CONFLICT 
Definitions of conflict, as too those of war, are contextual and usually multilevel. For 
example, Galtung describes conflict is a political process (dynamic situation) in which 
engaged parties have incompatible attitudes and behaviours.
13
 It consists of: a conflict 
situation, manifested in expressing various political aims or conflict of interest, which 
cannot be simultaneously achieved and for that reason could be qualified as mutually 
exclusive; conflict behaviour at the first place aimed to achieve the mentioned political 
aims; and conflicting attitudes and perceptions, having emotional dimension (such as 
feeling of anger, mistrust, fear, disrespect, hate and revenge.) Some modern and 
measurable definitions of conflict also exist for example SIPRI
14
 defines it as violence 
among social groups, nations or states, which causes at least 1000 casualties per year.
15
 
Conflict can be defined as a disagreement through which the parties involved perceive a 
threat to their needs, interests or concerns. Generally, if there is some level of difference 
in the positions of the two (or more) parties, regardless of the degree of enmity or amity 
between them, they can be said to be in conflict. When such disagreements are 
fundamental in nature and affect the core interests or values of either party, the conflict 
will invariably possess a volatile and escalatory trend. Another issue that needs attention 
is that of true disagreement versus the perceived disagreement. Arising out of mistrust, 
lack of communication or misunderstanding, the real and perceived issues can at times be 
quite different from one another. Contemporary conflicts and the trajectory for future 
ones – in terms of nature and scope – suggest an ever increasing complexity which 
require and equally complex or at least well considered response. War occurs when 
peaceful means for conflict resolution are either exhausted or are perceived to not have 
the capacity to yield meaningful results. Seen in this context, conflicts deal with issues 
while war provides an avenue for solution. 
WAR 
Political – rationalistic definitions of war and warfare tend to see war as a condition 
between states and organised forces. For example, according to the Merriam Webster 
Dictionary war is ‗a state of usually open and declared armed hostile conflict between 
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states or nations,‘ or ‗a period of such armed conflict‘ or  ‗a state of hostility, conflict, or 
antagonism... a struggle or competition between opposing forces for a particular end‘ for 
example a class war or a war against disease.’ As an act, to war is to ‗be in active or 
vigorous conflict,‘ or  ‘to engage in warfare.‘16, similarly Rousseau argues that ‗war is 
constituted by a relation between things, and not between persons…War then is a 
relation, not between man and man, but between state and state…‘17 Both definitions 
suggest that war only exists between states. In both cases, war is seen as a condition or 
state and a prequalification of formal declaration is added. John Keegan characterises 
such political-rationalist theories of war as essentially limiting since these assume war to 
be an orderly affair in which states are involved, in which there are declared beginnings 
and expected ends, easily identifiable combatants, and high levels of obedience by 
subordinates. Keegan notes that such nationalist theories do not deal well with pre-state or 
non-state peoples and their warfare.
18
  
There are other schools of thought that seek to address war in a broader context and 
include in its fold the struggles of nomadic or displaced peoples, non-state groups, 
insurgencies and insurrections. For example, the Oxford English Dictionary expands the 
definition to include ‗any active hostility or struggle between living beings; a conflict 
between opposing forces or principles.‘19 This avoids the narrowness of a political-
rationalist conception by admitting the possibility of metaphorical, non-violent clashes 
between systems of thought, such as of religious doctrines or rival trading companies. 
This perhaps indicates too broad a definition, for trade is certainly a different kind of 
activity than war, although trade occurs in war, and trade often motivates wars. Such 
definitions suggest how change occurs when opposing forces act on each other. War is 
often both the product, as also the driver of the process. 
The Encyclopaedia Britannica describes war in relation to the context or frame of 
reference. In its common and popular usage war is understood ‗as conflict among political 
groups involving hostilities of considerable duration and magnitude;‘ while in the social 
science perspective, application of the term is restricted ‗to such conflicts only if they are 
initiated and conducted in accordance with socially recognized forms. They treat war as 
an institution recognized in custom or in law.‘ Whereas ‗military writers usually confine 
the term to hostilities in which the contending groups are sufficiently equal in power to 
render the outcome uncertain for a time.‘ The encyclopaedia also cites further distinction 
based on the relative strength and size of the contending belligerents:  ‗armed conflicts of 
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powerful states with primitive peoples are usually called pacifications, military 
expeditions, or explorations; with small states, are called interventions or reprisals; and 
with internal groups, rebellions or insurrections. Such incidents, if the resistance is 
sufficiently strong or protracted, may achieve a magnitude that entitles them to the name 
‗war.‘‘20 
From these three influential dictionaries we have distinct definitions that connote 
particular philosophical positions.  Alternative definitions of war premise on legal, ethical 
and moral precepts as well as biological ones that suggest war to be a fatalist, all-
pervasive phenomenon of the universe also exist. War, we find, has been defined 
variously by scholars, statesmen and soldiers however, generally these definitions fall 
into two broad categories of act and state. A summary of the influential definitions 
follows: 
 Cicero (106 – 43 BC) presents one of the earliest and simplest definitions of war. 
A ‗contending by force‘21 is how he described it. This is a very general and broad 
definition but one that premises on the use of force. Cicero also wrote that ‗there 
is no intermediate state between war and peace‘22, which hints at the idea that war 
can also be thought of as a state. 
 Grotius adopted a legal approach that premised on and introduced the idea of war 
as a state. Grotious, initially critical of Cicero offered various definitions. From 
early works where he referred to it as the ‗act of putting arms to use‘ to a later 
one, closer to Cicero‘s which read: ‗the state of those contending by force.‘23  
 Hobbes‘ (1588 – 1679) definition of war posited an entirely different perspective: 
‗war consisteth not in battle only, nor in the act of fighting‘.24 Fighting was not 
elemental to Hobbes view on war. It also defined a particular type of war common 
in international parlance where a state of war exists but no fighting takes place. 
The peculiar state of war between Germany and the Anglo-French alliance over 
Poland, the ‗phony war‘25 as it was called, involved no fighting. Hobbes‘ 
definition thus describes the state of mind of the parties to a conflict – their will to 
be at war notwithstanding the absence of violence.  
 In the 18th century, Emerich de Vattel wrote: ‗War is the state in which we 
prosecute our right by force‘.26 He described war as a method of settling 
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disputes.
27
 A normative dimension that sees war as a prosecution of ‗rights‘ and 
not interests.    
 For Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804), war is ‗a regrettable expedient for asserting 
one‘s rights by force, with no court of justice available to judge with legal 
authority‘.28 Kant‘s conception is somewhat limiting outside the revolutionist 
paradigm, as it presupposes a certain international order to which the belligerents 
subscribe.  
 Carl Von Clausewitz defines war as duel at a larger scale and an ‗act‘ of policy. 
His description of war as ‗an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will‘29 
incorporates elements of a ‗state‘ or ‗condition‘ together with the ‗act.‘ 
Importantly, the act carries an aim without which it ceases to be war and becomes 
raw, wanton violence. An interesting thing to note in Clausewitz‘s definition is 
that he makes no mention of nations or states; it follows that the definition can be 
adapted to wider conflict situations provided the act carries a political aim or 
objective.  
 Among modern historians and strategists, Sir Michael Howard explains war as an 
‗armed conflict between organised political groups‘30 while Colin S. Gray moves 
away from the ‗condition‘ and ‗act‘ definiens and suggests a more abstract notion 
where ‗war is a relationship between belligerents, not necessarily states‘31 Taking 
a line closer to what Hobbes‘ had suggested, Gray‘s definition is incomplete 
unless qualified by the definition of warfare: ‗the conduct of war, primarily 
through not exclusively, by military means.‘32 Seen in this way, war is free from 
the act of fighting, the means as well as the condition of violence making it more 
universal and enduring in an environment where the character of war is 
increasingly technology intensive and its purpose less total. 
Having identified a spectrum of definitions, it is the political issue of war and its allied 
philosophical dimensions that concern this research. We need a definition that captures 
the clash of arms, the state of mutual tension and threat of violence between groups, the 
authorized declaration by a sovereign body with or without legal frameworks and last,  
definable ends and policy objectives. This would allow us to distinguish wars from riots 
and rebellions, collective violence from personal violence, metaphorical clashes of values 
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from actual or threatened clashes of arms. In wars with limited political aims, a more 
suited definition is: 
The use or threat of use of violence between organised groups for politico-
military objectives directly – through warfare and  war-fighting – or  through 
gaining sufficient leverage by military and / or other means of violence for 
favourable bargaining.  
The definition holds good for most types of wars even those which involve a super power 
against an easily defeated smaller entity – what the Encyclopaedia Britannica calls 
pacifications.
33
 The emphasis lies in both sides retaining the quality of limitation. When 
war becomes a total affair for any one of the parties, the rational calculus of ends and 
objectives ceases to retain a purely political meaning.   
SECTION 2: WAR AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE POLITICS 
OF VICTORY AND DEFEAT 
Politics is the womb in which war develops - where its outlines already exist 
in their hidden rudimentary form, like the characteristics of living creatures in their 
embryos.
34
 
Carl von Clausewitz  
This section is not about how nations gain tangible material rewards such as territory, 
regime changes, or resources, nor does it deal with diplomacy, coercive or compellence 
strategies that they may employ to further their goals.  History constantly reminds us that 
in international relations, military victory, or indeed the gain of any tangible reward at all, 
is neither necessary nor sufficient for domestic audience, allies or the international 
community to construe that a leader, nation or alliance has won. ‗Not necessary‘ writes 
Dominic Johnson ‗because perceived victory can be obtained despite net losses: not 
sufficient because even substantial gains do not guarantee that people will view events as 
a success.‘35 Victory and perceived victory can be synonymous. Johnson cites the Second 
World War as an example, however, as this thesis will show, concurrence between 
perception and reality only applied to the USA and the erstwhile USSR in 1945. For the 
remaining allies, while not pyrrhic, there were expensive political trade-offs in the name 
of victory.  
Quite often, however, ‗one side can exploit geography, technology and strategy to defeat 
an opponent militarily, yet still emerge as the perceived loser, with all the tribulations that 
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this status involves,‘36 Vietnam is a case in point; the jury is still out on the fate of a 
prolonged conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. If the wisdom of Sun Tzu and lessons of 
history are any guides, material benefits and sweeping military victories notwithstanding, 
international and domestic perceptions for the USA and her allies are likely to steer away 
from the victory notion.  
‗Defeat is an orphan‘37 as Thomas Campbell so avidly put it. Politically it is seldom that 
nations in a collective sense or more specifically leaders or parties accept failure as 
defeat. Stephen Van Evera argues that states tend to ‗embellish their past to aggrandize 
their prestige and deny their weaknesses. Countries are prone to ‗nationalist 
mythmaking‘, in which they exaggerate their greatness in history and contemporary world 
affairs, and diminish the greatness of others, through a range of societal processes, 
including education, literature, and the political postures of elites. The system works well 
because, as a general rule, the peoples of one nation do not read the histories of another as 
closely. If they do, they cannot identify with it in the same way.‘38  
From the perspective of international relations, the variations in perception, reality and 
the resulting construct of victory and defeat are aptly summed up by Elliot A. Cohen in 
the following passage taken from Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and 
Leadership in War:  
Every war is begun, dominated, and ended by political considerations; 
without a nation, without a government, without money or credit, without 
popular enthusiasm which furnishes volunteers, or public support which 
endures conscription, there could be no army and no war - - neither beginning 
nor end of methodical hostilities.  
War and politics, campaign and statecraft, are Siamese twins, inseparable and 
interdependent; and to talk of military operations without the direction and 
interference of an administration is as absurd as to plan a campaign without 
recruits, pay or rations...  
There is no evidence that they understood any better than the civilian 
leadership the mentality of friend or foe [in the Vietnam War], or that they 
had any ideas for bringing the war to a conclusion on terms acceptable to 
American diplomacy and bearable for the American public.
39
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PERSPECTIVES ON WAR 
The socio-political perspective of war is incomplete without reviewing the institution of 
war in international relations theory and practice. Realism defines the predominant nature 
of inter and intra-state relations though there have been selective experiments in 
rationalism and idealism. Realism points to the anarchical state of the world – in terms of 
absence of a single authority over states – characterised by its competitive nature. 
Competition can lead to war and war is accepted as an essential instrument of political 
interaction. Balance of power is seen as the principal source of order and peace as its 
subjective element. In contrast, idealism sees international law and morality as key 
influences on international events as opposed to the overarching status of power in the 
realist paradigm. Human nature is perceived as basically good. Human development 
through education and the existence of international organizations – such as the UN – can 
yield peace, cooperation and help to facilitate good relations between nations. Idealists 
see the world as a community of nations which has the potential to work together to 
overcome mutual problems.
40
 Balance of power, though useable, is second to the big 
brother, regional policemen – or a global power that arbitrates between states, ensures 
justice and resolves disputes while preventing violence. Idealism was manifested in the 
ill-fated League of Nations. Rationalism rests greater faith in the problem solving abilities 
of international institutions. ‗The object of war is peace and not vice versa‘.41 War still 
remains a possibility. However, the balance of power is not seen as the only means of 
maintaining international order.  
War is an inescapable reality, while interpretations of its function and utility vary; it 
remains the ‗ultimate feature of international relations, as revolution is the ultimate 
feature of domestic politics.‘42  Martin Wight‘s summation of the place of war in the 
‗three traditions‘ of international theory (discussed below), provides valuable insight to 
war‘s purpose, conduct and, by reverse induction, for the core purpose of this thesis.  
For the Rationalist school, war is a necessary evil, which is to be minimised as far as 
possible to serve the principal notion that the object of war is peace and not vice versa. 
‗Peace is the norm and war the violation or exception; peace is logically prior to war.‘43 
For the realist – ‗peace is the laboratory of war.‘44 The realist is constantly in a state of 
frictions with friends, allies and foe alike. With international anarchy as the common 
denominator, all ‗wars‘ are in substance ‗battles‘, peace is but a pause, a ‗revetment‘ for 
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the next battle. This leads to the conclusion that even the most defining wars – what 
Philip Bobbitt referred to as ‗epochal wars‘45 - represent battles or campaigns in a wider 
unending conflict, a perpetual friction in relations among all states.  
For the realist, peace is contested, war is the natural state. Effort, including violence is 
necessary to attain a desirable peace. In a more rationalist reduction, we can deduce that 
the object of war is not peace but a different peace as depicted in the diagram below:  
 
FIGURE 7: THE TWO STATES OF PEACE,  
 SOURCE: AN ADAPTATION OF AN EARLIER MODEL DEVELOPED BY THE AUTHOR.46  
 
 The revolutionists, like the rationalists do not consider power and war to be self-
justifying. Peace is prior to war and war is a necessary evil, a step towards a more desired 
peace. Rationalist and the revolutionist differ in the sense that the rationalist frame of 
The principles of physics, applied in Figure 7, elaborate the states of 
peace:  
In the absence of sufficient flux or ‘power’ or equal flux in both 
magnets, the pendulum would remain suspended in the zone of war 
and violence; though there may exist periods of apparent peace as 
indicated by ‘War Halted’  
Overwhelming flux on any one side draws the magnet out of war in to 
the zone of a desired peace – note that the process of drawing the 
magnet out is itself indicative of coercion or compellence and war.  
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reference is a single war whereas the revolutionist considers a series of wars leading to a 
perfect peace.
47
   
Clausewitz tells us that war is not merely an act, but also an instrument,
48
 a continuation 
of political relations, carrying out of the same by other means.
49
 It is an act of force 
which, in the context of Clausewitz‘s two wrestlers50, is the manifestation of their 
individual power and skill, firmness of grip – balance and will. It is the moral, conceptual 
and physical manifestation of power accumulated as a result of exercise, reflection, 
training and nourishment. The Clausewitzian explanation of war as a duel at a larger scale 
hence serves wider meaning than war-fighting alone. In the context of states, the origins 
of state power were reflected in military power, its usage (that is to deter, coerce or 
compel) and ultimately, in the manner in which war served state interests by the nature of 
political leverage it provided. Clausewitzian notion of victory, in both political and 
military terms and more so in the latter context, was a direct outcome of what he had 
witnessed war to be in his time and his interpretation of history. Napoleon pursued pure 
military victory in a form of war that resembled Clausewitz‘s theoretically perfect war 
(absolute war).
51
 Clausewitz‘s also realised that war in its perfect form could not exist in 
reality; nonetheless it needed to be studied in this hypothetical form for purpose of theory. 
In essence he identified the political character of war which was a distinct aberration from 
its pure primordial form that vectored war‘s inherent inertia in sobering often paradoxical 
direction.  
The pure, the absolute is the natural tendency of war, so Clausewitz warned us. This 
‗ghost of Napoleon‘ – Basil Liddell Hart‘s avid description of the smothering legacy of 
the French Revolution and resultant European order – lived on well into the 20th century 
and defined much of the socio-political intercourse that, in turn, tainted the character of 
war in an unprecedented manner. It was technology of mass destruction – the nuclear 
bomb – that put question marks on validity of the wisdom and future of age of mass 
warfare and echoed once again Machiavelli‘s assertion that war is useful only so long as 
it serves the interest of the state. What is thus of primary importance is the need to control 
war for the purpose it must serve and not war‘s own sake or the glory of a hollow 
victory.
52
  
Sun Tzu stresses that ‗victory is the main object of war‘53 and thus, by implication, either 
the war aims or methods adopted (that is to say the objective and subjective elements of 
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war) must be shaped and kept in harmony with the principal purpose of attaining victory. 
There appears a deliberate delinking of the ‗desired‘ and the ‗should be‘ aims and 
objectives from the pursuit of a perceptional victory – even if such a victory slights any 
substantive aims and objectives.  Analysing the relationship, John Keegan, writing in 
1994, presents a case for military success concluding that ‗those who make war an end in 
itself are likely to be more successful than those who seek to moderate its character for 
political purpose.‘54   
CAUSES OF WAR IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
War is often said to perform a biological and a socio-political function. These contexts 
represent the two major schools of thought in the contemporary theories on the causes of 
war. Ethology is a relatively new field of study. Pioneered in the 1920s by the Dutch 
biologist Nikolas Tinbergen and Konrad Lorenz of Austria,
55
 it is the study of animal and 
increasingly, human behaviour and places aggression on a continuum with, on one end, 
the absence of aggression or cooperative submission and on the other, the use of violence 
or war. Ethologists assert that instinct bound aggression is premised on self-preservation 
and self-improvement of a species necessitated by the functional distribution of limited 
resources in one part, and survival of the fittest by elimination of the weakest and the ill 
from the reproduction process on the other.
56
 War is attributed to ‗certain innate 
biological and psychological factors or drivers.‘57 Ethology relates to animal behaviour in 
much the same way as psychology does to humans. For Ethologists too, violence – which 
is essential to war – draws a distinct set of theories as it does for psychologists and 
psychoanalysts. Among the various theories of war, these theories are collectively 
referred to as biological theories of war.  
The Darwinian philosophy of natural selection combined with the biological theories is 
thus a combination of the ‗need, necessity, survival and interest‘ school within the ‗urge 
and impulse‘ school completing the biological theories subset. Although as modern 
discoveries and research point out, natural selection may not have defined our origins – as 
too that of other animals that survive today –58  but to the social scientist interested in the 
study of war, it does present a thesis for unifying the biological and social theory of war. 
Tempting as it may be to delve deeper in to the issue, it is a digression from the object of 
this study.  
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The causes of war according to the second school of biological theorists are postulated in 
man's psychological nature. The hypotheses range from the very general to complex. The 
former, boasting proponents such as St Augustine and Spinoza look at the more intuitive 
dimensions such as moral, ethical and philosophical.  Herfried Münkler finds that: 
Modern writers utilizing psychological approaches emphasize the significance 
of psychological maladjustments or complexes and of false, stereotyped 
images held by decision makers of other countries and their leaders. Some 
psychologists posit an innate aggressiveness in man. Others concentrate upon 
public opinion and its influence, particularly in times of tension; others stress 
the importance of decision makers and the need for their careful selection and 
training. Most believe that an improved social adjustment of individuals 
would decrease frustration, insecurity, and fear and would reduce the 
likelihood of war. All of them believe in the importance of research and 
education.
59
  
The limitations of such approaches derive from their very generality. Whether such 
psychological premises are realistic or idealistic, the impact upon human behaviour of 
social and political institutions that give man the opportunities to exercise his good or evil 
propensities and to impose restraints upon him can never be ignored.   
In sum, war and peace as far as behavioural research goes, are merely metaphorical terms 
for ‗two opposing sets of indistinctly defined circumstances on a continuum representing 
species-preserving and species-increasing aggression.‘ The military has learnt to suppress 
the human impulse to flee from danger, developed weapons; drill and practices combined 
these with psychosocial motivations to enable war to remain an instinct-bound form of 
settling conflicts.60 War ‗can neither be attributed to degenerated, misguided animal 
instincts nor to necrophilia or other pathological degeneration of human sexual desire. 
War is not a functionless degeneration, but a specifically human form of inter-group 
aggression that is used by people to compete for land and natural resources.‘61 Eibl-
Eibesfeldt asserted that the development of weapons of war was a decisive step in the 
functional change of aggression: 
 There can be little doubt that weapons were a decisive factor in the 
development of destructive aggression. Weapons technology played its part in 
eroding our instinctive inhibitions. A swift blow with a weapon can take out a 
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fellow human before he has the chance to plea [Sic.] for mercy using the 
appropriate submissive gestures. This works even better when killing is done 
at a distance using an arrow, for example.
62
 
We have looked at the two extremes: first, theories that suggest man‘s destructive instinct 
that impels him to kill his fellow man and, the other where the instinct is not wanton but 
itself a derivative of an innate awareness of natural competition for resources. These 
biological theories tend to lump individuals, social groups and wider national or state 
groups together and largely premise on a degree of symmetry, or at least a level of 
consistency in triggers and responses among them. The former set of theories, the social 
theories of war, take off from essentially interest based approach and themselves fork into 
two broad streams namely the socialist and the liberal theories.   
Liberal theorists differentiate between the individual, the society and the state. While an 
individual, a social group or a state may act symmetrically; this is not a general rule or a 
premise. The state, at least among the classical liberal theorists of the 18
th
 and 19
th
 
century, could not exist without the individual and the society. Economy, 
decentralization, and freedom from governmental control were the classical liberal's main 
concerns, as shown particularly clearly in the writings of John Stuart Mill.
63
 They 
accepted the necessity of maintaining defence but postulated the existence of a basic 
harmony of interests among states, which would minimize the incidence of wars. 
Economic cooperation based upon an international division of labour and upon free trade 
would be in the interest of everybody—commerce would be the great panacea, the 
rational substitute for war.  
In explanation of wars that did occur, however, liberals emphasized a variety of factors. 
First, they focused on autocratic governments, which were presumed to wage war against 
the wishes of peacefully inclined people. It thus became a major tenet of liberal political 
philosophy that war could be eliminated by introducing universal suffrage because the 
people would surely vote out of office any belligerently inclined government. The course 
of the 19th century, however, and especially after the First World War, liberals began to 
accept the conclusion that an unregulated international society did not automatically tend 
toward peace and advocated international organization as a corrective. 
Liberal ideas were manifest through political structures which they regarded as primary in 
determining a state‘s propensity towards war. Socialists however, saw the socio-economic 
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system as a prime mover. Whereas liberals concentrated on political structures, regarding 
them as of primary importance in determining the propensity of states to engage in war, 
socialists turned to the socioeconomic system of states as the primary factor. Early in the 
20
th
 century the two streams did, to some extent, converge, as evidenced by the fact that 
the English radical liberal John Hobson, in 1902,  explained wars in terms later adopted 
by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin in 1916.
64
 Today again, free market system is increasingly 
adopting socialist policies at least within selected sectors. With the world economy 
headed towards a recession we have seen and perhaps will continue to see staunch 
‗market states‘ acting quite socialistically and bailing out private concerns on taxpayers 
money. Our socio-economic experiments as too testing the limits of liberalisation seem to 
have run their course, a full circle as we head back to what resembles a convergence in 
realism and rationalism.  
GLOBALISATION AND WAR 
Kenichi Ohmae asserts that ‗the nation state has become an unnatural, even dysfunctional, 
unit of organising human activity and managing economic endeavour in a borderless 
world. It represents no genuine, shared community of economic interest; it defines no 
meaningful flow of economic activity.‘ Globalisation has three facets: trade, technology 
and liberalisation.
65
 While schools of thought on the nature and impact of globalisation 
vary, the visible impacts of the subjective aspects of globalisation have brought about a 
change in the character of states and their governments; what Phillip Bobbitt avidly 
describes as the ‗market state‘66. Taking this school of thought to be correct would mean 
that the changed international political context rejects physical and geographical confines 
defined by international borders and asserts instead soft borders delineated by trade, 
commerce, economic cooperation – the stuff found often in agreements between trading 
groups as opposed to governments. The ‗market state‘ therefore creates borders of its own 
– trade borders – spatial and extra-spatial dominions, of flow of capital, technology, 
goods and services manifest in fluid regional alliance, agreements, policies and operating 
systems.  
If borders still exist with only their definition changed, it may be argued that the 
globalised international system itself possesses roots for future conflict. The flux in the 
dominion of common space between geographically organised insular states and the 
virtual boundaries of the ‗market state‘ explains some of the conflicts that have ensued 
since the breakup of the Soviet Union.  
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In this synthesised geo-economics - geopolitical system, as indeed in the geo-political 
order that applied in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries, the superpowers continue to play their 
traditional role. Today, it is the mega economies that, to quote Woods, ‗get to set (and 
enforce) many of the rules of the new global economy.‘67 To a limited extent, emerging 
economic power houses have also sufficient economic coercive power to make and 
amend the rules, set the terms of play and even cite the goal posts. The rise of India and 
Brazil is a case in point. It is believed that the so called BRIC group (Brazil, Russia, India 
and China) would outstrip the G7 by 2032 and, by 2050, constitute the biggest economic 
group.
68
 Whether they realise a common platform such as the EU model is an issue of 
speculation and debate. However projecting the trajectory of their military developments, 
any military alliances to which two or more of these powers lend weight would invariably 
enjoy substantial power sway if not decisive superiority. What we may well see is the 
emergence of first real challenge to military supremacy since that enjoyed by the Ottoman 
Empire before their crushing defeat at Vienna in 1683.
69
  
Economic progress and military power go hand in hand. Epic wars of the industrial age 
encouraged great leaps in technology. The Napoleonic Era,  the First World War, the 
Second World War, the Cold War, the two Gulf Wars (1991, 2003) all manifest major 
leaps in technology and tempo of war – at least for one side – yielding a new character, 
quite distinct from the last, every time.  
These developments were driven in part by the principle of necessity and in part by the 
momentum and resources that the momentum of such wars unlocked. While the march of 
technology would certainly not have been halted had these long wars not occurred, 
however the scale, pace and energy with which society and its resources, human material 
and moral, were mobilised could not have been realised in the absence of these wars. So, 
too, the pace at which military technology found civilian applications accelerated, and 
vice versa. Today however, wars no longer serve as a fillip to the new technologies on the 
scale that they did earlier. On the contrary, the competitive economic environment that 
defines today‘s geo-economic environment requires stability and security. 
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MORALITY AND WAR 
Without a pretext, no war follows.
70
 
Thucydides  
Unlike the Mennonites, nearly every human society has experienced war in the course of 
its evolution. Indeed, it is probably fair to say that it is war that has most profoundly 
shaped the values of human society. Peaceful societies, when pressed by circumstances or 
interests – emerging realities – have transformed to face the challenge in a Darwinian 
manner – holding survival and self-perpetuation supreme. In any rational recourse to 
violence, the end state has a direct relationship with not only the cause but also the 
manner in which war is prosecuted. War, therefore, offers opportunity for a better, or at 
least a different, more acceptable peace.  
 ‗Humaneness‘ has only changed the face of warfare, not its incidence, frequency, 
brutality or inherent causes. The impulse to war rests in deep rooted factors: greed versus 
grievance, group motives such as horizontal inequalities, individual greed – the 
opportunity to profit from war as identified by Keen,
71
 Collier and Hoefller
72 
and the 
failure of the social contract manifested in inequality, poverty and lack of security. 
Thucydides, too, identifies these generic, instinctual issues, as the basic causes of the war 
and then takes the argument to a moral level. He sees freedom and peace as the purpose 
of war. The latter rests firmly in the rationalist paradigm but the former, in the absolute 
sense, is an idealist entity. Thucydides implicitly asserts that human history is causal, and 
that causes can be temporally proximate or long-term. He writes, ‗[M]en need a cause and 
a morality based on reason rather than force if war and slavery are to be avoided‘73, and, 
‗that men accept from one another hearsay reports of former events, neglecting to test 
them…‘ Citing the example of a historical error accepted by the Athenians, he goes on to 
say that ‗so averse to taking pains are most men in the search for the truth‘ and ‗so prone 
are they to turn to what lies ready at hand…‘74   
Among the root causes we also have the pre-state stage that one may relate to a certain 
extent with post-Cold War ‗failed states‘75, where then prevails, as Hobbes explains, ‗…a 
time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the 
time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their 
own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition … continual fear, and danger 
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of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.‘76 
Thucydides, writing in History of The Peloponnesian War, earlier reflected:   
‗And for his putting first the narration of the public and avowed cause of this 
war, and after that the true and inward motive of the same; the reprehension is 
absurd. For it is plain, that a cause of war divulged and avowed, how slight so 
ever it be, comes within the task of the historiographer, no less than the war 
itself. For without a pretext, no war follows. This pretext is always an injury 
received, or pretended to be received. Whereas the inward motive to hostility 
is but conjectural; and not of that evidence, that a historiographer should be 
always bound to take notice of it: as envy to the greatness of another state, or 
fear of an injury to come.‘77 
 Thomas Schelling, a prominent US Nuclear strategist during the Cold War, argued that 
the propensity towards peace or war is inherently ‗embedded in the weaponry, the 
geography and the military organisation of the time.‘78 Stephan Van Evera advances the 
argument further and presents five hypotheses built around the three fundamentals noted 
by Schelling. Van Evera asserts that the likelihood of war increases when: (1) states fall 
prey to false optimism about the outcome of the conflict,
79
 (2) advantage lies with the side 
that mobilises or strikes first,
80
 (3) power of states fluctuates sharply creating larger 
windows of opportunity or vulnerability,
81
 (4) control of resources allows states to protect 
or acquire other resources – cumulative resources82 and (5) conquest is easy83. Van 
Evera‘s hypotheses rest firmly in the realist paradigm and point even more profoundly, 
though indirectly, towards the essence of what Thucydides tells us – ‗… but it hath been 
fixed, for the weaker to be kept under the stronger.‘84 Van Evera‘s conceptualisation of 
the origins of interstate conflict is comprehensive but applies only to organised states 
wielding symmetric and possibly dissymmetric
85
 military forces. The hypotheses begin to 
break down when applied to ideological, intrastate conflicts or to what Samuel P. 
Huntington defines as the clash of civilisations,
86
 to what caused the attack on the twin 
towers in New York on 11 September 2001, how the non-state actor can and will 
interface with traditionally organised states and the emerging market states. Globalisation, 
demographic factors and humanitarian intervention are inescapable links that cannot be 
ignored as direct or contingent causes of conflict. Manufactured conflicts that serve 
covert purpose, politics, also elude defines of Van Evera‘s hypotheses. However, as we 
shall see later, these hypotheses have immense secondary utility, more relevant to this 
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thesis, as they provide a framework for analysing the historical and contemporary 
paradigms of limitation in war. 
In Indo - Persian philosophy, as revered in the East as that of ancient Greece is in the 
West, ‗war‘ has been a subject of intense scrutiny, debate and discussion over the 
centuries. Origins of Persian philosophy, which came to dominate and spread as a natural 
consequence of the Persian empire, can be traced back as far as to old Iranian 
philosophical traditions and thoughts which originated in ancient Indo-Iranian roots and 
were considerably influenced by Zarathustra's
87
 teachings. It is believed that the 
chronology of the subject and science of philosophy starts with the Indo-Iranians and 
dates back to 1500 BC.
88
 ‗Zarathushtra's philosophy entered to influence western tradition 
through Judaism, and therefore on Middle Platonism.‘89 War has material, moral and 
territorial origins. It can be explained as a play of the trinity of ‗Zan‘, ‗Zar‘ and 
‗Zamin‘.90 Literally translated it would read ‗women‘, ‗wealth‘ and ‗territory‘; however, 
the true context resident within has never really been developed among scholarship in the 
East. Let us briefly look at the individual components before taking the whole as a 
philosophy of war. 
ZAN 
Literal meaning ‗woman,‘ the term refers to and embodies honour, respect, status, beliefs 
and, in derivative forms, revenge and ideology.  
ZAMIN 
Meaning ‗territory,‘ is linked to the need for the state or group to expand and to protect 
the integrity of its physical boundaries. Territory is often synonymous with resources and 
wealth. The concept is quite akin to the notion of the state as a living organism that has an 
inherent urge to survive and to do so it must expand and grow or be taken up.
91
  
ZAR 
‗Wealth‘ is self-explanatory and can be construed in the passive or submissive, defensive, 
offensive, preventive and pre-emptive contexts. Thomas Robert Malthus (1766 – 1834), 
an 18
th
 century English economist believed that ‗survival is the perpetual struggle for 
room and food.‘92 In ‗An Essay on the Principle of Population as it Affects the Future 
Improvement of Society,‘ he presented what was referred to as Malthus‘ ‗Dismal 
Theorem‘93 by his contemporaries.94 Malthus was probably the first European to study at 
length the issue of resource – which he considered to be ultimately limited – and 
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demography. Around the same time Clausewitz was expanding his treatise On War. As 
Professor Christopher Bellamy points out in Knights in White Armour, the two never 
met.
95
 Had they done so, a more comprehensive and compelling relationship between 
resource and recourse to war might have been established by Clausewitz. Malthus 
believed that population is limited by means of subsistence, that population invariably 
increases where means of subsistence increase, unless prevented by some very powerful 
and obvious check and that these checks, and the checks which repress the superior power 
of population and keeps its effects on a level with the means of subsistence, are all 
resolvable into moral restraint, vice, and misery.
96
 A case certainly exists for 
demographic factors and resources as origins of conflict. Kerbs and Levy in Demographic 
Change and Sources of International Conflict identify the possible linkages between 
changes in population size and composition as well as resource scarcity and national 
power
97
. The illustration of the linkages as identified by Kerbs and Levy is reproduced 
below: 
 
FIGURE 8: DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE AND CONFLICT LINKAGE MODEL,  
SOURCE: KERB AND LEVY98 
 
Works such as Environment, Scarcity and Violence by Thomas F. Homer-Dixon
99
 and 
Environmental Conflict by Paul F. Dhiel and Niel Petter Gleiditsch,
100
 present causal 
linkages between environmental issues particularly those of environmental scarcity and 
resource capture as direct or indirect causes of conflict. In retrospect, even in the light of 
relatively selective case studies presented by Thomas Homer-Dixon, these linkages are 
essentially indirect but profound.  
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THE 3Z (ZAN, ZAR AND ZAMIN): A PHILOSOPHY OF WAR 
As a philosophy, ‗Zan, Zar and Zamin‘ can be extended from the context of an individual, 
where indeed a woman may be the sole purpose of conflict – Helen of Troy for example – 
to society, cultural groups, religious groups, traditionally organised nation states and the 
emerging ‗market states‘.  It is the overlap dimensions of the 3Zs of conflict that is of 
particular interest since the notion of victory, as we shall subsequently discuss, is distinct 
in all three. 
In the contemporary international system, with the geo-economic imperatives in the 
forefront, resource scarcity provides fertile ground for manufacturing conflicts. These 
may be overtly present under morally more justifiable origins and pursued to serve dual 
purpose. Some sceptics view the March – April 2003 Gulf War and the subsequent 
occupation of Iraq in this perspective. Object of victory in such conflicts becomes 
perception management and not necessarily the fulfilment in whole or part thereof of the 
‗moral‘ purpose for war. The anatomy of such conflicts and the aspect of perception 
management are discussed in more detail later in this section. The causes of war hitherto 
discussed are represented diagrammatically below: 
 
FIGURE 9: ORIGINS OF CONFLICT – A BASIC MODEL101 
(AUTHOR‘S OWN DIAGRAM) 
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This graphical representation lends itself to further develop the model. The causes of war, 
as we have seen, are innumerable. These can broadly be divided into two groups: the 
Politico-Military and the Socio-Political Causes. Seldom does a single issue constitute the 
root cause of a conflict in our contemporary world. A chain of events invariably 
contribute in what can be described as a causal train
102
. In terms of violence and intensity, 
conflicts, whose roots lie in the realm of ‗Zar‘, see Glossary, tend to be more limiting, the 
emphasis being on cost versus gains, and manifest greater degree of political and military 
control in their prosecution. Conflicts that fall in the defines of ‗Zan‘, and less frequently 
‗Zamin‘, where the primitive instincts of war and indeed Maslow‘s hierarchy of needs are 
highest
103, have the tendency to become pronounced and less ‗limiting‘. Victory if the Zar 
domain can be a simple cost – benefit analysis whereas in the Zan and Zamin category 
have an air of limitlessness about them.   
Another aspect that needs to be considered is that of time sensitivity and relative value of 
various causes. Honour, respect, status, beliefs, revenge and even ideology are all 
dynamic issues whose value and paradigms change with time, it follows that the notion of 
victory associated towards attainment of such ends would also change accordingly. This 
however is negated by the evidence of history. As links in the ‗causal train‘ these issues 
will have varied influence in different times – religious wars that plagued Europe before 
the Peace of Westphalia became, relatively speaking, a thing of the past but in contrast, 
religious sentiments still remain current in Northern Ireland at the time of writing – and 
are thus temporal in nature. Similarly, resources and wealth are time critical issues. Oil 
had limited value up until the 19
th
 century but today it alters the geo-political value of the 
Middle East and the Caspian region.  
We can develop Figure 9 further and superimpose the two broad foundations of conflict – 
the socio-political and the politico-military spheres and the relationships that emerge from 
the overlap of the fundamental elements: 
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FIGURE 10: DEVELOPMENT OF CONFLICT – A COMPREHENSIVE MODEL 
(AUTHOR‘S OWN DIAGRAM) 
 
THE STUDY OF THREAT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
International politics is characterized by the frequent occurrence of threats. Yet, although 
scholars have long acknowledged that threats are one of the most important concepts in 
the theory and practice of international politics, no theory of threats has been proposed. 
As one review on the subject remarks ‗threat has generally been treated as a vital but 
presumably implicitly 'understood' facet of reality.‘104 The negligence to systematically 
examine threats is all the more troubling if one considers that threats figure prominently 
in research on international crises, strategic bargaining, foreign policy decision-making 
A, B, C and D represent zones where the notion of victory cannot ordinarily be 
reduced to a score card. The perceptional dimension becomes more influential and if 
pronounced, can potentially supersede military success. The dominant spaces are the 
Zan and Zan-Zamin domains where the causes of war tend towards the indivisible 
and intra as well as post-war bargaining bear little value. The blue area is the area 
of conventional rational wars, wars of interest where bargaining is possible. The red 
area represents indivisible bargains where wars tend to be more ‘total’.  
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and most importantly military policy and strategy. In a simplistic form, threat is often 
explained through the following: 
 
EQUATION 1: THE THREAT EQUATION 
Assessment of a defined or potential enemy at lower levels – tactical and operational – is 
driven by existing or emerging capability. Capability, seen as combination of the 
physical, intellectual and moral domain, that is – fighting power, represents means that 
make possible a choice of ends and a variety of ways to attain them. The possibilities and 
hypotheses that emerge from the foundations for building response which itself is 
summed-up in physical, moral and intellectual terms.  At higher level, intents become 
more significant since capability can always be developed to match the ends desired. The 
terms ‗higher‘ and ‗lower‘ levels are quite deliberate. These levels are related to the 
nature and form that ‗capability‘ takes. Between capability and intent, the key 
denominator is time. If the time required to re-orientate is less than that required for the 
enemy to develop significantly new capability, then response is a function of capability.  
When assessing threats over a long term perspective, ‗intent‘ becomes more significant.  
Military strategy, as a process, can be divided into two distinct but interactive processes: 
the ‗development strategy‘ and ‗employment strategy‘.105 Employment strategy seeks to 
apply what is available against existential threats as well as orientate for threats in the 
near future – it essentially provides the ‗ways‘. Developmental strategy typically looks 
beyond the horizon while also addressing near-term shortfalls – it addresses the ‗means‘. 
Threat evaluation, orientation and response are a continuous process and collectively 
serve as instruments of deterrence or coercion during peace and are essential for strategic 
bargaining.  
Although strategic bargaining makes an important point about the contingency between 
actions and expected responses, it fails to elaborate on the notion of appropriateness 
which would explain how this contingency is formed and operates in social interactions. 
According to Knorr, ‗the facts that all perception is fundamentally selective and that 
selection is normally governed by working assumptions, or beliefs, about the outside 
world permit predispositions to intervene in the act of threat perception‘.106 
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VIOLENCE AS INSTRUMENT OF POLICY 
James D. Fearon in his research entitled ‗Rationalist Explanations of War‘107 argues that 
the occurrence of war is not sufficiently explained in traditional rationalist arguments. 
Premised on the sheer cost of war and the inherent risk that accompanies it, Fearon 
suggest that there should exist negotiated agreements that rationally led states in dispute 
would prefer to war. The emphasis is on the condition of rationality. Three causal 
mechanisms are presented that explain why bargaining sometimes fails and rationally led 
states choose to go to war:  
 The combination of private information about resolve or capability and the 
incentives to misrepresent these. 
 States‘ inability, in specific circumstances, to commit to uphold a deal.  
 Issue indivisibilities reduce the bargaining space so much that war is possible. The 
bargaining model of war is discussed in more detail in Section 3 of this chapter 
(page 131). The arguments presented are of immense value to the purpose of this 
research and in many ways help explain a rationalist calculus of political victory. 
As a case for war, traditional arguments include:
 108
  
 anarchy,  
 expected benefits greater than expected costs,  
 a rational preventative war,  
 rational miscalculation due to lack of information, and  
 rational miscalculation or disagreement about relative power.  
These arguments either fail to address or to fully explain what prevents leaders from 
reaching ex ante (pre-war) bargains that would avoid the costs and risks of fighting. 
Fearon identifies three causal logics to explain war despite its cost and risk:  
 War due to private information and incentives to misrepresent: Leaders know 
things about their military capabilities and willingness to fight that other states do 
not know, and in bargaining situations they can have incentives to misrepresent 
such private info in order to gain a better deal: Fearon suggests that although 
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costless signals are uninformative, costly signals (listed as building weapons, 
mobilizing troops, signing alliance treaties, supporting troops in a foreign land and 
creating domestic political costs) can be informative. They also increase the 
probability of war. – ‗a rational state may choose to run a real risk of (inefficient) 
war in order to signal that it will fight if not given a good deal in bargaining,‘109 
with the caveat that states may have to use war to reveal private information.
110
 
 War as a consequence of commitment problems: mutually preferable bargains may 
be unattainable because one or more states would have an incentive to renege on 
the terms. 
 Anarchy. Anarchy is implicit here in that bargains would be enforceable, and thus 
war avoidable, if anarchy did not exist. It assumes states have no private 
information and motivations never change (although Fearon does suggest that 
commitment problems may lead to war by narrowing the bargaining space such 
that it exacerbates other causes.)
111
 
 Pre-emptive war and offensive advantages. Offensive advantage only creates 
problems for commitment if it means that a state‘s odds of winning are better if it 
attacks rather than defends. Large enough first-strike incentives (relative to cost-
benefit ratios) can make all agreements unenforceable and incredible.  
 Preventative war. If one state A is increasing in power and another, B is declining, 
B can rationally wage preventive war on A – ‗if B‘s expected decline in military 
power is too large relative to B‘s costs for war, then state A‘s inability to commit 
to restrain its foreign policy demands after it gains power makes preventative 
attack rational for state B‘. Importantly, the declining states attacks because it 
fears the peace it will have to accept after its rival has grown stronger, not because 
it fears attack. The answer can be found if the determinants of military power can 
be transferred between states.
112
  
 War due to issue indivisibilities. Some issues may not admit compromise; if the 
issue allows only a finite number of resolutions, none may fall within the range 
both states prefer to fighting. Fearon discounts this cause for three reasons:  
1) most issues are complex, with many dimensions and possible settlements;  
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2) if states can pay each other money or goods or make linkages with other 
issues, then any issue should be perfectly divisible;  
3) some sort of random allocation or alternation between two resolutions 
could in principle serve to create intermediate bargains if an issue can only 
be settled in two ways.  
On the question of what prevents leaders from creating intermediate settlements, Fearon 
believes that the answer is likely to be other mechanisms rather than the core issues 
themselves. This thesis posits that the explanation of ‗other mechanism‘ can be found in 
the cultural domain that, as we have seen, influences policy, action and critical choices 
intra crisis. Asymmetric notions of victory play a critical role in decisions of ‗if‘ and 
‗when‘ to stop fighting. If war termination is not consistent with rational judgments as 
seen from the perspective of one side, the logic of the bargaining model crumbles. This is 
a significant, but not inescapable paradox of the rational calculus.  
WAR AND THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 
War strategy seeks ends that far too frequently are measured in tangible terms.  The true 
purpose of a limited war with limited objectives is to seek specific effects in the strategic 
environment. ‗For the state, the strategic environment is the realm in which the leadership 
interacts with other states or actors to advance the well-being of the state.‘113  
The strategic environment, according to Harry Yarger, writing in 2003,  ‗consists of the 
internal and external context, conditions, relationships, trends, issues, threats, 
opportunities, interactions, and effects that influence the success of the state in relation to 
the physical world, other states and actors, chance, and the possible futures.‘114 The US 
Army War College primer on strategic leadership describes the characteristics of the 
environment as ‗volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous.’115  
 The Strategic Environment can broadly be viewed as combination of a set of variables 
and conditions in the international system, the regional, domestic political and socio-
cultural precepts that collectively generate the legal, moral, political constraints on use of 
violence and in turn affect the liberty of action and the logic on which subsequent 
decisions are premised. International strategic environment suggests the general 
international ‗mood‘ of representative organisations of the international community as 
represented through individual states or international organisations such as the United 
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Nations, European Union, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Association of South East 
Asian Nations, Organisation of Islamic Countries  and African Union to name a few. 
Increasingly, the role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) is also beginning to 
weigh heavily on state behaviour.  
The strategic environment is influenced by a long list of factors contained within the 
broad categories discussed earlier. However, not all components of the environment are 
critical or effective. In shaping the environment, it is thus essential to be able to separate 
the operating components from the dormant or less influential ones. Having done so, the 
subsets of constituents or components that remain are referred to in this thesis as the 
‗effectual environment‘.116 The quality of political leverage attainable is thus a direct 
function of how well the effectual components of the environment are manipulated.  
The strategic environment is dynamic in nature; its operators may be external or internal, 
dependent or independent to the war or conflict in question. It encompasses political, 
economic, socio-cultural, moral, military and technical perspectives that influence war. 
This elusive, dichroic temper
117
 of the environment is not entirely fatalistic. The interplay 
of its concomitant factor – each of which can be influenced given direction, time and 
resources, shapes the environment. Chaos
118
 provides opportunity to initiate such change. 
 
FIGURE 11: THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT AND ITS LINKAGES TO VIOLENCE   
(AUTHOR‘S OWN DIAGRAM) 
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To be successful, all wars big or small require a ‗favourable‘ strategic and grand strategic 
environment. The ‗shaping‘ of the environment for war is often the first step in war 
initiation strategy, although the ultimate object is also the strategic environment that the 
war in turn shapes. What we then have is a cyclic dynamic within the strategic 
environment shaped by action and chance in a volatility, uncertainty, complex and 
friction ridden media:  
FIGURE 12: SHAPING THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 
(AUTHOR‘S OWN DIAGRAM) 
 
The process can be extended in time depending upon the volatility in the system that is 
intended to be influenced or be triggered by a significant event which catalyses the 
process. Volatility is either intrinsic or extrinsic: 
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FIGURE 13: VOLATILITY 
(AUTHOR‘S OWN DIAGRAM) 
 
The September 11, 2001 attacks on the Pentagon and the Twin Towers are an example of 
a trigger event that shaped the environment in favour of war; paving the way for the 
occupation of Afghanistan and later (in the US Government‘s contention, though the link 
was at best presumptuous and at worst completely invalid), Iraq. The wars that followed 
in turn shaped the regional and international environment. Without the trigger, the naked 
use of force, that arguably serves both the US short term security interests as well as the 
wider posture in the new great game, would have arguably been impossible. The 
environment is generally resilient to change unless volatility is induced in it. Trigger 
events generate a temporary instability, a chaos, an opportunity for expediency which 
may otherwise be repugnant to its nature and the earlier prevailing spirit – the one to 
which the environment will seek to return unless the opening is exploited and the course 
of change dominated.  
Being dynamic and due to its linkage with war and political violence, the environment 
can be shaped through hard and soft means such as military, economic, political, socio-
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cultural and information. This implies that the objective of war or conflict can be the 
creation of a particular environment that allows other political objectives to be pursued 
and of itself presents apparently no tangible gains or rewards from the immediate fighting 
or its outcomes. The role of will, friction and chance in shaping the strategic environment 
is represented in Figure 14.  
The yellow area represents the possible extents of the strategic environment, anything 
outside the yellow is not going to happen and thus projection or reductions beyond this 
space represent gross errors in assessment of the trajectory of events. Within the yellow 
space, we have desirable and undesirable possibilities. Without action, the odds that 
chance creates a favourable outcome are poo. Steering the environment towards a 
carefully perceived desirable core involves the fine-tuning of its component parts through 
action. All actions occur in time and space. By applying sufficient resources, opposing 
will, friction and to an extent, chance can be overcome. An interim, artificial 
environment, referred as the shaped environment, is invariably essential to sustain any 
deliberate action that seeks to cause change. The attainment and sustainment of the 
desired environment in its perfect and absolute form is victory per se because the climate 
created, of itself, enables the desired physical and moral outcomes. The purpose of the 
transient, shaped environment can be summed up as enhancing one‘s own liberty of 
action while curtailing the adversary‘s. The extent to which the environment is 
conditioned describes the ‗scale‘ of victory and the degree by which opposing forces are 
mitigated represents its ‗quality‘: 
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FIGURE 14: WILL, FRICTION AND CHANCE: SHAPING THE ENVIRONMENT 
(AUTHOR‘S OWN DIAGRAM) 
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Figure 14 presents two separate graphics overlaid in the same space. The first is the set of 
five ovals rendered in three dimension. The vertical dimension represents the time 
continuum and the ‗x‘ and ‗y‘ axes represent action and reaction. Consider two actors ‘A‘ 
and ‗B‘ in conflict. At the base, the oval marked ‗obtaining environment‘ represents the 
existential effectual environment as ascertained by actor A. The future possibilities are 
represented by the oval ‗possible strategic environment‘. In the absence of external 
influences,  a default transition occurs over time which is not in the interest of either actor 
who seek ovals A and B respectively. For A to affect a course change from the default 
trajectory and counter B‘s efforts as too the play of friction and chance, effort along 
carefully determined lines of operations (A‘) is required. The second graphic – the set of 
three arrows – represents the change over a time continuum. Beyond a certain point, the 
usability value diminishes, analogous to Clausewitz‘s culminating point of victory. A 
must alter its strategy and re-orientate so as to maintain its strategic edge over B. The 
curved arrow to the extreme left indicates a notional point at which A, while still 
benefitting from the existential environment, must decide and act for the future.   
SECTION 3: A STUDY OF WAR AND PURSUIT OF MILITARY VICTORY  
We have established the relationship between international relations, the idea of victory 
and the use of war as a political tool. Clausewitz tells us that war is subordinated to policy 
but attaches a caveat that war‘s inherent nature is to serve only itself.  
The pursuit of victory in war places demands on strategy, operations and the higher 
direction of war. These demands extend to both facets of strategy, that is, resource 
development and capability employment. A brief look at war from a subjective 
perspective – the dictates of strategy, operations and exigencies  of war – is not just 
appropriate but imperative.  
The Second World War has profoundly shaped our perspective on history. Even though 
the First World War resulted in the creation of new states such as Poland, Yugoslavia, 
Czechoslovakia, the Irish Republic and the emergence of the League of Nations, it had 
relatively little influence on the redistribution of power in the international system. The 
Second World War – which, as Christopher Bellamy points out in Absolute War,  was not 
one war
119
 but several conflicts played out concurrently in distinct and disconnected 
Chapter III—War and Politics 
~119~ 
‗theatres‘ – however, was destined to profoundly alter the international environment and 
the way nations interacted and even the internal organisation of states. It was undoubtedly 
an ideological struggle. A distorted face of National Socialism manifest in Hitler, soviet 
communism, western liberalism and American capitalism. It was also a struggle for 
human values where ‗the Allies – Britain, the USA and even the Soviet Union – stressed, 
at least formally, their commitment to the humanistic values of the Enlightenment. 
‗Hitler's Germany did away with them altogether, worshipping barbarian values like 
power and race instead, taking pride of its brazen contempt for morality, international 
conventions and the rule of law.‘120 This radical difference can best be illustrated by two 
diametrically opposed definitions of the aims of War. The first taken from the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica and the second from Adolf Hitler‘s ‗Weltanschauung‘: 
‗Civilized warfare... is confined, as far as possible, to the disablement of the 
armed forces of the enemy; otherwise war would continue till one of the 
parties was exterminated.‘121  
Encyclopaedia Britannica  
The aim of war is not to reach definite lines but to annihilate the enemy 
physically. 
122 
Adolf Hitler 
 
The section title suggest a study of war which, in fact, would require several volumes 
itself, what is presented here is a brief overview beginning with definition of war, the 
nature and character of war and the evolution of war.  
THE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF WAR 
War has served man individually and collectively. It has singularly and most profoundly 
shaped human behaviour, character, culture and societies. The nature of war is a 
reflection of the nature of man. In character, scholars observe, each war is different. 
Clausewitz attempted to explain the nature and character of war by looking at the 
subjective and objective elements.
123
 With so much said, written and endured, why is it 
that man has not been able to comprehend or explain its true nature?  War has different 
appeal and meaning to different people. As Quincy Wright said, ‗to some it is a plague 
which ought to be eliminated; to some, a mistake which should be avoided; to others a 
crime which ought to be punished; and to still others, an adventure which may be 
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interesting, an instrument which may be useful, a procedure which may be legitimate and 
appropriate, or a condition of existence for which one must be prepared.‘124 
To a soldier, the nature of war is as a product of the means and methods of its conduct. To 
the general, the nature of war is defined by a series of strategic choices that manifest 
themselves through the operational and tactical designs of his manoeuvre. To the 
combatant, it is the stark reality of engagement the ultimate trade of life and death, 
success and failure; the most primitive reality of battle that shapes war‘s nature and being.  
For a statesmen, war is a temporary indulgence, an instrument of political intercourse, 
which, given the right tools, control, will and capability, can be wielded successfully to 
further political interests and arrive at a suitable bargain; war is thus an opportunity, a 
means to an end, a quality it has retained since Abel and Cain. As an arbitrator between 
states and alliances, it is as, Martin Wight points out, ‗the ultimate feature of international 
relations as revolution is the ultimate feature of domestic politics‘.125  
The scholar‘s conceit lies in a full understanding of the face of war, its causes, purpose 
and general manifestation in the politico-military and the socio-political spheres. 
Economists see it in the context of the political economy, cost and gain, opportunity and 
chaos. Last but not least, the lawyer observes war through an entirely different prism as 
for the jurists the legal paradigms, judgments and precedents are the principal subjective 
tools to assess and address its nature and character. Tools serve to provide avenues for 
recourse, as well as to limit war; making the legal instrument a statesman‘s canvas and 
the military-man‘s prison. Yet another primitive truth in war, the law of the jungle, 
remains part of its nature. Might is always right and victors write history. The lawyer too 
must bow to the underlying truth of war‘s true nature.  
THE SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE NATURE AND ELEMENTS OF WAR 
Clausewitz introduces subjective and objective elements while referring to the nature of 
war. For Clausewitz, the nature of war is manifested in its objective elements such as 
violence, friction, chance and uncertainty while the subjective nature—the character of 
war—encompasses aspects such as military forces, doctrines, weapons, and the 
environment (the medium of war – land, sea, air, space, cyber space). The objective and 
subjective natures of war interact continuously and as a result the nature of war cannot be 
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separated from the means and the actors involved in its conduct.
126
 Indeed at its roots, the 
reality of war is death and destruction. 
The character of war is highly dynamic and as pointed out by Colin S. Gray, every war 
manifests a unique character.
127
 The nature of war remains more or less consistent. If it 
appears to have changed, the change only appears magnified by the narrow perspectives 
from which observers view or analyse war in their own time. In retrospect, the 
perspective of the age reflects minor spikes or changes as aspects of character and not 
nature. 
The nature and character of war troubled Clausewitz. We may never know what he may 
have made of it had he lived long enough to review his initial thoughts. Clausewitz was 
concerned quite evidently with the practice of war as much as its theory. Acutely aware of 
the pure and the impure in war‘s political nature and character, Clausewitz arrived at the 
two fundamental types of war: ‗Absolute War‘ and ‗Real War‘.128 The former relates to 
the dictates of political intercourse while the latter to the exigencies of war and dictates of 
politics. Neither fully defines war‘s character but explains quite profoundly its 
prosecution. War‘s function as a scientific (rational) organization of violence ‗a serious 
means to a serious end,‘129 is more enduring and can even explain conflict perpetrated by 
non-state actors. Terrorism as a means of organised violence requires a broader, less 
conventional, notion of organisation; but requires organisation nonetheless.  
Clausewitz was intimately cognisant of the elusive and complex nature of war as John 
Keegan writes, ‗Clausewitz was struggling to advance a universal theory of what war 
ought to be rather than what it actually was or had been.‘130 He did of course liken this 
adaptive nature to that of a chameleon. However, the tangible framework available to 
Clausewitz was provided by military history, his first-hand experience of Napoleonic 
campaigns, the available technology and the politics of his time.  
The campaigns of Napoleon and Clausewitzian philosophy – as too to a large extent 
Jomini‘s – influenced the political approach and the conduct of war in Western society 
both in Europe and America. The US Civil War manifested facets of Napoleonic warfare 
built around Clausewitz‘s and Jomini‘s strategic thought.131 War continues to do so to this 
day. In fact, as correctly observed by Daniel Moran, the reason why Jomini apparently 
gets little attention in Western military thought is not because of the irrelevance of his 
work but, quite to the contrary, the very fact that Jomini‘s thoughts have been largely 
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absorbed in Western military art.
132
 In summary, war‘s subjective nature stems from the 
means of its prosecution and its objective from danger violence and chance.
133
  
EVOLUTION OF WARFARE AND ITS IMPACT ON VICTORY AND DEFEAT 
Alvin and Heidi Toffler approached military revolutions in the framework of three waves 
defined broadly the way human society was organized and knowledge manifest in the 
ability to initiate change.
134
 First wave Warfare was the consequence of the Agricultural 
Revolution of the Neolithic era and the consequent emergence of the first civilisations. It 
also introduced the idea of division of labour, though the author believes this concept 
became more pronounced during the second great, industrial, revolution. Organised 
armies and fortifications began to emerge. It is fair to say that the Agricultural Revolution 
started the first great wave of change as Professor Jeremy Adams writes: 
Few may realize it amid today's swift changes, but the biggest technological 
shift in human history isn't the Internet. Instead, it was a process that took 
place more than 8,000 years ago and involved nothing more sophisticated 
than some seeds and a few crude hand tools. That shift was the Agricultural 
Revolution of the Neolithic Era or New Stone Age, which is what scholars 
call the time that began with the end of the last massive retreat of the ice caps, 
about 10,000 years ago.
135
 
The agricultural revolution is responsible for bringing about relatively stable and 
geographically confined organisation of human society which had up to that stage 
survived as hunter-gatherers. Farming required stability and continuity of effort. In return, 
it promised greater security; however, in that age it was also the cause of many wars. A 
link was established between war and soil that endures to this day. The modern peasant 
evolved as people were kept ignorant by their masters so as to keep them focused on 
farming and warfare. The soldiers were occupied for the most time of the year with 
working the fields. Volunteer soldiers came mainly from farms and their primary 
vocation only permitted a few months a year for campaigning. The armies were poorly 
organized and equipment often included farming tools. The Toffler‘s also note exceptions 
to this rule as manifest in the Roman Army that was not only well equipped and highly 
organized, but was also led by generals who learned and mastered their art.   
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According to the Toffler‘s, the industrial revolution marked the beginning of Second 
Wave warfare.
136
 Its defining feature was mass production and developments in weapon 
technology. Revolutionary France epitomized the possibilities and the two World Wars 
the dangers. Often referred to incorrectly as the era of ‗total war‘, Toffler‘s perceive this 
period to continue right through the two World Wars and well into the period of the Cold 
War. Arguably, the Second Wave begins not with ‗industrialisation of war potential‘ but 
the replacement of bio-mechanical energy – mechanical, animal and human energy – with 
chemical energy. This constitutes an entirely different perspective as well as framework 
from that adopted by Alvin and Heidi Toffler. The change from First Wave to Second 
Wave warfare was not sudden; the transition period saw both types of armies take the 
field. A good example cited is that of the American Civil War (1861-65) where ‗the 
industrialized North defeated the more agrarian South‘.137 Weapons were becoming 
cheaper, quicker to manufacture, easier to use and more accurate. Industrial age warfare 
brought to an unceremonious end the age of armoured knights and castles of the 15
th
 – 
16
th
 centuries.  
The machine gun and the artillery reduced warfare to what Professor Richard Holmes 
avidly describes as ‗the locked front.‘138 Supremacy of firepower made manoeuvre, 
especially frontal attacks, bloody and futile, a lesson learnt at immense human cost during 
the First World War. Mechanisation, developments in air and sea warfare – particularly 
the aircraft carrier – restored the balance between offence and defence, attrition and 
manoeuvre and, for a while, manoeuvre became dominant as witnessed during World 
War II. The combination of dominant manoeuvre and exceptional firepower made war 
extremely destructive and blurred the distinction between combatants, non-combatants 
and the general civil populace. From the time of the French Revolution until the end of 
the Second World War, warfare embraced a new theory: mass destruction. The new 
character was a product of the time, one that would probably have made Clausewitz turn 
with disgust as this was if anything a perverse face of the absolute and in the end real.  
Third Wave Warfare, according to Alvin and Heidi Toffler, is a product of the 
developments in technology during the 1970s and 1980s. The Information Revolution 
was already under way a decade or so earlier and the mass society slowly became a 
communication society. Warfare and the way armies were organised also adapted to the 
inherent opportunities and in turn the dictates of emerging technologies. The first Gulf 
War (1991), the Toffler‘s opine, was fought in a dual mode with low technology ‗stupid‘ 
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bombs on the one hand and high technology precision weapons on the other. The theory 
is well grounded though the author tends to disagree with the over-liberal usage of the 
term ‗information warfare‘ in describing the way allies fought the first Gulf War as well 
as the origins of the Third Wave which can be traced back to the inception of electronic 
communication in the early part of the 20
th
 century – indeed as Prof. Christopher Bellamy 
points out, Electronic Warfare was waged during the First World War.  
Additionally,  Information War and information age warfare are different entities as 
pointed out by Colin Gray.
139
 It would be more accurate to view the 1991 Gulf War in 
operational terms as the application of information technologies in fighting a 
conventional war with advanced weapon technology and increased accuracy. Information 
warfare of today is the advanced face of intelligence, deception, propaganda and 
electronic warfare. Just as agricultural wave armies were defeated by industrial age 
armies as reflected in Napoleonic Campaigns and the American Civil War, it remains a 
truism that Second Wave armies were defeated with relative ease by Third Wave armies 
as witnessed in the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003. The relationship; however, needs to be 
confined to conventional war-fighting alone. The laws of physics tell us that to every 
action there is an equal and opposite reaction, in the realm of warfare, the reaction is often 
more profound and overwhelming. The reaction was, of course, and so should have been 
predicted, asymmetric.
140
 
Nuclear weapons and inter-continental ballistic missiles as developed during the Cold 
War affected war, warfare and war-fighting in an unprecedented manner.  No longer did 
man intend to use maximum means to achieve victory but sought ways to prevent such 
escalation; a significant shift from the realist to the rationalist ideals of war-fighting. The 
dynamics of war changed under the shadow of nuclear weapons. Wars continued in the 
traditional manner in the Third World in the form of ‗proxy wars‘141 – the threat of 
nuclear annihilation actually encouraged this process – or simply, disputes between two 
regional powers not involving a super power like the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistan 
conflicts. Nuclear Age Warfare affected doctrines, strategy and tactics at the conceptual 
level and organisation, equipment, and training at the physical and moral level. The 
impact was and continues to be profound, meriting a classification of its own. The age of 
‗Limited War‘ – ‗wars in the minor key‘142 – had dawned. Intense debates followed on 
the utility and purpose of war, escalation and workability of nuclear deterrence.  
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The dominant characteristics of each age as identified by Alvin and Heidi Toffler are 
tabulated in Table 1. The ‗nuclear wave‘ does not really fit into the frame of reference 
used by the Toffler‘s since the waves described by them depended on the predominant 
way in which human society was organised and run. Nuclear science has affected man 
significantly but not revolutionised our way of life. However, in the context of war-
fighting, the author believes, it is the single most important influence since the invention 
of gunpowder.  The table has been adapted to include the impact of the ‗nuclear age‘: 
 First Wave Second Wave Wave ‘Two and a 
Half’ 
Third Wave 
Agricultural Age Industrial Age Nuclear Age* Information Age 
Physical Security 
provided by 
A Warrior class, 
Mercenaries, 
Militia 
Professionals 
Citizens 
Deterrence/ 
compellence, 
Block/ alliance 
building 
 Information 
 Knowledgeable 
leaders 
Dominant Soc., 
Pol., Econ. Force 
Tribe, City, 
State, Family 
Nation-State, 
Factories 
Nation-state, 
Technology 
Global 
conglomerates 
Economy dominant 
by 
Trade Money Economic system 
Symbols (e.g. in a 
database) 
War Characterized 
by 
Representational 
Conflict 
Mass Armies, 
high casualties 
Limitation and 
Proxy 
engagement 
Information 
Attacks, low/no 
casualties 
Destructive 
Capability 
Gunpowder 
WMD (nuclear, 
chemical...) 
Nuclear War.   
Nuclear 
proliferation 
Critical Data 
Deletion 
Leadership  Hierarchical 
Top down 
orders 
Top Down and 
Lateral 
Low level, flat 
structures 
Information Based 
Warfare 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Information 
technology in war 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Information War No No Yes 
Yes 
 
  
TABLE 1: EVOLUTIONS OF WARFARE – MODIFIED ALVIN AND HEIDI TOFFLER MODEL143 
*RELATIONSHIPS MODIFIED AND COLUMN ‗NUCLEAR AGE WARFARE‘ ADDED BY AUTHOR 
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MILITARY VICTORY: THE TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL LEVEL 
Clausewitz points out that war has a natural tendency to serve only itself.  When war 
breaks out, the influence of the military – including those in government and bureaucracy 
that serve or exist for the military – begins to have a direct and wider influence on 
political decision making. With the higher direction of war - the level of grand strategy 
merging with the politico-military dictates of the strategic level, the subjective demands 
of war-fighting – the consequence is a blurring of military objective with the military aim 
– the latter, as we saw in Chapter III, flowing from grand strategy while the former rests 
in the domain of military strategy and the level of operations. One of the conclusions we 
arrive at is that the separation of the grand strategic level from that of strategy is essential. 
The two are linked only by the political control on the military objective that must in turn 
serve the military aim. The influence of the military outcome also affects the military aim 
as Liddell Hart writes: 
 Whenever war has broken out, policy has too often been governed by the 
military aim--and this has been regarded as an end in itself, instead of as 
merely a means to the end. The ill effects have gone further. For by losing 
sight of the proper relationship between the object and the military aim--
between policy and strategy --the military aim became distorted, and over-
simplified.
144
 
In his critique of On War, Liddell Hart opines that Clausewitz‘s ‗greatest contribution to 
the theory of war was in emphasizing the psychological factors. Raising his voice against 
the geometrical school of strategy, then fashionable, he [Clausewitz] showed that the 
human spirit was infinitely more important than operational lines and angles. He 
discussed the effect of danger and fatigue, the value of boldness and determination.‘145 
Though Clausewitz‘s assertion was arguably only to highlight the importance of the 
human spirit as it applied to the military and its ability to fight, this is nonetheless an 
important observation. In bringing to fore the moral factors, Clausewitz too – like Sun 
Tzu – opens up the art of strategy and the conduct of war to the skill of winning without 
fighting, or minimal fighting such that the final blow is all but a coup de grace and there 
by taking the whole – that which comes through violence and that which is accrued 
without violence.  
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Liddell Hart‘s philosophy of physical and moral dislocation as the purpose of strategy – 
and therein the selection of military objectives – particularly at the operational and 
military strategic level – rests on the overarching importance he gives to the moral – 
psychological factors. Liddell Hart was joined and reinforced by an equally influential 
contemporary, Major General J. F. C. Fuller. Liddell Hart‘s emphasis on selecting 
operational lines that produced psychological dislocation and paralysis in the enemy‘s 
system of forces was demonstrated by the Germans in Poland, France, North Africa and 
Russia during the Second World War. The Russian also used the concept to good effect 
once they switched over to the offensive. It was the practical genius of Hans Guderian 
that was instrumental in developing doctrine and tactics that manifested the intellectual in 
the realm of the physical. The product was Blitzkrieg. It applied rapid manoeuvre, a 
higher tempo of operations than the enemy‘s ability to respond to create operational 
effects that exploited the fear of an impending and unavoidable defeat in the enemy‘s 
mind. It was more moral than physical. However, for the moral dimension to generate 
physical effects, a ‗compliant‘ enemy, one who allows that apparent hopelessness to 
influence the decision making and ends up either psychologically unable to respond 
(paralysis), respond where the outcome would be inconsequential (distraction) or end up 
with ready and able forces in a zone other than where these are required (dislocation).   
THE POST-WAR ENVIRONMENT 
As noted, in an unlimited war, the destruction of the enemy (total defeat) is almost 
universally accepted as the political object. Consequently, the destruction of the enemy's 
military and political viability is a reasonable means of achieving the political goal, with 
the details regarding the post-war balance of power dictated by the victor after the fact.  
However, in a limited war, the post-war landscape must be shaped prior to and during war 
termination since the opposing government will generally not be eliminated. 
Consequently, questions regarding post-war relative strength in-theatre must be addressed 
upfront rather than after the fact. Tradable military gains and the ability to pursue 
violence, causing serious or unacceptable damage will often constitute the most important 
bargaining tool.  
Because the post-war environment must be considered and often shaped while conducting 
the current operations, difficult choices are presented in campaign planning at the 
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strategic level and aspects of military necessities for the operational commander when 
attempting to terminate war.  
As articulated by Fred Ikle, ‗for any war effort...that is supposed to serve long-term 
national objectives, the most essential question is how the enemy might be forced to 
surrender, or failing that, what sort of bargain might be struck with him to terminate the 
war.‘146 In addition to simply terminating the war, Ikle implies that a nation prefers to 
terminate the war having achieved both its short (the original political goals) and long-
term (post-war balance of power) interests. Since the operational commander impacts all 
aspects of the in-theatre war effort (including termination), it is important to review 
theoretical aspects in order to provide insight on how the termination effort can be 
favourably influenced.  
THE RATIONAL CALCULUS OF VICTORY 
In war the rational and irrational factors that relate ends to the means interact 
continuously and strategy correlates the ends and means. Using Clausewitz‘s theory of 
culminating point of victory, Michael I. Handel advances a theory of the rational calculus 
of war. This theory presumes that nations fight wars in pursuit of post-war objectives 
whose benefits exceed the cost of attainment. Costs and benefits are weighed throughout 
the war effort and ‗once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, 
the object must be renounced and peace must follow.‘147 An essential presumption that 
must be made is that opposing combatants have one identifiable decision making centre; 
know precisely what they and their enemy are attempting to accomplish; have all 
available information; and can identify and compare the costs of available courses of 
action. The difficulty with the rational theory is that it is based on presumptions that are 
unrealistic due to three reasons:  
1) First, the level of information required is exhaustive and simply unobtainable.  
2) Second, even if complete information were available, the ability to measure costs 
versus benefits in an objective manner simply does not exist.  
3) Third, the rational theory completely omits the passions/politics of the human element 
(political and military leaders) in examining/adjusting existing policies and in 
analysing available data (different people will draw different conclusions from the 
same data). 
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Clausewitzian, or more accurately, Prussian, calculus of war
148
 is explained in the 
following diagram: 
FIGURE 15 : THE RATIONAL CALCULUS OF WAR 
(ADAPTED FROM MICHAEL I. HANDEL‘S RENDERING149) 
 
‗Every war must end‘ that reality is principally a mixture of the two theories discussed 
above. In essence, national leaders are guided by a concept of national interest. However, 
this concept is impacted by personal considerations, motivations and experiences. 
Consequently, different national leaders will have varying perceptions regarding the 
rational status of the military/political situation at any given time, optimism or pessimism 
of current operations, perception of the exact point where costs begin to exceed benefits; 
The large rectangle denotes commencement of war (S) at its bottom left corner and 
possible conclusion depicted by the other three corners. The diagonal line joining 
(S) and (4) represents poor cost-benefit calculus towards it upper side and a better 
cost – benefit yield towards the lower half. Of course (2) would thus represent a 
perfect and efficient war with high yields and negligible comparative cost, zone (1) 
would be the exact opposite whereas (4) while still notionally a success, is attained 
at very high costs which may of itself outweigh the value of the gain.  
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most significantly, the issues of war termination and an answer to the question: when is 
victory complete or further punishment unacceptable? 
This difference in perceptions is magnified by cultural differences that exist between 
states; consequently, it is very conceivable (and, in fact, probable) that one‘s enemy will 
perceive the military situation in a starkly different context than that perceived by one‘s 
own political and military leaders. Intra War Dialectics are of particular interest to the 
operational and military strategic commander. Political bargaining also follows the 
OODA
150
 logic and is therefore time critical. With time as the common denominator 
between the leverage sought through military means and the bargain at play, several 
unique dangers arise that can profoundly affect military operations in-theatre. This is of 
course Clausewitz‘s ‗Real War‘151; it preys on the exigencies and dictates of war; the 
victory at hand, the war fighting, the unfinished ruse, the unfolding of the best laid plans. 
This is a reality that no military commander can or should disregard. The dynamics or 
hazards are:
152
  
1) First, the possibility that negotiations themselves can be used to impact the military 
balance of power. These phenomena will occur if the enemy is given time to rebuild 
due to a temporary ceasefire or cessation of offensive military operations.  
2) Second, the possibility that negotiations will adversely affect the psychological 
balance of power. In essence, an erosion of ‗national will‘ can occur in both military 
personnel within a theatre and the civilian population at large if early expectations of 
quick termination remain unfulfilled as negotiations drag out.  
3) Third, the potential that a willingness to negotiate will communicate a perception of 
weakness, thus enhancing the enemy's resolve.  
4) Finally, the possibility that political demands made during negotiations will seem so 
severe that the enemy's willingness to conclusively bargain will be eroded, thus 
actually increasing the enemy's willingness to continue fighting. 
Such developments need to be recognized and managed as well as possible by the both 
the political and military leadership as well as those – the operational commander and 
diplomats for example – who translate policy into action. 
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THE BARGAINING MODEL OF WAR 
Interest and studies on the bargaining model of war and its application have mushroomed 
over the last two decades. The concept that the whole process from war initiation to 
termination is part of a single bargain provides a number of significant opportunities in 
the study of war. It also helps explains bizarre choices that leaders appear to make and 
even why apparent victories get perceived as defeats. Most importantly, it emphasises the 
role of political control on war, the demotion of military considerations for success and 
their subordination to the political (bargaining) dictates of war. Clausewitz of course 
explained this tendency in his all-encompassing expression ‗real war‘. As bargaining tool, 
war is not a pause in politics but an integral part of the political process; the classical 
continuation of political intercourse applying to varying degrees all elements of national 
power including violence. As a bargain it would suffice to use threat of escalation or 
continued punishment instead of total destruction. As a bargain, the initiation, 
prosecution, termination, and consequences of war are viewed as part of a single process 
within a larger bargaining dynamic between states. 
Pioneered by Alistair Smith and Allan Stam,
153
 the interest and debate drawn on the 
subject have made references to the bargaining model commonplace in conflict literature. 
The bargaining model has been used to explain ‗how wars begin, how wars end, and how 
long we can expect wars to last. In addition the model has been adapted to explain the 
durability of peace agreements, extended deterrence, territorial conflict, trade and 
conflict, and the democratic peace. The theoretical transport of this simple model is quite 
impressive. Like most formal models in political science, the bargaining model of war is 
an equilibrium model. That is, scholars use the bargaining framework to derive 
equilibrium solutions in order to make statements about how players make demands, and 
either avoid or enter conflict. The model‘s linkage to and dependence on Game Theory154 
is indispensable. Game theoretic models in general produce sharp predictions but have 
little to say about when or why players might deviate from equilibrium strategies.  
Scholarly attention to the pursuit of a real or perceptional victory within the wider logic 
of the bargain is often missing.  
In the Second World War, Japan realised that it had lost the war against USA well before 
the Atom Bombs were dropped. It had begun to signal for ‗an honourable exit‘.155 
However, it failed to realise that the US perception of victory placed uncompromising 
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demands on war termination and required unconditional surrender even though these 
would have made no substantial material difference to the leverage accrued by the US.  
These demands, without the hindsight of the subsequent nuclear strikes, at that point in 
time were unacceptable to the Japanese for purely cultural and ceremonial reasons. 
However, concession to Japan at that point in time would have been culturally 
inconsistent and generated a feeling of an incomplete victory from a US perspective.  
In essence, all bargaining models mainly serve to refine rationalist theories of war. They 
explain why mutually acceptable solutions fail and the states willingly move from the 
incentive – persuasion mode to the coercion-compellence dynamic. In practice, actors 
frequently divert from theoretical perfect response and display non-equilibrium 
behaviour. Such behaviour would render the standard bargaining model inefficient. 
Studies into equilibrium concepts designed to admit errors – or noise – and also account 
for ‗past action‘ learning processes in decision making have yielded a more efficient 
variant of the standard model.
 156
 The advanced models neither assume that players are 
infinitely ‘rational – that is to say infinitely responsive to expected payoffs – nor do they 
assume that all players are perfectly responsive.  
For Bargaining Models, the central puzzle is that wars are costly but nonetheless recur. 
This is then drawn into the bargaining perspective where rational states should have 
incentives to locate negotiated settlements that all parties would prefer to the gamble of a 
costly war. Unless states enjoy the activity of fighting for its own sake, war is inefficient 
ex post. For war to be modelled as a process in a wider bargain, four assumptions are 
necessary:
157
 
1) The conflict is not a fait accompli. The probability that one state would win over 
another exists. 
2) There is a rational calculus of risk and that states are either risk-averse or risk-neutral. 
3) The Core issues that precipitate war are divisible. The willingness to give and take on 
both sides so as to arrive at a settlement suggests a continuous range of peaceful 
settlements exists. 
4) Perceptions of victory and defeat (success or failure) are consistent with the terms of 
the bargain. 
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In practice we find that such rational logic does not apply. Core issues are often 
indivisible hence no trading can occur on the object of the conflict. There is thus no room 
for bargaining. The cost and risk nonetheless exist and yet an irrational war occurs. From 
the military perspective, The Yom-Kippur war, 1973 for example had no rational military 
payoffs for Egypt since no military plans existed to exploit the initial success and draw 
the war to its logical military conclusion – usually the disruption of the enemy‘s military 
centre of gravity. However, while there was no military bargain to be had, a notional 
political leverage – the manifestation of a threat to Israeli sense of invincibility – was 
certainly available even through an apparent military defeat. For Egypt, therefore, the 
possibility of a political victory existed even in military defeat.   
The bargaining model of war rests on the precept that war and politics are intimately tied. 
For it to work, a certain level of symmetry in political thought, political risk taking and 
limitation is essential. As benign and innocuous as this assertion may seem, it creates 
enormous opportunity for developing a unified theory of war tying together causes, 
prosecution, duration, termination, and consequences. The opportunities that arise when 
one views each of these stages as elements of the bargain are enormous.  
Observers have long thought of the outbreak of war as representing the end of bargaining. 
However, bargaining can also be used to understand all phases of war, as bargaining 
continues during war, the termination of war is itself almost always a bargain, and the 
consequences of war are the nature of the war-settling bargain. In summary war starts 
because the attacker believes his power affords him a greater share of the benefits than he 
currently has and thus demands some concessions from the defender and because the 
defender believes that it does not need to make as many concessions as the attacker has 
demanded and thus refuses to concede.
 158 
War continues so long as the attacker continues 
to overestimate what defender will concede or in the event of a retreat, underestimate 
what he must give up. War ends when the attacker and defender‘s beliefs about each 
other‘s power converge sufficiently for one side to make a proposal acceptable to the 
other at each stage the attacker can obtain a concession only if its threat to attack is 
credible or, as soon as one side‘s resources fall below the minimum level necessary to 
continue fighting.
 159
  
Some hypotheses that emerge are:
160
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 The attacker never retreats after winning first battle.  In general, retreats follow 
losses not victories, 
 The attacker is more likely to make proposals that involve a risk that a war begins 
or continues,  
 if the attacker is optimistic that the defender is weak,  
 if the attacker anticipates low resource losses from fighting,  
 if the attacker‘s probability of winning battles conditional on the defender being 
weak is high, 
 Since battle victories make the attacker more optimistic we expect that attacker is 
more likely to offer an acceptable settlement after a loss than a victory,  
 Early losses for the attacker are conducive to a short war, 
 The failure of negotiations makes the attacker more pessimistic. On average the 
duration of war will positively affect the likelihood that the war will end and 
negatively affect the attacker‘s prospects for victory, 
 The final settlement responds to military variables. Diplomacy and force are 
linked. 
THE APOLITICAL MODEL OF WAR AND NON-RATIONAL THEORY 
An apolitical war is one which offers no rational calculus or bargaining. The object of war 
is serving elite or group interest as opposed to the interest of one or more entities at war 
and thus may be void interests that typically fall in the political domain. The apolitical 
model is not entirely without political objectives, however it presupposes that such 
objectives are either impossible or unlikely to be attained or represent the wishes of a 
very small number of people who may not represent a larger demographic subset. Al 
Qaeda would fit as an example of such an entity. The characteristics of the apolitical 
model are:
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 There is apparently no bargaining within war. 
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 The war-fighting process is seen as fundamentally mechanical rather than strategic 
or instrumental. 
 The model flows from the Clausewitzian assertion that once violence begins, it 
adopts a logic of its own which is neither moral nor political. Albeit now rare as a 
casus belli between states, conflicts in the ‗Zan‘ domain have a greater propensity 
towards this form.  
  Non rational theory argues that the policy for continuing or terminating war is shaped by 
competition between individuals and agencies that are pursuing their own interests rather 
than the rational interests of the nation or ethnic group as a whole. The drug cartels at 
work in South America (1980s onwards) and Afghanistan (1987 onwards) and the 
Diamond Wars of Africa (1990s) are examples. Given this lack of an objectively 
determined national objective, a rational calculus is almost impossible to establish.  
With no clear ends except destruction and damage and no rules to subscribe to, the ‗ways‘ 
and ‗means‘ dimensions of the strategic equation – being of little or no consequence to 
the strategy itself – are thus left to innovation, experiment and change. There is little or no 
relation to political advantage gained, territory captured, own losses or even enemy killed. 
The strategy remains acceptable as long it serves to create and maintain chaos, anarchy, 
diminish state control and erode its regulating organs. The rational value of bargaining 
and favourable war termination is obviated by the absence of clear political objectives. 
Such ‗wars‘ or ‗hostilities‘ may not terminate even when a bargain is struck that serves 
the apolitical purpose of the entities. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter established how war is perceived from different perspectives and different 
‗traditions‘ within international relations. The role and function of war within the war 
system was discussed and the importance of perception over reality in outcomes was 
highlighted. In the dominant realist tradition, war has the potential to provide political 
leverage, a bargaining platform where a position of strength or weakness depending on 
the ‗perceptional‘ outcome of the war is traded for political outcomes.  
Discussion on the Bargaining Model of War was picked up in the last section however; 
much of what preceded provided the platform for the efficacy of the model itself and its 
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utility in understanding victory and developing a theory thereof. The preliminary 
discussions included a study of the dimensions of war, the causes of war and its 
relationship to each dimension – the ‗Zan‘, ‗Zar‘, ‗Zamin‘ matrix, morality of war and 
instruments of limitation.  A generic model of threat assessment and response was 
followed by an analytical look at the importance of the strategic environment, its contours 
and influence on war initiation, war termination and intra-war diplomacy.  
In the study of war, the thrust was on its direction and outcomes towards its political 
purpose as opposed to ‗good‘ and ‗bad‘ strategies. Having compared various definitions 
of war, a functional definition that sees war both as an act as well as a state - the Hobbes 
definition as adapted and modified by the author – was picked up as this addressed the 
spectrum of victory in all its probable domains and dimensions.  
No discussion on war is complete without a reference to war‘s nature and character. The 
Clausewitzian caveat of war‘s tendency to serve only itself and in the process lose its 
objective purpose was discussed at length. We concluded that the cultural urge to succeed 
and the need to be seen to be victorious has often stripped war of its political value and 
purpose.  The zeitgeist and its influence on the notion of victory using the framework of 
waves of change as posited by Alvin and Heidi Toffler was used to describe the dynamic 
nature of victory in both a macro as well as a micro timescale perspective. We then 
established that the bargaining model of war serves as a reasonable framework that 
unifies war initiation, intra war diplomacy and war termination  as part of a wider 
bargaining process. Its applicability in both political and apolitical models was confirmed.  
Before developing a definition and theory of victory, it is essential to identify what the 
victory notion encompasses, identify the language and vocabulary that is associated with 
it. Chapters II and III provide a firm foundation for a detailed look at what is essentially a 
‗pre-theory‘ of victory.   
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CHAPTER IV – THE CONTEMPORARY THEORY AND 
DEFINITION OF VICTORY: A PRE-THEORY 
Wars are conflicts of societies, and can be fully understood only if one 
understands the nature of the society fighting them. The roots of victory or 
defeat often have to be sought far from the battlefield.
1
 
Sir Michael Howard 
INTRODUCTION 
ny conceptual exploration designed to identify and observe relationships in a 
field of inquiry carefully – in this instance the understanding of Victory, needs 
to be founded upon organising principles and testable methods; especially so 
when the process involves new and rudimentary ideas regarding political phenomena or 
the classification of procedures and methods of research and analysis. 
Theory can be described as a system of ideas. According to Acharya and Buzan there are 
two definitions of theory: the harder positivist definition dominant in the United States 
and the softer reflectivist definition prevalent in Europe.
2
 While the former strictly 
explains causal relations and contains ‗testable hypotheses of a causal nature‘, the latter is 
‗anything that organizes a field systematically, structures questions, and establishes a 
coherent and rigorous set of interrelated concepts and categories.‘3  
James Rosenau finds that theory cannot flourish ‗until the materials of the field are 
processed‘  that is to say, ‗rendered comparable - through the use of pre-theories‘4 He 
observes that pre-theory does not need to include or mean techniques related to data 
collection, management quantified techniques.
5
 When moving from absences of theory 
towards a pre-theory, there is no consciousness about or constrains or influence from the 
organising and channelling effects of an obtaining theory. Research is steered and 
evidence gleaned mainly by individual experiences and the intellectual wisdom organised 
by the scope and purpose of the study. There is also no immediate need or conscious 
effort to turn thoughts into a systematically constructed theoretical paradigm as that is the 
domain of theory and not pre-theory. The pre-theory stage also provides an opportunity to 
admit mixed disciplines. This is because pre-theory seeks disciplinary identity after the 
fact and not when it did not exist. A simple process for theory building is illustrated in the 
following flow chart:  
A 
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FIGURE 16 : FROM ABSENCE TO THEORY  
(AUTHOR‘S OWN DIAGRAM) 
 
This leads to the finished product – the refined theory. In this process we are essentially 
moving from deductively inferred hypotheses that describe, explain and link affective, 
cognitive and behavioural aspects of collectively experienced phenomena, in our case, the 
condition and process of Victory to a theory thereof. Theory leaning and evolution is 
generally evolutionary but can also follow a revolutionary path as indicated in Figure 16. 
Deductively inferred hypotheses are in themselves pretheories.  Notwithstanding even 
considerable challenge to their validity and relevance, as long as these pretheories serve 
the function of perseverance of core social-political and military cognitions and an 
organizing framework is established, the conditions of pre-theory are essentially met.   
Theory is an essential tool for statecraft. It provides the framework for understanding, 
diagnosing and projecting events, explaining their causes and likely outcomes, 
prescribing responses, and evaluating the impact of policy options. Policy debates often 
rest on competing theoretical visions.
6
 The relationship between theory and policy, policy 
and action and, action and outcome extracts the value of a study of victory from a purely 
academic debate to the realm of strategy and action. 
Scholarship may differ on theories of victory yet there appears a general consensus that 
with changing times the concepts of victory and defeat have changed. Little direct 
research exists on the nature of this change, however indirect analogies can be found in 
history. These will be dealt with in greater detail in the case studies that follow in Chapter 
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IV. Applying grounded theory approach, we can establish with reasonable accuracy the 
contours of the pre-theory and using inductive and deductive logic arrive at the broad 
contours and the building blocks of victory and its dynamic nature. 
SECTION 1: A PRE-THEORY OF VICTORY 
 As stated in Chapter II (see page 17), there has been a flood of new literature since 2006 
on the understanding of victory. This rich axial data is ripe for theorising and indeed some 
scholars as we shall see in this chapter have explicitly done so. However, any 
comparative study requires that colourful language often adopted in narrative be stripped 
to relieve data of any prejudice or exaggeration. In other words, data needs to be 
underpinned by scientific language without altering the context originally intended. 
The character of war and the political purpose it serves is a direct product of the age. This 
according to John Mueller, explains why today‘s wars are not total affairs as was the case 
when ‗marauding kings or warlords would conquer their enemies outright, steal their 
treasures, raze their towns, kill their warriors, and imprison or enslave whoever was left. 
This was a time when joy of victory and the ugly reality of defeat were self-evident to 
both the victor and the vanquished.‘7  
While Hannibal (248 – ca. 183 BC) and his turning move at the Battle of Cannae may 
have inspired General Schwarzkopf during the first Gulf War,
8
 how the vanquished 
enemy was dealt thereafter bears no resemblance.  Alexander, after the siege of Tyre is 
332 BC that lasted 7 months, ‗slaughtered eight thousand Tyrians and the remaining thirty 
thousand inhabitants were sold into slavery. In early, pre-modern and modern wars, there 
was little room for the niceties of twentieth century diplomacy, humanitarian intervention, 
or UN brokerage. Since 1945, the wholesale conquest of rival states and populations has 
fortunately become rare.‘9 Increasingly, in a world of limited wars, multi-ethnic civil 
wars, UN peace deals and international intervention, the relative winners and losers in the 
global chess game (or, indeed, of any single move) are much more ambiguous. 
Evaluations are more and more open to interpretation and influence by moral, cultural, 
perceptional and psychological biases.  
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SECTION 2: INDUCED THEORIES 
The real key here is not how many enemy do I kill. The real key is how many 
allies do I grow…And that is a very important metric that they just don't get.10 
Newt Gingrich 
The literature alludes to a number of ‗non-theories‘ and some generic pre-theories on 
victory. An increasing volume of literature however continues on the issue and theorists, 
scholars and practitioners are addressing the subject from a variety of perspectives. The 
available literature when scoped in combination with earlier studies provides sufficient 
data for developing substantive pre-theories.  
Through a combination of inductive and deductive approaches as consistent with the 
nature of the data (inductive reasoning for the reflective and deductive for the 
contemplative) are succinctly presented in this section. The pre-theories have also been 
constructed from grounded theory approach with the exception of the Match-fixing and 
Scorekeeping Model. 
PRE-THEORY 1: A RATIONALIST MODEL  
Sun Tzu presents war as an indispensable element of statecraft and an activity lending 
itself to an in-depth and dispassionate analysis. This text has been widely researched and 
extensively debated. Several translations in English language exist. However, owing to 
the complexity of both the work and the source language – in this case Chinese – and, at 
times, the brevity of the work, translations and interpretations vary considerably. A 
number of Chinese scholars have begun to comment on the Art of War and present new 
perspectives. True comprehension of Sun Tzu‘s text is not possible without some insight 
into the wider philosophical references it makes. For example, knowledge of the idea of 
‗Shih,‘ the ever-changing configuration of power in one's environment, alters the meaning 
and depth of some of the passages of the Chinese text. Most early translations simply 
ignore such detail. In effect, this is like referring to Zeus as merely an important Greek 
god! To avoid such errors and the associated pitfalls, what follows is an inductive 
analysis of Sun Tzu‘s concept of victory based on the synthesis of four11 popular English 
language translations of the original text. The emphasis on Sun Tzu is quite deliberate 
because not only does he present what may best be categorised as a rationalist 
perspective, but he brings with it a depth of insight into the cultural and temporal 
frameworks that, as we shall see, hugely impact the notion of victory.  
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Sun Tzu‘s opening chapter on ‗Appraisals‘ sets out the basis for establishing military 
force, evolving a military strategy including developmental strategy and the need for 
training and discipline. Some of the retranslated text - instantly recognizable includes: 
The military is a great matter of the state.
12
 It is the ground of death and life, The Tao
13
 of 
survival or extinction. One cannot but examine it.
14
  
The usage of the term ‗victory‘ by Sun Tzu is incredibly complex and deep. It cannot be 
separated from the Chinese civilisation and the philosophical thought or, to use a 
Clausewitz‘s phrase, ‗spirit of the age‘15. For example, Sun Tzu writes: ‗...the victorious 
military is first victorious and after that does battle. The defeated military first does battle 
and after that seeks victory.‘16  
The idea of victory expressed here is not immediately evident. Barry C. Boyce provides 
one answer in his article ‗Applying Unconventional Power of the Sun Tzu to the 
Conventional World‘: 
It is possible that victory may be an on-going condition, rather than a 
temporary state of affairs defined in relation to reversing an uncomfortable or 
undesirable situation that we find ourselves in. …How is it possible, with our 
conventional understanding of victory, for the victory to be obtained before 
the battle? …While this sense is implied in the Sun Tzu, a deeper sense may 
also be derived, namely that victory is a condition of confidence, knowledge 
of affairs, and innate curiosity, such that one knows what can be conquered, 
how, and when. This kind of victory can be cultivated. It is precisely the 
opposite of the pre-defeated mentality that believes that victory must be 
sought elsewhere, as the sum of a series of battles. Such conventional victory 
is already being diminished the moment it is attained.
17 
 
Avoiding battle yet seeking victory goes hand in hand with joining battle; much like the 
psychological dislocation and paralysis of the enemy propounded by Liddell Hart and 
Fuller. Manoeuvre to a position of indisputable advantage such that victory is assured. If 
the enemy does not succumb to a superior manoeuvre, then on joining battle, Sun Tzu 
prescribes a quick, swift blow.  Boyce explains this in the following words:  
A force that seemed invincible may suddenly be vulnerable (or ‗vincible‘), 
merely through the passage of time and the inevitable fluctuation of energies. 
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If one regards the world as static, its solidity will always fight against you. 
Within [the] Sun Tzu, this point of view is never taken. Solid is only one side 
of the equation, a part of the fluctuation.
18
  
Only with the strategy of taking ‗whole‘ will the general find complete victory.19 This 
means conceiving the perspective of the ‗whole‘ at the outset of the campaign, before 
plans are laid out and the armies mobilised. The military is thus kept intact, ‗preserving 
both the advantage that leads to victory and the advantage that comes from victory.‘20 Sun 
Tzu‘s doctrine of the attack suggests a distinctly indirect approach. His vision of the 
purpose of stratagem allude what modern strategists call the main effects; namely, 
disruption, dislocation or paralysis. The following excerpt from The Art of War further 
elucidates the point: 
And so one skilled at employing the military subdues the other's military but 
does not do battle, uproots the other's walled city but does not attack, destroys 
the other's state but does not prolong. One must take it whole when 
contending for all-under-heaven. [emphasis added] Thus the military is not 
blunted and advantage can be whole. This is the method of the strategy of 
attack.
21
 
The distinct similarity between Sun Tzu‘s perceptions of victory to a notion attributed to 
Clausewitz is evident; the difference is in the relative emphasis on the means. For Sun 
Tzu, it is an inferior choice to seek battle and decision through war... 
Sun Tzu asserts that for the best defence one goes outside the range of enemy, becoming 
ungraspable and thus unbeatable. Victory need not be achieved by will or devastation. 
The Griffith‘s text reads: ‗One skilled at defence hides below the nine earths; one skilled 
at attack moves above the nine heavens. This possibly obscures the more powerful 
message that Sun Tzu might be trying to stimulate in the bamboo text, which points to a 
defence not based in conflict! ‗…Of old those skilled at defence hid below the nine 
earths and moved above the nine heavens.‘22 Thus they could preserve themselves and be 
‗all-victorious‘. 
On taking states intact, Sun Tzu says that ‗[T]aking a state whole is superior; destroying it 
is inferior to this.‘ And in the same passage continues with that well known phrase 
‗[T]herefore, one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the most skilful. 
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Subduing the other‘s military without battle is the most skilful.‘23 Sun Tzu then presents a 
further set of principles: 
And so the superior military cuts down strategy. Its inferior cuts down 
alliances; its inferior cuts down the military. The worst attacks walled cities.
24
  
The contrast in acuity from that of later military writers can be explained through 
understanding Sun Tzu‘s definition of war. He does not see war as a ‗duel at a larger 
scale‘25 but as a much wider phenomenon that includes any situation of conflict, including 
non-violent conflict.  Victory is viewed in terms of the ability of persuading others 
(furthering policy and politics) without ever having to battle (resort to other means).
26
 Sun 
Tzu advocates the use of military power as the last resort, but he is by no means a 
pacifist; what he tries to tell us, in the context of the ‗whole‘, is that better victories are 
won without fighting. 
Sun Tzu is aware of the philosophy of power and the human need for recognition. In war 
such an obsession can be costly but man is impelled towards the hazards none the less. 
Sun Tzu identifies why, as interesting passage indicates:  
Anciently those skilled in war conquered an enemy easily conquered. And 
therefore victories won by a master of war gain him neither reputation for 
wisdom nor merit for valour. 
Tu Mu: A victory gained before the situation has crystallized is one the 
common man does not comprehend. Thus its author gains no reputation for 
sagacity. Before he has bloodied his blade the enemy state has already 
submitted [emphasis added]. 
Ho Yen-his: … When you subdue your enemy without fighting, who will 
pronounce you valorous [or victorious].
27
 
For he wins his victories without erring; ‗without erring‘ means whatever he 
does insures [sic.] his victory; he conquers an enemy already defeated. 
Chen Hao: In planning, never a useless move; in strategy, no step taken in 
vain. 
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Therefore, the skilful commander takes up a position in which he cannot be 
defeated and misses no opportunity to master his enemy. 
Thus a victorious army wins its victories before seeking battle; an army 
destined to defeat fights in the hope of winning.
28
 [Emphasis added] 
An intriguing, somewhat paradoxical passage in comparison to what has been presented 
above is found in the chapter titled ‗Form‘. While hinting at the idea of ‗nature of victory‘ 
and war termination, it also suggests that for the skilled general wisdom lies in the fact 
and not the perception:  
In seeing victory, not going beyond what everyone knows is not skilled. 
Victory in battle that all-under-heaven calls skilled is not skilled. Thus 
lifting the down of an autumn leaf does not mean great strength. Seeing the 
sun and the moon does not mean a clear eye. Hearing thunder does not mean a 
keen ear. So-called skill is to be victorious over the easily defeated. Thus the 
battles of the skilled are without extraordinary victory, without reputation 
for wisdom, and without merit for courage.
29
  [Emphasis added] 
Sun Tzu‘s Principles for Victory can be summed up as: 
 Best victory is attained with minimal fighting and absorbs the enemy as a whole.30 
This implies both physical and moral victory which manifests its self in politico-
military success, military attainability and socio-political sustainability.  
 Avoid fighting; if you join battle keep it swift.31 
 Defeat the enemy‘s source of power or his strategy instead of trying to attack his 
military (military is the manifestation not the source of power).
32
 
 It is important to be seen to be victorious and to find glory in that victory. Fight 
that enemy who is easily defeated; some blood is essential for glory and glory 
essential for esteem. 
33
 
PRE-THEORY 2: A REALIST MODEL 
Machiavelli may be described as the father of realism. For Machiavelli, quality of success 
or victory is not judged on a moral-ethical scale that seeks to qualify the loss or gain with 
the added baggage of honour – dishonour, moral – immoral or ethics and chivalry. 
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Machiavelli sees nothing as permanent and everlasting hence the ‗here‘ and ‗now‘ takes 
precedent over the ‗who‘ and ‗how‘. To Machiavelli, success is often short lived and 
failure usually permanent. This philosophy gives rise to the irony in his political view, 
premised both on the narrow scale of time and the perception of human beings as 
opportunists, greedy and power-hungry animals.  
However, a dispassionate read ‗to attach to Machiavelli's advice some moral vision 
similar to an early anticipation of utilitarianism--to argue, in effect, that Machiavelli is 
urging the Prince to think of the greatest good of the greatest number and thus use his 
unscrupulous tactics for the long-term betterment of as many people as possible.‘  While 
this view does not deny the harshness of Machiavellian tactics, it at least seeks to mitigate 
the moral unease one feels by suggesting that there is a long-term moral goal in view.
 34
 
Machiavelli writes: 
I believe that this [how one is judged] depends upon whether cruel deeds are 
committed well or badly. They may be called well committed (if one may use 
the word 'well' of that which is evil) when they are all committed at once, 
because they are necessary for establishing one's power and are not afterwards 
persisted in, but changed for measures as beneficial as possible to one's 
subjects. Badly committed are those that at first are few in number, but 
increase with time rather than diminish. Those who follow the first method 
can in some measure remedy their standing both with God and with man. . . . 
Those who follow the second cannot possible maintain their power.
35
 
Machiavelli concludes The Prince with some very gloomy reflections on the nature of 
fortune, the shifting circumstances rulers face and the general impossibility of any 
success lasting for very long. He warns that the things that have worked towards gaining 
the Prince his power will be the very things that make him vulnerable to the next power. 
In such an unstable world, he concludes, it is better to be impetuous than calculating.
36
 
Machiavelli exhibits rationalist sentiments alongside his characteristic realist pessimism. 
His emphasis that loyalty of his people, good laws, and good weapons are the best 
security a ruler can possess as a universal and lasting precept for peace, stability and 
deterrence is indeed a very rational conclusion.  
Machiavelli‘s realism in victory can be summed up as ‗interests justify the means.‘ 
Following precepts of victory emerge: 
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 Protecting oneself from invasion and foreign control is of paramount importance. 
This is victory per se. 
 One who deceives will always find those who allow themselves to be deceived. 
 Whosoever desires constant success must change his conduct with the times. 
 Politics need not have a relationship with morals; interests supersede morals. 
 Perpetuation of one‘s success is the only ‗victory‘ that matters. 
PRE-THEORY 3: AN ABSOLUTIST FRAMEWORK  
Clausewitz‘s On War, remains the most dominant text on strategy and the study of war in 
the West. The Clausewitzian notion of victory is, at first sight, simplistic in comparison to 
Sun Tzu. The destruction of the enemy‘s ability to enter battle, resist or resume hostilities 
is, as Clausewitz tells us, the ultimate victory and an objective to be ruthlessly pursued. 
However, Clausewitz too, like Sun Tzu, emphasises the need to keep war purposeful. The 
object of war is first and foremost to further policy.  
Clausewitz identifies that even the most decisive military victory is never final and hints 
at, but does not talk about in any detail, what we describe today as war termination and 
peace building.
37
 Each war must terminate. It must involve diplomatic and political 
efforts to make victory acceptable and sustainable. Even when a total and decisive victory 
is achievable, limited goals are often more practical. It is on this assertion that Clausewitz 
introduces his notion of real war - a war that does not conclude on the theoretically 
perfect dynamics of escalation or annihilation of the enemy; instead is moderated by 
political calculations, uncertainties, the limits of strength, and psychological factors.
38
 
An important idea introduced by Clausewitz is that the political aim must adapt itself to 
its chosen means, a process which can radically change it; yet the political aim remains 
the first consideration.
39
 Policy, then, will permeate all military operations, and, in so far 
as their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them. ‗War is not 
merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political 
intercourse, carried on by other means‘.40 We may then conclude that a military success 
when achieved is a victory only when it has the potential to contribute to the original 
political objective; in other words, the quality of leverage.  
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Clausewitz‘s definition of war concludes with the famous dictum: ‗War is thus an act of 
violence to compel our enemy to do our will.‘41 Unlike Sun Tzu, Clausewitz identifies the 
inherent tendency of war to escalate independent of political logic or military prudence. 
War, according to Clausewitz will follow its nature, the inherent, primordial tendency 
towards violence and search for the ultimate victory. It is this tendency in the nature of 
war that perhaps propelled Clausewitz to conclude that any victory – in war – short of 
total destruction of the enemy‘s ‗hub of power‘42 is incomplete. 
Clausewitz emphasises that the shortest, quickest, and most effective way to win a war is 
through destruction of the opponent's army in a decisive battle. His idea of identifying 
and relentlessly – blow after blow – attacking the ‗centre of gravity‘ remains current even 
today. Finding and attacking the most critical point in the enemy‘s position is a problem 
that inevitably occupies every military strategist.
43
  
Clausewitz defines the centre of gravity in the context of his experience and the evidence 
of history: when one keeps the dominant characteristic of both belligerents in mind, ‗[o]ut 
of these characteristics a certain centre of gravity develops, the hub of all power and 
movement, on which everything depends.‘ Once the enemy is off balance, ‗he must not 
be given time to recover. Blow after blow must be aimed in the same direction‘. He 
concludes that ‗by constantly seeking out the centre of his power, by daring all to win all, 
will one really defeat the enemy.‘44  
Clausewitz points to several centres of gravity which may exist concurrently; be it in the 
levels of war or the geographical implications of force. In Book 6, Clausewitz reiterates 
this point: 
 Our position, then, is that a theatre of war, be it large or small, and the 
forces stationed there, no matter what their size, represent the sort of unity
45
 
[emphasis added] in which a single centre of gravity can be identified. That is 
the place where the decision should be reached; a victory at that point is in its 
fullest sense identical with the defence of the theatre of operations.
46
 
For Clausewitz, typically, the most important centre of gravity remained the enemy‘s 
army.
47
 He opines that great military leaders whose entire careers depended on their 
military success, victory on the battlefield was everything.  If their army had been 
destroyed, they would all have gone down in history as failures.
48
 On defeating the 
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enemy, the destruction of the enemy‘s forces comes first on his list.49 Clausewitz saw the 
destruction of the force as a guarantee for sustainability of victory – through denuding the 
enemy‘s ability to continue of enter hostilities.   
On decisive blows, Clausewitz also suggests that these should be delivered without 
geographical overextension, a direct lesson from Napoleon‘s ill-fated march on Moscow 
in 1812.  
The ‗Clausewitzian‘50 absolutist framework of victory is summarised below: 
 Quality of Victory is judged by one‘s ability to impose one‘s will on the enemy 
and vice-versa, the enemy‘s ability of continued resistance.51 
 ‗Absolute victory,‘ in a military sense, is attained in two parts: first is destruction 
of the enemy‘s center of gravity (C of G) and the second, the completion of 
victory through pursuit. Disabling the C of G or failing to complete the victory 
allows the enemy to eventually recover and continue resistance which is against 
the object of war.
52
  
 Clausewitz recognizes war as a political instrument. There is however a 
fundamental assumption that the closer the military success is to the absolute, the 
greater its value for politics and diplomacy.   
 Clausewitz does not use any metric to qualify the context or quality of victory. 
However from his insistence on the second state of victory, the pursuit, it is 
evident that, not necessarily annihilation of the enemy but, elimination of his will 
to resist is the ultimate victory.
53
 
 The realization of a cost-benefit dynamic in strategy and nature of victory can be 
construed from Clausewitz‘s discussion on the culminating point of victory.54 
PRE-THEORY 4: A MANOEUVRIST‘S FRAMEWORK 
The acquisitive state, inherently unsatisfied, needs to gain victory in order to 
gain its object—and must therefore court greater risks in the attempt. The 
conservative State can achieve its object by merely inducing the aggressor to 
drop his attempt at conquest. …Its victory is, in a real sense, attained by 
foiling the other side's bid for victory.
55
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Liddell Hart 
The Art of Winning was how the Russian military leader Alexander Suvorov called 
his book in which he laid the foundations of Russian and arguably, Soviet military 
science. ‗He brilliantly applied them in battles and never lost one‘ writes Major 
General Tiushkevich in an article entitled ‗Military Leaders of the Great Patriotic 
War: The Art of Victory‘56  
He finds that military theoreticians looked at victory and defeat as two sides of the 
same phenomenon whether an engagement, a battle, an operation or the campaign 
as a whole. ‗In the course of time the idea of victory became associated with a 
complete defeat of the armed forces and with the destructive impact on the enemy's 
rear‘. 57 This typical nineteenth century notion of victory survived through the next 
one hundred years until the end of the Second World War. ‗It should be added‘, 
writes Tiushkevich ‗that the concept of the military victory was imbibing the 
features and trends of each particular epoch which boosted its significance and 
intensified its social and political dimensions.‘ The two world wars, exerted 
tremendous impact on the course of history and resulted in a new theory of 
victory….Regrettably,‘ continues  Tiushkevich, ‗the problem of the price of victory 
had not been elaborated within the military theory of victory--it was merely touched 
upon on the tactical level.‘ 58 
The existence of a theory of victory in Russian politico-military thought is alluded to but 
none is explained. However, no codified evidence of a formal theory has been found. We 
can assume that a notional theoretical framework therefore did and does exist which  
exhibited all the characteristics of a wholesome theory including the aspect of progression 
and evolution. No such theory. 
With the experience of the two world wars, the massive destructive potential exhibited at 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a number of theorists in the mid-20
th
 century grappled with the 
meaning and purpose of war in the nuclear age. Some focused on the nuclear dimension 
while others, like Liddell Hart and J. F. C. Fuller focused on keeping conventional war 
relevant and less bloody; in effect these theorists modernised the manoeuvrist approach 
and led an advance towards keeping conventional war relevant. The theory essentially 
accompanied a unique notion of victory that was premised on and underpinned by a 
combination of moral and physical effect – essentially dislocation and paralysis – induced 
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through manoeuvre and firepower with ideally minimal of fighting.   As Liddell Hart 
explains: 
The atomic bomb in 1945 looked to the responsible statesmen of the West an 
easy and simple way of assuring a swift and complete victory…. They did not 
look beyond the immediate strategic aim of ‗winning the war,‘ and were 
content to assume that military victory would assure peace--an assumption 
contrary to the general experience of history. The outcome has been the latest 
of many lessons that pure military strategy needs to be guided by the longer 
and wider view from the higher plane of ‗grand strategy.‘59 
War is a violent clash of not just the armed forces but also the societies in competition. 
There is always therefore an external dimension to strategy as Sir Michael Howard also 
suggests that, if drawn in extended time and across cultural and social change, would 
suggest a change in both the object and its pursuit.
60
  Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart and to a 
very large extent Major General J. F. C. Fuller predicted and observed this transition in 
not just the notion of victory and its moral-cultural undertones but also the means and 
methods of its pursuit. Perhaps also taking a cue from Sun Tzu and the less quoted 
passages of On War, Liddell Hart presented a framework for application of strategy that 
sought not the destruction but the disruption of the enemy.
61
 A concept that attacked a 
system of forces or a strategy rather than the main strength of the force itself. The idea 
was contrary to Clausewitz, for what was being professed was the marginalising of the 
main force or its centre of brevity while continuing to attach the critical requirements and 
vulnerabilities of the centre of gravity.    
He posited that through increased tempo of operations, a state of relative time could be 
created wherein for the superior military time runs in slow motion whereas the other is 
always out of it. Through manoeuvre and concentration at decisive points and while 
isolating, separating, dividing or dispersing the enemy, conditions of superiority could be 
created such that a sane enemy would concede without battle and should the enemy 
decide to pursue battle, a defeat was inevitable.  
The objective of manoeuvre is to seek specific ‗effects‘ and not battle; principally, 
‗strategic dislocation‘ whereby the enemy‘s main force is rendered ineffective at the 
point where decision is sought. The inability to act both physically and or deliver timely 
decisions for forces that could act was another main effect namely ‗paralysis’. The 
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‗pocketing‘ of the British Expeditionary Force in the battle of France was essentially a 
dislocation. The inability of the French to respond to the swift mechanised thrusts, 
paralysis.    
Liddell Hart of course was addressing a particular level of war – what we now know as 
the operational level (though it was not recognised then in the English language). 
Understanding of the operational level matured to a great extent during the Second World 
War with the combined influence of long range fires, strategic and tactical 
communications which collectively enlarged the canvas of warfare.  
The main flaw with this theory, one that leaves a gaping hole when we look at 
asymmetric conflict in particular, is that it requires a compliant enemy who shares 
identical if not similar precepts of military power, pain and pleasure, loss and gain and 
ascribes to a comparable cost - benefit logic to victory and defeat. A fundamental 
symmetry
62
 is thus a prerequisite for manoeuvre to substitute attrition in the context of the 
ultimate outcome and not just the battle.      
PRE-THEORY 5: A NON-VICTORY (SCARCITY) FRAMEWORK  
T. C. Schelling struggled to adapt the Clausewitzian distinction between defence and 
attack in applying the conventional mechanics of victory to the nuclear age. Realising that 
diplomacy had become inherently violent and that a permanent threat of violence existed, 
the natural conclusion Schelling arrived at was that coercion through the threat of 
violence and not compellence – the use of that violence – would define how one would 
impose one‘s will on the enemy.63 According to Schelling, ‗victory‘ inadequately 
expressed what a nation wants from its military forces.
64
 He believed that nations mostly 
want the influence that resides in latent force, the bargaining power that comes from its 
capacity to hurt and not just the direct consequence of a successful military action.
 65
  
In contrast to Gray‘s assertion of relevance and attainability of decisive victory, Schelling 
argues that while total victory over an enemy provides at best an opportunity for 
unopposed violence against the enemy populations, ‗how to use that opportunity in the 
national interest, or in some wider interest, can be just as important as the achievement of 
victory itself; but traditional military suicide does not tell us how to use that capacity for 
inflicting pain.‘66 Schelling posits that even a substantial military victory is a scarce 
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concept in the contemporary world and likens the pursuit of such a military victory to 
actual or virtual suicide.    
Schelling presents a nonlinear view of Victory. While victory may be a scarce possibility, 
defeat, at least in relation to the purpose of victory, is far more probable. Victory and 
defeat do not, therefore, register on a comparable sliding scale of possibilities since a 
simple axis would miss much of the relevant action.
67
 It echoes Michael Howard‘s 
opinion that ‗a war, fought for whatever reason, that does not aim at a solution which 
takes into account the fears, the interests and, not least, the honour of the defeated peoples 
is unlikely to decide anything for very long.‘68 As a military objective, decisive victory is 
not controversial. Whether or not the decision sought needs to be conclusive, not 
necessarily of a Carthaginian character, is a matter initially for policy to decide and then 
for political-military dialogue as events unfold.
69
  
Schelling is suggestive of an inherent inadequacy in pure military success without a 
linkage with interests. The quest for decisive success in the 21st century will more and 
more carry the risk of yielding only a painful Pyrrhic victory.  
PRE-THEORY 6: A RELATIVITY FRAMEWORK 
Victory and defeat register on a sliding scale of possibilities.
70
 
Colin S. Gray 
 
In Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory, Colin S. Gray lays out a theoretical 
framework for describing and assessing levels of victory. Gray finds that ‗decisive 
victory, though a meaningful concept, is not a clear-cut alternative to defeat, or even to 
indecisive victory.‘ 71 He finds that in terms of achievements, victory allows for more and 
for less and that while decisive victory is achievable, there is no guarantee of its 
attainability. Gray introduces, two lesser grades of achievement, namely: ‗strategic 
success‘ and ‗strategic advantage‘ with a qualifying emphasis on the ability of these 
lower shades to remain ‗positively decisive‘: 
Although the concept of decisive victory in principle is distinguishable from 
strategic success or strategic advantage, in practice either of the two more 
modest achievements can be positively decisive.
72
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Gray‘s framework parents a utilitarian assessment. It is both prospective and 
retrospective. Its simplicity in relation to the purpose of victory lies in the question, what 
does it mean for policy, strategy and the operational domain? The framework, or grades 
of victory, can be applied across the full range of levels of war, even the achievements in 
the technical domain.  
In describing the quality and utility of victory, implicit between the lines is that grades 
below strategic success fall outside the victory domain being best classified as stalemates 
or in the zone of failures.  Additionally, Gray leaves the question of ‗defeat‘ largely 
unaddressed and its relationship to victory open ended.  
The framework does not constitute a theory or comprehensive pre-theory but it does 
provide a tool for assessing victory and conveying scientific language that is sufficiently 
precise and adequately vague to serve the needs of a political theory. In explaining the 
characteristics of the lower shades of victory, Gray correctly asserts that depending on the 
nature of the issue and the type of bargain sought, strategic advantage and strategic 
success can in themselves be the defined end states for violence. In other words, usability 
of victory is more a function of how diplomacy uses what leverage the military provided. 
The limitation of Gray‘s framework is that it tends to presuppose defeat as relative to and 
an opposite of victory. Although this may be true at the tactical level, at higher levels, as 
we have shown earlier, outcomes are diffused in perceptional frameworks. Additionally, 
how does one apply the framework to counter insurgencies and terrorism? Since terrorists 
often seek attention, are not averse to loss of combatants, supporters or even sympathetic 
elements in the target society, terrorists may actually benefit from a tactical defeat or 
apparent losses. This necessitates an additional temporal framework which can be an 
organising argument for immediate, short and long-term implication of victory. 
PRE-THEORY 7: A POST ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK 
From the recent flood of literature, one of the most comprehensive and structured 
research comes from Martel who uses several case studies to induce generic framework 
for assessing victory and provides what he terms as  pre-theory
73
 of victory. Martel 
presents an analytical framework that plots the level of victory against the quality of 
victory for each of parameters B – D (see Figure below):  
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FIGURE 17: LEVEL OF VICTORY74 
SOURCE: WILLIAM C. MARTEL, VICTORY IN WAR: FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN MILITARY 
POLICY (FRAMEWORK ANNOTATIONS INSERTED BY AUTHOR.) 
 
The main limitation is the correlational emphasis on constructs of victory, neglecting the 
value of victory towards policy objectives, its sustainability, the overall cost and the 
absence of perceptional and cultural consideration. 
PRE-THEORY 8: AN ELEMENTAL FRAMEWORK 
Robert Mandel criticizes traditional understanding of victory, both in terms of end-state 
or cost-benefit metrics. Recognising the multifaceted nature of victory in war, Mandel 
provides a definition of strategic victory encompassing ‗informational‘, ‗military‘, 
‗political‘, ‗economic‘ and ‗diplomatic elements‘. By approaching victory in this way, 
Mandel posits that it is possible to develop a more complex and comprehensive picture of 
war outcomes. Achieving victory, accordingly becomes a problem of balancing various 
trade-offs between the elements of victory in the post-violence setting.
75
 This further 
explains the inherent subjectivity of the victory notion and points to the conceptual 
difficulties in assessing victory from the perspective of the ‗end state, the cost-benefit 
analysis and the embedded subjectivity.‘76 He dissects the concept of victory in two 
distinct phases namely war winning and peace winning. Five important fallacies that 
accompany the victory notion are:
 77
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 military fallacies that arise from overestimating the post war payoffs of military 
power,  
 political fallacies that stem from overestimating the ease of transforming the 
defeated state‘s post-war political system, 
 economic fallacies stemming from underestimating the costs of post-war 
economic assistance… underlying assumption that such economic reconstruction 
will be smooth, fast and inexpensive,  
 social fallacies that overestimate the vanquished society‘s willingness to adopt the 
victor‘s social value system and last,  
 diplomatic fallacies driven by the victor‘s appreciation of external legitimacy of 
the post war arrangement by assuming the outcome will serve as a positive model 
admired by onlookers. 
 Victory is what it is made out to be.  
Robert Mandel suggests dissecting victory into its constituent elements and assessing 
outcomes in each separately. The elements identified are: the ‗informational‘, ‗military‘, 
‗political‘, ‗economic‘ and ‗diplomatic‘. When assessing victory separately, a need arises 
to balance various trade-offs between the elements of victory in the post-violence setting. 
This implies deliberately aiming at identified or fine-tuned ends to be sought in each of 
the elements such that the collective impact of the parts is capable of producing the ends 
desired by policy. This would invariably involve trade-offs, limiting greater success or 
investing more effort in another with a view to attaining a particular calibrated level of 
success in each element.  
Mandel addresses symptoms of non-victory as opposed to providing any nascent theory 
or an organising framework for pre-theory.  
PRE-THEORY 9: A SCOREKEEPING AND MATCH-FIXING MODEL 
Given the requirements of a theory as pointed in the introduction to this chapter, the 
closest attempt to present a theory of victory is to be found in a seminar paper entitled 
‗Victory and Defeat in International Relations‘ by Dominic Johnson and Dominic 
Tierney. The duo, emphasizing the moral factors, present a case for perception over 
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reality and the inescapable influence of culture on the former. Their thesis suggests that 
no theory of victory is complete unless the end state is viewed within the absolute and 
relative cultural frameworks of the opposing sides.    
Through a survey of wars and political crises short of war, Johnson and Tierney opine 
that the outcome is seen in the context of reality. As such observers ‗perceive‘ reality and 
thus perceive the outcome of war and engagements.
78
 Their definition of insiders and 
outsiders needs to be elaborated. Everyone is an observer, insiders are observers that 
include decision-makers, administration and bureaucrats; whereas outsiders are those who 
were not personally involved in making the foreign policy upon which they now cast 
judgment. Outsiders include opposition politicians, the media, the general public at home 
and abroad, allies and partners and the world community at large,
79
  
People‘s evaluations according to Johnson are ‗quasi-attitudes made up on the spot, half-
hearted, even random reactions.‘80 Insiders and outsiders can be highly judgmental 
because attitudes pre-exist in people‘s minds, or are formed rapidly when prompted. ‗Key 
attributes of human nature include systematic tendencies to reach and hold judgments of 
people and events, to form them quickly, to be influenced by others, for first impressions 
to last, for emotional responses to shape opinions, and for people to find it hard to shake-
off established images.‘81 ‗Westerners‘, writes Nisbet, ‗for example, have a tendency to 
categorize even complex issues into black and white choices.‘82 People from the east in 
comparison are happy with shades of grey. ‗At times, people disagree strongly about the 
performance of their leaders or armies; at other times almost everyone agrees about who 
won and lost.‘ The two questions, Johnson and Tierney ask are: how are these judgments 
made? And why do they vary? A common answer explains this as a two-stage process:  
 
FIGURE 18: JOHNSON AND TIERNEY‘S TWO STAGE EVALUATION PROCESS  
SOURCE: JOHNSON AND TIERNEY, ‗VICTORY AND DEFEAT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS‘, 
CONFERENCE PAPER / UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPT, HAWAII, 2004. 
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First, observers need a set of criteria – a metric – against which an outcome is to be 
measured. It has two components:
83
 
 a  ‗yardstick‘ of what to measure (such as territory, or body counts); 
 a ‗threshold‘ to mark when success has been achieved (for example, a strategic 
target captured, or half of an enemy army destroyed).   
Second, once observers have selected a metric (or have had one imposed on them by the 
political elite, the media or peers), they need information about the conflict outcome to 
determine whether side X has reached the relevant threshold on the yardstick or not. 
FRAMEWORK ONE: SCORE KEEPING 
A Scorekeeping analysis adjusts for the existing material strengths of each side in the 
dispute by assessing difficulty. What Scorekeeping really measures is the success of each 
side‘s strategy, or how effectively they use their resources, given the particular 
environment, to make gains (especially core objectives). Hence, a Scorekeeping judgment 
of victory involves a comparison of the material gains made by each side, plus the 
achievement of material aims in the context of importance and difficulty.
84
 The 
relationship is summarised in the equation below. The main development from the 
previous equation is that the aims and gains are modified by the interaction of importance 
and difficulty: 
 
EQUATION 2: THE AIMS AND GAINS RELATIONSHIP 
SOURCE: JOHNSON AND TIERNEY, ‗VICTORY AND DEFEAT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS‘, 
CONFERENCE PAPER / UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPT, HAWAII, 2004. 
 
In theory, a scorekeeping analysis would have to compare fact against a ‗what if‘ theses. 
The inherent pitfalls of assessing fact against fiction make such an analysis questionable. 
In practice such a counter-factual analysis is very difficult, is rarely employed and cannot 
usually explain the process by which observers do in fact evaluate outcomes. Usually, 
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observers also do not have uniform perfect information and are generally unaware of 
courses and options open to policymakers. This suggests only a ‗best fit‘ analysis. 
A scorekeeping analysis also assumes that observers‘ perceptions are driven by data about 
material gains and aims, and not by pre-existing theories or beliefs. In cricket for 
example, the metric for victory is, of course, scoring the most runs and the time factor or 
overs. Since the result has to be attained in a particular timeframe, say five days for a test 
match, either time or the score board would tell, and consulting the scoreboard provides 
concrete information about which side has achieved victory or how a draw was achieved.  
Johnson‘s score sheet matrix for ‗quality of victory‘ is presented in Table 2: 
TABLE 2: ASSESSMENT SCORE SHEET 
SOURCE: JOHNSON AND TIERNEY, ‗VICTORY AND DEFEAT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS‘, 
CONFERENCE PAPER / UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPT, HAWAII, 2004. 
 
FRAMEWORK TWO: ‗MATCH FIXING‘ 
Observers often fail to evaluate on the basis of a Framework 1 Scorekeeping analysis. If 
so, what determines their choice of metric and information? In this section we build an 
alternative approach to understanding perceptions of victory and defeat, which we call 
Framework Two, or ‗Match-fixing‘. In contrast to Framework One’s focus on striving for 
an objective evaluation of material gains and aims achieved, Framework Two offers a 
model of victory and defeat based on real human beings whose perceptions of the world 
are shaped – and therefore can be understood and predicted – by logical inferences and by 
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well-established psychological biases. Figure 19 depicts three major sets of influences on 
perceptions of victory and defeat which operate in a chronological order: (1) mind-sets 
(before the event), (2) salient events (during the event), and (3) social pressure (before, 
during, and after the event). These variables capture the essentials of a causal account of 
how perceptions of victory are formed.
85
  
In Figure 19, factors influencing the transmission of information into a final judgment of 
victory and defeat (column 1) plus the effects of each of these factors in the process of 
evaluation: shaping and distorting metrics (column 2) and information (column 3). 
Match-fixing outcomes can be a representative when the psychological outcomes are 
profound and over shadow the physical – see the Battle of Karbala in Chapter V. This 
implies that match-fixing is not itself constructive but could well be part of an alternate 
reality. It ‗does not inherently create incorrect views of the winners and losers because 
determining the ‗real’ winner is difficult, and involves consideration not only of material, 
but also of psychological gains made by each side. Match-fixing factors often, but not 
always, encourage deviations from ideal standards of information processing (for 
example, through cognitive dissonance, or if media manipulation leaves key facts about 
the outcome unknown).‘86 
 
FIGURE 19: MATCH-FIXING MATRIX.  
SOURCE: JOHNSON AND TIERNEY, ‗VICTORY AND DEFEAT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS‘, 
CONFERENCE PAPER / UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPT, HAWAII, 2004. 
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In some cases, match-fixing can be the result of ‗simple variation in beliefs and attitudes, 
rather than unconscious biases.‘ A pacifist and soldier, for example, might both be fully 
aware of all the key facts about an outcome, ‗but assess that outcome with a different set 
of philosophical or ideational concerns.‘ They will not necessarily perceive the outcome 
incorrectly; ‗instead different metrics will be selected. In the following sections we 
explain how each stage in the evaluation process is influenced by the three match-fixing 
factors: mind-sets, salient events, and social pressures.
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The use of cognitive dissonance as a match-fixing tool is somewhat limiting, particularly 
if we look at both the definitional and the implicational usage of the condition. Cultural 
dissonance however serves to better describe the phenomenon.  
The model is a useful tool for an ex-ante analysis from the perspective of only one of the 
sides. It attempts to relate the notion of success and failure from a single cultural 
perspective and tries to factor the other side‘s perspective for what it should be and not 
for what it is. Another limitation of the framework in its narrow applicability to various 
levels of war as well as to unconventional or asymmetric warfare. Additionally, the 
match-fixing metric can be used to explain the cultural impact on information processing 
and assessment of end states – what Mandel refers to as the social-value system of the 
antagonists. The assessment sheet for scorekeeping is somewhat limiting but can be 
useful in ex-ante analysis as well as the calculating the utility of the bargaining leverage.  
The two frameworks presented by the term are rather process oriented as opposed to 
content oriented. While major elements of victory and defeat are addressed, this 
contextual quality is lost in the assessment process. They do not identify the temporal 
influence on outcomes both in the political and the military contexts. Finally, the 
somewhat predictive and prophetic tendency that the framework encourages is an 
exercise in automation as opposed to broad-based ‗consider all factors‘ analysis.  
In sum, the main criticism of both frameworks is their failure to recognise or define 
reality itself. A notion of victory in a single culture context is being used as a yardstick. 
This premise leads to induced errors of all other notions as ‗perception‘. Margaret Mead‘s 
works on physical and cultural reality discussed earlier reinforce this assertion. Reality in 
one culture can quite frequently be construed as perception in another.  
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PRETHEORIES: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
An appraisal of the pre-theories, assessment criteria and most significantly, constructs of 
victory suggests that the notion of victory is approached variously and often 
inconsistently. The research and analysis shows that no functional definition is offered in 
classical or contemporary thought. Definition remains at best confined to the dictionary 
equivalents. The term is used frequently with adjectives to express its quality however the 
usage of such qualifiers is highly subjective and often sensational without adding 
information of any considerable academic or critical value.   
From a functional perspective, two kinds of victory emerge, the quid nominis and the 
quid rei. The essential difference between the two is that the former is the correlational 
perspective and hence a nominal assessment of victory. It comes with a latent leverage 
that diplomacy must realise towards policy. Of itself, victory quid nominis serves neither 
policy nor politics. The process of leveraging victory quid nominis produces victory quid 
rei. It presents leverage, value and utility. It is coherent with and adapted to the strategic 
environment, seeks specific changes in the effectual environment and skilfully harnesses 
the potential of violence and the moral precepts of the outcome.   
In terms of advancing a theory, the above survey reveals at least two distinct approaches 
towards a pre-theory of victory, namely the context and the content-based approaches. In 
the absence of a definition of what is exactly being theorised, the objective value of such 
theories remains suspect as theory must serve some practical value. However, from a 
general pre-theory a working definition of victory can be gleaned: 
Victory through war is the successful attainment of military objectives 
aimed at compelling the enemy to do ones will. The military 
instrument serves as a vehicle for violence and leverages the threat of 
punishment, further punishment or political annihilation to the point 
that compliance is achieved. The degree of compliance is typically a 
function of the other side’s resilience, morale and will power. For any 
substantial objectives, a disproportionate degree of military 
punishment is usually necessary.  
Pre-theories, metrics, models and frameworks are summarised in Table 3: 
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TABLE 3: PRETHEORIES: SUMMARY OF MODELS AND FRAMEWORKS 
(AUTHOR‘S OWN TABLE)  
Areas where deduced pretheories are either silent, do not sufficiently explain the concept 
or proffer appropriate language include: 
 Qualification of actors and their intimacy to the object of war, particularly the 
aggressor – aggressed metric and the differences in the internalised notion of 
success for each. 
 Asymmetric matchups and the expectant metric. 88 
 Temporal – Moral Metric.  
 Physical – Temporal – Moral Metric, the issue of limited war and limited victory. 
 The need to understand the value of success or quality of victory in war, through 
war, and from war. 
 The usability metric.  
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CHAPTER V – CASE STUDIES 
The greatest civilisations of the time are also the most efficient killers.
1
 
Christopher Bellamy (2007) 
 
There are two roads to the reformation of mankind—one through misfortune 
of their own, the other through misfortunes of others; the former is the most 
unmistakeable, the latter the less painful.
2
 
Polybius (203-120 BC) 
INTRODUCTION  
n chapter IV we established an organising framework, a contemporary pre-theory 
and arrived at a general definition of victory. Armed with this framework, we are 
now in a position to look at case studies in the light of the research questions that 
collectively bind the thesis of this research. 
Presented here are nine studies spanning a period from the Napoleonic era to the present 
day with the exception of the Battle of Karbala [680 AD], included as deviant case.
3
 The 
selection of cases was a deliberate and purposed process. The cases presented here are 
included for their comparative information oriented sampling value, as opposed to 
paradigmatic context. All cases are formally well documented and extensively debated by 
scholarship and therefore a general consensus on perceived outcomes and effects is held. 
The wealth of analysis and debate existing in each instance reduces induced errors from 
situated premise thereby obviating the need for a basic or initial scrutiny of data. In 
context and nature, the case studies represent conflicts in the politico-military and the 
socio-cultural domains.  
Each case study is organised along a similar framework of analysis developed along 
following lines: 
 Brief strategic environment, background and causes. 
 Initial and modified political aims (including analysis where necessary). 
 Initial and subsequent war aims. 
 Outline political and military strategy. 
I 
Chapter V—Case Studies 
~184~ 
 Important intra-war decisions including revisions and changes to political and 
military aims, strategy and operations. 
 Outcome and Analysis: Vocabulary of Victory and Defeat.  
SECTION 1: CASE STUDIES 
CASE 1: THE BATTLE OF KARBALA 
Background and Causes 
The Battle of Karbala took place on either the 9
th
 or the 10
th
 of October, 680 AD at 
Karbala, in what is now Iraq.
4
 The battle owed its origins to the violent uprising and 
political fallouts after the third Caliph, Hazrat Usman Ghani‘s assassination. Ali Ibn Abi 
Talib, Muhammad‘s cousin and son in law, was elected as the fourth Caliph with mixed 
support and allegiance. Muawiya, the Governor of Syria, refused allegiance to Ali which 
resulted in the Battle of Seffin. As tension between the House of Muhammad and 
prominent tribal chieftains vying for power grew, a new group called the Kharijites
5
 
emerged. Politically and ideologically at a tangent from the House of Muhammad, the 
group had mixed allegiances with various other competing centres of power. This splinter 
group essentially professed that any Muslim could be the spiritual and political leader.
6
  
From a religious standpoint, the group propounded literalism and conservatism with the 
exception of reconstruction and re-interpretation of selective source as a tool for 
inspiration and motivation. This is the earliest evidence of the notions of  Dar al Aman or 
Dar Al Harb (the house of god or the house of war).  The group, as part of its political 
agenda, decided the removal through assassination of the three main leaders namely Ali, 
Muawiya who was the governor of Syria and Amr Ibn Al As who was the ruler of Egypt.  
Only a token effort was made on the lives of Muawiya and Amr who easily escaped the 
assassination attempts but Ali was struck by a poisoned sword while in the famous Kufa 
Mosque. The Shiites widely believe that it was Muawiya who was backing the Kharijites 
and that the botched assassination attempt on his own life was only intended to prevent 
fingers being pointed at him for Ali‘s assassination.  
Ali‘s death hastened the total control of the Muslim Empire under the Umayyad dynasty. 
Hassan, Ali‘s eldest son and spiritual successor (Imam, as referred to by the Shia Sect), 
proceeded to sign a conditional truce with Muawiya. On assuming power Muawiya 
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moved swiftly to consolidate his position, He had Hassan poisoned and continued 
persecuting those that continued to pay allegiance to the new Imam, Hussein Ibn Ali.  
At his death, Muawiya appointed his son, Yazid as successor. Hussein believed that 
Yazid would destroy the spirit of republicanism nurtured and developed so assiduously 
during the Prophet's era and would recreate a hereditary kingship which was repugnant to 
the original political teachings of Islam.   
Yazid was an ambitious and ruthless man and was obsessed with consolidating his throne. 
He believed this to be only possible when he embodied both political and spiritual 
leadership within the territories he controlled. While Yazid enjoyed unparalleled political 
power, the spiritual powerhouse and therefore an eternal threat remained in the House of 
Muhammad. To redress this, he had to either get Hussein to swear allegiance to him or 
have him and his companions eliminated such that the threat is removed and with it any 
political or religious restraints that the House of Muhammad, through the House of Ali 
might possibly pose. 
While at Mecca, Hussein received many letters of support and allegiance from the people 
and prominent elders of Kufa, a city on the Euphrates River in Central Iraq. Kufa had 
been the fourth Caliph‘s capital. The Kufans had two motives, one religious and the other 
political. In the latter, they hoped to restore Kufa‘s power over Damascus which had been 
Muawiya‘s and now Yazid‘s seat of government. 
To address the Kufan concerns, Hussein sent his most trusted and eminent emissary, 
Muslim Ibn Aqeel to assess the situation. Simultaneously however, Yazid and his 
governors mobilised and quickly persecuted those that had extended allegiance to 
Hussein. The Governor of Kufa created examples out of those believed to be supporting 
Hussein. Aqeel was assassinated while another group of assassins was sent to Mecca to 
eliminate Hussein during his Hajj pilgrimage there. Hussein abandoned Hajj and decided 
to go to Iraq. He delivered a famous sermon before undertaking the journey. This sermon 
points to Hussein‘s clear and conscious understanding of what he was embarking on, the 
fate that awaited his non-military mission and his notion of victory post diplomacy and a 
possible battle. In the latter case, with annihilation as an all too possible outcome, victory 
lay in another dimension that Hussein understood all too well: 
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The death is a certainty for mankind... And I am enamoured of my ancestors 
like eagerness of Jacob to Joseph ... Everyone, who is going to devote his 
blood for our sake and is prepared to meet Allah, must depart with us...
7
 
Hussein left Mecca with an entourage that had no resemblance to an army on a mission of 
conquest. The figures vary, but a party of over a hundred men, women and children left 
Mecca. The actual combatants that could be drawn from this party were seventy two 
which consisted of notable members of Muhammad's close family, including his 6 month 
old great grandson. The Battle of Karbala has assumed a ‗holy; status particularly among 
the Shia Muslims. Accounts of the battle vary considerably from source to source and 
exaggerations and omissions are all too common. However, there are five primary sources 
that survive and serve as a good source for research. These have been used to construct 
the event and their political and ideological fallout.
8
 
Politico-military Objectives 
Yazid‘s political objective was to assimilate and assume uncontested political and 
spiritual power. Through this, perpetuate power of the House of Muawiya. The strategy 
adopted was total; a direct elimination of the threat posed by Hussein and his 
companions. His approach was to lure Hussein and his small contingent into battle and 
destroy the centre of gravity which he recognised as embodied in the personage of 
Hussein and the male members of the House of Muhammad. 
In contrast, Hussein‘s political objectives were: 
 to establish and defend an ideological line that defined the values of Islam as 
embodied and prescribed by the Prophet Muhammad and preserve the spirit of 
republicanism nurtured and developed assiduously until Ali‘s death,   
 to defy hereditary kingship, as a political right. This was repugnant to the original 
teachings of Islam and never prescribed by Muhammad or the ‗Rightfully guided 
Caliphs‘9 among them Ali his father. 
 to reiterate the Imamate as the spiritual fountain head of Islamic teaching and 
guidance. 
His military objectives were neither leverage, nor territory or power.
10
 Given his small 
party, the outcome of the battle was a fait accompli. It was the usability of the end that 
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Hussein expected that was more important than victory quid nominis. The military 
objectives were spiritually inspiring. His choice to include in his party the old, the young, 
women and children is suggestive of how the moral objectives were to be attained. Spirit 
of sacrifice for what he believed and the message of commitment on the part of every 
man woman and child in his party were his moral objectives.   
Conduct  
The battlefield of Karbala was a desert region located adjacent to one of the tributaries of 
the Euphrates River. Hussein arrived at Karbala on 2
nd
 Muharram in the 61
st
 year of the 
Islamic calendar (680 AD). He ordered his force to camp by the river. The news of 
Muslim Ibn Aqeel‘s death at the hands of Ziyad, Kufa‘s new Governor, had reached 
Hussein a few days earlier. He also learnt of the shift in the allegiances of the people of 
Kufa.
11
 Hussein continued his advance despite the troubling news. He was met by a 
vanguard contingent from Ziyad‘s army led by Hurr. Hussein dialogue with Hurr‘s party 
is recorded in the following words; the opening phrase was eventually to be made more 
famous in the West by President Bush in gathering his post 9/11 alliance against 
Afghanistan: 
Hussein: ‗With us or against us?‘  
Hurr:  ‗Of course against you, oh Aba Abd Allah!‘  
Hussein:  ‗... So if you are different from what I received from your letters 
and from your messengers then I will return to where I came 
from.‘  
Hurr:  ‗No, but select a way neither toward Kufa nor Medina enabling me 
to find a pretence before Ibn Ziyad that you would have disagreed 
with me on the way.‘12 
Hussein:  ‗It has happened from the events what you have seen. And the 
world has been changed and become abominable and its goodness 
turns ... Don't you see that the truth is not put into action and the 
false is not prohibited?  
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The believer has got to be fond of meeting his God justly. So I do 
not consider the death but blessedness and living with the 
oppressors other than abjectness.‘13 
Hussein was forced to break camp and move away from the River. See Map 1: 
  
MAP 1: THE BATTLEFIELD OF KARBALA 
SOURCE: HTTP://WWW.ABSOLUTEASTRONOMY.COM/TOPICS/BATTLE_OF_KARBALA,14  
THE MAP DEPICTS THE POSITIONS AND DEPLOYMENTS OF OPPOSING FORCES ON 7TH OF  
MUHARRAM. (ANNOTATIONS INSERTED BY AUTHOR) 
 
By the evening of the 9
th
 of Muharram, Hussein‘s camp was completely besieged. This 
night, Hussein gathered his men turned out the lamps in the camp and offered all those 
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that wanted to leave and save their lives an open offer to do so. He also warned those that 
remained that only death would meet them the coming day. Historians record that no one 
left the camp and on the contrary a senior commander along with his sons from the 
opposite camp joined Hussein to share the Imam‘s fate.15  
Before the Battle on the 10
th
 of Muharram (11 Oct 680), Hussein addressed his party: 
Lo and behold; an ignoble (Ibn Ziyad), son of another ignoble (Ziyad ibn 
Abihi), has entangled me in a bifurcation, between either unsheathing the 
swords or accepting abjectness. And far be it that we accept abjectness. Allah 
abominates that for us, plus his prophet, believers, the chaste pure 
gentlewomen, those who do not accept oppression as well as the souls who do 
not submit to meanness abominate it. They disapprove that we prefer 
obedience of scrooges to the best sites of murder. Beware; I assault you 
together with this family....
16
 
The Battle ensued for much of the day with individual combats and larger skirmishes 
continuing. By late afternoon, only the fifty four year old Hussein survived and having 
spent most of the day burying his companions including his brother, nephews and two 
sons.  It was then Hussein‘s turn to battle. Historians record the display of bravery and 
skill that had been attributed to his father, Ali until he was killed while prostrating in 
prayer during combat. Looting followed, the dead that had been buried were exhumed 
looted and accounted while the women and children were expelled from the tents and left 
for some time in the open desert. The camp was set on fire.  
By 11
th
 Muharram (11
th
 October 11, 680), all captives including women and children 
were loaded onto camels and moved toward Kufa and later on to Damascus to be 
presented before Yazid. Among the captives was Hussein‘s sister a woman of great 
substance and eloquence, Zainab bint Ali. Zainab‘s most famous sermon was delivered in 
Yazid's court: 
Oh Yazid! Do you think that by making us prisoners in such a way that we are 
being taken from one place to another in humiliation - do you think that by 
this you have humiliated us in the sight of Allah and have earned respect for 
yourself? 
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This apparent success of yours is the result of grandeur of your might and 
lofty status for which you are proud…. You feel that you have conquered the 
whole world and your affairs are organised and that our domain is now under 
your control… And are you forgetting that Allah has said:  
 ‘Surely those who have bought unbelief at the price of faith shall do no harm 
at all to Allah, and they shall have a painful chastisement‘.  (Quran 3:177)  
... By Allah! O Yazid, by killing 'Husayn [Hussein] you have not torn but 
your own skin and you have not cut but your own flesh. You will be brought 
to the Prophet with the crimes of spilling the blood of his children and 
humiliating his family.
17
 
Yazid held his captives for a year. Spiritually, the masses remained aligned to 
Muhammad‘s family and Yazid could not afford to create more trouble for himself. 
Caught in a trap, Yazid could neither afford to kill nor completely isolate his prisoners. 
The people of Damascus began to frequent the prison, and Zainab used that as an 
opportunity to further propagate the message of Hussein. As public opinion against Yazid 
began to foment in Syria, Iraq, Mecca and Medina, Yazid ordered the release of the 
prisoners in the hope that through cunning he may better dispose of them at a later stage.  
Outcome and Analysis 
The Battle of Karbala assumes a deviant status as a case study. It was a total military 
defeat that yielded an enduring ideological victory for the militarily defeated. Politically, 
the Umayyad rule, though not Yazid or his immediate line, sustained but had to reconcile 
with the sheer momentum of the now clearly bifurcating movement that saw itself as the 
preservers of the true Islamic faith as prescribed by Mohammad, the last prophet of Allah, 
the movement was labelled as the Shiites, it is a name given to and not adopted by the 
movement. Hussein‘s achievement is summed up the words of one of his great grandson:  
Some people think that victory means the total destruction of your opponent 
but there is another broader meaning to consider. If the values you have been 
fighting for endure, this is a greater indicator of victory.
18
   
The quote presents two important facets of victory, its usability and sustainability.  
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The battle accounts and histories of events have taken on a romantic colouring. The 
details of the battles and the horrendous treatment meted to the defeated are insignificant, 
the undisputed aspects such as aims, objectives and outcomes suffice to make the Battle 
of Karbala a ‗must-read‘ for any study on the notion and understanding of victory and 
defeat.  
Clearly, the battle resulted in a comprehensive military and political victory for the armies 
loyal to Yazid whose immediate politico-military objectives were fully attained. The 
victory however failed to yield any of the long-term personal political advantages Yazid 
had set for himself. His rule became even more troublesome and his own son refused the 
crown, disowned Yazid and disappeared. The line was broken. The battle also had 
significant effects on formation of subsequent revolts against the Umayyad dynasty 
leading to its eventual down fall.  
As for Hussein, the political objectives were attained in spite of the military disaster. The 
Shi‘ite philosophy, for which Hussein stood, flourished even though it remained 
subjected to over a millennium of persecution. With time, even those that were at the 
head of this Yazid‘s military achievement began to disown it. Yazid‘s military victory 
came to be seen as a comprehensive defeat, exactly as Zainab bint Ali had foretold in her 
rebuttal at Yazid‘s Court.  
In much of Arabia the political enmity with Muhammad‘s family continued but the lines 
had been drawn in the sands of Karbala that constrained every successive dynasty. While 
the Shia – Salafi split can be traced back to 632 AD, which is immediately after the death 
of the Prophet Muhammad,
19
 the origins of a permanent schism between Salafism
20
 and 
the Shiite Sect can certainly be dated to the events of Karbala. Shia – Sunni differences 
are peripheral whereas those between Salafist off-shoots are more elemental and 
fundamental in nature.  
The transmogrification of a comprehensive defeat into a total victory, denotes a 
relationship between the moral-temporal domain of victory that is almost absent in 
literature and strategy. The Battle of Karbala is thus a unique and symbolic event in 
history that grows far beyond its negligible military significance due its profound 
strategic value. The notion of victory, that is to say Hussein‘s triumph at Karbala is thus a 
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shared vision between the mainstream Sunnis and the Shi‘ites whereas the Salafist 
offshoots tend to regard it as a military and political victory for Yazid and his Army.  
CASE 2: NAPOLEON‘S INVASION OF RUSSIA, 1812 
Background and Causes 
In June 1812 Napoleon marched on Russia with the largest army ever assembled in 
Europe till that time.
21
 Before the Russian campaign, Napoleon‘s influence extended to 
virtually whole of continental Europe, either under direct control or through treaties 
favourable to France. Mainland Europe was not in a position to contest France either 
militarily or economically and for the Tsar it made political sense to ally with France, 
particularly after Russia‘s defeat in the Battle of Friedland (14 Jun 1807).22 
Although France and Russia had been official allies since 1807, they were never reliable 
friends.
23
 The continental system set up by Napoleon was great for France but the trade 
boycott with Britain hurt Russian economy which had little resilience. Covertly ignoring 
the provisions of the treaty however made good economic sense for Russia. The Tsar 
turned a blind eye to the defaulters who continued to trade with Great Britain.  
Albeit rich in raw materials and resources, Russia had little by way of manufacturing and 
above all, while in treaty with France, she could not undertake trade that was so vital to 
her economy. Russia was forced to default from the continental system out of sheer 
necessity; however, such defiance could not possibly be tolerated by Napoleon who was 
at the peak of his achievements.
 24
  
Economy and trade were not the only sources of growing bitterness between France and 
Russia.  Alexander was uneasy with the provisions of the 1809 Austrian war treaty which 
annexed Western Galicia from Austria to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. This posed a 
direct physical threat to Russia.
25
 It was only a matter of time before Napoleon turned 
east. 
Politico-military Objectives  
Napoleon‘s main political objective was to bring Russia back on track as an ally. 
However, to garner support from his Polish troops, Napoleon himself referred to this 
campaign as the Second Polish War.
26
 His decree to the troops on 22
nd
 of June, 1812 at 
the head of River Neman expressed his overt objective:  
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Soldiers, the second war of Poland is started; the first finished in Tilsit. In 
Tilsit, Russia swore eternal alliance in France and war in England. It violates 
its oaths today. Russia is pulled by its fate; its destinies must be achieved. 
Does it thus believe us degenerated? Thus let us go ahead; let us pass Neman 
River, carry the war on its territory. The second war of Poland will be 
glorious with the French Armies like the first one.
27
 
As such, the recreation of Poland – to be carved from territories of Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth, Belarus and the Ukraine – became the official declared goals of the war. 
His military objectives were not so clear. As always, none of his senior commanders 
knew what was expected of them in the overall context; except that was revealed to them 
from time to time. What is clear, however, is his initial strategy where he sought – as was 
done with such precision in earlier campaigns – to separate enemy forces and deal with 
each individually. Here, the initial operation intended to split Marshal Petr Bagration's 
Second Western Army from Marshal Barclay de Tolly's First Western Army by driving to 
Vilna.  
Napoleon had probably expected to meet and defeat the Russian Army either at Smolensk 
or, more favourably for the French, piecemeal engagements between Vilna and Smolensk 
(see Maps 2 and 3 below).   
 
MAP 2: HISTORICAL MAP OF THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 1812 
SOURCE: INTERNET, EMERSENKENT.COM 28 
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MAP 3: NAPOLEON‘S ADVANCE  TO AND RETREAT FROM MOSCOW  
SOURCE: INTERNET, HTTP://WWW.NAPOLEONGUIDE.COM/CAMPAIGN_RUSSIA.HTM 
(ADVANCE ROUTE TO MOSCOW ANNOTATED BY AUTHOR) 
 
The Conduct 
On June 24, 1812 Napoleon‘s troops began crossing the Neman River and entered 
Russian Poland. Met with little resistance, the mass of French forces moved quickly. 
Napoleon rushed towards Vilna with his other columns advancing on the other side of 
River Vilna where he expected to find battle.  
On June 26, Tsar Alexander left Vilna, leaving Barclay de Tolly in overall command. 
Earlier, when news of Napoleon‘s crossing arrived, orders were sent out to Marshal 
Bagration and Marshal Ataman Platov to take the offensive. However, on reassessing the 
hopelessness of the situation, Barclay decided to retreat and ordered Vilna's magazines 
burned and its bridge dismantled. Barclay continued his retreat further east almost 
unhindered by French forces offering occasional resistance and rear-guard action to 
facilitate his withdrawal. Rapid marches, harsh weather and poor logistics caused 
physical dilution of troops in space while affecting morale through desertion, starvation 
and disease. Logistics trains lost horses by their thousands, further exacerbating the 
problems. The tactics that had served Napoleon so well in central Europe did not work in 
the Russian expanse. ‗Some 50,000 stragglers and deserters became a lawless mob 
French Line of Advance 
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warring with local peasantry that further hindered supplies reaching the Grande Armée 
already down to 95,000 men.‘29 As Napoleon progressed further, serious problems in 
foraging surfaced, aggravated by scorched earth policy advocated by Karl Ludwig von 
Phull.
30
 
Barclay believed that facing the French in an open battle without proper preparation 
would be a pointless sacrifice. His unwillingness to give battle was increasingly being 
viewed as intransigence by the populace and led to his removal from the position of 
commander-in-chief. He was replaced by the boastful Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov, 
who, though allegedly instrumental in creating political pressure for Barclay‘s removal, 
largely followed the strategy and direction that had earlier been adopted by Barclay.  
The strategy of trading space for time and allowing dreadful weather, poor logistics, and 
dwindling morale to take its toll was repeated over and over again until Napoleon finally 
had his battle at Borodino following an indecisive clash at Smolensk.   
The Battle of Borodino on 7
th
 September, 1812 was the bloodiest single day of battle of 
all Napoleonic Wars.  Although there have been battles with higher casualties, the hourly 
casualty rate at Borodino – 6,500 per hour or 108 men per minute – is truly staggering. 
The total losses (dead and wounded) on both sides were in excess of 77000.31  The 
Russian army could only muster half of its strength on 8
th
 September and was forced to 
retreat, leaving the road to Moscow open. Kutuzov also ordered the evacuation of the 
city.
32
 Napoleon entered Moscow on September 14, 1812 to find it empty, burning and 
devoid of materials and supplies. Napoleon, as had been the honoured tradition, had 
expected Tsar Alexander-I to accept defeat and offer his capitulation at the Poklonnaya 
Hill. No such delegation awaited him.
33
  
Despite an apparent military success in spite of the cost, Russian defiance continued and 
the surrender never came. All this while, his troops continued to suffer for want of rations 
and supplies. Napoleon‘s grand victory turned sour and as Napoleon faced the inevitable 
and decided to retreat, one of the greatest disasters in military history began. Early snows, 
failure to heed to good advice and adopting already plundered territory despite better 
supplied routes being available, the most impressive armies ever to be formed became a 
rout.  
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Bonaparte left his army on the 5
th
 of December to return to Paris amidst a failed coup 
attempt against him. His intent was to raise another army. On 7
th
 of December, the 
Grande Armée army finally crossed the Niemen out of Russian territory. Only a fraction 
had survived. In 1859 Charles Joseph Minard, a Surveyor,
34
 depicted the catastrophe of 
the march, capturing the horror in one graphic. Overlaid on a rough map, Minard 
illustrates the state of the advancing and retreating army together with temperatures 
recorded. Many colourful and annotated versions are available; presented here is an 
image of Minard‘s original work.35  
 
FIGURE 20: MINARD‘S FIGURATIVE EXPRESSION OF THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN OF 1812 
SOURCE: HTTP://WWW.ADEPT-PLM.COM/NEWSLETTER/NAPOLEONSMARCH.HTM 
 
The graphic is excellent for comparing the size of the French force before and after major 
events – battles and river crossings for example – and also comparing the relative size of 
the force at the same geographical point on the way to and from Moscow. Looking at the 
relative size of the two lines at Moscow, the French casualties were light however; the 
relative size of the strips at the head and tail of the march to and from Moscow indicates 
the degree to which the march consumed Napoleon‘s forces.  
Chapter V—Case Studies 
~197~ 
 
Outcome   
The French invasion of Russia in 1812 was a turning point in the Napoleonic Wars. The 
campaign reduced Napoleon‘s French and allied invasion forces to a tiny fraction of their 
initial strength. In using violence as an instrument of bargain, Napoleon miscalculated 
Tsar Alexander‘s breaking point and as result ended up stretching the war in temporal and 
geographical terms beyond what his strategy had provided for. 
The Russian success over the French army in 1812 marked a huge blow to Napoleon's 
ambitions of European dominance. Out of an original force of 450,000-600,000, only 
20,000 to 40,000 frost-bitten and half-starved survivors stumbled back into France. The 
Russian campaign was the decisive turning-point of the Napoleonic Wars. It put an end to 
Napoleon‘s reputation of invincibility, the undefeated military genius. Napoleon, 
however, never lost hope, foreseeing the fall out of failure, rushed back to France before 
word of the disaster became widespread and successfully quelled a coup attempt by the 
republicans.  
For Russia the term Patriotic War (an English rendition of the Russian Отечественная 
война) formed a symbol for a strengthened national identity that was to affect Russian 
patriotism not just through the 19th century but also become an inspiration through to the 
next when another ill-fated march towards Moscow was to occur. In 1941, at the peak of 
his power, Hitler marched on Russia. The Germans repeated many of the same mistakes 
and made some new ones. In failing to draw on any of the lessons of history, Hitler and 
through him, Germany, met a fate worse than Napoleon‘s.  
If we go by Clausewitzian framework of victory—to force our enemy to do our will—
then Napoleon certainly failed, but then so did Russia – at least in an immediate sense 
however, they did reach Paris in 1815. For Russia the outcome was neither a decisive 
victory nor a strategic success but did provide a strategic advantage that came from 
denying victory to the enemy. Russia, in hindsight, failed to build politically and benefit 
externally from Napoleon‘s defeat even after their march on Paris in 1815. Internal 
troubles continued. Revolutions brewed just as they might have in spite of the success. 
Although the war did shape Russian culture and perceptions in a profound way, as is 
evident from Tolstoy‘s War and Peace.36 Externally, urged on by Prussian nationalists 
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and Russian commanders, the failure encouraged a general revolt among German 
nationalists across the Confederation of the Rhine and Prussia which was to result in 
Napoleon‘s German Campaign of 1813.  
Napoleon on his part too was not ‗defeated‘ as neither hope nor purpose was lost despite a 
failure short of reversal in Russia. Having successfully foiled a coup attempt in Paris, he 
would march the following year at the head of a 400,000 strong French force supported 
by a quarter of a million allied troops to Dresden (August 26-27, 1813) where despite 
being outnumbered, he secured a military victory over the sixth coalition.
37
 It was not 
until Leipzig, the Battle of Nations (October 16–19, 1813) that he was finally defeated. 
The British effort in the Peninsular War, the so called Spanish Ulcer, from 1808-1814 
also bled Napoleon‘s forces and defeated his Marshals even if not Napoleon directly. 38 
With these series of reversals, Napoleon no longer had the necessary troops to stop the 
Coalition's invasion of France. He was eventually exiled to Elba in 1814. Russia took on 
the might of Napoleon‘s army singlehanded. Its only ally, Sweden supported neither in 
troops nor materials however it did allow the Russian to withdraw 45,000 troops from the 
Steinheil Corps as reinforcements, 20,000 of these were eventually stationed at Riga.
39
  
Comparing the outcome to some of the frameworks established in the previous chapter, 
we find that this campaign highlights the limitations of Mandel‘s framework, the fallacy 
of alliance building as a measure of success. It also points to the complexity of identifying 
military objectives that have the potential to yield political success. Another, even more 
profound lesson is the cultural dimension of victory and defeat. Napoleon‘s 
disappointment at Poklonnaya Hill stemmed for his enemy‘s refusal to accept what was 
culturally an obvious sign of victory for the French. ‗Is victory complete until the enemy 
accepts defeat?‘ is a question that begs an answer in the light of this campaign.  
To the outside observers, the outcome was contrary to expectations. No power in Europe 
expected Napoleon‘s defeat; least of all, Napoleon‘s own army which was as much driven 
by the rush of victory as by any causal motivations and associations the soldier may have 
held with the campaigns. The ‗expectational framework‘ again comes to fore. Anything 
short of decisive victory, with expectations soaring high, would essentially have been a 
notional defeat. In reality it was worse. 
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CASE 3: THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
BACKGROUND AND CAUSES 
The First World War was the first ‗total war‘40 in the sense that the war effort transcended 
all spheres of activity within the belligerent countries – political, economic, social, 
cultural, educational, media and technological efforts were singularly directed towards the 
object of attaining victory. Governments, both democratic and autocratic, increasingly 
regulated everyday life within their dominions. In many ways, the First World War 
served little political purpose beyond feeding the nature of war to serve only itself as 
opposed to the purpose for which it is intended.
41
 As the war lingered on, fronts became 
locked and frustration grew whereas, in contrast the means – in terms of weapons 
equipment, logistics and supply of troops – became virtually limitless. The annihilation of 
opposing forces became the military objective on all sides, and broad, elusive objectives 
such as honour and prestige (Zan) became the acquired national aims. 
The Industrial age brought with it large scale corporatism and capitalism. ‗Capitalism 
implies competition‘.42 Large corporate politics brought with it monopoly capitalism 
making this competition assume a politico-economic dimension and hence a military-
economic one. The quest for markets and raw materials brought states and their 
imperialist armies also into direct competition and confrontation on the fringes. ‗The 
destructiveness of such competition became increasingly pronounced, amidst a growing 
trend towards militarisation and its ideological reflection: the justification and 
glorification of war.‘43 
The outward spill of national capital, industrialisation and the inherent demands on 
materials and resources, led to breakneck competition for trade routes from where such 
resources and raw materials flowed both within and outside Europe. ‗Between 1876 and 
1914 European powers managed to annex some eleven million square miles of territory, 
mainly in Asia and Africa.‘44 The colonial empires thus created were a temporary answer 
to the problem that Mandel describes as the disproportion between development of 
productive forces and the political form – the nation state – within which this 
development had taken place. Despite large empires, the big colonial powers found it 
difficult to find new markets as their colonies remained largely underdeveloped and had 
little demand for the manufactured goods.  
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The imperial system had benefitted the early powers and left the later industrial giants 
such as Germany, USA, Japan and increasingly Russia out of the race. These emerging 
industrial giants found it difficult to cultivate markets resulting in the creation of extreme 
flux which reached staggering proportions early in the twentieth century. Conventional 
diplomacy had no answer for the ‗burgeoning productive forces and the prevailing 
political structures‘ and the coalitions that this structure fostered merely exasperated the 
problem. Germany was the technology giant and was most affected by a lack of markets. 
A new, more favourable order would mean that she could gain substantially in wealth, 
prosperity, power and influence.
45
 With the assassination of the Arch Duke Ferdinand 
serving as a trigger, an unstoppable chain of events unfolded (see Figures 11-13.) 
POLITICAL AIMS: AGGRESSORS 
German belief in its capacity to force a change and its timing has often led to theorising 
on the causes of the First World War. The Fischer thesis,
46
 a revisionist theory presented 
in the 1970s, suggests that Germany more or less provoked the war. Fischer presents 
sizeable evidence to advance his conclusion supported by documentation from German 
government archives. The thesis is premised on the logic of German interest and 
opportunity: 
 in 1914 Germany enjoyed a temporary advantage over its rivals,  
 Russia was rapidly industrializing, and Britain would soon embark on a big naval 
arms build-up, therefore time was not on Germany‘s side,  
 the Turks could probably be counted on now, but possibly not later, and  
 a general war in Europe was probably going to happen sooner or later and it was 
greatly to Germany‘s advantage for it to happen sooner.  
Acting upon that analysis, they pushed Austria to take a very hard line against Serbia, 
which almost certainly had no hand in Arch Duke Ferdinand‘s assassination and which, in 
any event, had largely capitulated to Austria's demands. 
By questioning the status quo Germany stood to gain the most. As the industrial leader, it 
also wanted to assume the political share of its role in Europe and more importantly the 
colonial share that favoured Britain and France. It now had the means and reason to do so 
through force of arms. German political aims were thus a progressive domination of 
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Europe and access to world markets and resources. German objectives had to be carved 
out of British, French and Russian interests. The military objectives were, as had been the 
practice before, conquest and destruction of the enemy thus waning his will to resist.  
POLITICAL AIMS: AGGRESSED (FRANCE, GREAT BRITAIN, SERBIA) 
The war aims of Serbia and Britain emerged post facto. While Britain had clear sights on 
the opportunities offered by the First World War in the shape of the post war order, 
Serbia had no preconceived war aims at all until after they were pushed unwillingly into a 
war they tried to avoid. 
It is difficult to ascertain with any degree of accuracy what war aims Serbia developed. 
Serbia ended up with a small empire as a result of their participation on the winning side, 
lobbied in all probability after the war was over; the creation of a state of Yugoslavia was 
certainly not a war aim at the outset. From hoping to survive the experience — hardly a 
foregone conclusion they ended up with Yugoslavia, comprising Serbia plus elements of 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
Britain, an ‗aggressed‘ power, clearly had definite geopolitical aims in mind once the 
opportunity presented itself. These were: 
 a favourable outcome of the disposition of the moribund Ottoman Empire, 
 secure possession of Egypt, which were essential to its continued and secure 
possession of India;  
 secure possession of Palestine which was essential to its secure possession of 
Egypt.  
 A later aim, once Russia was out of the game, was to make sure the Germans did 
not get their hands on the Baku oil fields.
47
 
The French had territorial scores to settle with Germany; the legacy from the Franco-
Prussian war of 1870. France sought to address her future security by eliminating once 
and for all the threat from her eastern neighbour, Germany.  
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OUTCOMES AND ANALYSIS 
Germany failed to achieve any of her war aims but survived complete defeat because, in 
part, her residual military power in 1918 was still sufficient to defensibly counterbalance 
Britain, France and the USA and also because the victorious alliance was weary of 
pushing for a total defeat of Germany owing to the scale of carnage that had occurred 
since 1914. Because German strength lay in its human resource and not so much in 
mineral wealth or territory, on a material level, a total defeat of Germany offered no great 
spoils as there was no empire to be carved up and shared among the victors. The 
unexpected appearance of a radically new regime in Russia and the genuine fear that its 
influence might spread throughout the European working classes who had suffered so 
horribly in two wars was also an undeniable factor. One must also not forget that British 
interests in Europe also required a Germany capable of counterbalancing France 
subsequently – Britain had long held that neither France nor Germany could be allowed to 
gain decisive superiority in the continent.  
Serbia did very well, albeit at huge cost in lives,
48
 perhaps the worse per capita loss of 
any state. For Britain and France, there were political benefits to be had from the strategic 
advantage the war provided. The price was far too high in moral and physical terms. 
While Britain attained her war aims, the strategic periscope was blurred. Her traditional 
ambitions for territory continued in to an age where Empires were crumbling all around. 
The British Empire was never larger than after WW-I. Britain enhanced her control over 
Egypt and added Mesopotamia and Palestine. The trouble was that the war had broken 
Britain economically and emotionally. The country lacked the will and resources to 
manage even the Empire she had before the war, much less the expanded Empire after the 
war. Iraq and Palestine proved particularly unmanageable and the most economical means 
were sought.
49
 Lastly there was the certain old problem of Ireland. Parliament had passed 
the Irish Home Rule Bill in Sep 1914 but it was shelved because of the complexity of 
implementing it. Ireland was finally partitioned at the end of 1920.
50
  
For Britain, therefore, the First World War was a pyrrhic victory. The last call had begun; 
its final stanza was played out during World War II, when the sun finally set on the 
empire, leaving mere fragments to remind of a bygone glory. Britain had won her victory, 
but victories won in strategic disillusionment—incorrect projection of the probable 
future—are usually short lived, expensive, temporal victories.  
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The clarity of a war won or a war lost is not always immediately apparent. While the end 
favoured Britain, the middle was not so sweet. The British led a campaign to forge a new 
front at the rear of Germany and Austria-Hungary with a view to relieve German pressure 
on Russia. This was to be achieved through landings at Gallipoli on the Turkish 
Dardanelles on April 25, 1915. It was a disaster. Allied and Turkish losses soared before 
the Allies withdrew nine months later. According to Gregory R. Copley, the author of The 
Art of Victory: Strategies for Personal Success and Global Survival in a Changing World
 
,51
 Turkey‘s greatness as an empire was finally sealed in the pages of history but it 
emerged no less victorious than Great Britain for example at the end of the Second World 
War.
 
Gregory R. Copley, in a talk delivered at the US Army Command and General Staff 
College, comes to the same conclusion as the Author albeit he uses a passive framework, 
a ‗fatalistic‘ view of the course and impact of history where as the Author views the same 
events in a proactive context of notion of, and strategy for, Victory.   
Indeed, Copley is correct to assert that there were things to rejoice for Turkey after the 
First World War and Britain after the Second World War. ‗Modern Turkey arose from the 
ashes of the fractured Ottoman Empire... from defeat in the war but success in a major 
battle‘ writes Copley, the other ‗two nations among the victors of the First World War 
were the most heroically defeated armies of Gallipoli: Australia and New Zealand. And it 
was from the iconic saga of their defeat in that nine month campaign that they forged 
national identities which shape their destinies to this day.‘ 52 
France came out of the war with territory and a hefty reward in the form of reparations 
from Germany. A political victory, as it not only satisfied her core aims but also allowed 
additional benefits to be drawn from the outcome. The reality was that while France had 
the territory she wanted; Germany was broken so badly that it did not have the means to 
honour the treaty. Here lay the problem. When the opportunity presented, France pushed 
for more and more out of her victory, losing to an extent the original purpose. The nature 
of the bargain entered, altered from the physical divisibility of the territorial issue to the 
moral indivisibility of continued existence of Germany. The very foundation of the 
Second World War, the premise and catalyst for German ‗Hitlerism‘ lay in exploitation of 
a morally indivisible bargain.  
If this was not enough, France wanted still more. In 1922, Britain and France developed 
serious differences about the amount of reparations to be extracted from Germany and in 
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1923 Franco-German Ruhr Crisis followed. The French ultimately withdrew from the 
Ruhr, which they had occupied to force Germany to pay reparations, thus representing the 
accomplishment of a clear German aim. On the other hand, German finances had been 
temporarily ruined and the new German government led by Gustav Stresemann had called 
off passive resistance against the French occupation. According to recent work by Conan 
Fischer, the Weimar Republic was deeply compromised by the economic and political 
costs of the crisis.
53
 The subsequent Dawes Plan led to renewed, although reduced, 
payments of reparations to France. Despite an apparently unclear result, the Ruhr Crisis 
became widely seen as a French failure, with Paris perceived as bowing to the pressure of 
Britain and the United States, and losing its grip over its ‗defeated‘ enemy. The French 
Prime Minister Raymond Poincaré soon fell from power.
54
 
As noted above, the First World War gave birth to the socialist revolutions that for Russia 
meant the consolidation of Bolshevik power from 1917 – 22 and the appearance of the 
Soviet Union from 1922 onwards and, with it, the division  of the world on ideological 
lines. 
CASE 4: THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
‗Victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory however long and 
hard the road may be.‘55 
Winston Churchill 
BACKGROUND 
The Second World War was a war for world hegemony, the opening up of world markets 
outside the closed colonial systems that had governed them. While historians trace the 
causes of the war to the Treaty of Versailles few acknowledge that the treaty exacerbated 
the problems, it did not create them. The peculiar relationship developing between China, 
Japan and the USA, according to Ernst Mandel writing in The Meaning of The Second 
World War, provides some answer.
56
 China was the most populous country and rich in 
mineral resources. Despite growing cooperation between US and Japan, the Japanese 
policy towards China was however not in US interests. The economic crises of the 
twenties forced USA to reconsider its isolationist policies and look for strategic insertions 
via various forms of hegemony over selected regions in the pacific. This brought Japan 
and the USA in a direct conflict of interests.     
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European and Japanese interests also ran rough waters, particularly in relation to colonies 
in the Far East. Hitler was quite conscious of the long term conflict of interests between 
German and Japanese imperialism.
57
 On the rapid conquest of East Asia by Japan he 
stated: 
East Asia could have been kept if all the white states had formed a coalition, 
Japan wouldn‘t have moved against it.... 
 The struggle for hegemony in the world will be decided for Europe by the 
possession of the Russian space. Any idea of world politics (for Germany) is 
ridiculous as long as it does not dominate the continent.... If we are masters of 
Europe, we shall have the dominant position in the world. If the Empire 
[reference here is to the British Empire] were to collapse today through our 
arms, we would not be its heirs [hence Hitler‘s original desire to seek an 
alliance and not confrontation with Britain]. Russia would take India, Japan 
East Asia, and America.
 58
    
The alliance that eventually defeated Germany comprised of three principal allies Great 
Britain, Russia and the United States, while China and France (the free French movement 
under Charles De Gaulle) constituted the other two. Each of the three principal allies, as 
indeed De Gaulle‘s Free French Movement and China had widely differing views of their 
own place in the post war world. Neither of the allies ever lost sight of their individual 
interests throughout the war. What held the alliance together, and emerged as the 
common aim, was the firm commitment to defeat the Axis Powers.  
Before discussing the political aims and objectives of the antagonists, it is necessary to 
briefly survey the obtaining international environment in which the war broke out and 
ensued.  
Germany 
The German inner front was mainly influenced by the treatment Germany received after 
the First World War.
59
 The Treaty of Versailles left Germany at the verge of economic 
and socio-political collapse; a number of smaller states were created (breaking the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire into separate states). Germany also saw her territory reduced 
with the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine to France and the creation of Poland that now 
controlled the strategic Danzig Corridor. These smaller states encircled Germany as 
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buffers and were to prevent it from rising to power or to threaten its neighbours beyond. 
Extreme economic depression and slowdown followed as part of the general world 
economic crises and internal problems resulted. Adolf Hitler rose to power in this 
political climate and soon received wider public support for the changes he promised to 
bring about. He undertook to rid Germany of the capitalistic shackles of economic 
subservience, and acquire Lebensraum (living space) for the German nation. 
France 
After its ‗victory‘ in the First World War, France maintained its military pre-eminence, 
though on the lines of the old school of defensive – static mind-set. France was the 
biggest direct beneficiary from the war and ensured the harshest terms against Germany 
in the Treaty of Versailles. France was offered Anglo-American guarantee for territorial 
integrity in place of territorial safeguards that France had sought in the Rhineland during 
the Peace Conference. Interestingly, and later to Hitler‘s advantage, in rejecting the 
Treaty of Versailles, the United States Senate also rejected this guarantee for territorial 
integrity of France. With this British guarantee also lapsed. In January 1923, The French 
announced that the Germans were in default on their coal deliveries. A few days later they 
occupied the Ruhr district of Germany in order to forcibly obtain coal. The German 
people and government pursued a policy of passive resistance. The French behaviour and 
actions simply reinforced the idea that something had to give way, and Germany had 
done what was necessary. 
Great Britain 
After the First World War the British maintained her imperial image and her military 
commitments were prioritised accordingly. Despite the carnage of the First World War, 
Great Britain strongly believed that the fate of Europe depended upon Anglo-German 
collaboration and continued to appease Hitler for averting war. Great Britain relied 
heavily on the League of Nations for post First World War security and thus actively 
participated in the League.  Britain had quite a different outlook from her European 
neighbours; her proximity to the Continent did not necessarily dictate an orientation 
towards Europe and European concerns.  
Due to economic recession all over the world, Britain diverted most of her resources 
towards economic revival, thereby neglecting defence preparations. In response to the 
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sudden military developments in Germany, she had little choice but to adopt a policy of 
appeasement so as to prevent confrontation on the continent. Britain sought to revise or 
reconstruct the entire Versailles system in such a way so as to bring Germany into 
satisfactory treaty relations with all her neighbours and avert war. After the Berlin Crisis 
and subsequent German invasion of Czechoslovakia, Britain, along with France entered 
into a pact with Poland guaranteeing her independence.  
Britain had still more territorial ambitions. Intervention in East Africa, mopping up the 
Italian colonies, liquidation of the French enclave in the Near East, eyes on Iran and 
preparations for the invasion of the Balkans with the evident purpose of making Greece a 
stepping stone for replacing French satellite states in Eastern Europe. She was also 
looking at influence in Latin America by encouraging Juan Piron against American 
imperialism. All this was envisioned despite the fact that Britain‘s means had become 
disproportionate to the ends.
60
   
The USSR 
Meanwhile, the USSR was undergoing a process of overall reformation under Joseph 
Stalin. Following the ambiguous events of the 1920s, Stalin took effective charge in about 
1929. The Soviet military was being transformed into a well-equipped and fully 
mechanized force. However, this process required time and resources that the Soviets did 
not possess at the time. Knowing that his Armed Forces were ill prepared to face a 
possible German attack, he preferred an alliance with Germany and in doing so sought to 
divert German attention towards the west, or at least gain time to prepare for a possible 
German expansion eastwards. Stalin had his eyes fixed on Finland, Latvia, Estonia, 
Eastern Poland and Eastern Rumania. Germany seemed willing to accede to the bargain, 
thus an apparent, if only temporary, confluence of interests emerged.   
The USA 
American imperialism was conscious of its destiny to become a world leader. Though not 
manifest openly till announcement of a decision by Roosevelt in 1940 to ‗commit the 
United States to the assumption of responsibility for nothing less than the leadership of 
the world.‘61  The scope of US imperialism was outlined in a statement by the Secretary 
of State Cordell Hull in Jul 1942: 
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Leadership towards a new system of international relationships in trade and 
other economic affairs will devolve largely upon the United States because of 
our great economic strength. We should assume the leadership, and the 
responsibility that goes with it, primarily for the reasons of pure national self-
interest.
62
 
It is clear that the United States must assume today the task that Great Britain 
performed so well in the 19th Century- the protection of western civilization 
from external danger...  a world order will come not by a gentlemen‘s 
agreement, but through so decisive a victory by one of the great powers that it 
will be able to dictate and enforce international law as Rome did from 
Augustus to Aurelius
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The sudden crash of the New York Stock Market in 1929 plunged the world into 
economic recession which had serious effects on the policy formulation of all the 
countries including the USA. US analysts considered the imperial influences of colonial 
powers as the main hurdle to US economic interests and her lack of access to 
international markets. For the US to succeed and become truly great, European 
colonialism, including the British Empire, had to be ended. The Second World War was 
to be the great leveller.  
The US Neutrality law forbade international expeditionary warfare. United States‘ Senate 
did not ratify the Treaty of Versailles and thus withdrew itself into isolation. ‗Neutrality 
Law‘ passed by the Senate prohibited all kinds of material assistance to any party during 
the course of conflicts. US neutrality ended with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. As 
the US engagement in the war progressed to combat support and eventually leadership of 
the alliance, her wider motives and world view became more apparent – more so under 
Roosevelt than his successor, Harry S. Truman.  
GERMAN GRAND STRATEGY 
On assuming power, Hitler set a new direction for Germany, imbibed new spirit into the 
nation and introduced a special brand of nationalism based around the philosophy of 
‗superior nation‘. Objectives for the German nation had been cemented in his mind even 
before he rose to power. He saw himself as the only means for Germany to realise its 
‗true‘ position among the comity of nations.64 Accordingly, his grand strategy was 
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devised to achieve an ambitious set of objectives. Germany started the war with a perfect 
juxtaposition of the principles of political and military strategy, using the two instruments 
in sequence and concert. Hitler made three profound mistakes in planning, first was the 
underestimation of the USSR and the second, an incorrect assessment of British response 
– Hitler imagined a world order where Germany and Britain shared power and influence 
over the world; Britain in her empire and Germany in Europe. Last, but not least, how the 
US camel, whose capabilities he had grossly misjudged, would sit.    
German military strategy was carefully envisioned; however, the desired end state and 
important contours of grand strategy were not well defined. If clear in Hitler‘s mind, it 
was not discernable or clearly understood by those connected with animating the strategy. 
Peace at the conclusion of war was not clearly calculated and planned. Each front or 
objective in the war appeared to create new ones without moving closer to the attainment 
of the war aims. In strategy, time and resource consuming errors are unforgiving.  
Germany‘s main objectives were territorial and lay in the Soviet space.65 Occupation of 
France as such was a military necessity to secure flanks. Settling an old score by way of 
revenge against French behaviour after the First World War was arguably a secondary 
consideration in a bigger contest. In the process of application of military strategy, 
however, Hitler only managed to open new fronts, invite new enemies and overextend his 
limited and diminishing resources.  
The German invasion of France was based on a strategic gamble. Hitler anticipated that 
with the fall of France, the British government would see reason (from his point of view) 
and give-in, one-way or the other. He expected that the Great Britain would accept a 
negotiated peace. Any success towards the east was contingent upon the gamble paying 
off. This miscalculation was perhaps the single most important factor shaping the course 
and outcome of the war.
66
  
Hitler accepted the British Empire as a reality to be worked with and had apparently no 
plans to threaten it. Western hatred for the Soviet Bolshevism was also a reality too well 
known and something Hitler had hoped to exploit in its dealings with Britain. However, 
Germany failed to conclude any significant agreement with Britain for mutually agreed 
balance of power in Europe and maintaining her eastward focus.   
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Although 1941, the United States was still a largely unwilling and uncertain ally against 
Germany. It did however see opportunity emerging from the war in Europe. In the early 
stages of the war, Americans were neither dismissive nor supportive of German policy. 
The Americans in general felt that this was not their war as it could affect no vital 
American interests as long as the power denomination in Europe did not alter. Even 
having committed material support to Britain, in what was essentially a business like 
contract (lend-lease); America was divided on how to deal with Germany. Hitler‘s 
declaration of war on the United States in December 1941 was a turning point. By adding 
the United States to the list of overt enemies at a time when Germany was fighting both 
Great Britain and the USSR, Hitler sealed his fate.
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Hitler‘s problem vis-à-vis Russia, was one of time and space. He had to defeat her and 
establish his lebensraum before United States intervened in the war. If not, then the 
inactive western theatre would once again become charged and Germany could be caught 
between two fronts. His initial strategy of avoiding a multi-front war failed and became 
his nemesis. 
Hitler wanted to make Germany independent of international loan-capitalism. Germany 
refused foreign interest-bearing loans and based its currency on production instead of 
gold.
68
 This antagonized the major trading nations, particularly the United States and 
Great Britain, who between them represented the Money Power of the world. The notion 
was flawed from the outset as some argue that even if he had succeeded he would have 
still have faced the loan capitalists sooner or later.
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The Russo-German Non-aggression Pact of 23 August 1939, which greatly facilitated the 
German invasion of Poland and seriously upset the Allies‘ calculation about early 
containment of Germany, was the most significant strategic alliance of the pre-war 
period. However, subsequently and during more critical stages of the war, the Axis 
powers failed to take advantage of alliances. This was owing to the fact that the members 
had largely divergent national interests, no contiguity of borders with the common enemy 
and functioned without a common strategic command and control system. 
70
 Germany‘s 
alliance with Italy proved of little consequence. Mussolini sought to realize his dream of 
an Italian Mediterranean empire. In the late summer and early autumn of 1940 he 
launched an offensive from Libya against the British in Egypt and an invasion of Greece 
from Albania (which he had occupied in 1939). Both enterprises eventually proved 
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disastrous for the Italians. German forces were sent to rescue the Italians resulting in the 
diversion of German forces and resources away from the primary objectives.
71
   
Germany and Japan largely operated independent of each other and were isolated by the 
Allies for piecemeal treatment. Hitler failed to coordinate his invasion of Russia with 
Japan which would have made this alliance more meaningful in a practical rather than 
notional sense. In fact Japan signed a pact of neutrality with the Soviet Union just before 
Operation Barbarossa,
72
 which was paradoxical to the idea of an alliance as it released 
Soviet Forces that were tied down against the Japanese in the east.  
BRITISH AIMS, GOALS AND STRATEGIES 
British acquiescence in a European continent dominated by Germany without the 
existence of a powerful independent French army was contrary to British interests. Britain 
understood, and correctly so, that peace with any power – friendly or hostile, that 
completely dominated Europe would only be an interlude before an all-out war against 
the Empire. Hitler‘s economic interests and desired economic system ran contrary to 
British interests. Military objectives evolved over time. The initial objective can quite 
simply be summarised as ‗continued defiance‘.73 Due to slow rearmament in the pre-war 
period, the loss of equipment at Dunkirk (summer 1940) and limited industrial capacity as 
compared to Germany, Great Britain could not hope to cope with the material demands of 
a protracted war all by herself. She hoped to acquire US assistance initially on gold 
payments and subsequently as aid.  Britain‘s three pronged war policy was built around 
these premises and included: 
 The security of United Kingdom and its imperial possessions. 
 Command of the Home Waters. 
 Development of resources for a major offensive. 
British strategy addressed the above concerns through: 
Pact with Russia 
The day Germany attacked Russia, 22 June 1941; Churchill made an evening broadcast in 
which he offered assistance to the Soviet Union. Initially there was no response from the 
Soviets but later they requested that the British Government receive their military mission 
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for negotiations.
74
 On July 12, 1941 an agreement was signed between Great Britain and 
Russia for provision of war assistance and support of all kinds. It also included a clause 
restricting both signatories from concluding an armistice or treaty of peace with Germany 
except by mutual agreement.
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Involvement of the USA 
In September 1940, Great Britain offered to the US a series of air and naval bases in the 
West Indies and Newfoundland on ninety-nine-year lease in return for 50 reconditioned 
destroyers.
76
 The transfer to Great Britain of these fifty American warships was a clearly 
un-neutral act and brought the United States closer to the war in Europe. It marked the 
passage of the United States from being neutral to being non-belligerent.
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Indirect Approach 
British grand strategy was influenced by military, political and economic caution. A 
strategy of fighting the enemy at the periphery instead of a direct approach was 
formulated. Despite reservations, Britain offered support to Russia, even realizing that 
Soviet victory might bring troubles later. The British Government attached great 
importance to aiding General de Gaulle and the Free French. The object was to raise the 
Free French flag in West Africa, to occupy Dakar, and thus consolidate the French 
colonies in west and equatorial Africa for General de Gaulle.
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The British eventual military aim was total defeat of Germany and elimination of Nazism. 
British military strategy evolved during the course of the war and can broadly be divided 
into three phases: 
Formative Phase. Once Britain declared war on Germany, her military strategy in 
mainland Europe conformed to the Anglo-French defensive mindset. After the fall of 
France, Britain found itself on the front line and that too without a clear cut military 
strategy to deal with the threat. Still not fully aware of Hitler‘s long term intents, 
particularly during the so called phoney war, Britain remained cautious of the 
possibilities of a powerful France emerging from any adventure that saw a total 
collapse of Germany – a legacy of institutional knowledge developed over the 
centuries. The British political beacon soon honed on to the probability of a bleak 
future which prescribed danger to her domestic and global interests, particularly after 
the fall of France when Britain found itself under the shadow of German violence. 
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Additionally, engaging Germany had financial underpinning ‗so that one may not 
look at only political but also military appeasement.‘79   
Middle Phase. After Hitler‘s failure to gain supremacy over the RAF, Churchill was 
convinced that Britain was safe from the threat of physical invasion. The focus now 
was her wider interests and the colonies. Accordingly, British military strategy 
evolved to include the following:  
 Hit Germany around the edges of the continent and gradually weaken it. 
 Support occupied countries by subversion against Germany. 
 Launch an intensified air offensive against vital economic and industrial targets. 
 Help Russia, the principal land combatant, in order to weave the Russian effort 
into the wider texture of the war.
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 Engage German Army on land at selected places since the British could not match 
immense strength of the Germans in any theatre where their main power could be 
brought to bear. By use of sea and air power, Great Britain decided to meet 
German armies in regions where only small forces could be brought into action.  
 Bomb German Industry to weaken her war potential and her cities to weaken the 
will of the German people. Britain selected five main targets for the air force, 
namely, military targets, industries of all types to cut production, urban areas to 
demoralize inhabitants, sources of energy, and the communication infrastructure 
including railways. 
Actualisation Phase. Strike at the heart of Germany.  
US AIMS GOALS AND STRATEGY 
Political Aim and Strategy 
The breakdown of the world‘s economy in the 1920s and the exclusive trading blocs 
centred around leading European nations and their colonies – the largest of which was the 
‗sterling block‘ - imperilled not only American markets but also her supply of raw 
materials. The war in Europe was to be the great leveller on a world stage. It would open 
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whole of the world‘s markets and resources to wider and non-European exploitation. The 
opportunities were endless. US political strategy could be summarised as follows: 
 Diversification of the American economic interests and their consequent 
expansion overseas, coupled with growth in American power. 
 Prevent the war from reaching USA and protect the sea trade routes through 
control of the Pacific by the United States Navy and the Atlantic by the British 
Navy. 
 Preserve and protect the capitalist economic system. 
 Render all possible material assistance to Great Britain and Russia in their fight 
against German aggression. To this end, in March 1941, the Congress passed the 
Lend-Lease Act, which authorized the United States to provide war materials for 
nations under Axis attack.
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Military Aim and Strategy 
The US military aim was to mobilise the American people and war industry to defeat the 
Axis forces indirectly by aiding countries in war with them or directly in collaboration 
with the affected countries. This was later modified to the unconditional surrender of Axis 
powers.
82
 The US was acutely sensitive to that fact that the defeat of Germany and Japan 
critically depended on the ability of the Grand Alliance to hammer out a coordinated 
strategy. This was a complex proposition all members of the alliance possessed 
ideological differences, divergent geopolitical aims, and dissimilar visions about the post-
war international order. In addition, they were sharply divided about what strategy they 
should follow to defeat the Axis Powers, in particular Germany and Japan.
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The Allies finally decided on the following military strategy: 
 Diminish Axis economic power to wage war by blockade, raids and a sustained air 
offensive and protect the sea lanes of communications of the Allied powers. 
 Work closely with Royal navy and Royal Canadian Navy to develop innovative 
methods and new weapons for antisubmarine warfare.  
 Use 1942 as a year for preparation for major assault against Germany.  
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 Wear down German resistance in 1942 by strategic air bombardment. 
 Materially assist the USSR and Great Britain in their war against Germany.  
 Try to gain the entire North African coast, disperse German forces in secondary 
theatres and support insurgencies in Nazi-occupied Europe. 
 In 1943 initiate a large-scale land offensive against Germany across either the 
Mediterranean Sea or the English Channel. 
The US had some critical decisions to make:
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 Germany vis–á-vis Japan. America had the option to either take on both Japan 
and Germany simultaneously or take each adversary at a time. It was generally 
agreed that the defeat of Germany would leave Japan exposed to overwhelming 
force, whereas the defeat of Japan would not have brought the war to an end. It 
was, therefore, decided by America and Great Britain to remain on strategic 
defensive in the Pacific while defeating Germany first. 
 Mediterranean vis–á-vis English Channel. Within Europe, America had the 
option to either launch its offensive against Germany through the Mediterranean, 
or opt for a cross Channel attack on France. The latter option was adopted. 
SOVIET AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
Although the USSR was prematurely drawn into the war by Hitler‘s surprise timings in 
opening a new front, Stalin secretly acknowledged the inevitability of war with Germany. 
There is also the thesis that he ‗used Hitler as ‗an icebreaker‘, to weaken the Western 
democracies before Stalin himself overran Europe.‘85 In the context of the Second World 
War, the Soviet Union was constrained to defeating Germany only by the conditions that 
accompanied US material support although immediately afterwards it moved quickly to 
gather other territories in Eastern Europe.
86
  
Whether it was a pre-emptive or preventive war for Hitler or, the object of naked German 
aggression, Stalin had clear aims and objectives that were political, territorial and 
extended to a predominant role in the post-world war order.  
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His military aim, as for the other allies, was the total defeat of Germany and capture of 
maximum German Territory to force a favourable settlement with its allies.
87
      
OUTCOME AND ANALYSIS 
The Second World War presents a comprehensive case depicting paradigmatic, deviant 
and critical characters. A significant lesson relearned out of the war is that victory is not 
the objective of war, victory only opens the doors to the objective, while defeat shuts 
them unequivocally. Whether analysed from Martel‘s, Gray‘s, Clausewitz‘s or any other 
perspective, the defeat of Germany and Japan and, the comprehensiveness of the Allied 
military victory cannot be disputed yet the impact of defat and victory on the various 
players was, as we have seen, quite different. 
If we look at British political objectives and the ends achieved after defeating Germany, 
one finds a largely quid nominis victory. When Winston Churchill was asked during the 
course of the Second World War what was Britain's objective, he responded: ‗Victory at 
all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory however long and hard the road may be; for 
without victory there is no survival.‘88 Romantic and poetic as it may be, the statement 
said nothing and served no purpose for those whose business it is to translate political 
aims into objectives, objectives in to strategy of which military strategy is but a 
constituent part and indeed translates political objectives in to military aim and military 
objectives. In reality however, Britain failed to secure some of her core objectives.  
During the war, Churchill reluctantly agreed to rethink his visions of Britain and the 
empire. Winning the war was at the cost of seceding much of British wealth and influence 
in Europe and the rest of the world the US. Most telling was the loss of exclusive trading 
position in the colonies, particularly in the Pacific, which became the exclusive domain of 
the US. The biggest political gain came in the shape of a pre-eminent position in the 
United Nations and preventing an invasion of the British Isles.  
France lost much of what it had started with but considering it was occupied by the 
Germans, actually did very well. It earned a more than proportionality share of the victory 
and benefited in terms of territory as well as security.   
China, Russia and the US were the biggest beneficiaries. Russia and the US would 
spearhead the bipolar order that followed and each preserved its political ideology which 
was directly threatened by the war. The US, Soviet Union and Chinese victory can be 
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described as Strategic victory while other allies ranged from strategic success to strategic 
advantage. 
Among the Western allies, clearly Great Britain had the tougher time in terms of 
casualties than the United States, destruction of property and economic drain, her losses 
at a proportional rate were at least six times greater than those borne by the United States. 
In comparison to the Soviets and the Chinese, these casualties were insignificant as the 
two combined (although China was split), sustained twenty-six times the number of 
fatalities.
89
 America acted with a more global view.
90
 It did not suffer as badly and took a 
lion‘s share of the spoils. A clearer, wider picture guided US strategy that served to 
translate military victories in to realising political interests.  
Victory too has subjective and objective elements. Unless success is achieved at the 
objective end, outcomes in the subjective fields are irrelevant.
91
  
CASE 5: THE COLD WAR  
The ideological standoff between the communist Soviet bloc and capitalism, led by the 
United States, the so called cold war, was underpinned in nature and character by the 
precepts on violence as moderated by the emergence and perfection of Nuclear weapons. 
Characterised by the need to avoid a direct confrontation between the superpowers, the 
cold war played out in the form of hot diplomacy and proxy wars. Occasional 
mobilisation and diplomatic showdowns as well as posturing of the sort epitomised in the 
Cuban Missile Crisis were, luckily, somewhat rare.  
The cold war appeared to threaten the ‗war system‘ of diplomacy, the days of vast armies 
confronting each other on the battlefield appeared to have ended apparently severing with 
them the critical link between war and strategy that the Clausewitzian school had 
intricately established and preserved. This was realised as early as the late 1940s and the 
50s as evident from the writings of Liddell Hart and Schelling.  
There were numerous major wars involving one of the superpowers directly and another 
minor power or superpower indirectly. Significant among these were Korea and Vietnam 
involving the US directly and China covertly and, Afghanistan (1979 – 1987) involving 
the Soviet Union directly and the US covertly. In each of these wars, the philosophy of 
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force and Clausewitzian maxim of war and its linkage to policy was stood on its head; 
battlefield results had little or no bearing on the final political outcomes.  
There were also major wars among client or neutral states, or where the US and the 
Soviet Union did not overtly interfere, support militarily or diplomatically. For example, 
India and Pakistan engaged in two wars in 1965 and 1971. The Iran – Iraq war that 
continued through most of the 1980s was quite ‗total‘ given the resources each antagonist 
had at its disposal. Britain and Argentina had a relatively short and conventional 
showdown over the Falkland Islands in 1982. This was arguably a classic ‗limited war‘. 
Each of these wars took place under a peculiar international political climate and the 
outcome in each had a distinct relationship with intended political aims.  
Deterrence was a reinvented and evolving science, one that ran its full course during the 
Cold War. We can never really know how well or if at all it worked, as Freedman points 
out that only failure of deterrence produces empirical results.
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 The ‗essence of the 
problem, wrote Lawrence Freedman, would be ‗in attaching rationality whatsoever to the 
chain of events that could well end in utter devastation of one‘s own society (even 
assuming indifference to the fate of the enemy society‘.93 These signals included public 
acknowledgment by Harry S. Truman, the US President from 1945 – 1953, that ‗starting 
an atomic war is totally unthinkable for rational men‘94 and from Khrushchev, the Soviet 
leader from 1953 – 1964, in a letter to J. F. Kennedy stating that only lunatics or suicides, 
who themselves want to perish or destroy the whole world before they die would start a 
nuclear war;
95
 the latter comment coming at the height of the Cuban Missile crisis. Such 
signals, nuclear strategists would argue dilute the value of deterrence which relies on 
capability, will and communication to be of value. In sum, the Cold War and the great 
nuclear bluff produced a very hot peace.  
The Soviets on their part successfully reconsolidated their influence in Eastern Europe by 
crushing anti-communist/Soviet movement and re-installation of a pro-Soviet government 
in Budapest in November 1956
96
 and in Czechoslovakia in Aug 1968.
97
 Soviet attempt to 
annex Afghanistan to their zone of influence was their nemesis. The Afghan Mujahedeen 
were not intimidated by Soviet occupation of their capital city, always thought to be the 
Afghan centre of gravity. Their true ‗centre of gravity,‘ one that still holds, was to be 
found as much in their conception of struggle as in a powerful mix of motivational factors 
including religion, nationalism, xenophobia and ethnicity.  
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Victory had a profoundly different meaning to what it had assumed during the 
conventional wars that had preceded it.  This empirical study of the cold war looks at 
selected, non-paradigm, cases with a view to draw conclusions on language and aspects 
of victory that conventional references ignore. 
CASE 5A: THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 
They talk about who won and who lost. Human reason won. Mankind won.
98
 
Nikita Khrushchev 
The Cuban Missile Crisis is both a critical as well as a deviant case. This dual character 
stems from the overt and covert diplomacy, bargaining and trade-offs that, while the crisis 
ensued, were not public information and as such played no role in perception building on 
either side. The crisis occurred at a point when the political psyche of the cold war had 
already sunk deep into the minds of governments and the public on both sides of the 
ideological divide as well as the observers at large. While deterrence stood, the threat of a 
nuclear war was perceived as all too present and missile posturing that had already 
affected the Soviet Union with US Missiles in Turkey now came to the Americas in the 
shape of SS-5 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) allegedly being staged in 
Cuba. 
Background 
The crisis occurred at a time when the ‗peculiar rules of the nuclear game were in full 
force, and the progress of the crisis reveals them in full force.‘99 Since Fidel Castro 
assumed power in Jan 1959 and aligned himself unequivocally with the USSR, the US 
was deeply uneasy, fearing the ‗domino effect‘ of Communist expansion in the Americas. 
In an attempt to overthrow Castro, CIA backed Cuban exiles landed on the Bay of Pigs on 
17 April 1961. The plan failed miserably, resulting in the capture of over one thousand 
rebels.
100
  
The Soviet logic for basing the missiles in Cuba is still an issue of debate, when seen in 
the context of the indirect approach and an indirect strategy, the objectives begin to 
crystallize. In July 1962 Castro announced that Cuba and the USSR had taken steps that 
would make a direct attack on Cuban soil by the US impossible. This of course involved 
basing Soviet Missiles on Cuban soils as well as IL 28 bombers. The implications from a 
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capability perspective are evident from the declassified CIA annotation depicting ranges 
of Soviet missiles (marked in concentric red circles) below (Map 4): 
 
MAP 4: SOVIET MISSILE RANGES (SRBM AND IRBM) 
SOURCE: JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM, CUBAN MISSILE 
CRISES- HISTORICAL, ACHIEVES AND MANUSCRIPTS, PLATE 15 (ELECTRONIC), COLUMBIA 
POINT, BOSTON: MA. (MISSILE NAMES AND SCALE INSERTED BY AUTHOR)  
 
N 
SS-5 
SS-4 
SS-3 
Scale 
0              500          1000        1500 
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The red circle indicate missile ranges for the SS-3 (Russian: R-5, Shyster) with a range of 
630 NMs, the SS-4 Scandal (Russian: Р-12  Двина – read ‗Dvina‘) with a range of 1020 
NM and the  SS-5 Skean (Russian: P 14: Чусовая, read ‗Chusovaya‘) with a range of 
3700 KMs (2200 NMs).
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 Robert McNamara, backed by experts and some other presidential advisors, opined that 
the missiles would not materially alter the strategic balance. Why then would the Soviet 
Union risk a nuclear war to achieve an end that served no strategic value; what exactly 
were Khrushchev‘s motives? ‗A consensus‘ writes Schell, ‗on this matter has 
subsequently emerged among historians.‘ The defensive value of the missiles to future 
US adventurism was obviously one, but probably a secondary issue. The primary reason 
is to be found in Kennedy‘s presidential campaign. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the 
US possessed six thousand nuclear warheads, the Soviet Union had only three hundred or 
so of which ‗a fraction were mounted on mere thirty five missiles capable of reaching the 
United States. This of course was private information to which only Khrushchev and his 
inner circle had access. However, in his presidential campaign, Kennedy claimed a 
‗missile gap‘ with the Soviet Union. The error suited the Soviets and they adopted a 
policy of ‗bluster and bluff‘. Alexander Shelepin, the head of the KGB, launched a 
campaign of disinformation to reinforce the US perception.
102
 It was not until Kennedy 
entered office that he called the Soviet bluff. The US Under Secretary of Defence 
Gilpatric Roswell, in an address delivered in October 1961stated: 
The destructive power which the United States could bring to bear even after 
a surprise Soviet attack upon our forces would be as great as, perhaps greater 
than, the total undamaged forces which the enemy can threaten to launch 
against us in a first strike.
103
 
It is widely acknowledged that, despite the real and present threat, war was avoided only 
because of back-door diplomacy that ensued parallel to the public show of strength from 
both leaders. It was in secret dealings with Kennedy that Soviet material motives came to 
fore.  Khrushchev sent two letters to Kennedy, one public and one private. In the public 
letter he set forth the condition of removal of US missiles from Turkey. In his private 
letter he sought commitment that the US would not invade Cuba once missiles had been 
removed.
104
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In the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. hammered out a deal that brought 
the world back from the brink of nuclear war. The settlement involved compromises and 
concessions on both sides, yet all over the world, this event was seen as a major defeat for 
Moscow, and the Soviet leader Khrushchev was soon thrown out of office. The belief that 
the U.S. triumphed in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 produced the subsequent ‗lessons‘ 
that nuclear crises are manageable, or inherently winnable, and that a tough stand will 
always make the Soviets retreat. American policymakers became convinced that the 
Soviet Union had backed away from a show of resolute force by the United States, and 
members of the Kennedy administration thought that the same logic would apply if they 
were steadfast in Vietnam. President Johnson‘s Press Secretary, Bill Moyers, said, after 
resigning, that in the Johnson inner circle: ‗there was a confidence, it was never bragged 
about, it was just there – a residue, perhaps of the confrontation over the missiles in Cuba 
– that when the chips were really down, the other people would fold.‘105 However, a 
closer examination of the missile crisis illustrates that it was the willingness of both sides 
to compromise that diffused the situation, and whilst nuclear war was unlikely, it was a 
real possibility. As Graham Allison writes:  
No event demonstrates more clearly than the missile crisis that with respect to 
nuclear war there is an awesome crack between unlikelihood and 
impossibility.‘106  
Such caution about reading too much into supposed triumphs echoes the ancient Greeks, 
for as Plato wrote: ‗Many a victory has been and will be suicidal to the victors.‘ If 
genuine triumphs can breed an unhealthy level of hubris, the danger is even greater 
when the victory is more imagined than real. 
107
 [Emphasis added] 
A post analysis of the Cuban Missile crisis suggests that while from a policy perspective 
and the dialectic between the two major ideological blocks, the Soviets came out clearly 
on top; publically it was the US that benefitted from a notional victory.  
... Midway through the crises, it was clear that the US was to be content with 
image at home and among its allies while in real terms having already 
receded on Turkish Missile Bases which was more significant to the Russians 
than basing in Cuba. The very fact that this pact was to be kept secret, and 
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indeed with Khrushchev locked in a catch 22 situation, the US success was 
complete. The impact on Senior Soviet polity was immense…..108 
US intervention in Vietnam is linked by revisionists to the perceived success in the Cuban 
Missile Crisis and with a strengthening of the limits of deterrence as Lebow writes: 
‗Kennedy‘s successful use of coercive diplomacy led ineluctably to American 
intervention in Vietnam.‘109 
CASE 5B: THE VIETNAM WAR 
The Vietnam conflict, also known as the Second Indochina War, from its onset to the 
humiliating retreat of US forces presents an interesting critical case for this thesis. The 
conflict occurred in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and ensued for twenty four years. US 
active involvement in the conflict escalated in early 1960s when combat units began to be 
deployed. The war was fought between the communist North Vietnam and South 
Vietnam. The north was supported by its communist allies, principally China who 
remained in the background while the United States supported by the South East Asian 
Treaty Organisation (SEATO) took on the fighting for the South. 
In 1949, President Truman and U.S. Democrats were accused of ‗losing‘ China to the 
communists during the Chinese Civil War, because they provided insufficient support. 
‗The criticism stuck, despite the fact that the United States would have had to send tens or 
hundreds of thousands of troops to avert a communist victory.‘110 The loss was followed 
by yet another; this time Korea. Shortly after the supposed defeat for the U.S. in China, 
North Korea invaded South Korea in 1950. U.S. and allied forces succeeded in preventing 
a communist takeover of South Korea, but following China‘s intervention, the allies lost 
virtually all their earlier gains in the North. The war became increasingly unpopular in the 
United States, and by 1952, was widely seen as an attritional failure.
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 The hat trick in 
the Pacific was completed with the outcome of the Vietnam War. Johnson, fearful of 
being seen to ‗lose‘ Vietnam to communism, escalated U.S. intervention and brought the 
US in active involvement in the fighting. Johnson declared that the earlier setback for the 
Democrats in 1949 would be ‗chickenshit compared with what might happen if we lost 
Vietnam.‘112 
The US entered the war as part of her wider strategy of containment that sought to restrict 
the spread of communism in the Pacific Rim, an area of vital US security and strategic 
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interests. As the conflict progressed, the US became increasingly entrenched and drawn 
into a dynamic that appeared to increasingly lose political purpose and domestic support. 
US involvement peaked in early 1968 around the time of the famous Tet offensive.  
In January 1968, the Vietcong unleashed a surprise offensive that was to go down in 
history as the greatest American battlefield defeat of the cold war.
113
 By any rational 
battlefield analysis, Tet was by no means a defeat. It was if anything, a disaster for the 
communists. ‗Despite the advantages of surprise, the South Vietnamese insurgents, the 
Vietcong, failed to hold on to a single target in South Vietnam and suffered staggering 
losses. Of the 80,000 attackers, as many as half were killed in the first month alone, and 
the Vietcong never recovered.‘114 
Faced with increased domestic pressure and political failure, the US, under a policy called 
Vietnamisation,
115
 began to withdraw as South Vietnamese troops were trained and 
armed. A peace treaty was signed by all parties in January 1973 however the fighting 
continued. In the mid of that year, US forces were constitutionally forbidden to take 
further part in the war as a result of the Case-Church Amendment
116
 passed by the US 
Congress in Jun 1973.  
In April 1975, North Vietnam captured Saigon. North and South Vietnam were reunified 
the following year. 
The war had a major impact on U.S. politics, culture and foreign relations. Americans 
were deeply divided over the U.S. Government‘s justification for, and means of fighting 
the war. Opposition to the war contributed to the counterculture youth movement of the 
1960s. It exacted a huge human cost in terms of Vietnamese fatalities that exceeded total 
German military casualties during the Second World War.
117
 Direct US casualties in the 
war as a whole were in excess of 59,000.  
Political Outcome and Analysis 
The Vietnam War has been a subject of intense debate in and outside the USA. While the 
US clearly failed to achieve its political objectives, militarily it was quite successful. 
Even the infamous Tet offensive was a military defeat for the North. Important lessons of 
the Vietnam War can be found in the nature of war rather than the attainment or failure to 
realise political and military objectives. At the strategic level, the concept of victory 
between the Vietcong and the United States was starkly different. The United States 
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sought to eliminate communism from the Vietnamese peninsula and to do so was firmly 
committed to fighting a limited war in the geographical sense of the term. The Vietcong, 
however, were fighting a war that was quite total, a war of survival in the ideological 
sense. The notion of victory, as too the strategic objectives of the main antagonists, thus 
lay on different planes. Rational calculus of war and the notion of bargaining leverages to 
be accrued from violence thus bore no counter relationships; one side‘s ability to hurt the 
other had no direct consequence to the purpose for that violence or its political utility. The 
usability of military gains was thus completely lacking for the US. For the Vietcong, mere 
survival, in spite of the cost, was enough to be construed as victory. Both sides were 
therefore evaluating the outcomes in completely different ideological metrics.  
The cultural dissonance does not however explain why most Americans saw the Tet 
offensive as a failure for the United States. The answer to this is again to be found outside 
the battlefield. Leading up to the Tet offensive, President Johnson had been running a 
‗progress campaign‘ to convince Americans that victory in Vietnam was just around the 
corner. The bullish victory rhetoric accompanied comments convincing the Americans on 
the hapless situation of the enemy and the imminent success of American forces and 
policy. The campaign that ensued in a relative calm before the storm created overblown 
expectations among the American public.  
When Tet finally happened, its sheer scale and surprise sent a shock wave through the 
American psyche. Its occurrence and not its outcome were the source of shock and sense 
of failure. As Johnson‘s former aide, Robert Koner, later recalled, ‗Boom, 40 towns get 
attacked, and they didn‘t believe us anymore.‘118 The illusion of defeat was heightened by 
two powerful symbolic events and the media.  
First, the communists attacked the American Embassy in Saigon. It was one of the 
smallest-scale actions of the Tet offensive, but it captured America‘s attention. The 
attackers had assaulted the pre-eminent symbol of the United States presence in South 
Vietnam. The media incorrectly reported that the embassy had been captured whereas in 
reality none of the attackers made it past the courtyard.  
Second, Eddie Adams‘s photograph of South Vietnam‘s police chief executing a 
Vietcong captive in the street caused a sensation. After he fired the shot, the police chief 
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told nearby reporters: ‗They killed many Americans and many of my men. Buddha will 
understand. Do you?‘119 
Finally, the American news media painted a picture of disaster in Vietnam. Even though 
communist forces incurred enormous losses and strategic setbacks, opinion columns and 
the media in general tended to laud their performance. As the Times war correspondent 
Peter Braestrup put it, ‗To have portrayed such a setback for one side as a defeat for the 
other — in a major crisis abroad — cannot be counted as a triumph for American 
journalism.‘120 
To the average American, the circumstance and the images spoke powerfully of a brutal 
and unjust war.
121
 For some Americans, this image was associated with the Tet offensive. 
The military facts of the Vietcong failure did not matter, the fact of the offensive not its 
outcome was sufficient for a notion of failure. The role of the media in distorting or 
reinforcing perception became most evident. The dynamics of preparing the domestic and 
international audience, information and its packaging has since been a major 
consideration for the strategy and conduct of war ever since. The backdrop and the media 
shape how information is processed by the audience, as primary evidence, the media, and 
particularly visual media are first instant contributors to the impressions of victory and 
defeat. Any subsequent processing or re-packaging of information occurs in a friction 
medium setup by the original impressions; as such no theory of victory, no theory that is 
comprehensive, can ignore the information dimension. The contextual framework for 
assessing winner and losers cannot be ignored by strategy. 
The influence of culture shaping notion of success and failure is also evident from the 
war. Both in the context of Vietnam and the United States, the cultural disparities and 
their impact on how information was processed and understood distorted relative 
impressions of perception and reality. Culture – domestic, international and most 
profoundly so that of the enemy and its population – is indispensible to the respective 
constructs of victory and defeat. Culture emerges as the single most significant factor in 
the moral dimension of victory.  
CASE 6: ARAB – ISRAEL WAR 1973 
The 1973 Arab-Israel War, also known as the Yom Kippur War, was fought from October 
6 to October 26, 1973 by a coalition of Arab states led by Egypt and Syria against Israel. 
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The war began with a surprise joint attack by Egypt and Syria on Yom Kippur, the Jewish 
Day of Atonement and in the month of Ramadan (hence the other names for the war).  In 
the third Arab-Israel War, Israel had captured the Golan and the Sinai. In the years 
following that war, Israel erected lines of fortification in both the Sinai and the Golan 
Heights. In 1971 Israel spent $500 million fortifying its positions on the Suez Canal, a 
chain of fortifications and gigantic earthworks known as the Bar Lev Line, named after 
Israeli General Chaim Bar-Lev were set up. This was Israel‘s ‗Maginot Line‘ the 
‗impregnable‘ defence of the Sinai that ran on eastern side of the canal and housed 
formidable fortifications and bunkers.  
Under US mediation, rapprochement between Israel and Egypt continued. The US, other 
than security of Israel had its own direct interests involved, namely reducing Soviet 
influence in Egypt.  According to Chaim Herzog ‗on June 19, 1967, the National Unity 
Government of Israel voted unanimously to return the Sinai to Egypt and the Golan 
Heights to Syria in return for peace agreements.‘122  The proposal was to include 
demilitarisation of the Golan Heights and special arrangement for the Straits of Tiran. 
‗The government also resolved to open negotiations with King Hussein of Jordan 
regarding the eastern border.‘123 
The Israeli decision was to be conveyed to the Arab states by the U.S. government. The 
U.S. was informed of the decision, but not that it was to transmit it. There is no evidence 
of receipt from Egypt or Syria, who apparently never received the offer. The decision was 
kept a closely-guarded secret within Israeli government circles and the offer was 
withdrawn in October, 1967.
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Both Egypt and Syria desired the return of lost territories however at the Khartoum Arab 
Summit but the policy arrived at on conclusion of the conference left few options. It 
appeared in the form of the famous three ‗no‘s‘: no peace, no recognition and no 
negotiations. This was followed in 1970 by the death of Gamal Abdul Nasser, the 
Egyptian President. His successor Anwar Sadat resolved to fight and win back the 
territories.  On mediation through Gunnar Jarring, the UN intermediary, Sadat softened 
and offered peace if Israel withdraws to pre 1967 lines. This time, the Israelis refused. 
To break the deadlock, restore pride and create hope for regaining lost territories 
essentially through diplomatic negotiations, Sadat decided to strike Israel. The objective 
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was not grand; he hoped that a military adventure would break the deadlock. There were 
other concerns, in the three years Sadat had been in office, the domestic economic crises 
had worsened; War, specially a successful one, felt Sadat, could be a good diversion. In 
his biography of Sadat, Raphael Israeli writes that the issue of ‗shame‘ over the Six Day 
War had also to be removed before any reforms could be introduced.
125
  
Egyptian military aims were modest. These included an assault across the Sinai breeching 
the Bar-Lev line and a shallow thrust into Israeli defences while remaining within 
Egyptian Surface to Air Missile coverage.
126
  The military aims were therefore essentially 
tactical while the war aim was strategic, the reopening of a constructive dialogue. 
Clausewitz tells us that to compel our enemy to do our will, the destruction of the 
enemy‘s centre of gravity and with it rendering him vulnerable should be the object of 
war.
127
  
Strategists have long construed that what Clausewitz suggests is that strategic gains 
require strategic military operations at a strategic scale. Clausewitz does not however 
limit, in prescriptive terms, what a centre of gravity is and where it may be found. His 
assertion that it is the hub of all power and movement are contemplative in spirit. The 
Yom Kippur war demonstrates how an essentially tactical operation, in this case a 
bridgehead and a foothold, a lodgement  in enemy controlled territory, can in given the 
wider influence of the strategic environment in which it occurs, yield strategic outcomes. 
Textbooks on operations of war will typically describe bridgeheads as ‗preliminary 
operations‘, ruptures in defences that create conditions for manoeuvre to occur. Sadat‘s 
logic, if transported to the opening of the western front in 1944 would imply an allied 
plan that would demonstrate the ability to land armies on the beaches of Normandy and 
on that fact, assume that Hitler would sue for peace on Allied terms! 
Under the international strategic environment and the Israeli mind-set at the time, a 
consequence of the sense of impregnability behind the 500 million dollar Bar-Lev Line, a 
mere lodgement would have just the right impact, a display of the vulnerability. As such, 
Sadat‘s war aims are an excellent example of well defined, attainable military objective 
that create the desired political outcome through inducing the specific volatility in the 
effectual environment. It is another example of the usability of an outcome not 
necessarily victorious. 
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The plan was to secure crossing across the Suez and limited spaces within the air defence 
umbrella of the SAM 6 missiles system with a view to break the myth of Israeli 
invincibility and encourage her back to the negotiating table. Sadat also probably 
understood the international environment and the extent to which Russians would allow 
an Israeli reappraisal. It was a gamble he took and one that paid off. In this backdrop, his 
war directive that would otherwise have sounded like military suicide is worth reading: 
To challenge the Israeli security theory by carrying out a military action 
according to the capabilities of the armed forces aimed at inflicting the 
heaviest losses on the enemy and convincing him that continued occupation 
of our land exacts a price too high for him to pay, and that consequently his 
theory of security - based as it is on psychological, political, and military 
intimidations - is not an impregnable shield of steel which could protect him 
today or in the future.
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Conduct 
The Egyptians and the Syrians triumphed in as far as their military objective visualised. 
No plans for deeper thrust, provisions for logistics or the vital air cover that would be 
essential were ever prepared. The shallow advance of the Egyptian and Syrian forces 
came to a halt within the first 24–48 hours. Thereafter, the Israelis began to recover, and 
by the second week of the war, the Syrians had been pushed out of the Golan Heights. In 
the Sinai to the south, after valuable intelligence provided by the Americans, the Israelis 
crossed the Suez and struck at the seam between two Egyptian armies and cut off the 
Egyptian Third Army just as a United Nations cease-fire came into effect.
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 The Israeli 
counter offensive, a relatively small scale operation, was masterly and created effects, as 
Christopher Bellamy puts it, ‗disproportionate to its size in tipping the enemy [Egypt] off 
balance operationally and, by appearing on his home territory.
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 Map 5 depicts the 
operation: 
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MAP 5: THE ISRAELI COUNTER OFFENSIVE 
(SOURCE: CHRISTOPHER D. BELLAMY. THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN LAND WARFARE131) 
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The counter offensive took the battle to Egyptian territory. This was an enormous military 
achievement for Israeli forces, yet when the war ended, it was Egypt that was considered 
‗victorious‘. The Arab world, which had been humiliated by the lopsided defeat of the 
Egyptian-Syrian-Jordanian alliance during the Six-Day war, felt psychologically 
vindicated by its string of victories early in the conflict. This vindication paved the way 
for the peace process that followed, as well as liberalizations such as Egypt's ‗infitah 
policy‘132. The Camp David accords, which came soon after, led to normalized relations 
between Egypt and Israel—the first time any Arab country had recognized the Israeli 
state. Egypt, which had already been drifting away from the Soviet Union, then left the 
Soviet sphere of influence entirely.
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 It was a win-win situation for all. 
The Arab Israel war of 1973 provides three important lessons: 1) contrary to the 
conventional school of strategic thought, tactical victories, even half victories can yield 
strategic advantage or even success, 2) the strategic environment as well as the enemy‘s 
mind-set are critically influential on enemy‘s behavioural coefficient that can multiply or 
mitigate the actual leverage attained by military outcomes and, 3) the value of the 
contextual framework and the expectational argument is again highlighted; in this case 
the former appears more important than the score-keeping or match-fixing frameworks.  
CASE 7: THE ISRAEL-LEBANON WAR 2006 
Background and Causes 
The Israel-Lebanon War of summer 2006, more appropriately the Israel – Hezbollah 
skirmishes, is part of a continuous low intensity affair that has become something of a 
―romance‖ between Hezbollah and the Israelis. While appealing to be deviant in character 
but when analysed closely, the Israel-Lebanon War 2006 is in fact a paradigm case. 
To understand the dynamics of this conflict it is essential to look at the origins of the 
parties at war. Israel was carved out of Palestinian territory as part of the post war 
arrangement of the Second World War. Churchill had in fact written a white paper on 
how an Israeli state may be created already in the 1930s. The actual state that emerged 
was not very different. The creation of a state on territories already inhabited by myriads 
of cultures and faiths in a balance that was established over two millennia was suddenly 
upset. A permanent state of conflict was thus created between societies that were unlikely 
to reconcile in spirit regardless of what political expediencies may drive them.  
Chapter V—Case Studies 
~232~ 
Hezbollah has a far more recent origin, as Pierre Tristam points out: 
Around lunchtime on April 19, 1983, a suicide bomber slammed a truck 
packed with 2,000 pounds of explosives through the entrance of the American 
Embassy along one of Beirut‘s fashionable seaside avenues on the 
Mediterranean. The attack killed 63 people, most of them Lebanese 
employees at the embassy or visa applicants, 17 of them American. Six 
months later two suicide bombers simultaneously attacked U.S. Marines‘ 
barracks south of Beirut and French barracks in the eastern part of the 
Lebanese capital, killing 241 American soldiers and 57 French paratroopers. 
Hezbollah, the ‗Party of God,‘ a militant Lebanese Shiite organization, was 
born out of those bombings.
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Born as the ‗Islamic Jihad‘, Hezbollah showed it‘s leaning towards Iran when in the 
1980s it targeted French interests in Lebanon because of French support to Iraq in the 
Iran-Iraq war.
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The June 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon had driven out the Palestine Liberation 
Organization‘s ‗state-within-a-state‘ which it had built there since 1970. ‗The invasion 
forced 6,000 PLO militants to leave the country. Mediating those militants out of 
Lebanon is what brought the U.S. Marines, the French and some Italian forces to 
Lebanon.‘ Israel thought its problems in South Lebanon were over.136 
South Lebanon is overwhelmingly Shiite. Largely neglected by the central government, 
with the country‘s Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims generally sharing power, there 
already existed scope for a political movement. When the PLO was forced out, Hezbollah 
saw its opportunity and filled the vacuum, both to Israel‘s and the central government‘s 
surprise.  
Hezbollah began a campaign of opposing all things western taking numerous Americans 
hostage and conducting a relentless guerrilla war against the Israeli occupation until Israel 
finally withdrew completely from Lebanon in 2000. This was Hezbollah notional victory 
and was termed by them, as too by many Lebanese, as the ‗liberation‘ of Lebanon. To 
Israel and the United States, Hezbollah was just the latest Lebanese terrorist organization 
to wreak havoc on the country and on Israel.
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 To Hezbollah, its actions against Israel 
weren‘t terrorism, but legitimate resistance. Following the 2000 Israeli withdrawal, 
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Hezbollah took a far more politically minded road in Lebanese affairs. Hezbollah 
politicians were elected to the Lebanese parliament. But the organization continued the 
fight against Israel, because Hezbollah (and the Lebanese government) claimed that Israel 
had not completely withdrawn: It still held on to a small strip of land in southern Lebanon 
called Shebaa Farms (Map 6).  
 
MAP 6: SHEBA FARMS 
Source: Internet, http://www.theisraelproject.org/atf/Account16894/images 
/_271105212552084.jpg138 
 
Minor incidents continued between Israel and Hezbollah from 2000 to 2005. Then-Israeli 
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon took the chronic strife as the price of living with a hostile 
frontier, a price not nearly as heavy as the one Israel was paying for its proximity to the 
Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Sharon, who had been the architect of the 1982 invasion 
and lost enormous prestige from that invasion‘s ultimate failure, was not about to ratchet 
up the battle with Hezbollah.  
His successor, Ehud Olmert, had different ideas. On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah militants 
fired on an Israeli patrol on Israel‘s side of the border fence, killing three Israeli soldiers 
and seizing two of them. This was in retaliation to an earlier killing of a Lebanese family 
in a mistaken attack by Israel. Olmert opted for a disproportionate response and 
bombarded parts of south and eastern Lebanon. Widening the bombing campaign, most of 
Lebanon was attacked in what became a 34-day all-out war between Hezbollah and Israel. 
Hezbollah retaliated with intense, daily, indiscriminate missile barrages at towns in 
northern Israel, and as far south as Haifa.
139
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Politico-Military Aims and Objectives 
Olmert publically pledged to destroy Hezbollah‘s military capacity rendering it incapable 
of fire bombings in Israeli territory. Politically, he hoped to create deterrence by 
punishment; forcing Hezbollah to not use violence for fear of unacceptable consequences. 
Hezbollah on its part had no tall objectives except maintaining its pledge not to stop its 
barrage until Israel ceased its operations.  
Conduct and Outcome 
The war lasted 34 days. The Hezbollah rockets carried on firing, while the wider 
destruction that Israel caused did not deter Hezbollah. Most significantly, the whole of 
Lebanon began to associate itself with Hezbollah and its defiant attitude. It was not until 
August, 14 that a cease-fired brokered by the United Nations ended hostilities. About 
1,000 people, mostly Lebanese civilians, were killed, and one million Lebanese civilians 
and some 300,000 to 400,000 Israelis temporarily displaced. Both countries‘ economies 
suffered, although Lebanon‘s suffered far more as much of its infrastructure—roads, 
bridges, electricity and water plants—were damaged by Israel‘s bombing campaign.140  
Israel‘s objectives were not met. Hezbollah‘s military capability was temporarily 
diminished but not destroyed, and ‗its political stock rose in the eyes of Lebanese, 
including in the eyes of Christians who had previously opposed Hezbollah.‘141 Syria and 
Iran reportedly restocked Hezbollah‘s arsenal of missiles. Hezbollah‘s boycott of the 
Lebanese government, which was backed by the Western, created a political stalemate, 
but also strengthened Hezbollah‘s hand as a force in Lebanon‘s future.  
The 2006 Lebanon War, in sum, killed many, destroyed much, but failed to advance 
Israel‘s politico-military aims. Since technically Lebanon was not at war and had no 
agenda except its survival and existence, it clearly succeeded in both. Hezbollah emerged 
from the conflict stronger than before it began, even though Lebanese army troops 
deployed in south Lebanon.  
The minimalist framework and the notion of victory for a non or sub state actor are 
decidedly different from the conventional frameworks we have looked at up until now. 
The minimalist, the terrorist and most sub-state organisations that neither possesses the 
finance, the resources nor the military muscle to force a change through the outcome of 
violence, use violence to attract violence. Victory is not gauged by any match fixing or 
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scorekeeping analysis but in the perpetuation, politicisation and publicity received as a 
consequence. In the acknowledgement of their existence and capability to inflict pain, 
even if pinpricks, the minimalist policy is advanced. Reappraisals and any response short 
of decisive victory thus seem to serve only the minimalist.  
The contextual framework for assessing winner and losers in the ensuing war against 
terrorism needs to be informed by both the cultural dimension of the societies at war as 
well as the nature and character of the war itself – its objective and subjective dimension. 
SECTION 2: PROBLEMS WITH CONTEMPORARY THEORY 
ANTAGONISTS, THE AFFECTED AND OBSERVERS: A FUNCTIONAL 
GROUPING  
The range of case studies selected collectively highlight the deficiency of existing 
pretheories and how in certain cases even all the pretheories combined fail to present a 
cohesive theory that can be applied as a general case. The need for language, scope of 
association of belligerents and non-belligerents to the violence or the conflict is another 
area where language is clearly lacking. 
The three fundamental considerations for victory that emerge as an interim focus for any 
subsequent theory are the attainability, sustainability and the usability of victory. 
Clearly evident is the fact that it is not necessarily the degree of leverage earned through 
violence but the quality of diplomacy and post war strategy that affects political 
outcomes.  
This chapter, through empirical study, identified the voids in the definition and theory of 
victory that the contemporary understanding discussed in Chapter IV either fails to 
address or addresses incompletely. We have also concluded that: 
 Perceptions are not reality. Perceptions are, however, often more important than 
reality. Evaluations of victory and defeat are more open to interpretation and 
influenced by the psychological biases. 
 The existing pre-theory of victory and defeat is insufficient to explain the wider 
application and implication of the victory notion. 
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 Additional frameworks are needed to develop a more comprehensive theory of 
victory. 
 The constructs of victory and defeat, albeit intrinsically understood, are not 
formally described in language and vocabulary. 
 History reflects that military success, particularly when coercive violence fails to 
further or catalyse the wider bargaining process towards the objects of policy, is 
not sufficient to serve the notion of victory.  
 Victory sought, its dynamics and the paradigms shaping it govern – in a proactive 
sense – and shape – in a passive context – the conflict continuum. In turn, this 
influences the ways, as also, the means adopted to realise the desired end.   
 The contemporary concept of victory does not adequately serve the purpose of 
theory. The contours of the pretheories however, do find selective relevance and 
in varying degrees. The main limitations being not so much their correctness or 
validity but of the voids within. 
 Scientific language of victory and defeat needs to be developed. To allow for a 
more specific reference to context, an interim set of terminologies related to war 
and conflict is presented below which is intended to serve subsequent use in the 
research: 
INTIMACY TO VIOLENCE  
Aggressor 
The ‗aggressor‘ is defined as a person or country that attacks or starts a war, fight, or 
argument, often without being provoked.
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 In international relations the term has varied 
and distinct usage both as a concept and as a form of proscribed behaviour. In law it is 
used ‗to distinguish between just and unjust wars and between legal and illegal use of 
force.‘143 In this thesis, however, the term aggressor is neither used in a condemnatory nor 
pejorative sense but refers to an entity that consciously initiates political violence in 
pursuit of leverage to serve political aims. Aggressor may include a single state, alliance, 
group or a combination of these. It includes instigators that may cause a third party to 
pursue war without themselves taking active part in hostilities. To qualify as an aggressor 
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or its abetted party must, in a military sense, be strategically on the offensive and pursue 
an offensive military strategy in the conventional and unconventional sense.  
Respondents or Aggressed 
The term ‗Respondents‘ include a single state, alliance, group or a combination of these 
that is drawn into politically motivated violence and is threatened by the ‗initiators‘ with 
– on initiation of hostilities – an unacceptable political bargain. The respondent either 
chooses or is drawn into war instead of concession. The ‗Aggressed‘ may adopt an 
offensive or defensive strategic posture consistent with outlook, capabilities, war aims 
and objectives. It may in turn also have additional political objectives that, given the 
opportunity, may be explored and exploited.  It may also initiate hostilities employing 
offensive actions consistent in an overall strategically defensive posture such as 
preventive war, pre-emption and the counter offensive.  
Tugged Entities 
‗Tugged‘ entities are those that are drawn into a conflict as a result of treaty 
arrangements, moral obligation or any other causation that does not include self-defence, 
active or latent objectives. A ‗tugged‘ entity is identified by its apolitical disposition to 
the war outcomes.    
Impinged Entities 
Impinged entities includes those directly affected, with or without an active role in the 
fighting and those that join on either side not in pursuit or defence of a common political 
aim but their own separate aim. The alliance is thus against a common enemy and not a 
common cause. Russia and China in the Second World War – as seen from the 
perspective of Britain or the USA are good examples however; these states in their own 
capacity had been directly involved against an aggressor and were threatened in the first 
degree (see below). 
Observers 
Observers are entities that are disaffected or marginally influenced by the violence. They 
generally take no part in the conflict in their own capacity but may also represent the 
international community and its response.  
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CATEGORISATION OF THREAT 
Quantifying the nature of threat is essential to the understanding of the purpose and 
degree of commitment of a threatened entity. It influences the nature of coercion and 
violence on the part of the aggressor (the source of the threat) and the nature and depth of 
response from the aggressed.  
Threat can vary from an acute nature to peripheral significance. Three shades or degrees 
of threat can sufficiently embody the concept: 
First Degree Threat 
A first degree threat is one where the very existence or continued existence of the 
threatened entity is at stake. It should be noted that who initiated the war is not important, 
it is the nature of outcome sought that sets the bargain.   
Second Degree 
A second degree threat is where the core interest of the threatened entity is at stake 
however; its existence is not at risk.  
Third Degree 
A third degree threat is where the ante includes peripheral interests or where a first or 
second degree threat to an important ally is present. 
CATEGORISATION OF WARS AND CONFLICT 
From the survey of history we have seen that wars are either limited or total. Based on the 
generic but useful premise on Total War and other lesser severe forms of war, the 
following sub-categorisation are considered useful: 
Total War in the First Degree 
When the objectives are unlimited and one side seeks the complete political destruction of 
the other, the war is total in the first degree. The notion of victory for either side is set on 
extreme poles, for one it is the revisionist ends that seek the political destruction of the 
opponent while for the other, a lesser notion of success is sufficient. This will usually 
involve continuity on one end of the scale to existence and survival on the other. Progress 
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would be a bonus. Serbia for example in World War One was drawn into a total war in 
the first degree but came out of more powerful than it had ever been.  
Total War in the Second Degree 
When the entire resources of a nation are applied to the military effort, the war is total in 
the second degree. By implications, a second degree total war may have limited 
objectives; it is the means that are total. It implies the readiness of the nation to continue 
the war effort despite the losses. For example, the Iran – Iraq war was total in the second 
degree for both the countries and probably more so for Iran. The objectives were far from 
total, but neither side was prepared to limit the ‗means‘ hence the war extended in time 
and geographical scope but remained nonetheless limited as far as objectives were 
concerned.   
Limited War 
Limited war and limitation in war are two separate notions. The former developed in the 
context of cold war and embodies comprehensive body of language in support of the 
concept. Limited war generally suggested conventional war below nuclear threshold or 
short of nuclear options for either of the belligerents. By implication, one of the 
belligerents or allies in support of the belligerents had to possess nuclear weapons.    
Restrained War 
War has always been restricted in one form or another. Even the most total affairs were, 
in hindsight, restricted. For war and violence to remain restrained, both sides must 
consciously manifest qualities of limitation. A restrained war embodies following 
qualities in varying degrees: 
 Non total Purpose;  found in the aims and objectives. Must be for bargainable 
commodities and goods. 
 Mode and means; manifest in character of war and the form that it takes for 
example LIC, open conflict, terrorism, coercive diplomacy, direct or indirect 
approach; also type of forces and nature of weapons. 
 Scale and Scope; deliberate geographical confinement, impacted and affected 
populations, scale of violence, selection of targets and degree of punishment.  
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CHAPTER VI – TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE THEORY  
Victory always starts in the head. It's a state of mind. It then spreads with such 
radiance and such affirmations that destiny can do nothing but obey.
1
 
Douchan Gersi 
Victory and defeat should not be seen as opposites on a common continuum. 
The physical dimension notwithstanding, both are notional and contextual. 
For one side to be victorious, the other is not necessarily defeated. 
Author 
INTRODUCTION 
he complexity surrounding the notion of victory and defeat are embedded as 
much in the cultural and temporal domains as they are in the physical and 
moral. We identified that interpretation and information processing while 
influenced to a large extent by media and propaganda, accompany deeply ingrained 
psychological biases that lend themselves to external and internal influences. The pre-
theories of victory as applied in the analyses of the case studies suggest deficiencies in all 
the three fundamentals of victory namely attainability, usability and sustainability. A 
synthesis and theory development to fill the voids is needed to explain the wider context, 
application and implication of the victory and defeat.  
Culture shapes perceptions; it shapes reality and human action. Assuming interpretations 
of victory in one culture to be largely symmetrical in another without applying contextual 
corrections is not only inadequate but can also be very dangerous. Napoleon discovered it 
at the cost of half a million men in Russia, 1812; the British fared just as poorly in 
Afghanistan in their two solo adventures (1838-1842 and 1878-1881). The jury is still out 
on how the US and its allies might ultimately fare in Afghanistan. All these campaigns 
are beset with one common problem, the assumption of a symmetrical notion and context 
of what might constitute defeat for the enemy.  
From the recent research in the definition of victory, scholarship unanimously 
acknowledges the need to look beyond the physical and alludes to the linkage between the 
physical, the moral and the cultural contexts. The exact nature of this linkage is what the 
any new theory of victory needs to address comprehensively.  
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  SECTION 1: THE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF WAR 
Based on the precepts gleaned in Chapter IV, we can summarise drivers of the nature and 
character of war. The scope of definitions and descriptions may vary; in essence, there are 
five principal constructs that influence and drive the wider phenomena shaping war‘s 
nature:  
1) the psychosocial construct, 
2) the socio-political construct,  
3) the politico military construct,  
4) the military cultural and, 
5) the military technical construct.  
The psychosocial construct drives a society‘s propensity towards violence and its moral, 
ethical and proportionality notions. It is an innate and primordial tendency that would be 
cloaked in widely accepted or tolerable façades. The socio-political dimension 
encompasses various descriptions found in International Relations theory: nationhood and 
statecraft, economic and political interests. It is itself a product of the individual and pan-
social dimension that generates ideology, socio-cultural as well as the psychosocial 
propensities and the individual and collective political will and therefore in a national 
context borrows heavily from the psychosocial construct. It can be manifest in a single 
person who through the synthesis of his charisma, leadership, influence and authority can 
derail an entire people or a limited but sufficiently motivated following – Hitler and 
Osama Bin Laden being obvious examples.  
The politico-military dimension is less philosophical. It generally confines itself to real 
objectives and gains, means and methods, chances of success – risk analysis and, 
strategies, the ends, ways and means. The politico-military dimension at its top layer 
represents the way states interact and how militaries are organised and equipped to 
convey information to partners, observers and foes. It embodies the political framework 
for the system within which war occurs, the tools – including legal and rational – as well 
as aspects that fall purely in the military domain.  The military culture of a society is 
embedded in part in its history and in part the society. It also borrows from lessons and 
experience of the past as internalised in the way that military does its business. 
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The military technical; construct in largely manifest in wars character however has an 
influence on the nature of war too by virtue of creating efficient militaries that have 
become exceptionally good at their ability to use focused or large scale violence as well 
as the nan-state actors that have become equally efficient at using other – non traditional 
technologies to do what they do and avoiding what needs to be avoided.  
Every dimension of war is subjective to man, the principal reality and the most enduring 
feature upon which the changelessness in all conflict is premised.  
The individual and pan-social perspective shapes how facts and acts are received and 
perceived in each of the wars constructs and domains of victory. Unless these alter 
significantly, the nature of war remains more or less unchanged. It may then be argued 
that the nature of war, like a zeitgeist, remains relatively consistent as long as the way 
human beings, societies and cultures organise and interact among themselves does not 
undergo a revolutionary change. Arguably, no such change has occurred since the state 
was made the functional arbitrator of human societies. Whether globalisation is destined 
to play a revolutionary role remains to be seen. We will perhaps only know of the change 
in retrospect and not as we live it. 
SECTION 1: UNDERSTANDING ‗DEFEAT‘ 
In considering the effects of a victory, we are particularly interested in those 
that manifest themselves in the losing side.
2
 
Clausewitz 
The moral effects of defeat are universally acknowledged. However, this agreement is not 
without perspectives. Clausewitz captures the essence in characteristic brevity: ‗when a 
battle is lost, the strength of the army is broken—it‘s moral even more than its physical 
strength.‘3 Clausewitz also identifies the loser‘s perspective in the political realm where 
conflict continues beyond battles. If the defeat is not total, that is to say the state survives 
no matter how weakened and subdued, ‗even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always 
to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a 
transitional evil; for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some 
later date.‘4  
Clausewitz dwells at length over the impact and implications of defeat. ‗When one is 
losing,‘ writes Clausewitz, ‗the first thing that strikes one‘s imagination, and indeed one‘s 
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intellect is the melting away of numbers. This is followed by loss of ground, … Next 
comes the break-up of the original line of battle, the confusion of units, and the dangers 
inherent in the retreat...‘ Beyond the physical effects, Clausewitz enumerates the moral 
impact: 
The feeling of having been defeated … runs through the ranks, down to the 
very privates. It is aggravated by the horrible necessity of having to abandon 
to the enemy so many worthy comrades, whom one had come to appreciate, 
especially in the heat of battle. Worse still is the growing loss of confidence in 
the high command, which is held more or less responsible by every 
subordinate for his own wasted efforts. What is worse, the sense of being 
beaten is not a mere nightmare that may pass; it has become a palpable fact 
that the enemy is stronger.
5
 
The fine line between loss of ‗will‘ to continue the struggle and ‗hope‘ of a favourable 
outcome becomes prominent. Defeat is essentially a mental state. Liddell Hart identified 
the loss of hope as the tipping point. According to him, the loss battles, wars, life, 
comfort, happiness or any of the expendable commodities is insignificant as long as there 
is hope. Only when hope is lost is one defeated. ‗Victory has many fathers while defeat is 
an orphan.‘6 While victory cannot be separated from the collected interplay of its moral, 
physical and psychosocial domains, defeat is essentially moral in nature, hence an orphan. 
Its physical dimension is invariable always temporary. The moral dimension of defeat is 
distilled down to just two elements ‗will‘7, the lesser as it is manifest in motivation, 
leadership and the interplay of the physical domain and ‗hope‘8, manifest in what drives 
will, means, time and the propensity to accept the costs of failure and in the belief that 
despite loss of the physical, there is hope and hence a reason to keep the struggle alive. 
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Figure 21 maps the relationship of the dimensions and elements of Defeat: 
FIGURE 21: ELEMENTS AND DIMENSIONS OF DEFEAT EXPLAINED 
(AUTHOR‘S OWN DIAGRAM) 
 
Will: As separated from intent, is constructed in purpose (not to be confused 
with aim and objective, its usage here is ‗sense of purpose‘), leadership, moral, 
motivation and means.  
Hope: Hope is intrinsic in human optimism. It is nurtured and embedded in the 
long march of man, the struggle and change. Hope is constructed in ideology, 
and will. Both ‗Will‘ and ‗Hope‘ have attributes that are psychological and 
physical.   
Time: Time is to be seen in its criticality to the purpose and means. 
Means: It is the least significant element of defeat. It is found in the tools and 
instruments of power and change, for example the physical components of 
power.  
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At a subjective level, hope has physical and psychological connotations. In its 
psychological context, it lives in the shape of an idea. As long as the idea survives, defeat 
is a victory awaited, regardless whether those that originally held the idea and the will to 
pursue it to the extreme, survive or are vanquished. In a lessor context and in its overlap 
with ‗will‘, hope can also exist in the shape of ‗will‘. If means are temporarily denied, but 
the will is not lost, then hope exists and the struggle continues. Such a defeat is purely 
temporal and may lay seeds for a future victory. Again, in its physical context, when 
means are lost but purpose and will survive and, time is not critical to the purpose, hope 
exists and thus defeat is incomplete. This is because means can be regenerated, the lost 
time is not critical. Since 'will' persists, defeat is but temporary. 
In sum, defeat is set foremost when hope is abandoned or critical time is lost and thus the 
impossibility of attaining the aim and objectives that generated the conflict or war.  This 
theory of defeat is meaningless unless it tells us something beyond the hair-splitting of its 
various components. The theory must add to a better understanding and explanation of the 
past, and more profoundly, guide policy and action towards it avoidance.  
Defeat, to the defeated, is entirely in the mind - a ‗mental‘ state, whereas to the victor the 
other-side‘s defeat is constructed largely in its physical dimension.  The most significant 
inference that the theory provides is that when judging the enemy defeated, it is an error 
to assess the ‗mental state‘ purely through the physical. In combating terrorism, the 
failure of coercive tools – the collective term for military and other elements of power 
that expound threat of physical loss and suffering – to subdue or eradicate the ‗will‘ 
towards acts of terrorism is largely due to this misunderstanding. Israel frequently adopts 
punitive actions with the aim of defeating the terrorists ‗will‘ and alter their behaviour, 
essentially deterrence by punishment. But as we have seen, the outcome is only a 
temporary diminishing of the enemy‘s means and gaining time; paradoxically, the will is 
strengthened and hope ignited resulting only in the perpetuation of the conflict and 
expansion of its base.  
Weak minds can be influenced by coercive tools and their compelling use, particularly 
where ‗will‘ is rested more in the means and less in its other cohorts; however strong 
minds may lose will or means but usually never hope. Hope is nested deeper and cannot 
be eliminated purely by kinetic tools short of annihilating all those who hold, or have the 
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potential to hold or have the propensity to acquire motivations which if held are 
considered a threat.  
What is the solution? The question to be asked is that do we want to win or do we want to 
defeat the enemy? To win, the enemy‘s defeat is not essential. But in order to defeat the 
enemy, a decisive physical victory may be necessary and the price of success, instead of 
the more tangible shades of physical and moral victory, may be Pyrrhic.  
SECTION 2: VICTORY 
THE MORAL-TEMPORAL-PHYSICAL FRAMEWORK 
Thus far, we have identified, developed and used pretheories of victory without 
assembling the thoughts or language in a concise cohesive form. Such an exercise is 
however essential to close the discussion on the theory and definition of victory and set 
the stage for a review of history. Through the prism of the case studies and subsequently, 
discussion on the utility and true purpose victory, this thesis can serve its true value. 
THE DOMAINS OF VICTORY 
Victory is a synthesis of the physical and the moral through the ever dynamic medium of 
time – the spirit of the age. The impact of the latter can be from minimal to profound thus 
justifying its consideration as a separate domain tying the physical and the moral to a 
continuous trajectory of change. Within each of these domains operate a number of 
tangible and intangible dimensions or elements. The domains, as too the elements therein, 
are neither watertight nor do they have any exclusivity of role beyond the tactical level. 
The higher the level, the greater the osmosis and complexity of relationship between the 
parts.  
THE PHYSICAL DOMAIN 
The ‗physical‘, in terms of actions and correlational or spatial outcomes is a matter of 
‗fact.‘ If removed from judgemental criteria such as legality, ethics and proportionality, 
what we have is essentially a tangible constant. This ‗fact‘ has an interpretive perspective 
over and above the factual. The former, as we have seen from the discussions of reception 
and cultural contexts, is more significant. This is because it is the interpretational context 
of the physical that influences the important and enduring moral domain.  
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How the constant, that is to say the factual physical (the correlational outcome, used 
interchangeably), is perceived is itself a function of the moral domain and within that 
most significantly the cultural dimension. The timeframe for the interpretational physical 
is immediate to short term, limited within the confines of the military and political phases 
of war termination.   
Victory and defeat, in the politico-military context, do not lie on the same continuum and 
should not be seen as antonyms but rather separate conditions that can coexist mutually or 
exclusively. Unless total, defeat is a temporal state of a victory awaited. Unless defeat 
occurs, the value the physical component of victory is thus short lived, the temporal 
domain and its dynamics then take over either during or after the war termination phase. 
The impact of the temporal domain, history reminds us, can shape the most decisive 
military success to yield little long term political value (for example, with the Sixth 
Army‘s defeat at Stalingrad on 2 Feb 1943 (see Case Study 4), Germany could not have 
lost more against Russia (but probably not won). At Karbala in 680 AD (see Case Study 
1, Outcomes) we find the paradox of the ‗physical,‘ repeatedly come to fore in the form 
of counterproductive political outcomes.  
Let us now consolidate these thoughts into a basic theory of the factual physical 
component of victory. We have shown that the moral influence on the physical domain is 
a function of time, scale and the catalysts of change, both in the subjective context and the 
wider ‗environment‘ in which it is assessed. To express these as a function, the following 
set of equations is presented:  
The Factual Physical is constructed thus: 
 
EQUATION 3: CONSTRUCTION OF FACTUAL PHYSICAL VICTORY  
(AUTHOR‘S OWN EQUATION) 
The Interpretative Physical is constructed thus: 
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EQUATION 4: CONSTRUCTION OF INTERPRETATIONAL PHYSICAL VICTORY 
(AUTHOR‘S OWN EQUATION) 
Combining the two, we can conclude the discussion on the constructs of physical victory: 
 
EQUATION 5: PHYSICAL VICTORY—RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FACT AND INTERPRETATION 
(AUTHOR‘S OWN EQUATION) 
 
To simplify the relationship and assuming the ‗=‘ sign to represent the functional rather 
than mathematical connotation,  we end up with:  
 
 
EQUATION 6: THE CONSTRUCTS OF PHYSICAL VICTORY 
(AUTHOR‘S OWN EQUATION) 
The various constituent elements of the physical domain namely, military, economic, 
diplomatic and the political, collectively shape physical victory. The above equation 
when applied across the elements yields a unique result. It is not correct to merely collate 
the individual results to arrive at the physical component of victory (Vp); one further 
correction is needed.  
From cultural and perceptional contexts we know that each of the four elements 
influences the belligerents differently. It is no good assessing structural losses in 
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Afghanistan in terms of numbers or dollars on a scale a similar loss may be seen in the 
West. The equation, as unfortunately such is reality, also holds good for civilian and 
combatant casualties. The relative impact of the elements has thus to be established to 
reasonable accuracy and monitored through the course of the conflict as their relationship 
can be highly dynamic.   
THE MORAL DOMAIN 
The Moral Domain, as our earlier discussions have revealed, is more complex as well as 
the most influential. Its elements and in each, their constructs, are in themselves vast 
fields of debate. The moral includes the ethical, psychological, social, religious, 
ideographic, political, historical, expectational and the inter as well as intra cultural 
elements. We can reduce these to three separate categories namely: Cultural, Political and 
Ideographical. The political element here is confined to the aspirational influence on the 
polity. National aims and objectives are translated into political aims and objectives.  
While the political aims and the strategies animated for their attainment ought to be in 
harmony with the wider public aspiration, at times this is not so. Vietnam is a case in 
point.    
FIGURE 22: DIMENSIONS OF THE MORAL DOMAIN 
(AUTHORS‘ OWN DIAGRAM) 
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Like any living entity, culture too is both resilient and dynamic. While some facets 
change in one period they may remain static over another. From the relatively short term 
perspective of strategy, the dynamic aspects are in a constant flux while the static are 
more resilient to the effects of ‗time slice‘ and the changing environment. If we are able 
to reduce the dynamic and the static, the framework of change is potentially projectable 
and hence predictable.  
When values that govern a set of decision today cease to hold relevance tomorrow, the 
interpretations of reality of tomorrow can be, in the worst case, paradoxical to that of 
today. For example, the Iranian Revolution had a profound impact on the vast majority of 
Iranians who in a very short span of time adapted, at least outwardly, to new values that 
the revolution brought.
9
 A similar case was argued by the Taliban in 1996 after their 
takeover of Kabul. However since theirs was an imposed values system, enforced through 
fear and punishment, it survived only the duration of the regime itself.
10
 Values alter 
when either the physical denominator or the moral denominator alters. For example, a 
struggle for particular natural resources is valid only as long as that resource lasts. Once 
secured, such ends only serve meaning during the life expectancy of the purpose for 
which they were sought in the first place. There is thus a ‗time value‘ of victory. 
 
 THE CULTURAL FRAMEWORK 
Nations do not usually embrace defeat in their mythology. Indeed, they do 
everything in their power to deny it or to turn the tables by imagining the 
victor as the loser of the next round of warfare.
11
 
Wolfgang Schivelbusch 
 
The cultural framework deals with aspects of culture that are enduring and less volatile to 
short term change. It includes for example religious colourings, mythological influences 
and deep culture.
12
 After its defeat in the Second World War, the German nation did not 
suddenly become repopulated by those that rejected the Third Reich. There were still 
those that rallied behind Hitler and cheered German successes in the war.
13
 Selectivity 
among parallel realities both of which are ‗true‘ and thus, real, provide a possible 
explanation. Essentially, the two realities, the bivalence that operated therein, subdued the 
rational for the radical, once either is removed, the other takes over. A deeper probe on 
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how selectivity and dissonance interact in moral and ‗life-threatening‘ situations could 
possibly explain the rapid transition.  
Cultural framework is also embedded in religious, ideological, legal and ethical precept 
operating exclusively or collectively. It co-exists with the moral-temporal-physical 
framework but rests exclusively in the Zan dimension.      
TEMPORAL DOMAIN 
We have discussed that the dynamic elements are in constant flux with the present as seen 
through recent past; this can be negative, positive or indeed neutral. These conclusions 
were however based on the subjective influence of time. The Temporal Dimension is 
distinct from the effect of time discussed in the Interpretational Physical dimension. The 
primary difference is in terms of ‗time scale‘ and ‗level of change‘; distinguishing 
reflective change (recent and near recent events), spirit of the age and, revolutionary 
change – waves in history. The temporal domain has two parameters, the predictive and 
the reflective. Consider the following diagram:  
 
FIGURE 23: THE ASSESSMENT OF THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 
(AUTHOR‘S ADAPTATION) 
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We can be reasonably, though not entirely, accurate in locating the parameters of the 
present environment through observation and assessment. Induced or analytical errors 
may still exist; nonetheless, assuming the cumulative errors are minimal, a reasonably 
accurate picture can be built.  
When we try to predict the future environment complications emerge. Is the future likely 
to be built on the trends of the past? If so, are these trajectories linear? To what extent is 
the future environment dependent on trigger events that cannot be predicted? How risk 
resilient is the prediction, for example, trigger events such as 9/11 totally altered the 
strategic picture towards attainment or shaping of which many courtiers had mobilised 
resources in the period preceding the event.  
Trigger events can be catastrophic as indeed the September 11, 2001 attacks (9/11) were 
for the USA and very quickly, the rest of the world.  July 7, 2005 (7/7) for the UK had 
similar implications. Triggers generate volatility which can often go ignored or wielded to 
an advantage. Positive manipulation of volatility can alter the course of the future as it has 
done so for all of recorded history. The US and the UK used triggers to initiate a more 
proactive response which may otherwise have met severe criticism. The volatility 
justified the response. There are examples where triggers create contrary effect. For 
example, the March 2004 attack in Madrid was catastrophic for Spain. Instead of 
consolidating national and international resolve, this trigger forced major policy change, 
in this case, withdrawal of troops from allied effort against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
14
 
Triggers feed chaos and chaos generates volatility and volatility breeds challenges and 
opportunity. Volatility from its utility can be positive of negative. 
The Predictive 
Projecting into the future presents several possibilities that stem from inherent problems 
with crystal-ball gazing. Assume that one had the ability to travel into the future and with 
benefit of hindsight assess the environment obtaining at a given point in time. A fairly 
accurate assessment would be possible. However, since time travel has not yet been 
realised we can only guess or predict. In either case, if the outcome of such an exercise 
suggests an environment unacceptable to ones interests, efforts to alter or shape its course 
ought are a natural outcome.  
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This accurate prediction is represented by the confines of the pink circle (actual future). 
Without the privilege of time travel, scenario building or other similar predictive tools 
allow us to generate possible futures. The assessed future, should ideally be a subset of 
the actual future‘  As we saw in the case analysis of World War II, leaders who were 
seeking a future that was not on the cards, ended up committing resources towards a 
world view that was not to be. Those, like the US and to an extent the USSR and China, 
who had a reasonably better perception of the possible future, were better able to plant 
their own place within it; thus synergising their potential and the environment in their 
favour.  
The Reflective 
The reflective temporal parameter concerns the impact of outcomes sought in the present 
and reflected for their utility and value in the future. Again, taking World War II as an 
example, strategies animated to create strategic advantage towards Britain‘s imperial 
compulsions were arguably time and resource wasting errors. Since the objective could 
never be realised as these were premised on a conception that lay outside the possible 
future (Assessed future – 2 the preceding diagram).   
The impact of time can be evolutionary or revolutionary to the context. Time, more 
accurately the temporal framework can alter reality when it does so drastically, it can be 
said to be revolutionary and when the change is limited, it is evolutionary. A linearity of 
change is not implied in any of the conditions. 
Time alters culture both domestic and international. It is also the medium in which 
change occurs in other fields. It is only logical that the temporal domain also impacts 
warfare by way of ‗means, methods or ends‘. The impact of the temporal domain can be 
‗Degradative‘ (in the contra-political ideographic sense); it can be a reflective or 
predictive change within a given context of the politico-military aspects collectively 
referred to as ‗Creative‘, or it can be ‗Mutative‘ (that is, a change of framework or 
perspective – shifting the goal post). The impact of Temporal Domain is expressed 
graphically in Figure 24: 
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FIGURE 24: IMPACT OF THE TEMPORAL DOMAN 
(AUTHOR‘S OWN DIAGRAM) 
 
THE CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Interpretations of victory as too of defeat are embedded in the context defined by purpose. 
When the enemy offers no quarter, there is no bargain to be struck, the goals or contested 
positions remain indivisible, survival then become the objective, a subset of ‗Zan‘. All 
material loss and pain that comes in the process of preservation of indivisible moral issues 
are immaterial. When division of the indivisible is sought by the enemy, to be not 
vanquished is to be invincible and thus victorious. If war is pursued in the realm of ‗Zar‘ 
or ‗Zamin‘, whether for material acquisition, resources, territory or its contemporary 
derivatives of trade and markets, the context is altered, bargaining models become 
relevant, cost-benefit analysis, the rational calculus of war and with it the application of 
normative logic, assumes an elevated position in assessing outcomes. Many conflicts 
however present elements of Zan, Zar and Zamin simultaneously (see Figure 10: 
Development of Conflict – A Comprehensive Model). 
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This overlap can be incidental or deliberate. For example, ethnic violence frequently has 
or ends up as having physical or territorial linkages, additional benefits that the victor or 
its supporters can accrue.   
 When two antagonists view the same conflict in different dimensions of war that is to say 
one sees the conflict as wholly moral (Zan) and the other as wholly physical (Zar and 
Zamin), both can emerge winners in their own ‗true‘ realities. Both will be 
philosophically, culturally and even militarily correct.  
The precondition for both to emerge successful is that their moral constructs must 
produce different realities. The other possibility is when one side seeks material gains 
while the other, purely ‗moral‘ ones. This was the case immediately after the Battle of 
Karbala where physically Yazid secured a decisive victory whereas Hussein sought 
success in another domain. Similarly, every positive engagement of terrorists is described 
by the US and her allies as success in the struggle against terrorism yet, the terrorists 
themselves see these ‗losses‘ as their success too. The driver again is the context. In 
summary, to an outside observer intimate with both realities, A‘s success is also B‘s 
success, only the contexts are altered. 
THE EXPECTATIONAL FRAMEWORK 
Embedded in culture, history, faith, leadership, instruments of power – both hard and soft 
– and history, every challenge—most of all war—builds among the leaders and the 
societies in conflict an expectation outcome. Observers too apply the same context to 
build their own expectation arguments.  For example, after Gulf War 1 (1991) which in 
the application of US military power assumes the status of a symbolic event, any military 
campaign involving the US and its alliances is expected to mirror that symbolic event. 
People are generally not bothered with details and form their opinions based on what they 
see or what is presented to them. This is synthesised with their background on the issue 
and what they expect. Americans, therefore, came out of the Gulf War with a stature that 
was built in part on reality and in part on how that reality was fed.
15
 The perception of US 
power and its application against any hostile state creates internally and externally an 
image of a ‗cake walk‘ for the US and a fait accompli for its enemies. An inability to 
master Afghanistan despite so much time and effort therefore runs contrary to world 
external and internal expectations. Small failures, just as in Vietnam, come to be seen as 
major setbacks, slow progress is seen as no progress and so on. High expectations are 
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dangerous as setbacks become exponentially painful. Lyndon Johnson learnt this from the 
Tet Offensive.
16
  
We find therefore that there is an influencing notion at work, an ‗expectation argument‘ 
rallying the moral and physical elements to predict an outcome. For those directly 
involved or intimately affected by the conflict there is an emotional component that 
amplifies like a rising torrent.  
The Expectation Argument is influenced by history, past action theory, the physical as 
manifest in capability, the moral-cultural and psychosocial makeup of the peoples and 
groups in question. Its public outcome can take the form of political resolve, public 
resolve and emotional out bursts. The Expectation Argument directly impacts the contents 
and framework of competing realities and adds a moral colouring to the actual outcome. 
The argument can be broken down into three shades: 
High Expectational Argument (HEA) 
A HEA exists when a very favourable outcome is expected to yield from the conflict. 
In the Gulf War (1991), the Republican Guards were played up as an exceptionally 
potent elite force. In reality, this force was never used in meaningful numbers and 
made little difference to the outcome. It was the Iraqi Army that suffered the greatest 
casualties with up to 70% of the force and its best equipment destroyed.
17
 Despite the 
reversals of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), a high expectation coefficient was 
associated with this force by Saddam Hussein as well as the US intelligence 
community. Regular army units that were beefed up by the Republican Guards did 
give a better account of themselves.
18
  
Soon after the war anti Saddam insurgencies erupted in Southern and Northern Iraq 
with Shia and Kurdish groups respectively. These groups backed their abilities against 
a demoralised Iraqi Army which was unable to manage the situation. In March 1991, 
the Special Republican Guards were sent to the rescue, Saddam as well as the CIA 
associated a high expectation argument with this force. It delivered. However, for 
Saddam and his support base in the country who associated a high expectation 
argument with the Iraqi Army as well, particularly against lightly armed, poorly 
trained, hurriedly mobilised rebels, the poor performance was a shock that shook 
Saddam and forced him to respond with his elite Special Republican Guards.
19
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In the Second Gulf War, elite force again became a centre of discussion, at least 
among the media. This time it was engaged and tested. It performed no better than the 
Army had done in the earlier encounter. Those that sympathised with Saddam 
Hussein quickly lost hope once the Guards units fell, the moral impact of the 
performance of this force was extremely negative. In the other camp, prior to any 
engagements, a natural safety valve was created for the advancing US forces. Had the 
Republican Guards managed to create a small dent, the lowered expectation 
coefficient would have served to justify the performance. Where domestic and 
international expectations are high, the scales are adversely tilted. Partial gains or 
strategic advantage can frequently be construed as loss or failure, stalemates as defeat 
and setbacks as reversals. Enemy‘s insignificant gains become material and 
significant. 
An expectation argument is always present. If not induced or cultured, it develops 
from within, it is a product of our creative and predictive faculties, our need to be in 
control of ourselves and our surroundings. As an object of influence, it deserves 
special attention in shaping the environment. According a High Expectation 
Argument (HEA) to an enemy can yield quick moral dividends especially if the HEA 
is illusory.  
Nurturing a high HEA among a friendly population is a great morale booster but can 
be a double edged, especially if the projected capabilities are false or fail to create 
desired results. When it works, it begets even greater emotional approval, as the 
essayist, novelist and historian, Sir Arthur Helps put it ‗nothing succeeds like 
success.‘20 But when it fails, it causes a ‗Vietnamisation‘ of the conflict. 
Low Expectational Argument 
Take the myth of David and Goliath, without the advantage of prior knowledge, a 
rational calculus of David‘s chances against Goliath would generate a very low 
expectation coefficient. One may praise David‘s courage and resolve; the predicted 
outcome would suggest David‘s defeat. Now, any outcome, that is a notch higher than 
that the expectational, even if David is ‗defeated‘ or at best achieves a stalemate, 
would still be notionally David‘s success and Goliath‘s failure.  Such victories 
become inspirational and the stuff of legends. Small gains take bigger meanings and 
the expanding effects of ‗defeat‘ begin to impact the opposing side.  
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Common and Altered Expectation Argument (CEA and AEA) 
When observers see a matchup as more or less even, a Common Expectation 
Argument applies. An ‗Altered Expectation Argument‘ is the impact on the actual 
notional EA as a result of external factors such as psychological and information 
operations, media perspectives, motivation and indoctrination or false objectives. 
AEA is an object of information strategy while the other arguments its starting points.   
SECTION 3: A DEFINITION AND TAXONOMY OF VICTORY 
Having looked at the components of victory and their interrelationship, we are now in a 
position to proffer a grounded definition of victory in the military and the political 
context. This initial definition also serves to generically communicate the linkage 
between use of violence and the how the outcomes are expected to contribute to the 
purpose for that violence:   
Military victory is the deliberate, consequential or incidental success 
accrued through direct or indirect use of the instruments of violence. 
It provides useable political advantage that can be leveraged in 
concert with other elements of power to attain or advance ends of 
policy. Quid rei, it is the actual conversion of such leverage in to 
sustainable success or advantage consistent with the strategic 
environment and spirit of the age. 
Author   
TAXONOMY 
The research has thus far collected all the elements that go towards completing the 
framework for a theory of victory. This chapter will assemble the various components or 
elements in to the three broad taxonomical first order roots of victory; that is to say the 
physical, moral and temporal domains. A graphical interrelationship of second order 
components to the three domains is illustrated below:  
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FIGURE 25: THE TAXONOMY OF VICTORY 
AUTHOR‘S OWN DIAGRAM  
The inner triangle (Vc) presents the overall outcome of the three first order taxonomical 
components – the domains of victory which are depicted along the sides of the inner 
triangle. The second order components are reflected alongside their respective first order 
domain. The arrangement of the first and second order components is directly related to 
the three dimensions of war: Zan, Zamin and Zar. Not reflected in the diagram are the 
third and fourth order components of victory however the basic relational framework has 
been established and can be populated as required. 
For war to be purposeful and manifest the essential limitations, it is desirable to draw it 
away from and contain war in the Zar and Zamin dimensions of war. As evident from the 
placement of the Zamin dimension, it has invariable tendencies towards Zan, hence the 
most ideal object of war that the above taxonomy suggests and one where victory is most 
easily created is therefore the Zar dimension. 
Another important inference that such a relational placement of influential factors reveals 
is the role of the second order components, for example ‗Military Correlational‘ in the 
Physical Domain. These central components serve as link fields to the more desirable (in 
this case military-economic) and the less desirable (special) components. Strategy can 
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potentially use these link domains as controlling mechanisms towards attaining the 
desirable and avoiding the less desirable.     
QUALITY AND VALUE OF VICTORY: A FUNDAMENTAL FRAMEWORK 
LEVELS OF VICTORY AND SHADES OF DEFEAT 
Quantitative assessment of qualitative data is a complex and often misleading exercise. 
Qualitative data requires a framework that deals with shades and effects rather than 
numbers and quantities. To this end, Gray‘s dissection of three shades of victory21 in to 
three progressive levels is very useful. Strategic advantage, strategic success, and decisive 
victory can be used to sufficiently convey the quality of victory. Treating the levels as 
nouns and with the adjective of ‗strategic‘ removed; we can develop a framework which 
lends applicability to all levels of war and politics. As a verb, adverbs can be attached to 
describe the process towards rationally calculated ends that do not necessarily seek 
nominal equivalence. In other words, a process or action is a complete success when it 
attains the objective it was intended to yield even though the objective was short of being 
decisive. A parallel notion in political science can be described as Realpolitik. This 
means:  strive for, and attain, what a state can rather, than what it wants to achieve.
22
   
For a theory of victory however, the framework is incomplete. We need to extend this 
framework towards the direction of non-victory.  With stalemate or status quo at its 
centre, we can apply similar logic of shades to the opposite side of a linear scale and 
using relatively similar shades. Loss, failure and reversal are nominally suggestive and 
hence adopted. The language of defeat is thus explained in following terms: 
 Loss. This implies the conceding of politico-military advantage to the opposition 
which it can use as leverage towards non-critical and peripheral objectives, 
 Failure. It is the ceding of substantial advantage to the enemy which allows 
translation of military setbacks into clear  political leverage by the opposition 
 Reversal or Capitulation. Reversal or capitulation suggests large-scale fallout for an 
aggressor or the respondent respectively. It is distinguished from failure by the 
significance in scale and scope of the leverage ceded to the opposition. When used in 
the context of the aggressed, the term capitulation implies a general collapse. 
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We can now graphically develop a comprehensive two dimensional framework for 
assessment of any one particular actor towards the quality of victory or defeat achieved 
by it or by the opposition. The primary concept is illustrated below: 
 
FIGURE 26: A RAW ASSESSMENT SCALE  
(AUTHOR‘S OWN DIAGRAM) 
The word ‗defeat‘ has deliberately been avoided here. This is based on the findings on the 
context of defeat. Essentially strategy yields failure, success or stalemate.  
It is important not to attempt to place more than one actor on one-side of the scale as that 
would imply that victory for one side and defeat for the other lie on a common continuum 
which is contrary to the findings of this research. However, by placing competitors on 
opposite sides of the scale two things can automatically be discerned: first is the relative 
achievement of both sides and the second, their interrelationship. For sake of simplicity, 
we will refer to one side as RED and the other as BLUE. Consider the diagram below: 
 
FIGURE 27: THE DIALECTICAL CORRELATION OF OPPOSING PERCEPTIONS  
(AUTHOR‘S OWN DIAGRAM) 
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In the above diagram a linear relationship between side ‗Red‘ and ‗Blue‘ is depicted. The 
zone in the middle (between the two diagonal lines w-w‘ and x-x‘) indicates the existing 
stalemated position. The lines also suggest the tipping point where stalemate yields to 
either loss or advantage.  
At the outset of a conflict situation, negotiation or war, the relative advantage enjoyed by 
either side is expressed by the offset of the starting points of each. Elements of power and 
strategies of incentive, persuasion, coercion or compellence are applied by the revisionist, 
in this case Red, to force the desired change. The object for the revisionist and the 
rejectionist is common, to side their present position rightwards towards the zones of 
success. 
The angle of the diagonal line to the right suggests that Red would have to achieve more 
than blue to move into the field of ‗advantage‘. Since Red is the revisionist, a status quo 
would signify success for Blue. While Red has to achieve more, Blue on the other hand, 
has to do comparatively little to achieve a position of advantage.   
In a conflict where one side attempts to force change through violence (Red in the graphic 
above) while the other as first priority, only resists such change without additional agenda 
(Blue), an outcome that remains within the band of status quo is inherently success for the 
latter, since its core objective is fulfilled. The function served by the two diagonal lines 
goes beyond defining the extents of a status quo zone and needs to be examined in detail. 
It is clearly a relative function which could range from being common, or say a value of 
‗1‘ to being more or less for one or the other side (a fraction for one and a number greater 
than one for the other). Whether we use quantitative or qualitative prefixes, what we are 
essentially doing is ascribing a ‗Notional Assessment Factor‘ (NAF) to each side. 
The framework is incomplete unless it is linked to the dimensions of conflict established 
earlier. In a race for flags with both sides evenly matched, the competition is entirely for 
Zar. The NAF is even or common. However, in a war where the very existence of one 
side is threatened or any of its indivisible values, the war takes the dynamic in the Zan 
dimension. For Blue and Red, the NAF would create a very large gap. The following 
graphic illustrates this point: 
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FIGURE 28: RED – BLUE CORRELATION IN ‗ZAN‘ DIMENSION  
(AUTHOR‘S OWN DIAGRAM)  
 
Note the offset of the scales for Red and Blue as well as the exaggerated gap created by 
the NAF. Short of decisive victory, there can be little available to side Red to leverage for 
attainment of political objectives in the post war bargain. Red either annihilates Blue or 
must settle for failure. For Blue on the other hand, the field of play is much larger, more 
to give, more capacity to accept losses and yet only a small gain may push the marker to 
attainment of strategic advantage and beyond. The asymmetric moral effects of the 
victory on the losing side discussed earlier in this section come into play.  
When the conflict is more complex that is to say that each side has an agenda beyond the 
status quo, each belligerent, aggressor, aggressed, tugged or impinged may seek a wider 
political agenda. We saw this in the case of the Second World War where beyond defeat 
of the Axis Powers, Britain, USA, Soviet Union, China and France – to mention the main 
five – each had a specific post-war agenda. This agenda played a significant role from the 
emergence of this alliance of interests till the fall of Berlin and Tokyo. The comparative 
nature of objectives and intended war outcomes means that Red and Blue produces a 
relative notion of success and advantage. In Zan domain, Blue will define victory cheaply 
and Red is invariable set a more demanding outcome.  
The NAF determines the degree of temporal and physical space between the shades 
through the angle and orientation of the lines depicting it in the above diagram. For 
example, two parallel vertical lines depict both Red and Blue have a symmetric or 
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common NAF. The space between the lines, the ‗NAF Gap‘, represents how expensive or 
cheaply the transition out of ‗status quo‘ or ‗stalemate‘ is ‗notioned‘ by either side. The 
wider the gap towards any given side, the greater the effort, investment, effects and 
outcomes needed to proceed out of the commencing state.   
Taking Nazi Germany as an example, despite the popularity and public support that Hitler 
may have enjoyed from his subjects, essentially in a controlled information and insulated 
environment regime, the power elite can effectively ‗hijack‘ the public opinion and the 
masses. This can be through psychological operations, indoctrination (to which the youth 
are most susceptible), incentives, or fear. In such a case, Hitler and Saddam Hussein serve 
as good examples. ‗Defeat‘ of the regime does not necessarily imply a defeat for the 
people. This is because there is an internal latent conflict situation enclosed within an 
external, more apparent, conflict.  
It is on the NAF that the cultural as well as the Expectation Frameworks bear their 
influence and with it alter the space between its positive and negative extremes. 
STRATEGY AND THE FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS OF VICTORY 
The survey of literature and the case studies allowed us to provisionally conclude that 
military victory does not guarantee political success. We also find that with multiple lines 
of operation, which are essential for any good strategy, political success does not 
necessarily require a resounding victory in war. The fine tuning of each line of operation 
and synergising the various lines is far more productive. In theory, Victory cannot be 
complete unless it is attained in requisite measures in all, or at least the dominant, of its 
three domains: the physical, the moral-ideographical and the temporal. While the 
fundamentals of victory identified in the previous chapter, namely:  attainability, 
sustainability and usability, refer to the end state, they are equally useful notions to 
assess each line of operation and its value towards creative victory.  
An explanation of the fundamentals follows: 
Attainability 
Attainability relates to the ways and means to an end and is to be found 
predominantly in the physical domain. This is but one part of strategy, the easier and 
obvious part. Military victory in Iraq was, according to the then US President, Mr 
George W. Bush, ‗attained‘ on 2 May 2003.23 It was automatically concluded that this 
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would swiftly translate into a political victory. We find however, that the victory was 
neither militarily nor politically attained since the former, as Clausewitz tells us, is 
only complete when the enemy is no longer able to resist. In Iraq even military victory 
was incomplete and prematurely declared since the defensive operational cycle for the 
Iraqi resistance was not complete.
24
 Seen from the point of view of the attacker, the 
offensive operational cycle was also, obviously, incomplete since the attack failed to 
defeat the opposition‘s final initiative – in this case an asymmetric counter offensive.  
Sustainability 
Sustainability is the key to victory. Any victory that is not sustainable, at least for the 
minimum period of is utility and advantage intended to be accrued from it, is 
inconsequential and merely a temporary comfort. Sustainability of victory depends on 
all three domains that is to say, the moral, temporal and physical. Strategy frequently 
ignores the sustainability aspect beyond the physical domain and concentrates 
primarily on the attainability fundamental.  
Sustainability is simple to explain and theorize but complex to manifest in strategy. 
This is because it to be found in all three domains of Victory and is a highly 
subjective notion. The subjectivity can, however, be rationalised to immutable 
principles, provided a comprehensive understanding of the nature of the conflict and 
its accurate placement in the 3Z (Zan, Zar, Zamin) trinity is used as a backdrop to the 
analysis of the strategic environment and the development of threat scenarios 
therefrom.   
Usability  
This fundamental demands the correct reduction of a desired set of interest to 
mutually contributing objectives along different lines of operations. The synthesis 
between selecting appropriate strategic lines, the relative value of each in contributing 
to the overall aim and the objectives for each line is a complex three dimensional 
equation that strategy – both military and non-military – must balance. Three basic 
questions need to be answered: 1) what exactly is to be achieved, 2) how much or in 
what degree or intensity and, 3) for how long the environment thus created is to be 
sustained. 
We can conclude that, focusing only on the attainability aspect renders victory to chance 
and frequently, if not invariably, result in pursuit of time and resource intensive notions of 
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success that may, when seen as a whole, be mutually non-contributing or worse, 
counterproductive. The common symptoms of ignoring sustainability and usability at the 
political level are prolonged or secondary conflicts, lack of ownership, disharmony and 
panic. For the military this appears in the shape of poor resourcing, mission creep, loss of 
purpose and de-motivation. The ultimate result is erosion of public and political support.  
SECTION 4: THE THEORY TESTED 
What can the individual learn from history? Not what to do, but what to strive 
for. And what to avoid in striving. The importance of seeing clearly.... To face 
life with clear eyes – desirous to see the truth... while achieving such 
conditions as to enable a man to get the best out of life, is enough for 
ambition – and a high ambition. Only as a man progresses towards it, does he 
realize what effort it entails, and how large is the distance to go.25       
Basil H. Liddell Hart 
Having established a theory and definition of victory, we now move to the next stated 
objective, that of verification. Additionally, the application of the taxonomy as well as the 
assessment framework provides a further opportunity for explanation of its usage. As 
highlighted in the introductory chapter, verification essentially falls outside the 
requirements of grounded theory however, since our research was premised on secondary 
analysis we can revisit and reanalyse the data in the light of the theory established in this 
chapter. Additionally, a look at the global struggle against terrorism from one possible 
terrorist group‘s perspective provides a complex and deviant case for analysis.  
CASE STUDIES REVISITED 
Presented here are post analyses of two case studies. Since we now have a theory, these 
are no longer deviant cases but paradigm cases. While the remaining case studies have 
also been validated through the framework, they are not produced here since the object is 
the validation of the theory and not conclusion of the case.  
 THE BATTLE OF KARBALA 
We know that the battle was waged in a culturally symmetrical environment however 
under two distinct ideological leanings. These leanings had already begun to divide 
Arabia after the death of the Prophet Muhammad among two clear poles, on the one hand 
were those that saw no role for the progeny of Muhammad in the religious or political 
affairs of the land and on the other, those that saw an inalienable allegiance to the 
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‗Imams‘ and the progeny of Muhammad as the primary source for spiritual guidance. A 
third sub group also saw a political role for the Imams. A victory for Yazid would be a 
victory for the former school while that for Hussein, a victory for the latter two. Let us 
assess the same in the physical domain: 
Factual Physical: Pf = f Effects (Spatial + Correlational + Material). We know that in 
terms of territory, remaining military capability and material gains, Yazid secured a 
decisive victory. This extended also in the economic, diplomatic and political fields over 
the short term (approximately 1 year in this case). 
Interpretive Physical: Pi = f (Time x Change). In this the coefficient of change was 
exponentially negatively charged. As time went by, the interpretive physical began to see 
Hussein‘s loss as a supreme sacrifice for a just and principled cause. This naturally 
created a negative trend that overshadowed the overwhelming physical success Yazid had 
so carefully managed. 
In the final analysis physical victory which we established as Vp = Pf + Pi, yielded a 
negative value owing to a negative (–ve) x Time yielding a larger negative  ‗Pi‘ in relation 
to ‗Pf‘.    
The moral domain which began to kick in as early as the arrival of the battered remnants 
of Hussein‘s household in Syria. As more and more people became aware, the ideological 
and moral-political context began to overshadow custom and culture yielding a decisive 
victory for Hussein. However Yazid was not defeated, neither was the Umayyad dynasty 
established by his father. It did, however, eventually result in the assassination of Yazid 
and transfer of power outside his household. The house of Muhammad became a force 
which now drew wider allegiance and would eventually overpower much of northern and 
eastern Arabia, Persia and Central Asia.   
The temporal domain was highly mutative; degradative for Yazid and creative for 
Hussein. It would eventually culminate into the Shiite‘ school as a distinct and 
progressive branch of Islam in contrast to the Umayyad school that was eventually to go 
on and profess a literalist approach. Today this literalist school can be found in shape of 
the ideology that feeds groups like, inter alia, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.    
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The Battle of Karbala shows that in ideological conflicts, the temporal domain is by far 
the most significant and the most important. If the object of war is a lasting peace and not 
a temporary gain, such conflicts must address and, as far as possible, be kept out of the 
‗Zan‘ sphere. The strategy laid out needs to ensure, as a minimum, victory in the temporal 
framework of policy.  
THE VIETNAM WAR AND PARALLELS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
The operational level of war ties individual battles towards the ends of the war, and the 
war, in turn, through the strategic level ties the outcome to the political objective.  
Militarily the US scored several victories in the 1965-1975 Vietnam War. In Vietnam the 
US planning to win, was from the very start strategizing how not to lose. The political 
objective was premised in the belief that the fall of South Vietnam would have dire 
consequences and an instant – or, at any rate, short-term, politico-military objective was 
to prevent such an outcome. Both Kennedy and Johnson avoided the question of whether 
to accept the true costs of victory or defeat.  
A surge in US commitment, it was hoped, would cause the Communists to cease and 
desist. The point that both administrations missed was that while the US was fighting a 
limited war - at least in terms of the total means at her disposal, for the Vietnamese, it was 
a total war in the first degree. As our analysis in Chapter V show, the US efforts to 
indigenize the war only pushed it further in the ‗Zan‘ domain (see Chapter V, Case 5b 
Vietnam War). With the security and integrity of North Vietnam guaranteed, there was no 
scope for disaster. Despite their military losses, and purely because of the nature of the 
war, the Vietcong fought the war in a very large band of advantage the NAF was 
positively charged for the Vietcong and created a huge gap for the US. Once the US had 
committed herself to the surge, there was simply no room for an ‗honourable‘ exit 
without first creating a semblance of Victory. This is illustrated below: 
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FIGURE 29: VIETCONG AND THE IMPACT OF THE ‗ZAN‘ DIMENSION 
(AUTHOR‘S OWN DIAGRAM) 
 
With a NAF gap as large as the one that existed in Vietnam, the relationship was loaded 
in favour of the Vietcong in the moral and the temporal domains. We find that, as the war 
progressed, and battles lost linkage with the political objectives and began to assume 
logic of their own, the temporal domain became mutative. Military success began to be 
viewed with scepticism and the People–Military–Government trinity lost its coherence 
(see Chapter V, Case 5b Vietnam War). 
Although in the physical domain, the US maintained without any doubt an upper hand. 
The Vietnam War was lost to the Vietcong in the moral – temporal domains. For the US it 
was no worse than a stalemate in terms of effects.  
An assessment of the war from the expectational perspective is also important. The 
expectational framework which perceived Vietnam as a mere ‗pacification‘26 as opposed 
to a ‗proper war‘27 soon took a polarised view of US military capabilities and its inability 
to attain victory envisioned by the politicians or that expected by the American public. 
The media, the body bags and images of helpless Vietnamese civilians for whom the US 
forces were no comfort, soon took a moral – political turn and with it, any chance of 
victory, even a cheaply defined notional success, became remote. 
When a ‗Zar‘ conflict is deliberately or accidentally pushed into the ‗Zan‘ dimension, it is 
Zar, and with it political rationality that gives way and the conflict assumes an indivisible 
totalistic character. The troughs and lulls, are not to be mistaken for ‗turnarounds‘ in the 
conflict continuum, but respites, bound towards new summits.  
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For the US, Vietnam was a rational war fought for rational ends. For North Vietnam, it 
was more total in character. A war  that started out as a rational-realist conflict descended 
early into the ‗Zan‘. Competitions in the ‗Zar‘ and ‗Zamin‘ are interchangeable and 
exhibit a fluid character but as these ‗interest‘ begin to contest in the ‗Zan‘, war assumes 
or begins to exhibit a different character. From the rational, it tends towards the total 
where the stakes, the ones that begin to drive the violence, are indivisible and thus 
apolitical.  
This progression is inherently dangerous. Unlike ends in ‗Zar‘ and ‗Zamin‘, where the 
cost and gains bear intimate relationship and hence keep the level of violence as well as 
the objectives bargainable, hence divisible and regressable,  in ‗Zan‘, there is little or 
nothing to trade since every bargain hits at the moral, psychosocial and cultural fabric of 
the society concerned. War descends along an irreversible path – a one way transfer to the 
total, the absolute.  
The pre-theory of defeat arrived at in this research (see Chapter IV, Section 1) tells us that 
an absolute victory is not possible unless the enemy accepts defeat with all its 
implications, preconditions and commitments it carries or is vanquished. Contemporary 
wars, and the projection of war in the foreseeable future, do not suggest a return to the 
sort of notion of victory or the treatment of the defeated that Alexander the Great or 
Hannibal might have carried.  Wars with limited objectives can produce decisive 
victories, albeit such victories are not complete in themselves, but are, nonetheless, an 
essential step towards the ultimate objective of war – to force our enemy to concede to 
our will. In contemporary wars, victory and defeat will be relative to the object of the war 
and the object itself constrained by the nature of victory attainable. Political purpose must 
dominate the strategy which must clearly understand the notion of victory and non-
victory on both sides and only having done so can strategy truly balance the ends sought 
with the means available 
Victory can mean different things at different levels. Tactical victories do not carry the 
same defining characteristics as victory in the operational or strategic plane. If this 
difference is not understood, war becomes a bloody and attritional affair. Such strategy 
for war robs victory of the benefits that should accrue from victory. The argument 
presented for the effects of victory and failure in the Falklands war for Britain and 
Argentina respectively is a case in point (see Chapter V, page 211). 
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The temporal dimension of victory tells us that translation of ends to the notion of victory 
must look beyond the horizon. Victory that retains a positive physical and moral meaning 
through time is better than one that outlives its utility before the objective life of the 
policy it served is ended. Physical victory that is not quickly translated into ideological 
success and an acceptable failure for the opposition will tend to flow towards the volatile 
temporal mode. 
Victory in war and political success are related but not synonymous. Defeating the enemy 
is desirable but not essential. However, if defeat of the enemy is essential for policy, the 
defeat must be achieved along the physical and the moral domains simultaneously or 
sequentially. The concept is explained in Figure 30:  
 
FIGURE 30: DEFEATING THE ENEMY – A PRE-THEORY 
AUTHOR‘S OWN DIAGRAM  
From a theoretical perspective, defeating the enemy physically would not usually be 
sufficient. Military victory and political victory bear a complex relationship. This raises a 
fundamental question for strategy – the need to relate nature of political leverage with the 
scope and  quality of military victory. To know exactly what is to be accomplished, to 
visualise the end before the beginning – what Clausewitz points out as the first, the 
foremost and most supreme act of judgment.
28
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In the conduct of war, the defender and the attacker follow certain distinct set of action 
that tie the opposing wills – animated through defensive or offensive operations – to a 
common framework, the decisive battle
29
 where the enemy‘s defeat is sought both  
physically and morally.  
A typical offensive cycle may comprise a preparatory manoeuvre followed by the assault 
which may then have to beat back the enemy‘s counter offensive and finally destruction 
and exploitation of the enemy follow. A defensive cycle would comprise the preparations 
for defence, the attrition of the enemy, the main battle followed by the destruction of the 
enemy through the counter offensive. The counter offensive is critical to both the 
offensive and the defensive cycles. For the offensive, the ability to defeat the counter 
offensive and thereafter destroy the enemy and be able to exploit the gains is the basic 
measure of success. For the defender, a successful counter offensive marks the 
destruction of the enemy‘s offensive potential and hence is a measure of a successful 
defence.  
Seeing the whole enemy and not just his armed forces as a system, the counter offensive 
can come in conventional or an unconventional mode.
30
 The latter to sustain itself needs 
external
31
 support, For example, after the rapid fall of France in 1940, the French 
resistance movement constituted elements of the civilian population and members of the 
defeated French military that escaped capture.
32
 The resistance did not have the capacity 
to destroy or evict the enemy or cause major setbacks, as would be expected from large 
scale counter offensive; however it had the capacity to keep the Germans unsettled and 
engaged. To succeed, this movement needed leadership and external moral and material 
support. De Gaulle provided the former while the allies, the latter. Similar analogies can 
be drawn from the Vietnam War, Korean War, Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). What 
we see in asymmetric warfare is not a digression from the conventional operational cycles 
but a transformation of the war from conventional to the irregular form where, for the 
stronger military, the counteroffensive comes as a slow long attritional bleed. Theory of 
asymmetric warfare needs to remain cognisant of the character and form of the 
counteroffensive, its aim and purpose.  
Consider the following diagram: 
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FIGURE 31: CREATING VICTORY – A PRE-THEORY 
(AUTHOR‘S OWN DIAGRAM) 
 
Figure 32 above depicts two possible progressions of a Physical Victory achieved through 
the use of military instrument. The clockwise progression (broad green arrow) draws the 
physical ends achieved – most significantly the interpretational component thereof since 
that includes cultural underpinnings – through the ‗Temporal domain‘ in a creative mode 
leading to the positive notional end indicated by the green space in the victory notion (‗V‘ 
where the quantum of green portion represents the quality of notional victory in the 
victory zone). The second scenario – anti clockwise progression – depicts early influence 
of cultural, ideographic and political dimension over the moral domain resulting in a 
victory influenced more by moral perspectives as opposed to tangible ends that violence 
can attain. This can of course be either positive or negative. In either case, the impact of 
time can be progressively mutative and a potentially volatile state of victory is achieved, 
one that can easily transmogrify into a defeat of nominal or phenomenal proportions.  
The third case, is a relatively linear translation of the physical ends into the notion of 
victory, that is to say, the physical outcome broadly defines the notional outcome. This is 
of course the simplest case where a level of ‗V‘ is attained corresponding to the quality of 
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physical victory. Even in such a direct arrangement, there can be some degree of 
negativity manifest in emotional undertones, objections over means and/or methods – as 
indicated by the band of red in the Victory zone. While the theory of victory provides the 
tools for assessing how the physical is likely to be interpreted as too, more importantly, 
how it can be tailored to be interpreted, it remains up to strategy to be first cognisant of 
this dimension and, subsequently, intimately animate itself according to the desired 
progression and notional implications in the transition and interpretation of victory.  
We have rejected the ideas of total victory (described as comprehensive, absolute and 
complete victory) as a notion that may only be relevant at tactical level or in minor 
engagements (see Summary and Conclusion to Chapter IV, p. 174). Wars in the 21
st
 
century would continue to serve complex ends where success could also accompany 
failures and the only sure gauge of victory would be the quality of its service – the 
leverage earned – for policy.  
Victory is a function of the ‗age‘. It cannot be, and should not be, separated from its 
social and cultural meanings. We have already seen the manifestation of culture and the 
creative or degradative influence of time on the physical domain of victory (see 
Conclusion to Chapter IV, page 174 and Chapter VI, page 262). We have also proffered 
some possible answers to obvious but pressing questions, inter alia, when is the enemy 
defeated? Which is that point at which operations, if stopped, would yield the bargain 
sought and their further continuation would not yield any considerable purchase (as the 
economists put it, the law of diminishing returns) for a better bargain? Additionally a, 
deliberate study of cultures and the notion of success and failure among peoples and 
polities has thrown up answers to the paradox of the physical and the notional that 
premised this study. Where does all this take us? We identified in Chapter III that while 
an enabling environment is essential for any military undertaking, it is the post war 
environment that is wholly or in part, the ultimate objective of violence.   
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CHAPTER VII – INFORMING POLICY, STRATEGY AND 
ACTION 
Nothing vital to the nature and function of war and strategy changes.
1
 
Colin S. Gray 
INTRODUCTION 
his chapter addresses the second part of the aim set for this inquiry, that is to 
say, how our comprehensive theory and definition of victory can guide strategy? 
We begin by taking a cue from the findings of Chapter VI, the impact of 
contemporary notion(s) of victory on policy, and how policy utilises instruments of power 
towards realisations of objectives. Colin S. Gray asserts that ‗nothing vital to the function 
of war strategy changes.‘2 Alongside the time trusted and enduring principles of strategy, 
alluded to in Gray‘s argument, the application of an informed theory of victory and 
applying its basic fundamentals may not change elements vital to strategy but it will 
certainly affect the approaches to it.  
We have thus far looked at strategy simplistically as the relationship between ways – 
means and ends. While this argument holds its own in any definition of strategy, it is 
inherently insufficient as it neither provides the essence of, nor presents the challenges to 
strategy. Strategy controls war
3
 and in doing so not only informs objectives, sets priorities 
but also defines the very purpose of war, its scope, intensity and the vigour with which it 
is to be pursued. 
This chapter explores the influence of the theory of victory on applied strategy.  
SECTION 1 – RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VICTORY AND STRATEGY 
Clausewitz states that the purpose of war is to make the enemy do our will.
4
 It is 
interesting that while Clausewitz lays considerable emphasis on the concept of absolute 
victory, in defining or identifying the purpose of war he links it to ‗will‘ rather than 
victory. The clarity of Clausewitz‘s thought is impeccable. Victory, unless complete, 
absolute or total does not guarantee any particular degree of compliance from the enemy. 
Victory is achieved by merging what the policy wants with what is possible. Prof. James 
Mowbray, a member of the faculty of the US Air War College points out that: 
T 
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Chief among those policies to be settled upon by the political leadership is 
selection of national objectives, such as ‗what is our goal in the course of 
military operations,‘ and ‗what should the world look like after the smoke 
clears.‘ The national objectives in the model are national objectives for the 
nation whose strategy is under consideration, or a coalition objective, and 
may be thought of as the objective for which the war is being waged. It is a 
result of policy from the political leadership at the national level, influenced 
by military inputs to both the objective making process and to the strategy, or 
strategic plan. That input is primarily what the military tells the civilian 
leadership it can and cannot accomplish at the level of military strategy. In 
cases where there are allies involved, their input to the coalition objectives 
and the strategic plan (strategy) will strongly influence what may or may not 
be undertaken. Be careful to distinguish between formal alliances between 
nations, and informal arrangements which spring up on short notice. They do 
tend to work differently. 
5
 
In modern military parlance, selection of objective and maintenance of aim within the 
available means or resources is among the crucial strategic decision.
6
 This decision is 
often complicated by an objective analysis of the political aim that may be abstract, 
specific, stated as an effect or a desired end state. Since militaries deal in violence, 
translation of a politico-military aim, end state or objective is an art and not an exact 
science. Take the Gulf War – 1 for example. One of the criticisms levied against Colin 
Powel has been the premature termination of war whereby Iraq‘s will to resist or continue 
further violence was not fully removed.
7
 Colin Powell presents a rational explanation to 
this premised on the aim and objectives spelled out to him and his translation of these into 
clear military objectives.
8
  
In the 2003 Gulf War, some theorists present the opposite argument. The revised 
objective of regime change was prosecuted with excessive infrastructural damage that 
made the post-war obligations for the allies an enormous challenge.
9
  This not only raised 
the scale and scope of the post war obligations for the US and her allies but also cast a 
doubt on who the ‗good guys‘, were? The, ‗destructive‘ liberator promising a government 
of the people for the people by the people;
10
 or, the ‗oppressive‘ the old regime in spite of 
its shortcomings.  
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Defeat, as we discussed in Chapter VI (see Figure 21), is complete when, in the moral 
domain, both will and hope are lost and in the physical, means and time are lost. As long 
as the enemy retains hope and a will to continue, the available means, however meagre, 
will invariably be applied in a most effective mode at hand. This is precisely in keeping 
with the ends – way – means approach, or more appropriately, ‗revised ends‘, 
‗expendable means‘ and ‗most profitable ways‘. The ends in this form need not be 
decisive as long as time is bought and the enemy bled in the argument. While this form of 
war will seldom yield decisive victory or strategic advantage, it does ensure that a side 
reduced only to ‗hope‘ in a clash of arms, travels clockwise along the defeat continuum to 
defeat‘s least decisive form – that is only the means to attain victory.   Given time and 
sustained external support, asymmetric counteroffensives can defeat even the most 
determined of enemies as was shown by the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan against the 
Soviet Union. 
Arguably, the rapid infrastructural collapse of the Iraqi government and the system of 
force of the Iraqi armed forces as well as law enforcement agencies and the civil 
administrative dispensations rendered state organs ineffective. The absence of a formal 
surrender whereby the allies could have taken charge of whatever remained of the country 
meant that every singly institution had to be raised afresh. The enemy that melted away 
into the common masses re-emerged to launch a counteroffensive in an unconventional 
mode.
11
  
SECTION 2 – THE ENVIRONMENT: SCOPING VICTORY 
A point that has repeatedly been made is that Victory finds specific meaning in the 
context and spirit of the age. The strategic environment projected through time is at best 
an informed guess. Britain, as discussed in the case study on World War II, consumed the 
entire first phase of the war towards realisation of a post war environment where her 
Empire strengthened or at least survived. The argument is abstracted in the following 
graphic:  
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FIGURE 32: THE CREATIVE ENVIRONMENT 
AUTHOR‘S OWN DIAGRAM  
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When an actor analyses the possible future environment, one of three things can happen. 
The first is an accurate projection of the future and correct rendering of the effectual 
strategic environment  with a set of objectives or interests required to be achieved over a 
period of time ‗t.‘ In assessing at the strategic environment, the sum of opportunities and 
challenges need to be crystallised from the time of initial assessment ‗t0‘ up to time ‗t1‘ 
when results are desired and ‗tf‘, the duration for which the effects must continue so as to 
accrue the desired advantage, three possible scenarios emerge: 
In the first scenario, a reasonably accurate picture of the possible future, identifying the 
main challenges and opportunities occurs. The play of friction, chance and opposing will 
are also abstracted and an embryonic assessment of the required change emerges 
(indicated by the green arrows marked ‗E1.‘) 
In the second scenario, some errors in assessment of one or more of the variables result in 
a misperception of the future environment and, in turn, the impact on ones interests. This 
‗False‘ assessment is described by the dotted blue oval.12  Efforts assessed as necessary to 
shape the desired future would either be misdirected, or misplaced. 
In the third scenario, a deliberate effort is made to project a ‗Faked‘ future. This faking 
could be for many reasons for example, to rally additional support and resources, build 
alliances or in a more sinister mode, cover own weaknesses and failure. By projecting a 
future that suggests the undesired faked outcome as indicated in Figure 33, the supposed 
attainment of the actual undesired future can be projected as success. This supposed 
success is achieved through effort E2, against an imaginary opposing will E3. Whereas in 
actual fact, it has arrived only at the undesirable end of the true realm of possibilities, 
unable to withstand threat E3. 
We can use the diagram to explain Al-Qaeda‘s strategic objectives, strategic approach 
and its generic design for achieving the organisation‘s aims and objectives. The principal 
objective of Al-Qaeda from which all other intermediate objectives flow is ‗puritanical 
Salafist Islamic reform in Muslim societies and the necessity of armed resistance in the 
face of perceived aggression.‘13 The Al Qaeda professes a barbaric image of the West and 
its allies.
14
 Its disciples, the ‗mujahidin‘, work towards the desired future with minimal 
guidance – mission type approach. Their strategies, synergised by the inherent advantage 
of the minimalist, are win – win. Since their object bear no relation to the methods and, at 
times, even the targets or their violence,  victory is to be found in being heard, noticed, 
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feared, accommodated and tolerated. The rest is achieved through the incremental nature 
of their political agenda. With every small achievement, the cycle begins again. 
SECTION 3: WAR INITIATION AND WAR TERMINATION 
WAR INITIATION 
A country's decision to initiate a war is at least as much influenced by political as by 
military considerations. Such a decision is also based on domestic, regional and global 
political variables. Indeed, a compelling set of political circumstances must emerge 
before a country thinks seriously about war initiation. To put it another way, the mere 
existence of conditions, that from a military viewpoint, favour war initiation, is not by 
itself sufficient to use war as an instrument of change. In 1967, for example, Israeli 
leaders would not have thought about war initiation if a number of Arab countries had not 
first engaged in a series of very provocative actions that directly threatened Israel's 
security. Similarly, in 1973, Egyptian and Syrian leaders would not have thought about 
war initiation if they had not been deeply disturbed by the prevailing territorial and 
diplomatic status quo. In short, a country's decision to initiate a war is always complex, 
and what follows is not intended to deny this reality. 
We find that when parties to a conflict no longer see the existential political approach 
yielding fruitful results within a cost – gain scenario, they invariably explore other 
options to resolve or address the issues. A decisive war or a conflict short of decisive ends 
is not usually an obvious choice, but remains a political option in the bargaining process.  
Opting for war as an arbitrator brings a number of preconditions or factors that the 
initiator invariably considers. These mostly deal with the moral, the cost – benefit and 
long term effects of the undertaking. For the weaker state, war avoidance is usually the 
most preferred option. War avoidance, however, is not possible without yielding to some 
of the core demands of the potential aggressor; it, therefore, premises on concessions or 
regression. When such concessions themselves strike at the core values of the weaker 
state, war avoidance may no longer be possible. Notwithstanding the power differential, 
the weaker, or smaller, threatened state, in such situations, may itself initiate a defensive 
or pre-emptive war. The Arab – Israel War of 1967 is a case in point. Victory is measured 
in the ability to prevent or limit the adversary‘s anticipated war potential and would be 
deemed as decisive if war aims and objectives of the stronger state are foiled.  
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War has never been an easy option, even for the most powerful. An actor that sees resort 
to war at some point in the future as a likely political consciously creates or shapes the 
environment to facilitate the nature of its possible future undertaking. This of course 
would be one of many strategies developed and one of many kept in the active list.  
Today‘s conflicts and wars, even internalized conflicts are fought in an increasingly 
globalised and interdependent world. Strategy must remain cognizant of the external 
influences that curtail the initiators liberty of action and move decisively to create 
windows of opportunity through triggers that create the required volatility in the strategic 
environment (see Figure 12, page 114). 
War initiation strategy needs to be animated well in advance to permit adequate time for 
various instruments of national power to achieve the desired effects thereby enhancing the 
liberty of action of the initiator. This will invariably involve external manoeuvres and 
other initiatives to limit the choices of the aggressed entity. A preliminary exercise may 
involve: 
 waiting for or creation of internationally acceptable moral grounds for use of 
force, 
 identification of the nature of war and its aims and objectives consistent with the 
obtaining environment / international and regional climate, 
 identification of a desired end state and possible end states that may result, 
including exit strategies, 
 a cost - benefit analysis followed by a provisional decision to include war as a 
bargaining option, and  
 a capability development strategy that seeks to enhance relevant elements of 
national power, gives credence to coercive strategies, deters threat adventurism 
and creates material as well as psycho-social conditions for prosecution of war. 
Once the above is set in motion war initiation may follow. The process could develop 
along a liner or non-liner continuum that includes display of: 
 moral high-ground (even if selective) among the influential regional and 
international actors, 
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 strength in essential elements of national power, 
 a discernable edge (even if notional) in military capability (moral, physical and 
intellectual), 
 continual offers to negotiate – giving peace a chance – even if only a façade, 
 create casus belli legitimizing the transition from peaceful bargaining to violence,  
 mobilisation of forces may precede or succeed the casus belli, either as part of the 
bargaining process or on purely military considerations of time required for 
assembly, and  
 deliberate pauses may be injected to aid the bargaining process. 
In the above political context, military strategy will invariably be called upon to: 
 psychologically dominate the enemy and aid in negotiation, evolve employment 
and development strategies, demonstrate and communicate military capability,  
 undertake, complement or supplement low intensity conflict,  
 transit rapidly and efficiently from peace / hot diplomacy to war, 
 identify military objectives towards attaining political ends of violence, 
 undertake focused military operations, 
 develop military operations in a manner that they can be regulated to complement 
application of other elements of national power, and 
 obtain position of discernable / clear advantage at the end of hostilities to aid 
favourable political settlement of war / conflict. 
INTRA-WAR DIALECTICS 
The term-intra-war deterrence was introduced by Herman Kahn in his seminal 1962 work 
entitled Thinking about the Unthinkable.
15
 While it encouraged much debate and criticism 
in nuclear parlance, it has some relevance in the conventional context. In political choices 
for policy advancement we talked about four options or loosely speaking – strategic 
choices namely: incentives, persuasion, coercion and compellence. The status quo power, 
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confronted with the threat posed by the aggressor responds with either regression, 
concession, deterrence or punishment. 
 Let us have a look at the coercion dynamic: 
 
FIGURE 33: THE COERCION DYNAMIC 
(AUTHOR‘S ADAPTATION) 
 
Deterrence operates predominantly in the framework of coercive strategies though it has 
understandable overlap in compellence too. The flow chart (Figure 33) represents the 
basic deterrent equation: 
 
EQUATION 7: DETERRENCE  
(AUTHOR‘S OWN ADAPTATION) 
 
The flowchart suggests that while a response may be expected by combining the three 
pillars of deterrence, in reality, the process is more involved. Each of the three 
components is processed by the deterred party through a set of filters which either 
reinforce or weaken the deterrent value of the entity. This process of filtering yields a 
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perceived will and a perceived capability. It is this deterrent that is processed for risks 
before a response is initiated.  
The flowchart applies to all forms of conflict including LIC and asymmetric war. If 
deterrence fails, forces may be called upon to fight. The nature of the fight can vary 
widely, depending on the scope and intensity of the operation. Specific operations will 
also be characterized by different approaches, varying the mix of objectives among 
coercion, prevention compellence, and intra-war deterrence: 
Intra-war deterrence is important in cases where the enemy has the capacity to expand the 
conflict beyond the scope within which it was preferred to be contained.  This objective 
demands both superior military capabilities at higher rungs on the ―escalation ladder‖ and 
a rational adversary. 
WAR TERMINATION 
Absolute war seeks the destruction of the enemy (total defeat) and with it prevents 
continued or future resistance to the political object. Consequently, the destruction of the 
enemy's military and political viability is a reasonable means of achieving the political 
goal. However, in wars with limited objectives, the post-war landscape must be shaped 
prior to and during war termination since the opposing government will generally not be 
eliminated. Consequently, questions regarding post-war relative strength in-theatre must 
be addressed upfront rather than after the fact. Tradable military gains and the ability to 
pursue violence, causing serious or unacceptable damage will often constitute the most 
important bargaining tool.  
Because the post-war environment must be considered and often shaped while conducting 
the current operations, difficult choices are presented in campaign planning at the 
strategic level and for the aspects of military necessities for the operational commander 
when attempting to terminate war.  
As articulated by Fred Ikle, ‗for any war effort...that is supposed to serve long-term 
national objectives, the most essential question is how the enemy might be forced to 
surrender, or failing that, what sort of bargain might be struck with him to terminate the 
war.‘16 In addition to simply terminating the war, to attain victory, it is important that 
both short-term (the original political goals) and long-term (post-war balance of power) 
interests are served. Since it is at the operational level of military strategy that all aspects 
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of the war effort are impacted, a review of theoretical aspects is necessary in order to 
provide insight on how the termination effort can be favourably influenced.
17
  
The discussion thus far has been on aspects germane to war termination at the strategic 
plane. Let us now turn to practical aspects in thought and action that could assist the 
military strategic and operational aspects of war termination.  
Clausewitz‘s theory of war termination advanced the concept of culmination point of 
attack at the operational level and culminating point of victory in the strategic domain. 
When neither side can bring a war to a decisive military conclusion, Clausewitz suggests 
that both sides must end the war through negotiations, ‗we see then that if one side cannot 
completely disarm the other, the desire for peace on either side will rise and fall with the 
probability of further success and the amount of effort these would require. If such 
incentives were equal for both sides, the two would meet half way. If they grow for one 
side, they would diminish for the other. Peace will result if their sum total is sufficient – 
though the side that feels lesser urge for peace will naturally get the better bargain.
18
 
Handel illustrates this in the following manner: 
 
FIGURE 34: WAR TERMINATION AND THE STALEMATED WAR: VIOLENCE WITHOUT 
PURPOSE 
SOURCE: MICHAEL I HANDLE, MASTERS OF WAR19 
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The two questions that emerge, both the rational and irrational calculus, are 1) what is the 
ideal condition to begin negotiating? and, 2) what is the ideal time for negotiation?  
The strategic environment is charged and multifaceted in any form of war; it is 
particularly complex in asymmetric or limited wars. An understanding of the effectual 
environment is critical to the appropriate application of any instrument of power and 
more so the military. If successful war termination is to be achieved, particularly in 
conflicts that exhibit elements of ‗Zan‘, a positive control on both war and how 
progression of war feeds back in to the environment is essential. Information operations 
can serve to create the required space but may not be sufficient without the controls 
alluded to earlier.  
Problems at the military strategic and operational level are:  
 the political objective is often unclear, unclearly stated or incoherent with the 
military instrument, 
 less than complete surrender of the enemy – decisive victory – usually demands a 
direct, usually immediate relationship between means and ends,   
 the political purpose is more resilient than the objectives. As such objectives are 
subject to change as diplomatic and military activities alter the perceptions of 
politicians (own, allies and enemy),  
 "national will" is a factor which often works against the politics of war,  especially 
if a nation‘s physical security is not directly threatened during the violence,   
 consideration for shaping of the post-war environment can set in motion 
unintended consequences that may directly impact war termination strategies, and, 
 the enemy's willingness to negotiate (and ultimately accept agreeable termination 
conditions) will not only be impacted by the current military situation, but will 
also by perceptions of future diplomatic and military success or failure.  
An initial strategic assessment should relate military capabilities to political objectives. 
This is absolutely essential towards successful war termination. The factors to be 
considered are:  
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 A clear understanding of political objectives. To this end, first, as Clausewitz 
argues, that the military commander should ideally be a part of the cabinet to 
ensure that political objectives are understood and can be addressed by the 
military instrument. It is also imperative that, at the operational level, the 
relationship between such political objective(s) and the military aim is clearly 
understood and conveyed. If this understanding is lacking, the misapplication of 
the military instrument is almost certain to follow with dire political and military 
consequences resulting. 
 Ability of the military instrument to achieve stated political objective(s). given the 
resource and political constraints that will apply during a limited war, this issue is 
often overlooked as both politicians and military leaders focus on the means of 
conducting war versus the larger strategic question of whether the military 
instrument can, in fact, deliver the political objective.
20
 When this situation occurs 
(or a situation where resources provided appear insufficient), the military must 
advise political leaders upfront that the ability of the military instrument to deliver 
the political objective is suspect.  
 Focus the military instrument in a manner that will achieve the political objective. 
Traditional military thinking has often focused on battlefield victory with minimal 
attention to achievement of the political end. All elements on national power must 
contribute effectively towards the ultimate objective. Each ‗line of operation‘ will 
usually have its own point from where the role that it must play in war termination 
must be set in to motion. This is illustrated below: 
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FIGURE 35: CALIBRATING WAR TERMINATION AND LINES OF OPERATIONS 
AUTHOR‘S OWN DIAGRAM  
 
 All military battles must be carefully woven into the tapestry of the campaign and 
the campaigns into the progression of the war. ‗A battle won should count on the 
plus side only if it fits into a larger design for ending the war on favourable terms; 
otherwise it might have as disastrous consequences for the winner as did the battle 
the Japanese won at Pearl Harbour.‘21  
 Above all, the military instrument must be applied as a coercive lever to achieve 
political ends, not simply as a means to defeat the enemy's armed forces. It is the 
quality of leverage attained by the military instrument is proportional to the 
quality of victory.   
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CHAPTER VIII – MAJOR FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
So here we are, at an age of movement; global movement. Everything, in a 
strategic sense, is in a state of flux, and we can make of the new world 
whatever we will. ...instead, I find a totally new world of chaos and 
adventure. All things are once again possible; both to win and to lose.
1
   
Gregory R. Copley (2008) 
For millennia, policymakers and statesmen have grappled with questions 
about the concept of victory in war.... How long does it take to achieve 
victory and how do we know when victory is achieved? And ... is it possible 
to win a war and yet lose the peace?2 
William C. Martel(2007) 
INTRODUCTION 
At the time of taking up this research, there was little research that could yield a specific 
or general theory and definition of victory. This vacuum was both a challenge and an 
opportunity. During the course of this research, from October 2004 till May 2009, and to 
an extent the phase of writing up the theses that extended till July 2010, more and more 
research and empirical data became available. William C. Martel in Victory in War: 
Foundations of Modern Military Policy which appeared in 2006 presented a pre-theory of 
victory and concluded his work with the comment that this ‗... is a preliminary framework 
for discussion among scholars and policy makers of the factors that apparently are related 
to what we may mean by the term ‗victory‘. He however pointed out that ‗the central 
problem for scholars is to sharpen the language that governs what victory is and what it 
has come to mean for the current generation of policy makers, so that discussions of war 
can be conducted with much greater rigour and clarity.‘3 
This thesis, from the outset, intended to go beyond that threshold and was designed to 
advance a comprehensive theory and definition of victory. It also charted a distinctly 
different path to arrive the findings presented in the preceding chapters. This chapter 
outlines the major findings of the study and their implications for policy and strategy. It 
also identifies areas that beg further study in the light of this research and enumerates the 
contours and thrust lines for such studies. 
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OBJECTIVES ACHIEVED 
The essential elements of a wholesome theory according to Gregory D. Foster are 
adequate terminology and definitions; premises, assumptions and limitations that 
underpin the theory; substantive propositions translated into testable hypotheses; and 
methods to test the hypotheses and modify the theory as required.
4
 The last element is 
essential as it gives theory a living quality, the strength to learn and adapt. All of the 
above have been aptly addressed within the scope set out for this research. 
The stated objectives of developing a theory and definition of victory and relating the 
theory to the realm of praxis are fully realised. The language and grammar of victory as 
well as defeat has also been adequately developed to allow for a more scientific and 
structured frame of reference to complex issues and notions that hitherto remained 
ambiguously addressed.  
THE LANGUAGE OF VICTORY  
In addressing the various components and facets of victory, a comprehensive scientific 
vocabulary emerged ranging from specific forms of reference to the belligerents, 
constructs of victory and the domains to sub theories, terms and definitions of interrelated 
subjects. The vocabulary developed remains representatively precise yet sufficiently 
vague to serve the requirements of disciplines of social sciences.  
In Chapter 1 and IV, we began with a set of definitions of victory quid nominis. Having 
identified and argued the inadequacy of a simplistic view of victory, Historical examples 
(case studies) were used to demonstrate that not only were such definitions arbitrary and 
insufficient but also paradoxical to the purpose, utility and strategic value of victory. 
Premised on the correlational physical context, these simplistic definitions neither 
required nor were capable of substantive proof and hence did not result from cogent 
theories. These definitions were turned into definitions quid rei through postulates.
5
   
By way of complementary theories, The 3Z philosophy of war – which potentially unifies 
the origins of conflict, causes, nature, character and prosecution of war and the notion of 
victory in a single dynamic – is posited along with specific and precise language (see 
glossary of terms) to serve as a foundation for developing and refining related 
terminologies of victory and defeat.  While the model for unifying war through the 3Z 
Chapter VIII—Conclusions and Recommendations 
~307~ 
philosophy remains inherently theoretical, it does present basic lines of thought that lend 
themselves to further critique and development.  
THE GRAMMAR OF VICTORY 
We have advanced an intimate relationship between the nature of war and the notion of 
victory and found that the more a conflict tends towards the ‗Zan‘ dimension, the more 
indivisible is the bargain and as such the meaning of victory alters to an extent of making 
reversals – short of total annihilation impossible. Similarly, wars of interest and wars of 
survival produce their own brands of victory with the latter spiralling towards the 
apolitical model of war and the notion of victory invoked by the indivisibility of the 
bargain. Thus far GWOT appears to be straying deeper into an indivisible mode, it will be 
a long drawn and permanent affair, something that subsequent generations would 
continue to grapple with. 
Military victory does not guarantee political success and neither does political success 
necessarily require a resounding victory in war; often a notional defeat can be more 
rewarding than a perceived victory condition. Such is the notion of victory. We have 
found that Victory is never complete unless it is attained in requisite measures in all, or at 
least the dominant, of its three domains: the physical, the moral-ideographical and the 
temporal. This trinity brings to fore the fundamental principles of Victory: the 
attainability, sustainability and usability of the victory condition. We find that 
attainability – the ways and means to an end – is but one part of strategy, sustainability – 
both moral and physical – is the aspect strategy frequently ignores. Addressing the 
fundamentals of victory allows every aspect of strategy to contribute to the larger notion 
of victory as opposed to pursuit of time and resource intensive impressions of success that 
may, when seen as a whole, be mutually non-contributing or worse, counterproductive. 
The theory of Victory serves a dual purpose.  It unites victory quid nominis and victory 
quid rei and, more significantly, informs policy, strategy and the military art right through 
the spectrum from war initiation, war-fighting, war termination down to the post war 
environment and obligations of the victor. If correctly applied, the theory boasts the 
ability to prevent mission creep, poor resourcing, lack of political direction and control 
and above all the need to seek a redefinition of objectives midway through a conflict. 
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THE LANGUAGE OF DEFEAT 
In a quest towards understanding victory, a basic theory of defeat was developed. We 
found that defeat is set only when ‗will‘ and ‗hope‘ are abandoned or critical time is lost. 
Loss of either critical time or hope implies that the aims and objectives that generated the 
conflict or war can no longer be attained and as such, space for initiating or continuing a 
rational war is lost.   
A theory of defeat is meaningless unless it tells us something, adds to a better 
understanding and explanation of the past, or more profoundly, guides policy and action. 
We discovered that defeat, to the defeated, is entirely in the mind - a ‗mental‘ state, 
whereas to the victor, the other-side‘s defeat is constructed largely in its physical 
dimension. The ‗mental state‘ is often erroneously construed through the physical. In 
combating terrorism, for example, the failure of coercive tools – the collective term for 
military and other elements of power that expound threat of physical loss and suffering – 
to subdue or eradicate the ‗will‘ towards acts of terrorism is largely due to this 
misunderstanding. Israel frequently adopted punitive actions with the aim of defeating the 
terrorist‘s ‗will‘ and alter their behaviour; an approach that falls squarely in the realm of 
deterrence by punishment. They succeed only in diminishing the means and gaining time; 
the will and hope endures and glorification of ‗victory‘ acts only as a catalyst for a new 
breed of enemy, a crop that sees terror tactics as the only available way forward.  
THEORY SUMMARISED 
In contemporary wars, victory and defeat are notions relative to the object of the war but 
the object itself constrained by the nature of victory attainable. The theory of victory 
presented is underpinned by a direct linkage between ‗desired ends‘ and the ‗to be 
attained ends‘ – the notion of Victory consistent with the nature and character of war. The 
value of victory revolves around three fundamental principles of attainability, 
sustainability and usability. A careful synthesis of the political aims, the applied means or 
elements of national power towards carefully considered ends within a risk matrix 
consistent with the cost – benefit of the probable and the possible is a complex equation 
that strategy has always sought to address. It continues to be so, indeed nothing 
fundamental or elemental to strategy has changed. A more structured and wholesome 
comprehension of victory helps inform the basic elements of the strategic equation. It 
informs the ends of military and other national strategies. The theory potentially guides 
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each element of power towards the quality of leverage they must provide in their 
respective physical, moral and the temporal contexts. Approaching strategy in this ‗ends 
first‘ approach, allows every action to contribute to the larger notion of victory as 
opposed to pursuit of meaningless and costly success that may, when seen as a whole, be 
mutually non-contributing. 
The theory induces a complex paradox by stating that victory and defeat lie in different 
continuums. This suggests that efforts to achieve one‘s own victory and to convince the 
enemy that it has been defeated may need to be assessed separately. A favourable bargain 
is not possible until the other side concedes leverage (to be found from within in that 
side‘s notion of success and failure.) It will usually not be sufficient to symmetrically 
apply one‘s own precepts to the other side.   
The notion of Victory is a synthesis of the physical and the moral suspended through the 
ever dynamic medium of time and the spirit of the age. The impact of the latter two can 
be from minimal to profound and one that ties the physical and the moral to an eternal 
trajectory of change. Within each of these domains operate a number of tangible and 
intangible dimension or elements. The domains, as too the elements therein, are neither 
watertight nor do they have any exclusive role beyond the tactical level. The higher the 
level, the greater the osmosis and complexity of relationship between the parts. A full 
taxonomy of victory can be found in Chapter VI, page 281 – see Figure 26.  
To allow quantification of moral factors in notional appraisal of victory, the concept of 
and Expectational Framework (EF) that comprises high expectation argument, low and 
common expectation argument, has been advanced and serves to effectively reduce a set 
of complex variables to a three useable contexts: HEA, LEA and CEA collectively 
referred to as the expectation framework (EF). 
An organising framework for assessment of victory and defeat has been expanded from a 
basic model to a more comprehensive tool for prospective and retrospective analysis. The 
ability to scale the quality of victory or magnitude of failure in useful measures along a 
continuum that can be applied to oneself or the enemy is powerful aid for strategy and 
analysis. The measures of victory ranging from stalemate to advantage, success and 
decisive victory on the positive axis and of failure/non victory from loss, failure and 
reversal/capitulation on the negative axis is universally applicable and should serve as a 
powerful tool for the strategist as well as the academics  (see Figure 27, page 272).  This 
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framework was adapted to represent war in various dimensions of 3Z and led to the 
important conclusion that when one opponent fights in the ‗Zan‘ dimension and the other 
in either or both of the other two, a notional victory is far more likely and more cheaply 
premised for the Zan entity as opposed to the Zar and Zamin. This is because Zan 
bargains are generally indivisible and less likely to yield a consensual acceptance of 
defeat.  The graphical tools provided in aid of the theory, allows many such inferences to 
be drawn based on sound prearrangement of the variables, constants and coefficients built 
in to the framework. 
SECTION 2: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND STRATEGY 
Understanding victory and a formal theory of victory allows for better strategies and 
indeed approaches to international competition. Redefining winning is like shifting the 
goalposts! We find that actions of statesmen and generals in pursuit of military victory 
and political leverage sought there-from are governed by the peculiar prevalent notions 
and paradigms of victory. These paradigms and notions are formed in the yoke of the 
domains of victory and the interplay of their component parts. 
Clausewitz defined strategy as the use of engagements or combat, or the threat thereof, 
for the purpose of war.
6
 While a sound strategy is the surest way towards victory, the 
purpose of war is political leverage that is typically proportional to the quality of victory. 
We saw in the bargaining model, it is the nature and quality of this victory that defines the 
position of strength that the victor brings to the bargain and it is this strength that is 
leveraged in exchange for public and private goods, the ends of policy.  Clausewitz 
reminds us that ‗the original means of strategy is victory—that is tactical success; its 
ends, in the final analysis, are those objectives which lead directly to peace.‘7 Smaller 
victories accumulating and contributing towards the attainment of the final objective - the 
desired peace. 
This research has provided one full cycle of generating postulates on victory. The theory 
presented is scientifically grounded and both methodologically and practically – through 
the medium of verification – sound.  It also dwelled at length on how policy can be 
shaped and strategy tuned to attain its purpose efficiently and effectively.  
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SECTION 3: OBSERVATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
We have seen the practical utility of this research as an aid to policy and strategy. The 
theory of victory outlined is supported by a comprehensive set of terminologies and 
definitions. However, the inquiry needs to extend vertically and horizontally and be 
subjected to open criticism from scholarship, strategists and the student of the military art 
before its foundations can truly settle. There are invariably certain premises and 
assumptions in any predictive study. Some of the aspects that merit mention are listed 
below:  
 The major challenge came in the form of a lack of benchmarking for theory 
developing and theory building on a subject such as ‗victory‘; a word so 
commonly used and apparently intrinsically well understood.  
 In realizing the objectives, there was little direct research available in the 
literature; however, some parallel inquiries did appear in print during the course of 
this study.  
 There are inherent limitations and problems associated with prospective analysis 
and prediction, particularly in cultural and anthropological studies. Assessment 
and quantification of variables has a natural tendency towards assuming the 
researchers perspective and may not accurately take into account cultural 
dissonance. 
 There are obvious problems associated with treatment of qualitative data and 
association of mathematical values to notional arguments. Methods and 
approaches refined through game theory may potentially provide more accurate 
answers. These approaches, being out of the scope of this research, were not 
considered. Instead ready coded data was used towards secondary analysis. 
Linked with this, induced errors due to possible biases inherent in the source data 
cannot be ruled out. 
 A relatively narrow band of time has been used to generate empirical axial data. 
There is a definite need to probe vertically and horizontally in time bands to see 
how notion of victory and warfare evolved, and which, if at all, drove the other?   
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 Development of a hypotheses built around the original thesis statement and the 
inclusion of additional hypotheses that emerged during the course of theory 
development have the potential danger of inducing circular logic where one set of 
hypotheses and presumptions supports other set of hypotheses and presumptions. 
A conscious effort was made to guard against this by including external validation 
which is not intrinsic to the approach followed for theory building. 
 In addition to case based validation, empirical tests and modeling was not used to 
validate theory. Although grounded theory does not require rigorous validation 
since the process of theory development takes that into account, nonetheless, 
modeling and scenario based analysis could lend addition substance to or further 
improve the theory. 
 Informing theory through secondary analysis can only be as good as the original 
data. While efforts were made to use diverse sources and opinions on all major 
areas of the study, such inclusions have been by no means exhaustive.  
 There is a need for assessment of end states and the use of pre-theory and post 
theory secondary analysis to inform notional outcomes in a more scientific and 
comparative manner. 
 A good theory requires a self-informing and modifying framework. While this has 
been established to some extent in the taxonomical approach, the rules of business 
and guidelines need to be further evolved.   
 The study has remained predominantly focused on use or threat of use of violence. 
Other elements of power have been identified however, owing to the limited scope 
of this treatise, these were not adequately addressed. 
SECTION 4: RECOMMENDATIONS  
In the course of the research a number of areas that require a deeper and more deliberate 
analysis also emerged. Below is an inducted topical summary that suggests broad areas 
for further study: 
 The cross cultural variations in the notion of victory. A look at individual cultures 
through the prism of history and that society‘s response to stimuli of outcomes. 
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Essentially based on secondary analysis of existing data and historical data, it 
would serve to identify the Expectational Framework (EF) and the Notional 
Assessment Factor (NAF) as well as the essential components of the Cultural – 
Ideographic context. 
 Notion of Victory and the War System – Are there alternatives? 
 We find that the minimalist is in a win-win situation in the physical plane as well 
as the narrow cultural context of the moral plane: 
o What strategy is needed to defeat the minimalist‘s design and how can the 
three faces of such strategy be animated namely: the minimalists and its 
sympathetic group, the affected groups and the world at large.   
o How to approach the minimalists in the moral plane. 
o What is the impact of engagements on the enemy and what purpose do 
engagements serve for the object of the campaign.  
o What exactly is the notion of victory for various non-state and sub-state 
actors? Are the overt causes correct or are there underlying personal 
motives that need to be understood?  
o How do conventional gauges of victory and defeat affect a sub or non-state 
actor‘s cause?  
 Victory is a function of the ‗age‘. It cannot be and should not be separated from its 
social and cultural meanings. When is the enemy defeated? Which is that point at 
which operations if stopped would yield the bargain sought and their further 
continuation would not yield any considerable purchase on a better bargain? We 
know that the answer exists. It just needs to be found. A deliberate study of 
cultures and the notion of success and failure among peoples and polities may 
well prove to be a very useful exercise. 
 Some secondary hypotheses emerged during the research, these found intimate 
linkage with the research and while generally conclusive arguments could be 
rendered, they did open up new avenues for research. These listed below: 
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o The structural progression which suggested that the concepts of victory 
and defeat have changed with changing times in a direct relationship with 
the spirit of the age.  
o The change in the meaning of victory is proportionate in nature, with the 
waves of change, in character, with the socio-political environment and in 
intensity, with the cultural precepts governing the societies in conflict.  
o The notion of victory has continually acquired new constructs that have 
either added onto or replaced those that existed before and, more 
importantly, that this process of acquisition, addition and relegation has 
not been linear or consistent across the myriad cultures, peoples, social 
groups and ideologies. This finding offers immense scope for a cross 
cultural research to determine the notional coefficients of assessment of 
victory and the inherent tendencies of their war to ease into or remain out 
of the more complex ‗Zan‘ dimension. Such a study can provide valuable 
data linking peoples to cultures and nations in an anthropological sense 
and nation states, regions or dominions in a political sense.  
o Each major change in the notion of victory brought its own social and 
political perspective on war, broadening or narrowing its scope in terms of 
the level and content of violence as well as its nature and character.   
o A disaggregated approach to understanding victory and defeat, a lack of 
structural framework as too the exploration of perspectives on the 
dimensions of war as condensed by the societal and cultural influences to 
the context of the 3Z, is victory‘s and defeat‘s true measure. Simply stated, 
all internalized concepts of victory are measured against how the outcome 
relates to the 3Zs (Zan, Zar and Zamin) on the scales of success and 
failure; all else is temporal, a passing phase, be it a low one or high.  
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CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
The notion of victory that governed war and conflict through violence and diplomacy, one 
that Clausewitz had so veritably summarised, finally ran asunder when confronted with a 
new brand of ‗real‘ wars where military logic of compellence became overshadowed by 
the globalisation and de-nationalisation of interests, war and conflict.  If the nature of war 
survived the change, the nature of inter-state and intrastate politics arguably did not, the 
impact on the place and purpose of war and coercive use of national power was certainly 
profound. While the change began as early as the middle of the cold war, it went 
unnoticed and largely ignored as states and militaries went about their business as they 
had always done. It was the increasingly paradoxical outcomes that began to emerge in 
the 20
th
 century that forced military planners, strategists, analysts and statesmen to 
question the validity of the ‗Clausewitzian‘ paradigm.  
This research has presents a modern and living theory that encapsulates traditional 
precepts, adds new ones and simplifies the complexities that have come to surround the 
notions of victory and defeat in contemporary times. Its real value however is to be found 
in the realm of praxis, where, its application is more an art than a science. It is hoped, the 
theory would allow calibrated means and the ends to be placed in a cyclic relationship 
with one moderating and informing the other within an overarching framework of the 
notion of victory, its attainability, usability and sustainability. It is a contemplative and 
not prescriptive formula that provides an idea of influences if not answers, effects if not 
strategies and a concepts if not doctrine.  
The theory is by no means exhaustive, nothing is. Critique and challenge of the simplest 
to the more complex ideas contained in this treatise is fundamental to the evolution of the 
theory of victory and its application. It is through re-evaluation, continuous appraisal, 
debate and application that this effort can evolve into competing or complementing 
theories and sub-theories. 
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4
 Gregory D. Foster, ‗A Conceptual Foundation for a Theory of Strategy,‘ The 
Washington Quarterly Vol. 13, Issue 1, Winter, 1990: pp. 43-59, this  p. 43.  
5
 As Saccheri observes that such provisional definition serve no purpose and for their true 
value to be realised, they need to be turned as quickly as possible into definitions quid rei. 
See Girolamo Saccheri, Logica Demonstrativa, op. cit., pp viii- ix 
6
 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, op. cit., pp. 128, 177. 
7
 Ibid., p. 143. 
Bibliography 
~317~ 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
PRIMARY SOURCES 
DISCUSSIONS AND LECTURE TRANSCRIPTS 
Babchuk, Wayne A. ‗Glaser or Strauss?: Grounded Theory and Adult Education‘, Lecture 
transcript, Michigan State University 1997 
Bellamy, Christopher D. ‗Northern Ireland‘, lecture notes, MSc Global Security, Cranfield 
University, Royal Military College of Science, Jan 2004. 
 _____. ‗The Battle of Borodino‘, lecture transcript, MSc Global Security, Cranfield University, 
Royal Military College of Science, February 2004. 
Cleary, Laura R. ‗The Practical and Theoretical Origins of the State‘, Lecture transcript, MSc 
Global Security, RMCS, Shrivenham, March 2004. 
Copley, Gregory R. ‗Grand Strategy in an Age of Tactics‘, Lecture transcript,  US Army 
Command & General Staff College, January 2008. Internet, 
http://www.artofvictory.com/Copley-GrandStrategy.htm. 
Holmes, Richard. ‗From Locked Front to Beep Battle‘, Lecture transcript, Cranfield University, 
RMCS, September 2003. 
____. ‗War in the Minor Key‘, Lecture transcript, Cranfield University, RMCS, October 2003. 
____. ‗Asymmetry: An Historical Perspective‘, Lecture Notes, Cranfield University, RMCS, 
Shrivenham, July 2005. 
Iqbal, Lieutenant General Shahid. Discussions on ‗Notion of Victory at the Operational Level. 
National Defence University, Islamabad, Pakistan. April 2008. 
Irwin, Lieutenant General Alistair. Lecture Transcript and discussion on ‗Future Trends in 
Warfare.‘ Command and Staff College Quetta, Pakistan. 1-3 April 2005.  
Jafri, Lieutenant General Suhail Abbas. Discussion on ‗Islamic Concept of War and the Notion 
of Victory.‘ Lahore, Pakistan, January 2008. 
Johnson, Dominic and Dominic Tierney. ‗Victory and Defeat in International Relations,‘ Paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton 
Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii, 05 Mar 2005. The cited version is the original 
manuscript. A revised version is now available on the Internet at 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p69842_index.html, 25 May 2009. 
Khan, Major General Khalid Nawaz. Discussion on ‗The Defensive Operational Cycle in Gulf 
War II,‘ Command and Staff College, Quetta, Pakistan. March 2006. 
Wirsing, Dr. Robert G. Lecture Transcript ‗Pakistan and GWOT.‘ Command and Staff College 
Quetta, Pakistan. December 2005.  
 
 
Bibliography 
~318~ 
 
RELIGIOUS SCRIPTURES 
Koran, trans., T. B. Irving. Suhrawardi, Tehran, 1998. 
Rig Veda, trans. and eds., T. Ralph and H. Griffith. Bloomfield, London, 1921. 
ARCHIVES 
Fuller, J. F. C. ‗Fuller to William Sloan of Rutgers University Press,‘ 2 July 1965. Liddell Hart 
Archive, King‘s College, London. Fuller Papers, 4/6/42/1 (hand written version).  
MacArthur, General Douglas. ‗Radio broadcast from the USS Missouri (on the eve of the 
signing of the Japanese instrument of surrender,)‘ 2 Sep 1945. MacArthur Achieves. US 
War College, Norfolk Virginia. 
_____, ‗Farewell address to Congress,‘ 19 Apr 1951. MacArthur Achieves. US War College, 
Norfolk Virginia. 
National Intelligence Council, ‗Iraqi Ground Forces: An assessment‘, declassified CIA 
document, NIC-M91-10003, CIA Achieves, Nov 2005. 
United Nations. White Paper by Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, 11
th
 Session, 
Supplement No 18 (A/3592) 1957. UN Archives, General Assembly Official Records, 
New York. 
OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS AND DOCTRINAL DOCUMENTS 
Joint Doctrine and Concept Centre. British Defence Doctrine, 2
nd
 ed, JWP 0-01. JDCC, 
Shrivenham, 2002. 
National Defence University, Theory of War and Strategy: Operational Art. NDU Press, 
Islamabad, 2008. 
United States Army, Operational Terms and Graphics, FM 101-5-1/MCRP 5-2A, Headquarters, 
Department of the Army, 30 September 1997. 
SECONDARY SOURCES 
REFERENCE BOOKS AND ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
A Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. by Antony Flew. Pan Books, London, 1979. 
Chambers 20
th
 Century Dictionary. Chambers, Edinburgh, 1983. 
Collins Essential English Dictionary, 2nd ed. HarperCollins Publishers, New York,  2006. 
Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics, ed. by Iain McLean. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1996. 
Dictionary of International Relations, ed. by Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newham. Penguin 
Books, London, 1998. 
Dictionary of the History of Ideas, Volume 1, Thompson & Gale, New York, 2004. 
Encyclopaedia Britannica. Student and Home Ed., (2008), ed. by Joseph Frankel, on DVD, 
Bibliography 
~319~ 
Encyclopædia Britannica, Chicago, 2008. 
Encyclopedia of Islam, ed. by Mohammad Ahmad Mukarram and Syed Muzaffar Hussain.  
Anmol, New Delhi, 2005. 
Merriam-Webster English Dictionary and Thesaurus. Electronic ed. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
Chicago, 2008. 
Microsoft Encarta Encyclopaedia 2003. CD. Microsoft Corporation, Bloomsbury Pub. PLC., 
2002. 
Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. by Simon Blackburn.  Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2008. 
Oxford English Dictionary. Oxford University Press, London, 2003. 
THESES 
BOOKS   
Adams, Jeremy. Condemned to Repeat It. Viking, Penguin, New York, 1998.  
Ahmad, Israr. The Tragedy of Karbala. Society of the Servants of Al-Quran, Lahore, 1999. 
Al Tabari, Muhammad ibn Jarir. History of the Prophets and Kings, Volume XIX, The Caliphate 
of Yazid, trans. by I.K.A Howard. Suny Press, 1991. 
Allan, Pierre and Christian Schmidt, eds. Game Theory and International Relations: 
Preferences, Information and Empirical Evidence. Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1994. 
Allison, Graham T. and Philip Zelikow. Essence of Decision, 2
nd
 ed. Longman, New York, 
1999. 
Almog, Oz. The Sabra: The Creation of the New Jew. University of California Press, London,  
2000. 
Alperovitz, Gar. Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, sec. rev. ed. Pluto Press, New 
York, 1994. 
Anon. Pashtoonwali. Iqra Kutabkhanna, Lahore, 2001. 
Angstorm, Jan and Isabelle Duyvesteyn, eds. Understanding Victory and Defeat in 
Contemporary War. Rutledge, Oxford, 2007. 
Krizanowic, Gary. ‗Operational Art in Limited War Termination: The Bridge Between the 
Strategic and Operational Levels of War‘ (MSc. diss., Naval War College, Newport, 
1994. 
Stocker, Ashley, ‗The Armed Forces Of Australia, Britain And Canada And The Impact Of 
Culture On Joint, Combined And Multinational Operations: A Methodology For 
Profiling National And Organisational Cultural Values And Assessing Their Influence 
In The International Workplace.‘  PhD diss.,  College of Defence Technology, 
Department of Defence Management and Security Analysis, Cranfield University, 2004.  
Zaidi, Colonel M. I. ‗War, Warfare and Warfighting: Paradigms of Limitation in the 21st 
Century.‘ MSc. diss., Cranfield University, Royal Military College of Sciences, 
Security Studies Institute, 2004. 
Bibliography 
~320~ 
Ayoub, Mahmood. The Qur'an and Its Interpreters: The House of ʻImrān, Vol. 2. SUNY Press, 
Albany, 1992. 
Becker, Howard S. The Epistemology of Qualitative Research. University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1996. 
Bellamy, Christopher D. Evolution of Land Warfare: Theory and Practice. Rutledge, London, 
1990. 
_____.  Knights in White Armour: The New Art of War and Peace. Pimlico, London, 1997. 
_____. Expert Witness: A Defence Correspondent’s Gulf War 1990-1991 (Brassey‘s, London, 
1993). 
___.  Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War. Vintage, New York, 2007. 
Berg, B. Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences. Allyn & Bacon, Boston, 1989. 
Berger, John. Ways of Seeing. Peter Smith Pub. Inc., 1971. 
Beschloss, Michael R. The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963. Harper Collins, 
New York, 1991. 
Biddle, Stephan. Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle. Princeton 
University Press, Princeton: N.J., 2004. 
Black, Jeremy. The Cambridge Illustrated Atlas – Warfare: Renaissance to Revolution 1492 – 
1792. Cambridge University Press, London, 1996.   
Blackwell, K. The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, Vol. 9. Unwin, London, 2000. 
Bobbit, Phillip. The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History. Penguin, 
London, 2002. 
Bond, Brian, The Pursuit of Victory: From Napoleon to Saddam Hussain. Oxford University 
Press, 1996. 
Boot, Max. Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power. Basic 
Books, New York,  2002. 
Boyce, Barry C. ‗Whither Vincibility?,‘ in Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. by Denma 
Translation Group. Shambala Publications, Boston, 2002. 
Boyce, Mary, ed. and tr., Textual sources for the study of Zoroastrianism (Manchester 
University Press, Manchester, 1984). 
Brecher, Michael and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. A Study of Crisis. University of Michigan Press, 
Ann Arbor, 1997. 
Brislin, R. W. and K. Cushner. Intercultural Interactions: A Practical Guide. Sage Publications 
Inc., Beverly Hills, 1986. 
Brodie, Bernard. Strategy in the Missile Age. Princeton University Press, 1971. 
Buchtel, Emma E. and Ara Norenzayan. Intuition versus Logic? Injunctive Norms about 
Reasoning across Cultures and Contexts. University of British Columbia, British 
Columbia, 2004. 
Bull, Hedley.  The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. Macmillan, 
Bibliography 
~321~ 
Houndmills, 1988. 
_____. Intervention in World Politics. Clarendon, Oxford, 1986. 
Bundy, McGeorge. Danger and Survival. Random House, New York, 1988. 
Bush George and Brent. Scowcroft, A World Transformed. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1998. 
Campbell, Thomas.‗Battle of the Baltic,‘ in Historic Poems and Ballads, ed. by Rupert S. 
Holland (George W. Jacobs & Co., Philadelphia, 1912. 
Carnap, R. The Logical Structure of the World, 2nd ed., trans. by R. George. University of 
California Press, Berkeley, 1969. 
Carr, David. ‗Taking Narrative Seriously: Exploring the Educational Value of Story and Myth,‘ 
in Philosophy of Education: Yearbook 2003‘, ed. by Kal Alston.  PES Publications 
Office-University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 2004. 
Carr, E. H. The Twenty Years Crisis: 1919–1939, Macmillan, London, 1989). 
Chakravarti, Uma. The social dimensions of early Buddhism. Oxford University Press, Delhi, 
1987. 
Chaliand, Gerard. The Art of War in World History: From Antiquity to the Nuclear Age, in two 
vols. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1994. 
Cimbala, Stephen J. Military Persuasion in War and Policy: The Power of Soft. Praeger, 
Westport, 2002. 
Clark, Peter. Zoroastrianism. An Introduction to an Ancient Faith. Sussex Academic Press, 
Brighton, 1998. 
Clausewitz, Carl Von. On War (1832), trans. and ed. by Michael Howard and Peter Parret. 
Princeton, New Jersey, 1989. 
Cohen, Elliot A. Supreme Command, Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in War. Simon and 
Schuster, London, 2002. 
Copley, Gregory R. The Art of Victory: Strategies for Personal Success and Global Survival in 
a Changing World. Threshold Editions, New York, 2006. 
Coates, A. J. The Ethics of War. Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1997. 
Collier, Paul  and Anke Hoeffler. ‗Greed and Grievance in Civil War,‘ Oxford University, 
Centre for the Study of African Economies, Working Paper.  No. 1, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2002. 
Creveld Martin Van. The Transformation of War. Free Press, New York, 1999. 
David, Beverly R. and Alan Gribben. Mark Twain and His Illustrators: 1869-1875. Whitston 
Pub. Co., 1986. 
Dehio, L. The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Power Struggle. Alfred A. 
Knopf, New York, 1962. 
Diehl Paul F. and Nils Petter Gleditsch. Environmental Conflict. Westview, Boulder, 2001. 
Durant, Will and Aerial Durant.  Lessons of History. M. F. J. Publishers, New York, 1997. 
Bibliography 
~322~ 
Eccles, Henry E. Military Concepts and Philosophy. Rutgers University Press, Rutgers, 1965. 
Echevarria II, Antulio J. Globalisation and Nature of War. Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, 
2003. 
Ehrenreich, Barbara. Blood Rites: Origins and History of the Passions of War. Virgo Press, 
London, 1997. 
Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Irenäus. The biology of peace and war : men, animals and aggression, trans. by 
Eric Mosbacher. Thames and Hudson, London, 1979. 
Epictetus. Discourses, reprinted in The Works of Epictetus, Howard University Press, 
Cambridge, 2001. 
Esposito, John. Unholy War. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002. 
Evera, Stephan Van. Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict. Cornell University Press, 
London, 1999. 
Falls, Cyril. The Nature of Modern Warfare. Oxford University Press, New York, 1941. 
Fetscher, Iring and Herfried Münkler, eds. Politikwissenschaft. Begriffe - Analysen - Theorien, 
Ein Grundkurs. Reinbek, Rowohlt, 1985. 
Fields, Rick, The Code of the Warrior. Harper Perennial, New York, 1991. 
Findley, Carther, Vaughn and John, Alexander. Twentieth-century World, Sixth ed. Houghton 
Mifflin, 1986. 
Finn, Christopher, ed., Effects Based Warfare. The Stationary Office, London, 2003. 
Firestone, Reuven. Jihad : The Origin of Holy War in Islam. Oxford University Press, New 
York, 1999. 
Fischer, Conan. The Ruhr Crisis 1923-1924. Oxford University Press, 2003. 
Fishel, John T. Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm. 
Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, 1992. 
Fortescue, John. The Writing of History. Longman Green and Co., Toronto, 1926. 
Freedman, Lawrence. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 5
th
 ed. Macmillan, London, 1983.  
_____.  Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam. Oxford University Press, 2000. 
Fromkin, David. A Peace to End All Peace. Orion Publishing Group, London, 2000. 
Fukuyama, F., The End of History and the Last Man. Free Press, New York, 1992. 
Galtung, Johan. Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means. United Nations, New York, 2000. 
Gelb, Leslie H. and Richard K. Betts. The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked. The 
Brookings Institution, Washington, 1979. 
Gelven, Michael, War and Existence: A Philosophical Enquiry. Pennsylvania State UP, 
Pennsylvania, 1994. 
Gerring, John. Case Study Research: Principles and Practices. Cambridge University Press, 
2007. 
Bibliography 
~323~ 
Gilbert, Marc Jason and William Head. ‗Introduction‘, in The Tet Offensive, ed. by Marc Jason 
Gilbert and William Head. Praeger, Westport, 1996. 
Glaser, Barney G. and A. L. Strauss. The Discovery Of Grounded Theory: Strategies For 
Qualitative Research. Aldine, Chicago, 1967. 
Glaser, Barney G. Theoretical Sensitivity. Sociology Press, Mill Valley, 1978. 
_____. Basics of Grounded Theory Analysis. Sociology Press, Mill Valley, 1992.  
_____. Doing Grounded Theory: Issues and Discussions. Sociology Press, Mill Valley, 1998. 
Gray, Colin S. Modern Strategy. Oxford University Press, New York, 1999. 
_____. Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory. SSI, Carlisle, 2002. 
_____. Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare. Widenfeld and Nicolson, London, 2005. 
Gray, Colin S. and Geoffrey Sloan, eds. Geopolitics: Geography and Strategy. Frank Cass, 
London, 1999. 
Griffits, Martin and Terry O‘Callaghan, International Relations: The Key Concepts. Rutledge,  
London, 2002. 
Grotius, Hugo. The Rights of War and Peace (1901), trans. by A. C. Campbell. Elibron Classics, 
Washington, 2005. 
Halliday, F. The Making of the Second Cold War, 2
nd
 ed. Verso, London, 1987.  
_____. Cold War, Third World.  Hutchinson Radius, London, 1989.  
Halperin, Morton H. Limited War in the Nuclear Age. Wiley, New York,1963. 
Hall, George M. The Fifth Star: High Command in an Era of Global War. Praeger Publishers, 
1994. 
Handel, Michael I. Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought. Frank Cass, London, 2002. 
Harstshorne, Charles, Paul Weiss and Arthur W. Burks, eds. Collected Papers of Charles 
Sanders Peirce. Harvard University, Cambridge, 1958. 
_____.  Philosophy of Right. Oxford University Press, London, 1973. 
Hegel, G.W.F. The Philosophy of History.  Dover, New York, 1956. 
Helmert and Usczek. Europäische Befreiungskriege 1808 bis 1814/15. Berlin, 1986. 
Helps, Arthus. Realmah (1868). MacMillan and Co., London, 1868. 
Hereford, George B. Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia. Empirical Books, London, 2002. 
Hirsch Jr, E. D., Joseph F. Kent and James Trefil, eds. The New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy, 
3
rd
 ed.  Houghton Mifflin, 2002. 
Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf (1924), 8th ed. Houghton Mifflin, New York, 1939.  
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan, ed. by C.B. Macpherson. Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1968. 
Hobbs, Richard. The Myth of Victory: What is Victory in War? Boulder: Westview Press, 1979. 
Bibliography 
~324~ 
Hobsbawm, Eric J.  Age of Revolution, 1789–1848. Penguin, London, 1988. 
_____.  Age of Capital, 1848–1875.  Penguin, London, 1988). 
_____. Age of Empire, 1875–1914.  Penguin, London, 1989.  
_____. Age of Extremes: A History of the World. 1914–1991. Pantheon, New York, 1994.  
_____, ed. On History. The New Press, 1997. 
Hofschroer, Peter.  Leipzig 1813: The Battle of the Nations. Osprey, 1993. 
Hofstede, Geert. Cultures and Organizations: Software of the mind. McGraw Hill, New York 
1997. 
Holmes, Richard. Riding the Retreat: Mons to the Marne 1914 Revisited. Pimlico, London, 
1995. 
_____, ed. Oxford Companion to Military History. Oxford University Press, New York, 2001. 
Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. Environmental Scarcity and Violence. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1999. 
Horne, Alistair. A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962. The New York Review of Books, 
New York, 2006. 
Howard, Michael. War and the Liberal Conscience. Temple Smith, London, 1978. 
_____. Clausewitz, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983. 
_____. The Causes of War and Other Essays. Temple Smith, London, 1983. 
_____. The Invention of Peace: Reflections on War and International Order. Profile Books, 
London, 2000. 
Huntington, Samuel P. The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. Simon and 
Schuster, New York, 1997. 
Ikle, Charles. Every War Must End. Columbia University Press, New York, 1971. 
Israeli, Raphael. Man of Defiance: A Political Biography of Anwar Sadat. Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, London, 1987. 
James, William. The Principles of Psychology. Harvard University Press, Harvard, 1890. 
Janis, I. L. Victims of Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos. 
Mifflin, 1972. 
Jervis, Robert, Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1976). 
Jochmann, Werner, ed. Monologue im Fuehrerhauptquartier 1941-1944. Albrech Knaus 
Verlag, Hamburg, 1980. 
Kahn, Herman. Thinking about the Unthinkable.  Horizon Press, New York, 1962. 
Kant, Immanuel. Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Morals.  Hackett, 
Indianapolis, 1983. 
Bibliography 
~325~ 
Kaplan, Jeffrey. Millennial Violence: Past Present and Future. Cass, London, 2002. 
Kecskemeti, Paul. Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat. Stanford University 
Press, Stanford, 1958. 
Keegan, John. A History of Warfare. Pimlico, London, 1994. 
_____, ed. The Times Atlas of the Second World War. Times Books, 1989. 
Keen, David. The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars, Adelphi Papers 320. 
Rutledge, New York, 1998. 
Kennan, George F. American Diplomacy: 1900-1950. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1951. 
Kennedy, Hugh. The Armies of the Caliphs: Military and Society in the Early Islamic State. 
Routledge, London, 2001. 
Kerbs, Ronald R. and Jack S. Levy. ‗Demographic Change and the Sources of International 
Conflict,‘ in  Demography and National Security, ed. by Myron Weiner and Sharon 
Stanton Russell. Berghahn Books, Oxford, 2001. 
Khadduri, Majid. The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani's Siyar. Johns Hopkins Press, 
Baltimore 1966. 
Khong, Yuen Foong. Analogies at War:  Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam 
Decisions of 1965. New Herseyt Univ. Press, Princeton, 1992. 
King, G., R. O. Keohane, and S. Verba. Designing Social Inquiry. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1994. 
Kneale, William and Martha. The Development of Logic. Oxford University Press, New York, 
1984. 
Knorr, Klaus. ‗Threat Perception,‘ in Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, ed. 
by idem, (University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 1976), pp.78-163 
Kokoshin, Andrey A., Victor M. Sergeev and Vadim L. Tsymburskt. ‗Evolution of the Concept 
of Victory in Soviet Military – Political Thought After the Second World War,‘ in 
Soviet-American Dialogue in the Social Sciences: Research Workshop on 
Interdependence among Nations, ed. by National Academy of Science.  National 
Academy Press, Washington D.C., 1990. 
Kolko, Gabriel. The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy 1943 – 1945. 
New York, 1970. 
Khong, Yuen Foong. Analogies at War:  Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam 
Decisions of 1965. New Herseyt Univ. Press, Princeton, 1992. 
Kripke, Saul. ‗Identity and Necessity,‘ in Identity and Individuation, ed. by M.K. Munitz. New 
York University Press, New York, 1971 
Kulm, Thomas. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago,1996. 
Lamnek, Siegfried. Qualitative Sozialforschung, Lehrbuch 4, Auflage, Beltz Verlag. 
Weihnhein, Basel, 2005. 
Lefebvre, Georges. Napoleon from Tilsit to Waterloo. Columbia University Press, New York, 
Bibliography 
~326~ 
1969. 
Lebow, Richard Ned. Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis. John 
Hopkins, Baltimore, 1981. 
Lévi-Strauss, Claude. ‗Discussion of Lévi-Strauss's paper 'Social Structure' (1952 - 1962),’ in 
An appraisal of anthropology today, ed. by Sol Tax. University of Chicago Press, 1953. 
Lewinsohn, R. Science, Prophesy and Prediction, trans. by Arnold J. Pomerans. Bell Publishing 
Company, New York, 1961.  
Liddell Hart, Basil H. Strategy: The Indirect Approach (1968). Penguin Books, New York, 
1991. 
_____.Why Don't We Learn from History? Allen & Unwin, London, 1946. 
Lewis, Adrian R. The American Culture of War: A History of US Military Force from World 
War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Routlege, London, 2006.  
Lin, Derek, Tao Te Ching: Annotated & Explained. Skylight Paths Publishing, Los Angeles, 
2001. 
Lin,Yutang. My country and my people. The John Day Co., New York, 1939. 
Lippmann, Walter. Public Opinion. Macmillan, New York, 1922. 
Little, David. ‗Holy War Appeals and Western Christianity: a Reconsideration of Bainton's 
Approach,‘ in Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and 
Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions, eds., John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson. 
Greenwood Press, New York, 1991. 
Lofland, J. and L. H. Lofland.  Analyzing social settings: A guide to qualitative observation and 
analysis, 2nd ed. Wadsworth, Belmont, 1994. 
Lonsdale, David J. ‗Information Power: Strategy, Geopolitics, and the Fifth Dimension,‘ in 
Geopolitics: Geography and Strategy ed. by Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan. Frank 
Cass, London, 1999, pp. 137 – 155. 
Ludendorff, Erich. Der Totale Krieg (1935), trans. as The Nation at War by Dr A. S. Rappoport. 
Hutchinson, 1936. 
Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince, ed. and trans. by Quentin Skinner and Russell Price. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990. 
_____. The Prince, trans. by Peter Bondanella and Mark Musa. Oxford University Press, New 
York, 1998. 
_____. The Prince, trans. by Rufus Goodwin. Dante University Press, Wellesley, 2003. 
_____. Art of War, trans. Christopher Lynch. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2003. 
Magee II, Roderick R., ed. Strategic Leadership Primer. U.S. Army War College, Carlisle 
Barracks, 1998. 
Maley, William ed. Fundamentalism Reborn?: Afghanistan Under the Taliban. NYU Presss, 
New York, 1998. 
Malthus, Thomas Robert. An Essay on the Principle of Population as it Affects the Future 
Bibliography 
~327~ 
Improvement of Society. Johnson, London, 1798. 
Mandel, Ernest. The Meaning of the Second World War. Verso, London, 1984. 
Mandel, Robert. ‗The Eye of the Beholder, Victory and defeat in US military Operations,‘ in 
Understanding Victory and Defeat in Contemporary War, ed. by Jan Angstrom and 
Isabelle Duyvesteyn. Rutledge, Oxford, 2007. 
Markham, Felix. Napoleon. Mentor, New York, 1963. 
Marks, Sally. The Illusion of Peace: International Relations in Europe, 1918-1933. Macmillan, 
London, 1976. 
Marshall-Cornwall, James. Napoleon as Military Commander. Batsford, London, 1967. 
Martel, William C. Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy. Cambridge 
University Press, 2007. 
Maslow, Abraham. Motivation and Personality, 2nd ed. Harper & Row, New York, 1970. 
Mates, B., ‗Synonymity,‘ in University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. 25. 
Reprinted  in L. Linsky, ed.  Semantics and the Philosophy of Language. University of 
Illinois Press, Urbana, 1950. 
Matinuddin, Kamal. The Nuclearization of South Asia. Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2002. 
May, Ernst R. and Philip D. Zelikov. The Kennedy Tapes. Belknap Press, Cambridge, 1997. 
McCarthy, Cormac. Blood Meridian, or the Evening Redness in the West. Vintage, New York, 
1985.   
McDermott, Rose. Political psychology in international relations, analytical perspectives on 
politics. The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2001. 
McNeill, W.H. The Pursuit of Power: Technology and Armed Force since A.D. 1000. Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford, 1983. 
Mead, Margaret.  And Keep your Powder Dry: An Anthropologist Looks at America (1942). 
Berghan, New York, 2000. 
_____. 'Warfare is only an Invention - Not a Biological Necessity,' in War, Studies from 
Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology, ed. by Leon Bramson & George W. Goethals. 
Basic Books, London, 1964. 
_____. Continuities in Cultural Evolution. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 1999. 
Meinecke, F. ‗Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d‘Etat and Its Place,‘ in Idem, Modern 
History. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1957.  
_____, The German Catastrophe: The Social and Historical Influences which Led to the Rise 
and Ruin of Hitler and Germany. Beacon, Boston,1963. 
Mikaberidze, Alexander. The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon's Hollow Victory. Pen & Sword 
Military, New York, 2007. 
Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty.  W. W. Norton & Co., New York, 1975. 
Mises, Ludwig Von. Human Action, 4
th
 Revised Edition. Fox and Wilkes, San Francisco, 1963. 
Bibliography 
~328~ 
Mitchell, Mark L. and Janina M. Jolley. Research Design Explained, 5th Edition. Wadsworth 
Publishing, Florence: KY, 2003. 
Moskos, Charles C. and James Burk. ‗The Postmodern Military,‘ in The Military in New Times. 
Adapting Armed Forces to a Turbulent World, ed. by James Burk. Westview, Boulder, 
1994. 
Mueller, John E. War, Presidents and Public Opinion. John Riley & Sons Inc., New York, 
1971. 
Mueller, John E. War, Presidents and Public Opinion. John Riley & Sons Inc., New York, 
1971. 
_____, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War. Basic Books, New York, 
1989. 
Mundey, Richard O. ‗Past Revolutions – Future Transformations: What Can the History of 
Revolutions tell us about Transforming the US Military?‘ in Military Affairs, The 
RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 1999. 
Münkler, Herfried. ‗Krieg und Frieden‘ (war and peace), in Politikwissenschaft. Begriffe - 
Analysen - Theorien, Ein Grundkurs, eds. Iring Fetscher and Herfried Münkler. 
Reinbek, Rowohlt, 1985. 
Murray, Williamson, McGregor Knox and Alvin Bernstein. The Making of Modern Strategy: 
Rulers, States and War. Cambridge University press, Cambridge, 1999. 
Naisbitt, John, Global Paradox: The Bigger the World Economy, the More Powerful it’s 
Smallest Players. William Morrow and Co., New York, 1994. 
Neff, Stephen C. War and the Law of Nations: A General History. Cambridge University Press, 
New York, 2005. 
Neuman, Russell W. The Paradox of Mass Politics: Knowledge and Opinion in the American 
Electorate. Harvard University Press, 1986. 
Nichols, Thomas M. Winning the World : Lessons for America's Future from the Cold War. 
Praeger, Westport, 2002. 
Nicholson, Michael, ‗Interdependent Utility Functions: Implications for Co-operation and 
Conflict,‘ in Game Theory and International Relations: Preferences, Information and 
Empirical Evidence, ed. by Pierre Allan and Christian Schmidt. Edward Elgar, 
Aldershot, 1994. 
Nisbett, Richard E., The geography of thought: how Asians and Westerners think differently - 
and why. Nicholas Brealey Publishing, London, 2003. 
Nixon, Richard M. No More Vietnams. Arbor House Pub. Co., New York, 1985. 
Norton, Augustus Robert. Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
2007. 
Nye Jr., Joseph S. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. Public Affairs, New 
York, 2004. 
Oestreich, G.  Neostoicism and the Early Modern State. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 1982. 
Bibliography 
~329~ 
Offe, C. Industry and Inequality: The Achievement Principle in Work and Social Status. St. 
Martin‘s Press, New York 1977. 
_____. Contradictions of the Welfare State. Hutchinson, London, 1984.  
_____. Disorganised Capitalism: Contemporary Transformations of Work and Politics.  Polity, 
Cambridge, 1985. 
Ohmae Kenichi. The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy. Harper 
Collins, London, 1994. 
Opello Jr., Walter C. and Stephen J. Rosow. The Nation-State and Global Order: A Historical 
Introduction to Contemporary Politics. Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1999. 
Overmans, Ruedigef. Deutsche Militairsche Verlueste in Zweiten Welt Krieg. Taschenbuch, 
Oldenburg, 2000. 
Overy, R. J. The Origins of the Second World War, 2
nd
 ed. Pearson, Harlow, 1998. 
Parret, Peter. Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Times. 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1986. 
_____, ed. The Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age.   
Princeton, Princeton, 1986. 
Parker, Geoffrey. Western Geopolitical Thought in the Twentieth Century. St. Martin‘s Press, 
New York, 1985. 
Pallister, John and Jonathon Law. A Dictionary of Business and Management. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2006. 
Prażmowska, Anita. Britain and Poland, 1939-1943: The Betrayed Ally. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1995. 
Pickthall, Marmaduke. The Meaning of the Glorious Koran. Amna Publications, New Delhi, 
1996. 
Pinkus, Oscar. The War Aims and Strategies of Adolf Hitler. McFarland and Company, 
Jefferson, 2005. 
Plutarch, ‗The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans,‘ in Great Books of the Western World, 
Vol. 14, ed. by Robert Maynard Hutchins. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1971. 
Polybius, The Histories of Polybius, Book One, trans. by Evelyn S, Shuckburgh. In Parentheses 
publications, Cambridge, 2002. 
Pollack, Kenneth M. Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991. University of Nebraska 
Press, Lincoln, 2002. 
Ramsey, Paul. Basic Christian Ethics. John Knox, Louisville, 1993. 
Razwy, Sayed Ali Asgher. A Restatement of the History of Islam and Muslims: CE 570 – 661. 
World Federation of KSI Muslim Press, London , 1995. 
Reiter, Dan and Allan C. Stam. Democracies at War. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
2002. 
Riehn, Richard K. 1812: Napoleon's Russian Campaign. John Wiley, New York, 1991. 
Bibliography 
~330~ 
Rizvi, Syed Wajid Ali. War and the Laws of War in Islam: Does Islam Stand for Terrorism? 
Army Education Publishing House, Rawalpindi, 2005. 
Roberts, Michael. ‗The Military Revolution, 1560-1660,‘ in Essays in Swedish History, ed. by 
ed., Roberts, Michael. Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1967.  
Rosenau, James N. ‗Pre-theories and Theories in Foreign Policy,‘ Approaches to Comparative 
and International Politics, ed. by Barry R. Farrell. North Western University Press, 
Evanston, 1966. 
 
Rosen, Stephen Peter. Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military. Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, 1991. 
Rothwell, Victor. War Aims in the Second World War. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 
2005.  
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Du Contract Social (English: The Social Contract) (1762). Reprint. 
Meta Libri, Amsterdam, 2008. 
Russell, Bertrand. A History of Western Philosophy. Touchstone, New York, 1972. 
Russett, Bruce. ‗The Fact of Democratic Peace,‘ in Debating the Democratic Peace, ed. by 
Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller. MIT Press, Cambridge, 
2001. 
Saccheri,Girolamo, Logica Demonstrativa, ed. and trans. by  George Bruce Halsted. The Open 
Court Publishing Company, London, 1920. 
Schell, Jonathan. The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People. 
Penguin, London, 2005. 
Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence. Yale University Press, New York, 1966. 
Schickel, J. Guerrilleros, Partisanen: Theorie und Praxis. Carl Hanser, München, 1970. 
Schivelbusch, Wolfgang. The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and 
Recovery, trans. by Jefferson Chase. Metropolitan Books, Markham, 2003. 
Seattle, Chief of the Squamish. The Speech of Chief Seattle. Applewood Books, Massachusetts, 
2000. 
Sharma, Arvind. A Jaina Perspective on the Philosophy of Religion. Motilal Banarsidas, Delhi, 
2001. 
Sherwood, Robert E. Roosevelt and Hopkins (1950). Enigma Books, New York, 2001. 
Shlaim, Avi. The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World.  W. W. Norton & Company, New 
York, 2001. 
Shy, John. ‗Jomini,‘ in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. by 
Peter Parret. Oxford University Press, New York, 1986. pp 143 – 185. 
Sobel, Lester A. Israel and the Arabs: The October 1973 War. Facts on File, New York, 1974. 
Spencer, Liz, J. Ritchie, J. Lewis and L. Dillon. Quality in Qualitative Research: a Framework 
for Assessing Research Evidence. The Cabinet Office, London, 2003. 
Stam, Allan C. Win, Lose, or Draw: Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War. University of 
Bibliography 
~331~ 
Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1996. 
Stein, Arthur, Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations. 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1990. 
Stern, Jessica. Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill. Harper and Collins, 
New York, 2003. 
Stevenson, Charles L.  Ethics and Language, Connecticut, (Yale University Press, New Haven, 
1944. 
Strauss, A. L. Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1987. 
Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. and ed. by Samuel B. Griffith. Oxford, New York, 1971. 
_____. The Art of War, trans. by Denma Translation Group, (Shambala Publications, Boston, 
2002).   
_____. The Art of War: Corner Stone of Chinese Strategy, trans. by Chao-Wing Chohan  and 
Abe Bellenteen, (Astrolog Publishing House, Hod Hasharon, 2003). 
_____. The Art of War: A Modern Chinese Interpretation, ed. by General Tao Hanzhang,  trans. 
by Youan Shibing. Sterling Publishing Company, New York, 2000. 
Suppes, P. Introduction to Logic. Van Nostrand, Princeton, 1957. 
Lamnek, Siegfried. Qualitative Sozialforschung . Weihnhein, Basel, 2005. 
Tarle, Eugene. Napoleon's Invasion of Russia 1812. Oxford University Press, New York, 1942. 
Tawoos,  Sayyid ibn.  Lohouf, trans. by anon. Suny Publishers, New Delhi, 2001. 
Taylor, A.J.P. The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1914. Oxford University Press 
Oxford, 1988. 
Tetlock, Philip E. ‗Social psychology and world politics,‘ in Handbook of Social Psychology, 
ed. by D. Gilbert, S. Fiske and G. Lindzey. McGraw Hill, New York, 1998. 
Thucydides. History Of The Peloponnesian War, trans. by Robert Richard Crawley. University 
of Chicago, Chicago, 1971. 
Tylor, Edward B. Primitive culture: researches into the development of mythology, philosophy, 
religion, art, and custom (1871). Gordon Press, New York, 1974. 
Tocqueville, Alexis de. Democracy in America, Vol. 1 and 2. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1945. 
Toffler, Alvin. The Third Wave. Willam Morrow & Co., New York, 1980.  
Toffler, Alvin and Heidi Toffler. War and Anti-War. Little, Brown and Company, New York, 
1993. 
_____, Creating a New Civilization: The Politics of the Third Wave. Turner, Atlanta, 1995. 
Tolstoy, Leo.  War and Peace. Oxford University Press, New York, 1998.  
Tuathail, Gearóid Ó., Simon Dalby and Paul Rutledge, Geopolitics Reader. Rutledge, 
Bibliography 
~332~ 
Abingdon, 1998. 
Townsend, Charles. The Oxford Illustrated History of Modern War. Oxford University Press, 
New York, 1997. 
Tuft, Edward R. The Visual Display of Qualitative Information. Graphics Press, Cheshire, 2001. 
Vattel, Emer de, Le droit des gens, ou, Principes de la loi naturelle, appliqués à la conduite et 
aux affaires des nations et des souverains, trans. by Charles G Fenwick. Carnegie 
Institution of Washington, Washington, 1916. 
Wallace, Robert Keith and Jay B. Marcus. Victory Before War. Maharishi, New Delhi, 2006. 
Weiner, Myron and Sharon Stanton Russell, ed. Demography and National Security. Berghahn 
Books, Oxford, 2001. 
Wight, Martin. International Theory: The Three Traditions. Continuum, London, 1991. 
Wiharta, Sharon  and Ian Anthony. ‗Major Armed Conflicts,‘ in SIPRI Yearbook 2003: 
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2003. Chapter 2. 
Wilkenfeld, Jonathan, Gerald W. Hopple, Paul J. Rossa, and Stephen J. Andriole. Foreign 
Policy Behavior: The Interstate Behavior Analysis Model. Sage Publications, Beverly 
Hills, 1980. 
Williams, Kieran. The Prague Spring and its Aftermath: Czechoslovak Politics, 1968 – 1970. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997. 
Williams, Raymond. A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. Oxford University Press, New York 
1983. 
Willisen, Karl Wilhelm Von. Theorie des Grossen Krieges (English: Theory of the Great War). 
Berlin, 1840. 
Willows, D.M. and H.A.Houghton, eds. The Psychology of Illustration, Vol 1. Springer-Verlag,  
New York, 1987. 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Zettel, ed. by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, trans. by G. E. 
M. Anscombe. Blackwell, Oxford, 1967. 
Woods, Ngaire. 'International Political Economy,' in The Globalisation of World Politics: An 
Introduction to World Politics, ed. by John Baylis and Steve Smith. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2001. 
Wright, Quincy. A Study of War. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1942. 
Yarger, Harry R. Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy. 
Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, 2003. 
Yin, K. Robert. Case Study Research. Design and Methods, 3
rd
 ed. Sage Publications, 
California, 2002. 
Zartmann, William I., ed. Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate 
Authority. Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1995. 
 
Bibliography 
~333~ 
 
NEWSPAPERS, JOURNALS AND MAGAZINE UNPUBLISHED ARTICLES 
Adler, Peter and Patricia A. Adler. ‘The Demography of Ethnography.‘ Journal of Contemporary 
Ethnography Vol. 24, No. 1, (1995): pp. 3-29. 
Ali, Nageeb M. ‗Waiting to settle: Multilateral bargaining with subjective biases.‘ Journal of 
Economic Theory. Vol. 130, Issue 1, September 2006. 
Alsharabati, Carole and Jacek Kugler. ‗War Initiation in a Changing World,‘ International 
Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations, No. 4, Vol. 
34, (2008), pp. 358 – 381. 
Bacevich, Andrew J. ‗Victory Spoiled.‘ National Review 28 June 1999. 
Bagley, Clarence B. ‗Chief Seattle and Angeline,‘ Washington Historical Quarterly Vol. 22, No. 
4, (1931). 
Baumeister, Roy F. and Mark R.Leary. ‗Doing Narrative Literature Reviews.‘ Review of General 
Psychology Vol 1, No. 3, (1997), pp. 311-320. 
Becker, Howard S. The Epistemology of Qualitative Research. University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1996. 
Belnap, N.D. ‗On Rigorous Definitions.‘ Philosophical Studies No. 72, (2-3) (1993). 
Bluhm, R. K. ‗Military Power: Land Warfare in Theory and Practice,‘ ed. by Brian Reid Holden, 
Journal of Military History. Vol, 63, No. 1, 1999. 
Bogan, Jim and Jim Woodward. ‗Saving the Phenomena.‘ Philosophical Review Vol.97, No. 3, 
(1988). 
Borchard, Edwin M. ‗The Attorney General's Opinion on the Exchange of Destroyers for Naval 
Bases,‘ American Journal of International Law, Vol: 34 (October 1940), pp. 690-697. 
Boyce, Barry C. ‗Whither Vincibility?‘ in introductory notes to Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. 
and ed. by Denma Translation Group. Shambala Publications, Boston, 2002. 
Brodie, Bernard. ‗Unlimited Weapons and Limited War,‘ The Reporter No. 9, November 18, 
(1954). 
Buscher,  Frank M. ‗Kurt Schumacher, German Social Democracy and the Punishment of Nazi 
Crimes,‘ Holocaust and Genocide Studies Vol. 5, No. 3 (1990), pp. 261-273. 
Clausewitz, Carl Von. ‗Uber das Leben und dem Charakter von Schanhorst.‘ Historische-
Politische Zeitschrift. Berlin, (1832) 
Cohen, Elliot. A. ‗The Politics of Victory-Richard Lowry, Supreme Command: Soldiers, 
Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime.‘ National Review No. 54, Bristol Connecticut 
(2002). 
Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. ‗Greed and Grievance in Civil War,‘ Oxford University, Centre 
for the Study of African Economies, Working Paper 2002-01. 
Doenecke, Justus D. ‗Edwin M. Borchard, John Bassett Moore, and Opposition to American 
Intervention in World War II,‘ Journal of Libertarian Studies Vol. VI, No. 1 (1982), pp. 
17-18. 
Bibliography 
~334~ 
Duplass, James A. ‗Charts, Graphs, and Diagrams: An Approach for Social Studies Teachers.‘ 
Social Studies Vol. 87, Issue 1 (1996). 
Ells, Mark D. Van, ‗Echoes of War: A Thousand Years of Military History in Popular Culture.‘ 
Journal of Popular Culture Vol. 37, (2004). 
Epstein, S, R Pacini, V Denes-Raj and H Heier. ‗Individual differences in Intuitive-Experiential 
and Analytical-Rational thinking styles.‘ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
71(2), (1996). 
Evera, Stephen Van. ‗Hypotheses on Nationalism and War.‘ International Security No. 18, 
(1998). 
Fearon, James D. ‗Rationalist Explanations for War.‘  International Organization 49(3) (1995), 
pp. 379-414. 
____, ‗Signalling Foreign Policy Interests.‘ Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41 (1997), pp. 68-90. 
Filson, Darren and Suzanne Werner, ‗A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the 
Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War,‘ Draft Working Paper, Claremont College, 2001-
02. 
Flyvbjerg, Bent. ‗Five Misunderstandings About Case Study Research.‘ Qualitative Inquiry Vol. 
12, No. 2, (April 2006), pp. 219 – 245. 
Foster, Gregory D. ‗A Conceptual Foundation for a Theory of Strategy.‘ The Washington 
Quarterly, Winter, 1990: pp. 43-59. 
Gandhi, Rajmohan. ‗War, Peace and Hinduism.‘ The Hindu, Sunday, 26 May, 2002. 
Garofano, J. ‗Tragedy or Choice in Vietnam? Learning to Think Outside the Archival Box.‘ 
International Security. No 26, (2002). 
Gheciu, Alexandra. ‗The Changing Character of War,‘ 
http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:VjAIBp9_V3wJ:ccw.politics.ox.ac.uk/material/M
T04/What_is_War_Report_23-11-
04.pdf+military+victory+filetype:pdf&hl=en&lr=lang_en&client=firefox-a 
Gray, Colin S. ‗How Has War Changed since the End of the Cold War?‘ Parameters Vol. 35(1), 
(2005). 
Hembree, R., ‗Experiments and relational studies in problem solving: A meta-analysis.‘ Journal 
for research in mathematics education Vol. 23(3), (1992). 
Howard, Michael. ‗The Use and Abuse of History,‘ Parameters: Journal of the US Army War 
College, Vol XI, No. 1, pp. 9-14. 
Huntington, Samuel P. ‗The Clash of Civilizations?‘ Foreign Affairs, Summer (1993). 
Jackson, Bruce. ‗Media and War: Bringing it all back home, Keynote address at the "Media and 
War" symposium, University at Buffalo, 17-18 November, 2003.  
Johnson, Dominic and Dominic Tierney. ‗Wars of Perception.‘ New York Times 28 November 
2006.  
____. ‗Essence of Victory: Winning and Losing International Crises.‘ Security Studies Vol. 13, 
No. 2, (October 2004). 
Keshavarz,  H. M. ‗Forms of address in post-revolutionary Iranian Persian: a sociolinguistic 
Bibliography 
~335~ 
analysis‘, Language in Society No. 17, 1988, pp. 565-575 
Kurth, James, ‗The American Way of Victory.‘ The National Interest, Summer (2000). 
Lebow, R. N. ‗Domestic Politics and the Cuban Missile Crisis.‘ Diplomatic History No. 14 
(1990). 
Little, Charles E. ‗The Authenticity and Form of Cato's Saying ―Carthago Delenda Est‖‘, 
Classical Journal , No. 29  (1934), pp. 429-435. 
Mandel, Robert. ‗Reassessing Victory in Warfare.‘ Armed Forces and Society Vol 33, (2007).  
Maoz, Zeev and Bruce Russett. ‗Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-
1986.‘  American Political Science Review Vol. 87, No. 3, (1993). 
Matthew Stibbe, ‗The Fischer controversy over German war aims in the first world war and its 
reception by East German historians, 1961–1989,‘ The Historical Journal. Vol. 3, No. 46, 
(2003), pp, 649-688.   
McKelvey R. and T. Palfrey, ‗Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games‘, 
Experimental Economics, 1-1998, pp.  9-41. 
Pace, Sharon. ‗The Original Torah: The Political Intent of the Bible's Writers.‘ Theological 
Studies Vol. 65, (2004). 
Pfaff, William. ‗Dangers of Victory: Resisting the Demand to Widen the War.‘ Commonwealth, 7 
December 2001. 
Polman, D. ‗Meaning of Victory May Mean Many Things.‘ Tribune News Service, 17 September, 
2001. 
Powell, Robert. ‗Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory.‘ American 
Political Science Review No. 85 (1991). pp. 1303-1320. 
Reiter, Dan. ‗Exploring the Bargaining Model of War,‘ Perspectives on Politics 1:2003, pp. 27-
43. 
Rosati, Jerel A. ‗The Power of Human Cognition in the Study of World Politics,‘ International 
Studies Review Vol 2, (2001).  
Scales Jr., Major General Robert H. ‗Achieving Victory by Avoiding Defeat.‘ JFQ, 
Autumn/Winter 1999–2000. 
Schelling, Thomas C. ‗Bargaining, Communication and Limited War.‘ Journal of Conflict 
Resolution March 1957. 
Shah, Nafisa. ‗Honour killings: Code of dishonour.‘ The Review No 19, 25 November 1998. 
Sloman, S. A. ‗The empirical case for two systems of reasoning.‘ Psychological Bulletin, 119(1), 
(1996). 
Stevenson, Charles L. ‗Persuasive Definitions,‘ Mind Vol. 47, No. 187 (July 1938). 
Tierney, Dominic. ‗Essence of Victory: Winning and Losing International Crises,‘ Security 
Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2 (October 2004). 
Tiushkevich, Stepan A. ‗Military Leaders of the GPW: The Art of Victory - Great Patriotic War 
of 1941-1945,‘ Military Thought, May (2001), pp. 70-76 
Bibliography 
~336~ 
Toulman, E. C. ‗Cognitive maps in rats and men,‘ Psychological Review, No.55 (4). 
Walt, Stephen M. ‗The Relationship Between Theory And Policy In International Relations,‘ 
Annual Review of Political Science, June 2005, Vol. 8. 
Widder, Major General Werner. ‗Auftragstaktic and Innerfuehrung: Trademark of German 
Leadership.‘ Military Review 3:9, (2002). 
Woodward, Jim. ‗Data and Phenomena,‘ Syntheses, Vol.79, No. 3, (1989). 
INTERNET SOURCES 
A Military History Timeline of War and Conflict Across the Globe - 3000 B.C. to A.D. 1999.‘ 
The War Scholar. http://www.warscholar.com/index.html. 
About.com, quotations.  http://www.quotations.about.com/cs/ inspirationalquotes 
/a/victory2.htm    
Acharya, Amitaz and Barry Buzan. ‗Why is there no non-Western IR theory: reflections on and 
from Asia‘, Oxford Journals on Line.  http://irap.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/ 
reprint/lcm011v1. 
Abraham Lincoln, ‗The Gettysburg Address‘, The History Place. 
http://www.historyplace.com/speeches/gettysburg.htm,.  
Abu Talib, Ali Ibn. Peak of Eloquence, http://www.nahjulbalagha.org/. 
Amin, ‗Hussein Abdulwaheed. ‗The Origins of the Sunni/Shia split in Islam.‘ 
http://www.islamfortoday.com/shia.htm, 
Angstrom, Jan, ‗The meaning of victory in a war on terrorism.‘ http://64.233.161.104/ 
search?q=cache:4Pp3ixXdtZ8J:www.kcl.ac.uk /depsta/wsg/research/paper-
angstrom.pdf+meaning+of+victory&hl=en&lr= lang_ en&client=firefox-a.  
Anonymous, Country Data, Internet, http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-9800.html  
Barnes and Noble. http://middleast.about.com/od/lebanon/a/ me070918.htm  
Berg-Andersson, Richard E. ‗HOLD ON THERE!!! Assessing the Meaning of Victory in 
Iraq,‘ Research and Commentary, The Green Papers Commentary, April 2003. 
http://www.thegreenpapers.com/PCom/?20030412-0. 
Beste, Steve Den, ‗Tour De Force: Nature of Present Conflict‘, TML Lutas Comments, 
http://www.denbeste.nu/cd_log_entries/2003/11/TotalWar.shtml.  
Blanchard, Christopher M. ‗Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology‘, CRS Report for 
Congress, updated July 9, 2007. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32759.pdf. 
British Library (The). ‗Asia, Pacific and Affric Collection‘, The World’s Knowledge.   
http://web.archive.org/web/20071225035825/http://www.bl.uk/collections/afghan/afgha
nglossary.html. 
Boeree, C. George. ‗Buddhist Morality‘, in Introduction to Buddhism, Shippensburg University, 
http://www.ship.edu/%7Ecgboeree/buddhamorals.html.  
Bokhari, Col. E. A. S. ‗October 1973 War & Lessons for the Arabs,‘ defence Journal (online). 
http://www.defencejournal.com/nov98/warlessonsarabs.htm, 
Bower, Bruce. ‗Blood and Sacrifice,‘ Science News CBS Interactive Business Network, June 7, 
Bibliography 
~337~ 
1986, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1200/is_v129/ai_4271453/. 
Channel Four. http://www.channel4.com/culture/microsites/K/karbala/his_massacre.html 
Churchill, Sir Winston. ‗Prime Minister‘s Inaugural Address to the House of Commons,‗ 
London, 13 May 1940, internet, 
www.winstonchurchill.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=391, 
Clausewitz, Carl Von. On War  (Original German Text), http://www.clausewitz.com/ 
CWZHOME  /VomKriege/VKTOC.htm.  
Cicero, M. T. Philippics: The Orations of Marcus Tullius Cicero, trans. C. D. Yonge, (George 
Bell & Sons, London, 1903).  http://classics.mit.edu/Cicero/ cic.phil.html. 
Cohen, Eliot A. ‗When is Victory Complete‘, WASHINGTON POST, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A53947-2004Sep1_2.html.  
 
Cold War Terminology, http://people.ku.edu/~cweaver/PDFs/170Spring2004/ 
ColdWarTerms.pdf.  
Correlates of War project (COW), http://www.correlatesofwar.org/, dataset MID v3.1. 
Correll, John T. ‗The Purpose of War‘, Air Force – A Journal of the Airforce Association, 
August 2001, Vol. 84, No. 8,  http://www.afa.org/magazine/aug2001/ 08edit01_ 
print.html .  
Daniel Easington, ‗Warfare and the Classical World.‘ Suit101.com, 
http://www.suite101.com/content/classical-warfare-a190653 
Devost, Matthew G., Houghton, Brian K., and Pollard, Neal A., ‗Information Terrorism: Can 
You Trust Your Toaster?‘, Sun Tzu’s Art of War in Information Warfare, (National 
Defence University: Institute for National Strategic Studies, October 2002), 
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/siws/cont.html. 
Dictionary Net. http://www.dictionary.net/victory  
Dougan, James C. ‗The Bloody Bridge,‘(2004). Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth.   
http://www-cgsc.army.mil/csi/ research /writing/ Papers%20C600/CommendDugan.asp. 
Echevarria, A. J. ‗An American way of war or way of battle?‘  
http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:h5yoPeA0FIwJ:www.strategicstudiesinstitute.ar
my.mil /newsletter/opeds/2004Jan.pdf+military+victory+filetype:pdf&hl= 
en&lr=lang_en&client=firefox-a.  
Fast, William R. ‗Knowledge Strategies: Balancing Ends, Ways, and Means In The Information 
Age‘, Sun Tzu Art of War in Information Warfare. National Defence University. 
Institute of National Strategic Studies. http://www.ndu.edu/inss/siws/ch1.html.  
Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress Country Studies Series. 
http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-9800.html. 
Feminia, Nora. ‗Brinksmanship Decision-Making and Hidden Grief: The Case of Argentina, 
1982,‘ United States Institute of Peace sponsorship, 1992, http://www.falklands-
malvinas.com/brink.htm.  
Fenzel, John, ‗Boyd‘s OODA Loop Model,‘ 
Bibliography 
~338~ 
http://johnfenzel.typepad.com/john_fenzels_blog/2008/03/john-boyds-ooda.html,  
Geetha, The Geeta Tridandi, Internet, http://hinduwebsite.com/ sacredscripts/rigintro.htm.  
Gandhi, Rajmohan. ‗War, Peace and Hinduism,‘ The Hindu Sun, 26 May, 2002, op. ed. 
http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/mag/ 2002/05/26/stories/2002052600150400.htm. 
Gheciu, Alexandra. ‗The Changing Character of War‘, 
http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:VjAIBp9_V3wJ:ccw.politics.ox.ac.uk/material/M
T04/What_is_War_Report_23-1104.pdf+military+victory+filetype 
:pdf&hl=en&lr=lang_en&client=firefox-a .  
Cindy S. Gillespie, ‗Reading graphic displays: What teachers should know‘, Journal of Reading,  
Vol. 36, No. 5, February 1993,  pp. 350 – 354, this p. 350. 
http://www.jstor.org/pss/40033324. 
Gray, Colin S. ‗What is War?‘, Excerpts of talk delivered as part of the Leverhume Programme 
on the Changing Character of War, Oxford, 24 Feb 2004.   
http://ccw.politics.ox.ac.uk/events/archives/ht04_gray.pdf.  
Haig, BrianD. ‗Grounded Theory as Scientific Method‘, in Scientific Method, Alven Neiman 
edit., (PES Publications Office-University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 1995), 
http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/eps/PES-Yearbook/default.asp. 
Harris, Jerry and Carl Davidson. ‗The Cybernetic Revolution and the Crisis of Capitalism‘, The 
Chicago Third Wave Study Group, Internet, http://www.bradley.edu/las/soc/syl/391/ 
papers/cyb _revo.html.  
Heinz, Richard. ‗World Civilisations‘, Washington State University, http://www.wsu. 
edu:8080/~dee/WORLD.HTM. 
Historylearningsite.co.uk, http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk. 
Hobson, John A. Imperialism: A Study.  
http://www.marxists.org/archive/hobson/1902/imperialism/index.htm. 
Howard, Michael. ‗War Against Terrorism‘, RUSI Conference Address, RUSI, 30 October 
2001, website of Westmoreland General Meeting, Preparing for Peace, 
http://www.preparingforpeace.org/howard.htm.  
The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  http://www.iep.utm.edu/d/dummett.htm. 
Irfi, Internet,  http://www.irfi.org/articles/articles_201_250/schisms_and_heterodoxy_ 
among_mus.htm,     
Islamic Western Calendar Converter, http://www.phys.uu.nl/~vgent/islam/ islam_tabcal.htm     
Ithaca.edu. ‗Cognitive Dissonance.‘  http://www.ithaca.edu/faculty/stephens/cdback.html, 
Jane’s Missiles and Rockets. http://jmr.janes.com/public/jmr/index.shtml.      
Jelinek, Pauline, ‗Victory in Terror War has Many Meanings‘, AP Online, 
http://www.highbeam.com/library/doc0.asp?DOCID=1P1:98608045&num=1&ctrlInfo= 
Round18%3AMode18c%3ASR%3AResult&ao=&FreePremium=BOTH  
Jackson, Andrew C. ‗The Peninsular War.‘http://www.peninsularwar.org/penwar_e.htm, 
John. F. Kennedy, ‗News Conference‘, 21 Apr1961, in Public Papers of Presidents of U.S.¸ p. 
Bibliography 
~339~ 
312. Also available on line,  Internet, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/pubpapers/index.html. 
Another version is ‗Victory has a hundred fathers, and no one acknowledges a failure.‘, 
G. Ciano,  Diary 1942 -1946, Vol II, p. 196. 
Jomini, Baron Henri de. The Art of War. Trans. G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill. The 
Gutenburg Project, http://www.gutenburg.org/files/13549/13549-h.htm#article_i. 
Jonson, Ian. Lecture delivered in Liberal Studies, Seminar on The Prince, February 2002, 
http://records.viu.ca/~Johnstoi/introser/machiavelli.htm  
Kapitan, Tomis, ‗Peirce and the Autonomy of Abductive Reasoning,‘ http://sun.soci. niu.edu /~ 
phildept/Kapitan/abduction.html.  
Kent, Emerson. ‗History for the Relaxed Historians‘. 
www.emersonkent.com/russian_campaign.htm, 
Kipling, Rudyard. ‗White Man‘s Burden‘, http://www.online-literature.com/kipling/922/.   
Klarevas, Louis. The ‘Essential Domino’ of Military Operations: American Public Opinion and 
the Use of Force, Blackwell Synergy, http://www3.interscience.wiley.com 
/journal/118929804/abstract?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0  
Krieger, D. ‗Day By Day we are Becoming more Hated, http://www.counterpunch.org/krieger 
04042003.html.  
Landry, Peter. ‗Biographies‘, http://www.blupete.com/Literature /Biographies 
/Philosophy/Malthus.htm. 
Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich. ‗Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism‘  
http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/. 
Lewis, Brian C. ‗Information Warfare‘, federation of American Scientists, 
2004,http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/snyder/infowarfare.htm.  
Malthus, Thomas Robert A Summary View of the Principle of Population (1830), 
http://www.creativequotations.com/one/1355.htm. 
Macdonald,  Charles B. ‗Grand Strategy and the Washington High Command,‘ in American 
Military History, (United States Army, Carlisle, No Date), Chapter 21, 
http://www.history.army.mil/books/amh/amh-21.htm, 
Mikhnaf, Abi, Ketab Maktal Al Huseyn.  http://www.sicm.org.uk/knowledge/ 
Kitab%20Maqtal%20al-Husayn.pdf.   
Møller, Bjørn. ‗Ethnic Conflict and Postmodern Warfare: What Is the Problem? What Could Be 
Done?‘ http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/sites/copri.html.   
Mowbray, James A. ‗A Priner of Strategy Analysis,‘ Military Theory Series, US Air War 
College, Internet, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/readings/mowbray 
/mowbmodl.htm. 
Nafziger, George, ‗Rear services and foraging in the 1812 campaign: Reasons of Napoleon's 
defeat,‘  http://genstab.ru/nap_sup_1812.htm.  
Nation Master Encyclopaedia,  http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/. 
Nikitina, O and  Zolotov, A. ‗The Meaning of Victory,‘ http://www.russiaprofile.org/ 
politics/2005/5/6/106.wbp.  
Bibliography 
~340~ 
O'Brien, Micheal J. ‗Al Qaeda‘s Victory‘, The Wednesday Report: Canada’s Aerospace Defence 
Weekly, Vol. 18, No. 14, March 31, (2004), 
http://www.thewednesdayreport.com/twr/twr14v18-Al-Qaeda.htm 
Offley, Ed. ‗Col. John Boyd: The Most Influential Unknown Hero,‘ Defence Watch, 
http://www.sftt.org/dwa/2003/1/1/ 2.html 
US Department of Defence (DOD), DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Internet, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/. 
US Air War College, ‗John Boyd and the OODA Loop.‘ Military Theory, Theorists and 
Strategy.  http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-thry.htm#boyd. 
US Department of the Army, Operations Other Than War, Joint Pub 3-07, 1995, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/ new_pubs/jp3_07.pdf .  
Oxford English Dictionary: The Definitive Record of the English Language, 
http://www.oed.com/perception.  
Quammen, David. ‗Was Darwin Wrong‘, National Geographic Magazine, Nov: 2004, 
http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/ngm/0411/feature1 /index.html.  
Reconstructionist Diverei Torah, http://www.jrf.org/recondt/noah_ waskow.html.  
Reza, Imam Ali. ‗Sayings of Imam Reza.‘  
http://www.imamreza.net/eng/imamreza.php?print=6466, 
Russia in World War II, 2WorldWar2.com, ‗Russia in World War 2, ‘ 
http://www.2worldwar2.com/russia.htm, 
SCISM, http://www.sicm.org.uk/knowledge/Kitab%20Maqtal%20al-Husayn.pdf  
Simran Khurana, about .com, ‗Quotes on Victory: A Collection of Quotes on Victory.‘ 
http://www.quotations.about.com/cs/ inspirationalquotes/a/victory2.htm     
Smith, Alastair and Allan Stam. ‗Domestic Political Institutions and a Bargaining Model of 
War‘,  paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, Philadelphia, Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, Aug 27, 2003, 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p64476_index.html.  
Social Research Methods Net, ‗Philosophy of Research,‘ Research methods Knowledge Base.  
http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/positvsm.php 
Stanford Encyloprdia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-theory/. 
Trevor Stanley, ‗Understanding the Origins of Wahhabism and Salafism‘, The Jamestown 
Foundation. 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=528&tx_tt
news%5BbackPid%5D=180&no_cache=1,  
Stroble, James A. ‗Buddhism and War: A Study of the Status of Violence in Early Buddhism‘, 
University of Hawai, Manoa, 1991, 
http://www2.hawaii.edu/~stroble/BUDDWAR.HTM.  
Suite101.com, ‗Barry Vale, Lyndon Johnson and the Tet Offensive: Media Coverage of Vietnam 
Fuelled Anti-War Protests in US‘, internet,  http://modern-us-
history.suite101.com/article.cfm/a_military_victory_but_a_political_defeat#ixzz0FHvn
Bibliography 
~341~ 
7oGW&A, accessed 6 May 2009 
Thagard, Paul and Shelley, Cameron, ‗Abductive reasoning: Logic, visual thinking, and 
coherence,‘  Waterloo, Ontario: Philosophy Department, University of Waterloo, 1997, 
http://cogsci.uwaterloo.ca/Articles/Pages/%7FAbductive.html  
The Bible, King James Bible, http://mindprod.com/kjv/index.html  
The Centre for Public Integrity, International Consortium for Investigative Journalism ICIJ, 
http://projects.publicintegrity.org/iranintelligence/Iran%20(D) 
/html/iran/MilitaryCulture / Civic%20Values%20and%20Military%20Culture.html.  
The Economist.com. http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory .cfm?story_id=11075147  
The First World War, http://www.firstworldwar.com/features/plans.htm. 
The Holy Bible. English Standard Version, Good News Publishers, 
http://bibleresources.bible.com/. 
The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  Eds. James Fieser and Bradley Dowden, 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/.  
The Koran. Electronic Text Centre, University of Virginia,  
http://www.jrf.org/recondt/noah_waskow.html. 
The Koran. Al Fatha (Victory), http://www.qidas.co.uk/Quran /Quran/48.html.  
The New World Encyclopaedia. 
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Battle_of_Karbala. 
The Torah. on-line: A Compilation of Internet Torah Shirum, Internet, http://www. 
wsat.org/drusha/mikeitz.pdf.  
The Torah. Chabad Org, Judaism 101, Internet, http://www.chabad.org/library/ 
article.asp?AID=145402.  
The Torah. Parashah,, Internet,  http://www.torah.org/hamaayan/5762.shoftim.html . 
 The War Scholar. A Military History Timeline of War and Conflict Across the Globe - 3000 
B.C. to A.D. 1999‘, http://www.warscholar.com/index.html. 
Think Quest. Oracle Education Foundation, ‗The Cuban Missile Crisis: Fourteen Days in 
October‘, The Crisis Centre, Internet,  
http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/days/timeline.html. 
Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian Wars. Trans. T. Hobbes. Vol I. Richards Printers, 
London, 1839, http://oll.libertyfund.org/Texts/. 
Torchim, William M. K. ‗Design‘, in Research Methods Knowledge Base, 
http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/design.htm.  
Tristam, Pierre. ‗The 2006 Lebanon War: Israel and Hezbollah Square Off.  About.com. 
http://middleeast.about.com/od/lebanon/a/ me070918.htm, accessed 21 June 2007. 
Tuft, Edward, R., Minard‘s Map. http://www.edwardtufte.com/tufte/minard-obit. 
United States. Strategy.  MCDP, 1-1. Washington, D.C., U.S. Marine Corps, 1998. 
http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS24785.  
Bibliography 
~342~ 
University of Warwick, ‗A guide to Definitions‘,  http://www2.warwick.ac.uk /fac/soc/ 
philosophy/staff/longworth/definitions.pdf .   
Webster Dictionary,  http://www.webster-dictionary.org/definition/proxy% 20war. 
Weisiger, Alex. ‗Victory Without Peace: Conquest, Insurgency, and War Termination‘, Paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer 
House Hotel, Chicago, April 2007, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/ 
p198347_index.html. 
Weinbaum, Marvin G. ‗Egypt‘s Infitah and the Politics of US Economic Assistance‘, Middle 
Eastern Studies, Vol 21, No. 2(Apr., 1985), pp. 206 – 222. 
Wikipedia Online Encyclopaedia, http://www.wikipedia.org.    
World War 2 wwii.com, ‗World War 2: Diplomatic History - Allied War Aims and Policies for 
Peace 1943 to 1945.‘ http://worldwar2-wwii.com/14c-world-war-2-wwii-Diplomatic-
History-allies-peace-policies.htm, 
Zimm, A. ‗A Causal Model of Warfare‘, http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache: 
wdNXP36NTsUJ:usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/English/ 
JanFeb01/zimm.pdf+paradigms+of+victory+filetypepdf&hl=en&lr=lang_en&client=fir
efox-a.   
 
Appendix A – Methodology 
 
~A - 1~ 
APPENDIX A – METHODOLOGY 
RESEARCH METHODS AND METHODOLOGY 
An overview of the human quest for knowledge and the scientific approaches developed 
towards its attainment is considered essential for any meaningful research. This is a vast 
subject even when narrowed down to a study of areas relevant to this study and therefore 
what follows is only summary of a much wider body of knowledge. This research is 
qualitative. The term qualitative research is applied variously in different fields. In the 
social sciences, qualitative research provides an approach for understanding the world and 
to construct meaning out of experiences. Epistemologically qualitative methods are not 
intended to invent a viewpoint; instead, they only attribute ideas in order that we can truly 
understand motives, reasons and actions.
1
 
From a Philosophical perspective, this thesis deals with theorising the phenomenon of 
victory. Subjectively, this implies the ‗abductive‘2 epitome of victory with a perspective 
on both the academic and the practitioner‘s context to be also synthesised towards 
developing a comprehensive theory. A Grounded Theory approach was adopted as it 
provided the necessary tools to address, in varying degrees of application, the complete 
context of the study.   
GROUNDED THEORY 
Grounded Theory is a qualitative methodology which derives its name from the practice 
of generating theory from research which is ‗grounded‘ in data. It was formally 
introduced in 1967 by the sociologists Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss in The 
Discovery of Grounded Theory
3
. Subsequent developments – particularly after Glaser and 
Strauss started working independently – yielded two distinct theories. Whereas many of 
the central components the theory as outlined in The Discovery (including constant 
comparison, theoretical sampling, coding procedures), survived, many subsequent 
publications by Glaser and Strauss began to reflect important differences in how these 
scholars envisioned grounded theory and its use. With the schism in theory, two 
somewhat distinct methodologies have evolved; both based on the original 1967 work and 
each with its own underlying epistemology and attendant properties.
4
 This inquiry is not a 
classical manifestation of either methodologies but adopts precepts of both while being 
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closer to Glaser‘s approach as set out in Basis of Grounded Theory Analysis.5 This is 
because for Glaser‘s version appeared to be considerably more flexible and adaptable, 
being guided primarily by informants and their socially-constructed realities.
6
  
HOW GROUNDED THEORY WORKS 
A summary of the salient features of grounded theory is presented below: 
 Grounded theory is, and has been applied in this thesis as a general method of 
comparative analysis.
7
  
 It is designed for handling, manipulating and interoperating any kind or mix of 
data, is multivariate, readily modifiable and particularly useful with qualitative 
data.
8
 
 The methodology is particularly useful for analysis linked with data collection that 
uses a systematically applied set of methods to generate an inductive theory about 
a substantive area.
9
  
 The methodology is repetitive and, therefore, self-corrective.10 
 The theories developed through the methodology can be advanced towards 
conceptualizing an integrated set of hypotheses.
11
 
 The theory itself is based on a concept-indicator model, which directs the 
conceptual coding of a set of empirical indicators.
12 
 Grounded theory uses a three level approach: the first level is the data; the second 
level perspective is the conceptualization of the data into categories and their 
properties and the third level is the conceptual perspective analysis.
13
 
 The methodology builds theory from data, hence the name grounded theory, and is 
then illustrated by characteristic examples of data. It is useable for descriptive (or 
narrative) and empirical data. 
14
 
Grounded theory uses the classical methods of logical reasoning namely induction, 
deduction and the more recent addition, ‗abduction‘15.  However, for validation, the 
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internal processes of grounded theory have been supplemented by methods proposed by 
Liz Spencer et. al. in Quality in Qualitative Research.
16
  
The use of narratives as data lends itself to a degree of philosophical scepticism but 
nonetheless presents valuable input to any discourse on the human condition as Dr. David 
Carr of the University of Illinois, points out: ‗it reflects widespread contemporary 
resistance to reductionist, empiricist and naïve realist conceptions of the relationship of 
knowledge to the world‘17 On its utility for research, despite the lack of scientific scrutiny 
of such text, he asserts: 
 [I]t is a timely and welcome reminder that human discourse can be 
meaningful in ways not reducible to the empirical data of natural or other 
science. It also reflects, however, the deep significance for personal and social 
self-understanding — not least for moral agency and identity — of stories of 
moral or other human agency: humans perhaps more readily conceive 
themselves as actors in the dramas of life, than as passively manipulated 
processes of blind material forces.
18
 
DATA PROTOCOLS IN GROUNDED THEORY 
At the heart of grounded theory analysis is the coding process which consists of three 
types: open, axial, and selective.  
OPEN CODING 
This is the initial process which involves breaking down, analysis, comparison, and 
categorization of data. In open coding, incidents or events are labelled and grouped 
together via constant comparison to form categories and properties.  
AXIAL CODING 
Axially labelled data represents the delineation of hypothetical relationships between 
categories and subcategories. 
SELECTIVE CODING  
This is the process by which categories are related to the core category ultimately 
becoming the basis for the grounded theory. 
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GROUNDED THEORY AND LOGICAL REASONING 
Reasoning is defined by the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy as ‗any process of drawing 
a conclusion from a set of premises.‘ 19 It is a process of using existing knowledge to 
construct explanations, draw new or additional conclusions or make predictions. 
Qualitative research relies heavily on the inductive logic which aims at observing specific 
cases to arrive at a general conclusion. Other methods of reasoning are the deductive and 
abductive approaches. All three approaches are used in this research. The most suited 
approach consistent with the broader methodological framework, enabled through the use 
of grounded theory, is adopted. For clarity, a brief note on methods adopted is included 
wherever necessary.  The three approaches are succinctly explained below: 
DEDUCTIVE, INDUCTIVE AND ABDUCTIVE REASONING  
INDUCTIVE REASONING 
Inductive reasoning moves from the specific to the general; that is to say, from a survey 
of specific observations typically limited or controlled in scope, a general case or 
conclusion is induced. The generalized conclusion represents something that is likely, but 
not certain. The quality of the conclusion is determined by the quality and accuracy of the 
accumulated evidence. Inductive method involves gathering evidence, seeking patterns, 
and forming a hypothesis or theory to explain what is seen. It is usually not possible to 
guarantee that all the facts and possible evidence has been gathered, conclusions arrived 
at through the inductive process are not logical necessities. The fact that there may exist 
further unobserved evidence does not invalidate a hypothesis nor do conclusions arrived 
at even if all possible evidence was gathered.  
Scientific research avoids language of absolutes and instead ‗uses more cautious 
language, the language of inductively reached, probable conclusions. Because inductive 
conclusions are not logical necessities, inductive arguments are not simply true. Rather, 
they are cogent: that is, the evidence seems complete, relevant, and generally convincing, 
and the conclusion is therefore probably true. Nor are inductive arguments simply false; 
rather, they are not cogent.‘20 While inductive reasoning cannot yield an absolutely 
certain conclusion, it nonetheless amplifies knowledge and also has the ability to makes 
predictions about future. 
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DEDUCTIVE REASONING 
Essentially the opposite of the inductive process, deductive reasoning starts with a general 
rule and proceeds to a specific conclusion. Deductive reasoning, a process commonly 
used in hard sciences, can guarantee absolute conclusions that is to say, if the original 
assertions are true, then the conclusion must also be true. For example: 
If x=5 and y=3 then x+y=8 
In social sciences, formal, symbolic logic uses a language that looks rather like the math 
equality above, complete with its own operators and syntax. For example:  
Threat = capability + intent 
More complex equations and functional relationships exist. Deductive reasoning also uses 
syllogism (the plain-English version of a mathematical equality) that allows mathematical 
symbols and logical operators to be expressed in ordinary language to depict relationship 
between variables, constants and results.  
ABDUCTIVE REASONING 
Abductive reasoning is creative in character. It allows for the best solution to be reached 
in the absence of sufficient evidence. It is in many ways speculative but the speculations 
are grounded in a logical process of assessment and that typically begins with an 
incomplete set of observations and proceeds to the likeliest possible explanation. As a 
process, it may involve a combination of partial induction and information starved 
deductions. ‗While cogent inductive reasoning requires that the evidence that might shed 
light on the subject be fairly complete, whether positive or negative, abductive reasoning 
is characterized by lack of completeness, either in the evidence, or in the explanation, or 
both.... Einstein's work, for example, was not just inductive and deductive, but involved a 
creative leap of imagination and visualization that scarcely seemed warranted by the mere 
observation of moving trains and falling elevators.  The abductive process can be 
creative, intuitive, and even revolutionary.
21
 
HISTORIOGRAPHY 
History is ―a record of all that the senses of man can perceive and all that the intellect of 
man can apprehend.‖22 Historiography is the method of doing historical research or 
gathering and analysing historical evidence. There are four types of historical evidence: 
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primary sources, secondary sources, running records, and recollections. Historians rely 
mostly on primary sources which are also called archival data because they are kept in 
museums, archives, libraries, or private collections. Emphasis is given to the written word 
on paper, although modern historiography can involve any medium. Secondary sources 
are the work of other historians writing history. Running records are documentaries 
maintained by private or non-profit organizations. Recollections are autobiographies, 
memoirs, or oral histories. Archival research, which is the most common, involves long 
hours of sifting through dusty old papers, yet inspection of untouched documents can 
yield surprising new facts, connections, or ideas. Historiographers are careful to check 
and double-check their sources of information, and this lends a good deal of validity and 
reliability to their conclusions. Inferences about intent, motive, and character are 
common, with the understanding of appropriateness to the context of the time period. 
Historical-comparative researchers who do historiography often have to make even more 
disclaimers about meanings in context, such as how they avoided western bias. 
SECONDARY ANALYSIS 
Secondary Analysis is the reanalysis of data that was originally compiled by another 
researcher for other purposes than the one the present researcher intends to use it for. 
Often, secondary analysis will involve adding an additional variable to an existing 
dataset. This variable will be something that the researcher collects on their own, from 
another dataset, or from a common source of information. As such, in the context of 
grounded theory, this form of data lends its self to be axially coded. Secondary data 
analysis is only limited by the researcher's imagination. While the technique is mostly 
quantitative, limitations exist that often force such researchers to have some qualitative 
means of garnering information also. In such cases selective coding has been applied and 
to ensure an additional level of check, the qualitative part of the study is used as a validity 
check on the quantitative part. Where the results of one or more studies on the same issue 
yielded different or contradictory results a technique called meta-analysis has been 
applied. This is decidedly a quantitative method, but involves sorting and coding 
techniques more common to qualitative research. Meta-analysis is not an established 
technique in grounded theory and therefore its application has been restricted to 
components of this research that occur after theories and hypotheses have been 
developed. 
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NARRATIVE 
Narrative as form of data is essential in this inquiry. From a scientific perspective, the 
contents of religious scriptures which, on grounds of their theological origins, are not put 
to scientific scrutiny are in fact, narratives. As David Carr points out: 
 
 ―The term narrative is often given wide application, and — in circumstances 
of philosophical scepticism regarding the epistemic priority of any one 
narrative over another — human agency may appear to be indifferently 
inspired or guided by a variety of scientific, religious, aesthetic or other 
stories: in this light, evolutionary theory might be just as much a story by 
which people can morally or otherwise live, as the Bhagavad-Gita or Don 
Quixote.‖ It is also arguable, on the one hand, that extreme non-realist (for 
example postmodern) tendencies to regard scientific, religious, and literary 
narratives as on much the same epistemic level is far too indiscriminate: for 
one thing, if everything is story, then we might as well say that nothing is — 
since any and all significant contrast between what is and what is not story is 
thereby obliterated…. Recent social theory has certainly raised our awareness 
of the importance for human identity, agency and education of great religious 
and other narratives; perhaps it is now time to begin taking them seriously. 
But before they can be part of any meaningful education, they must also be 
properly understood. 
23
 
 
The treatment of narrative data has been forced to the selective category to allow for an 
additional level of correlation. Constructive treatment of such data is invariably 
accompanied by logical explanations of the extent and consequence of induced errors. 
Since this thesis deals with such data in the cultural domain, the scrutiny of empirical 
evidence from the cultural subset using secondary analysis allows for a more accurate and 
replicable method of theorising. It can therefore be claimed that in addition to the strength 
and value of narrative data as revealed through modern epistemological methods, the use 
of grounded theory adds a further level of scientific scrutiny. 
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LANGUAGE AND FRAMING OF DEFINITIONS 
SCIENCE OF DEFINITIONS 
A definition in classical thought was taken to be a statement of the essence of a thing. 
According to Aristotle an object's essential attributes form its ‗essential nature‘, and 
therefore a definition of the object must include these essential attributes.
24
 For the 
purpose of this study we are more concerned with the normative understanding in the 
nominal and real sense where the essence of the thing and not purely its nominal sense is 
required.
25
 The idea that a definition should state the essence of a thing led to the 
distinction between nominal and real essence, originating with Aristotle. In a passage 
from the Posterior Analytics,
26
 Aristotle states that we can know the meaning of a made-
up name for example 'goat stag', if such a thing existed, without knowing what the 
essential nature of the thing that the name would denote. ‗This led medieval logicians to 
distinguish between the so-called quid nominis or 'whatness of the name', and the 
underlying nature common to all the things it names, which they called the quid rei or 
'whatness of the thing'.‘ (Early modern philosophers like Locke used the corresponding 
English terms 'nominal essence' and 'real essence').
27
 
STIPULATIVE AND DESCRIPTIVE DEFINITION  
Definitions are either descriptive that is to say they give the meaning that a term bears in 
general or stipulative, a construction imposed upon a term for the purpose of its usage. A 
stipulative definition differ from a descriptive definition in that it allows for a new 
meaning to a term already in use or to a new term. By this analogy, this thesis seeks 
stipulative definition of victory since the term and the word already carry various 
meanings and explanations.  While a descriptive definition can be shown to be right or 
wrong by comparison to usage, a stipulative definition bears the authority and logic of its 
creator.  
C.L. Stevenson presented another form of stipulative definition which he referred to as a 
‗persuasive definition.‘  It differed from a stipulative definition when its explanation 
becomes paradoxical to the term‘s descriptive definition. Stevenson also notes that some 
definitions are 'legal' or 'coercive', whose object is to create or alter rights, duties or 
crimes.
28
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USE OF CONCEPT MAPS, FLOWCHARTS AND GRAPHICAL 
REPRESENTATIONS 
A picture tells a thousand words. Knowledge, relationships, processes and structures that 
can be graphically expressed do just that. Illustrative representation of knowledge serves 
as a powerful tool for explaining and learning. While some scholars criticize their 
academic value
29
 and also their ability to inform the general public, they are none the less 
a very useful supplement to narrative explanations. According to Duplass, a professor of 
philosophy at the University of South Florida, graphical representations have particular 
value and relevance to social science and for problem solving.
30
  
All processes, parent-child relationships of data and concepts can usually be expressed 
graphically either as flow charts, cognitive maps, diagrams, tables or graphs. This thesis 
uses the classification system developed by Gillespie. All graphical and tabular 
renderings are classified in to five groups:
31
 
1) Sequential: these include flow charts, time lines, organisational charts, and 
process charts. 
2) Qualitative: number lines, bar graphs, line graphs, pictographs, and pie charts. 
3) Maps: political, physical and spatial purpose maps. 
4) Diagrams: crosscutting, blue prints and machine drawings. 
5) Tables/charts: row by column matrices. 
   
FLOW CHART 
 
A flow chart provides a model for flow of information, material, activities and people 
through an environment or system. ‗The primary purpose of a flow chart is to identify the 
activities taking place within a system and to enable this information to be represented 
graphically‘32 
COGNITIVE MAPS 
Edward Chace Toulman, a behavioural scientist, is attributed with coining the term 
Cognitive Mapping.
33
  ‗Cognitive maps, mental maps, mind maps, cognitive models or 
mental models are a type of mental processing composed of a series of psychological 
transformations by which an individual can acquire, code, store, recall, and decode 
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information about the relative location and attributes of phenomena in their everyday or 
metaphorical spatial environment.‘34 
GRAPHS 
Graphs can be multidimensional and in qualitative research can represent an abstract as 
opposed to a finite scale. ‗Graphs are taken to be those graphic forms that illustrate 
relationships among variables at least one of which is continuous‘35 for example ‗time‘.   
CASE STUDIES 
A case study is ‗a research approach, situated between concrete data taking techniques 
and methodological paradigms.‘36 It is one of several ways of doing research whether it is 
social science related or even socially related. ‗It allows for a scientific analysis of 
historical events, actions and decisions using comparative frameworks to either reinforce 
an existing view or arrive at new conclusions. A corollary in hard sciences would be 
experiments and among the soft sciences,  surveys, multiple histories and analysis of 
archival information.‘37 
Bent Flyvbjerg  points out that ‗rather than using samples and following a rigid protocol 
to examine limited number of variables, case study methods involve an in-depth, 
longitudinal examination of a single instance or event: a case.‘ He opines that they 
provide a systematic way of looking at events, collecting data analysing information, and 
reporting the results. ‗As a result the researcher may gain a sharpened understanding of 
why the instance happened as it did, and what might become important to look at more 
extensively in future research. Case studies lend themselves to both generating and testing 
hypotheses.‘38 
The cases selected for this research are not random. They follow the principle of 
information oriented sampling. Based on a broader survey of history, the selected studies 
bring home a general case solution to particular aspects of the notion and definition of 
victory. Information oriented sampling for selection of case studies as opposed to random 
sampling is supported by experts because the typical or average case is often not the 
richest in information. Extreme or atypical cases reveal more information because they 
activate more basic mechanisms and more actors in the situation studied.  
Three types of information-oriented cases may be distinguished: 
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1) Critical cases (also called Crucial Case) are defined as a case that offers particularly 
compelling evidence for or against a proposition. Inferences from such cases can have 
strategic importance in relation to a general problem.
39
  
2) Paradigmatic cases (also called the general cases), one that serves as prototype or 
‗perfect‘ example.40 
3) Deviant Case (also called Extreme Case), that by general understanding of the topic, 
or common sense, represents a dependent variable that deviates from the expected 
outcome.
41
 
Wars and conflicts seldom present sharp lines that allow cases to be neatly classified into 
one of the above categories. Most conflicts tend to represent a mix of all three in different 
instances and contexts. Each case presented in Chapter V is labelled according to one or 
more of the above classifications as applicable or relevant to the scope of and the aspect 
under discussion. 
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